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This study analyzes the narrative accounts of political entrepreneurs describing the 
events surrounding the politicization of one of the most significant education initiatives of 
the past decade: the Common Core State Standards (CCSS). This topic was chosen as it 
offers a revealing case with which to investigate the politics of national education standards 
in the United States as well as the perceptions of subsystem participants regarding the 
existence and impact of “institutional constraints” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 9). Interview data are 
examined using an approach based on Polkinghorne’s (1995) paradigmatic analysis of 
narratives. The storied accounts of the political entrepreneurs are compared and contrasted 
regarding the political backlash against the CCSS, the factors that were perceived as 
impacting their entrepreneurship while working on the initiative, and their predictions for the 
future of state standards. The analysis also provides insights into the policy core beliefs 
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014) held by members of five groups of 
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 For more than three decades, a diverse combination of subsystem participants, 
including business entrepreneurs, civil rights entrepreneurs, educational conservatives, and 
members of organizations representing state elected officials (especially governors), played a 
prominent role in shaping the national education agenda. As detailed by Rhodes (2012) in his 
book An Education in Politics, actors from these four seemingly disparate overarching 
groups first converged during the 1980s around a set of ideas relating to the theme of 
excellence in education and worked, sometimes collaboratively, to advance a common vision 
for school reform.  
 Members of the organizations that supported the excellence agenda subscribed to a 
powerful narrative that framed the “underperformance” of education systems as being a root 
cause of a range of social and economic ills (McDonnell, 2005; Rhodes, 2012). Moreover, 
backers of this agenda identified rigorous and comprehensive school improvement reforms, 
aimed at raising academic requirements for all students, as offering the most rational policy 
solution (McDonnell, 2005). From an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) perspective 
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014), the excellence agenda appealed to 
multiple belief systems, thus providing a point of convergence for the policy core beliefs of 
different subsystem actors. 
 Through the development and dissemination of parallel and overlapping policy 
proposals focused on “excellence,” political entrepreneurs from a range of organizations 





interests and emphasized the responsibility of state leaders over core educational matters 
(Rhodes, 2012). Supporters of the excellence agenda also helped institute the belief that 
raising standards and increasing the rigor of accountability systems would ultimately lead to 
the improvement of the nation’s schools (Cross, 2014; McDonnell, 2005).  
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the standards-based reform agenda emerged as 
an elaboration of the excellence agenda (Rhodes, 2012). The standards-based reform 
paradigm is premised on the creed that education systems may be fixed or enhanced through 
the development and implementation of aligned academic standards, curricula, testing, and 
accountability policies (Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008). This approach to systemic 
improvement, the intellectual underpinnings of which may be traced back to an article by 
Smith and O’Day (1990), has proven to be the dominant education reform movement of 
recent decades (Vogel, 2010).1  
 Various historians of education have chronicled how, despite the states being charged 
with taking the lead in improving schools, the rise to prominence of standards-based reform 
in the United States was accompanied by an appreciable expansion of the federal 
government’s role in education (Cross, 2014; Jennings, 2000; McDonnell, 2005). A common 
rendering of events suggests that federal involvement in the drive for standards-based reform 
derived primarily from the desire to address the uneven implementation of standards across 
the states (Jennings, 1998; McGuinn & Manna, 2013) and as a means to motivate state 
leaders to pay closer attention to groups of students who have historically been underserved 
(Cross, 2014; Jennings, 1998).  
																																																								
1 The ideational shifts associated with the standards-based reform movement have provided 
the basis for a range of layered and intersecting education policies, including key provisions 
within several reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 





 Though the federal government’s involvement in education policy has undoubtedly 
increased in the period since the Reagan administration (McDonnell, 2005; Shober, 2012), 
there still remains no truly national system of educational standards, testing, or 
accountability. Instead, as described by Rhodes (2012), “The federal government has sought 
to shape education reform through what sociologist Elisabeth Clemens calls a ‘Rube 
Goldberg-esque’ array of incentives and conditions-of-aid to state and local governments” (p. 
8). Such indirect and complex methods employed by federal policymakers are a product of a 
strong federal structure that distributes authority over schools between national, state, and 
local governments (Shober, 2012). 
 The complexity of education governance in the United States makes the 
establishment, adoption, and implementation of coherent policies across the states both 
politically and administratively complicated (McGuinn & Manna, 2013). For example, any 
state that does not wish to implement a federal education policy retains the discretionary 
authority to opt out and decline the associated monies (U.S. Department of Education, 2005). 
This arrangement stems from the federal government’s lack of constitutional authority over 
education,2 as well as its junior partner status in the financing of public schools.3 
Nonetheless, in practice, the states have come to rely on federal aid—especially in times 
when state and local budgets are tight—rendering them disinclined to refuse financial 
support, even with strings attached (Gordon, 2012; Pelsue, 2017; Shober, 2012). 
Consequently, the influence of the federal government “far exceeds its fiscal contribution and 
legal responsibility” (Corcoran & Goertz, 2005, p. 34).   
																																																								
2 The federal government does have jurisdiction over matters concerning the civil and other 
rights of students (McGuinn & Manna, 2013).  
 
3 The federal government provides approximately nine percent of the total K-12 annual 






 Federal involvement in education reached its zenith with the passage of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, 2002) and the series of competitive grant programs and 
conditional waivers associated with the Obama administration (Cross, 2014; Johnson, 2016). 
As the number of federal prescriptions mounted, however, so did the sense of discontent by 
various groups who objected to what they viewed as being the usurpation of local control 
(Rich, 2013). Of particular relevance to this study, which explores the impact of long-
standing institutions, organized interests that have grown up around these institutions, and 
sociocultural beliefs and values, such disputes brought to the fore the same enduring debate 
regarding the appropriate role of the federal government that has existed since the founding 
of the republic (Rhodes, 2012; Shober, 2012). 
 Recent developments appear to signal a shifting in the political and institutional 
context of education policy in the United States. On December 10, 2015, President Barack 
Obama signed into law the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). The ESSA has been 
described as the “largest devolution of federal control to the states in a quarter-century” (“No 
Child Left Behind’s successor,” 2015). This transference of authority grants state leaders 
greater regulatory flexibility to tailor the design of their school accountability systems than 
under the NCLB law, thus reversing the trend of escalating federal influence.4  
 This study was designed to investigate the politics of national, or “common,” 
education standards in the United States and document a possible transition period following 
a 30-year policy trajectory. Specifically, the research conducted for this dissertation 
examines the perspectives of members of an advocacy coalition regarding the events, 
institutions, hostile interests, and sociocultural factors that impacted their work on one of the 
																																																								
4	Despite this devolution of decision making, the ESSA still maintains many of the same 
basic standards-based reform elements associated with NCLB, including the requirement that 






most significant standards-based initiatives of the past decade: the Common Core State 
Standards (CCSS).  
 The CCSS initiative has become increasingly politicized and unpopular in recent 
years (Resmovits, 2014). As evidenced by longitudinal survey data (see Appendix A), public 
opinion regarding the CCSS plummeted between 2012 and 2016. During this same period, 
mounting opposition afforded a point of belief convergence for interests on either side of the 
political spectrum to challenge both the initiative itself and the dominance of the centrist 
standards-based reform coalition (Cross, 2014). Using data gathered from interviews with 
initiative leaders, the narratives told by this purposeful sample of political insiders were 
examined to compare perspectives on what led to the backlash against the CCSS and what it 
might mean for the future of standards-based reform in the United States.  
 The writings of three scholars proved to be especially influential in the initial 
conceptualization of this study: political scientist Jesse Rhodes and the sociologist 
collaborators Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.  
Jesse Rhodes: An Education in Politics 
 Rhodes’ (2012) theory of institutionally bounded entrepreneurship is used to explain 
how the agendas and associated public policies of entrepreneurs evolve in response to their 
interactions with “existing institutions and political developments” (p. 42). The institutions 
that Rhodes is referring to are humanly devised structures that produce stability in political, 
social, and economic contexts through cognitive, normative, or regulative mechanisms 
(North, 1990; Sheingate, 2003). Rhodes’ account of the historical evolution of federal 
education policy serves to highlight the extent to which social institutions shape and place 






 Though institutions characteristically remain stable (North, 1990), they are subject to 
change over time (Lewis & Steinmo, 2012). Political scientists have charted how institutional 
change may come as the result of exogenous factors, such as economic crises, or endogenous 
factors, including the agency of individual actors (Orren & Skowronek, 1994). Regarding the 
latter, political entrepreneur is the term used to describe “individuals whose creative acts 
have transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions” (Sheingate, 2003, p. 185).5 
By engaging in all manner of innovations, political entrepreneurs challenge established rules 
or norms in order to either transform existing institutions or create new ones.6  
 Despite the pervasiveness of entrepreneurship in American politics, such is the 
enduring nature of institutions that change often appears “halting and glacial” (Sheingate, 
2003, p. 201). According to Rhodes (2012), one of the reasons for this is that actors and 
groups with vested interests in existing institutions play a prominent role in thwarting 
proposed reforms.  
 In the American national political system, characterized by a separated 
presidency, Congress, and judiciary, as well as by multiple power sites within 
each of these institutions, there are many places in which opponents of a given 
entrepreneurial innovation can exert their influence. (Rhodes, 2012, p. 11) 
 
A central argument presented by Rhodes (2012) is that “The system of institutions 
and interests that [has] grown up around the federal role in education [has] discouraged 
reformers from pursuing a more aggressive course of action” (p. 145).  Fundamentally, based 
on their recognition of deep-rooted opposition by various interest groups regarding any 
expansion of federal authority, the entrepreneurs that advocated for excellence in education 
																																																								
5	Examples of political entrepreneurs may be found among members of Congress and state 
legislatures, presidents, governors, bureaucrats, and members of interest groups. 
 
6 Sheingate (2003) offers three examples of entrepreneurial behavior: shaping the terms of 






strategically elected to layer standards-based reforms on top of the existing Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) legislation, rather than attempting to make major changes 
to the established arrangements associated with the nation’s systems of education 
governance.  
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann: The Social Construction of Reality 
 Berger and Luckmann (1967) also address the subject of institutional constraints, 
albeit at a more theoretical level. In their influential book The Social Construction of Reality, 
Berger and Luckmann describe institutionalization as occurring “whenever there is a 
reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors” (p. 54). Social institutions, 
they explain, serve to control human conduct by establishing predefined patterns of behavior 
in collectivities of people.  
 In the words of Berger and Luckmann (1967), “Institutions always have a history, of 
which they are the products” (p. 54). They describe how institutions are transmitted to new 
generations through the processes of socialization and eventually become crystallized. When 
this happens, “The institutions are now experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a 
reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967, p. 58).  
Educational Policy in an Institutional World 
 It was the concept of a humanly produced institutional world experienced as objective 
reality, which in turn serves to constrain the decisions and behavior of political 
entrepreneurs, that first inspired the topic of this dissertation. Informal conversations between 
the researcher and individuals who had been involved with the CCSS initiative brought to 
light the apparent influence of powerful institutions—including rules, norms, and beliefs 





hindered the establishment of common state standards and contributed to their becoming 
politicized and unpopular. While reflecting on these constraints, these political entrepreneurs 
communicated a seemingly fatalistic attitude regarding what was perceived as being 
inevitable widespread opposition to the very idea of national education standards. Thus, this 
research was conceived, initially, to more formally explore and compare the perceptions of 
initiative leaders about the impact of such forces on their entrepreneurship.  
Paul Sabatier & Hank Jenkins-Smith: The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Also influential during the initial formulation of this study was the work of political 
scientists Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999). Rhodes’ (2012) description of 
the standards-based reform movement brought to mind Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s writings 
on advocacy coalitions. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which was first devised 
in the 1980s (Sabatier, 1986, 1988), is a framework for understanding the alliances formed 
by actors seeking to influence, either directly or indirectly, policy subsystems (Jenkins-Smith 
et al., 2014). Such advocacy coalitions consist of individuals—including legislators, 
members of interest groups, researchers, and bureaucrats—who share beliefs regarding the 
existence and seriousness of particular problems as well as preferred policy solutions for 
addressing them.  
Rhodes (2012) identifies five overarching groups of organizations as being the “major 
players” (p. 17) in debates over education reform in the United States: business 
entrepreneurs, civil rights entrepreneurs, educational liberals, educational conservatives, and 
organizations representing state elected officials. For this study, Rhodes’ framework was 
used to categorize the organizations that engaged in advocacy work for the CCSS. In 
addition, inspired and informed by the ACF’s description of belief systems (Jenkins-Smith et 





Rhodes provided an opportunity to more closely examine the shared and conflicting policy 
beliefs of actors within the CCSS advocacy coalition.  
Why Narrative Inquiry? 
As already described, this investigation was initially devised to gather, compare, and 
contrast the different explanations offered by a diverse coalition of individuals regarding the 
events and factors that resulted in the political backlash against the CCSS. The research 
methodology selected, therefore, had to be one that could account for multiple and divergent 
interpretations of the same subject by a sample of political insiders, rather than seeking to 
establish one singular or “true” version of events.  
Ultimately, it was the twin advantages of being able to explore the nuances of human 
experience while also looking for more general concepts, categories, and themes across the 
data that cemented the decision to use a form of narrative inquiry for the analysis (Kim, 
2016; Polkinghorne, 1995). 7 The particular analytic method chosen for comparing the stories 
told about the politicization of the initiative was based on Polkinghorne’s (1995) 
paradigmatic analysis of narratives, which seeks to “locate common themes or conceptual 
manifestations among the stories collected as data” (p. 13). In addition, the coding process 
employed aspects of other scholars’ writings from the field of narrative inquiry: Labov and 
Waletzky’s (1997) model of narrative extraction was combined with McBeth, Jones, and 
Shanahan’s (2014) description of narrative core elements. 
Problem Statement 
 A consequence of the groundswell of opposition against the CCSS (see Appendix A) 
has been that approximately eight of the 46 states that had adopted the initiative have since 
made the decision to drop the standards altogether, with an additional 21 states either 
																																																								
7	The field of narrative inquiry provides a body of methods for analyzing first-person 





revising or renaming the standards (Gewertz, 2015; Norton, Ash, & Ballinger, 2017; Ujifusa, 
2016b). What is more, any future efforts by the federal government to influence or 
incentivize state adoption of the CCSS, or indeed any other common standards initiative, is 
now proscribed under the ESSA (Johnson, 2016; Shober, 2016).    
In addition to the events described above, the election of Donald J. Trump in 2016 
means that the sitting president of the United States is on record as being a staunch opponent 
of the CCSS initiative. In a campaign video on his website, the then-presidential candidate 
made the following statement:  
I’m a tremendous believer in education, but education has to be at a 
local level. We cannot have the bureaucrats in Washington telling you how to 
manage your child’s education. Common Core is a total disaster. We can’t let 
it continue. (Trump, n.d.) 
 
These comments proved to be more than campaign rhetoric. A year after President Trump’s 
inauguration, in January 2018, U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos (2018) reiterated 
the President’s assessment of the initiative during a speech made at the American Enterprise 
Institute: “I agree—and have always agreed—with President Trump on this: ‘Common Core 
is a disaster.’ And at the U.S. Department of Education, Common Core is dead” (para. 30). 
 The fact that the CCSS initiative is not a federal policy makes the repeal of the 
standards by Congress and the Trump administration impossible (Turner, 2016).8 It is 
conceivable, however, that anti-Common Core Republicans at the state level may, at some 
point, decide to unite and act upon President Trump’s campaign rhetoric to jettison the 
standards altogether. All of these developments make the future of the CCSS uncertain, at the 
time of this writing.   
																																																								
8	Though the CCSS originated as a state-led effort, the Obama administration’s endorsement 
of the standards (and funding of the associated testing consortia) resulted in it taking on the 
appearance of a federal initiative, which subsequently caused much consternation among 






 In his book on the politics of the CCSS, Shober (2016) asserts, “There is no such 
thing as a permanent coalition in American politics” (p. 171). Like Rhodes (2012), Shober 
describes the configuration of entrepreneurs that advocated for standards-based education 
reforms as first emerging in the 1980s and becoming a dominant movement in the mid-
1990s. Shober also provides a detailed account of how this alliance—comprised 
predominantly of centrist political leaders from both major parties, business groups, and civil 
rights groups—ultimately led the drive toward common state standards and aligned 
assessments. With the intense politicization of the CCSS, however, Shober suggests that the 
influence of this coalition over the national education agenda may now be weakening. 
Consistent with this observation, several members of the CCSS advocacy coalition 
interviewed for this study described their personal experiences of waning influence within 
what they interpreted as an increasingly hostile and partisan political environment.  
 This investigation was designed to compare explanations for the politicization of the 
CCSS, as provided by political insiders with direct knowledge of events. Yet as the history of 
federal education policy tells us (Cross, 2014), the politics of common state standards run 
much deeper than this one initiative. According to Rhodes (2012), the same basic long-
standing institutions and hostile interests have hampered all previous efforts to establish and 
implement national standards. Thus, informed by this assessment, the broader problem 
studied in this dissertation was the perceived impact of various forces, including institutional 
structures, formal rules (e.g., laws), informal norms, and organized interests, on the 
entrepreneurship of actors advocating for national education standards in the United States. 
Research Questions 
 This dissertation research analyzes narrative data from interviews with 15 political 





CCSS. An analysis of narratives approach (Polkinghorne, 1995) was used to compare and 
contrast these insiders’ accounts of their experiences engaging in advocacy work for the 
initiative, the explanations that they offered for the political backlash against the standards, 
and their descriptions of factors that impacted their entrepreneurship. Other topics explored 
included the current and potential future status of common state standards and the associated 
advocacy coalition. The data were also analyzed to compare the policy core beliefs of actors 
from different organizations within the CCSS advocacy coalition.  
 The following questions guided the research:  
1) How are the narratives of these political entrepreneurs (grouped based on the five types 
of organization) similar, and how are they different, regarding the politicization and 
declining popularity of the CCSS?  
In addition: 
• What do these narratives reveal about the current status (circa 2017) of the CCSS? 
• What do these narratives reveal about the current status (circa 2017) of the 
coalition that formed to advocate for the CCSS? 
• What do these narratives suggest about the future of the CCSS? 
• What do these narratives suggest about the future of the common state standards 
coalition?   
2) What do the narratives reveal about the policy core beliefs of the political entrepreneurs? 
3) What do the narrative accounts reveal about the political challenges and institutional        
constraints associated with seeking to establish and implement national education 







Significance of Research 
 The politicization and declining popularity of the CCSS brand mark the latest episode 
within a reform trajectory that began more than 25 years ago. The significance of this 
research includes the fact that it documents the experiences of a sample of actors who 
engaged in advocacy work for this historic education initiative. The narratives told by these 
political entrepreneurs provide valuable insights into how and why the standards became so 
contentious. In addition, the interview responses afforded an opportunity to survey 
perspectives on the current status of the common state standards movement and compare the 
points of view of insiders as to whether recent developments may signify the weakening of a 
powerful advocacy coalition.  
 The narrative data gathered also help shed light on the broader politics of national 
education policies in the United States and how subsystem participants leading the movement 
toward common standards experienced the constraints of federalism and other institutional, 
political, and sociocultural variables. The reflections of participants were typically 
accompanied by advice for future entrepreneurs interested in developing national education 
reforms, thus providing practical recommendations for future policy work.  
 Furthermore, the narratives told by these individuals afforded an opportunity to 
compare and contrast the policy core beliefs of subsystem participants from different 
organizations that converged around the concept of common state standards, thereby 







Introduction to Chapter II 
 This investigation was designed to explore the viewpoints of members of an advocacy 
coalition regarding the events and factors that contributed to the politicization of the CCSS.9 
Survey data have revealed that the initiative declined in popularity following the 
implementation of the standards in 2011 (see Appendix A). During this same period, the 
initiative was sharply criticized and opposed by Republican politicians, states’ rights 
conservatives affiliated with the Tea Party, teachers’ union officials, educators, parent 
groups, and progressive academics (Resmovits, 2014). Rather than simply chronicling these 
events, which is a task that has already been effectively undertaken by other scholars,10 the 
research described here compares and contrasts the perspectives and beliefs of a sample of 
political entrepreneurs who worked on the initiative.  Moreover, this investigation documents 
what the experience of working on the CCSS has taught these political actors about the 
challenges associated with seeking to establish and implement education standards on a 
national basis in the United States.  
																																																								
9 A politicized issue is one that has been made political (politicize, n.d.). For this study, 
the term politicization refers to the backlash from actors and organizations on both sides 
of the political spectrum and to the standards becoming a matter of strong public 
concern. According to the research participants, the CCSS was originally conceived as a 
non-partisan initiative.  
 
10 The following texts provide comprehensive accounts of the history of CCSS: Arnold 
Shober’s (2016) In Common No More: The Politics of the Common Core State Standards; 
Robert Rothman’s (2011) Something in Common: The Common Core State Standards and 





A secondary objective of the research outlined here is to document and provide 
insights into a possible transition period in the history of American education policy. Over 
the past three decades, an assortment of subsystem participants—including elected officials, 
business entrepreneurs, civil rights groups, and educational conservatives—has helped drive 
a policy agenda focused on excellence in education and standards-based reform (Rhodes, 
2012; Shober, 2016). The strong influence of these groups of actors has resulted in a fairly 
linear policy trajectory spanning from the Reagan era through to the Obama administration. 
In recent years, however, the backlash against the CCSS, the passage of the ESSA, and the 
election of President Trump have appeared to signify a weakening of the standards-based 
reform movement and its associated advocacy coalition (Brown, 2017; Shober, 2016). 
Interviews with coalition members were, therefore, designed to capture these insiders’ 
perspectives on both the current status and the hypothetical future of standards-based 
education reforms in the United States.  
The following chapter of this dissertation begins by setting the scene. Though the 
CCSS originated as an effort led by national non-profit organizations and state leaders, 
subsequent federal involvement—specifically, the endorsement of the Obama 
administration—is considered to have played a significant role in tarnishing public 
perceptions of the initiative and fueling partisan opposition (Shober, 2016). Interestingly, the 
coalition of organizations that first developed the plan for the CCSS were well aware of this 
risk, based on their knowledge of the strong resistance that emerged during previous attempts 
to create national education standards, and they proactively sought to avoid this pitfall 
(National Research Council, 2008). A major focus of this investigation was how political 
insiders experienced and understood the opposition that exists regarding federal involvement 





The history of federal involvement in education and the origins of the CCSS are both 
discussed in this chapter. In addition, the literature that informed the design of the study is 
reviewed, including Rhodes’ (2012) concept of institutionally bounded entrepreneurship, 
Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) work on the social construction of reality, the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014), and narrative modes of inquiry (Bruner, 
1986; Kim, 2016; Labov & Waletzky, 1997; McBeth et al., 2014, Polkinghorne, 1995).  
The Context: Race to the Top and the Common Core 
Established as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA), the Obama administration’s Race to the Top (RTTT) program offered $4.35 billion 
in competitive grant funding to the states in order to spur a series of specific education 
reforms (Cross, 2014; Rhodes, 2012). To be eligible for a RTTT grant award, states were 
asked to commit to four core education assurance areas: 
• Developing and adopting common, high-quality standards and assessments; 
• Building improved data systems to measure student growth and achievement; 
• Recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and school 
leaders; and 
• Turning around the lowest-performing schools (U.S. Department of Education, 
2009). 
 Regarding the academic standards assurance area, the U.S. Department of Education 
incentivized the states to participate in consortia to develop and adopt common standards that 
were internationally benchmarked and prepared students for college and careers. 
Consequently, though the CCSS were not explicitly named within RTTT, it was generally 
inferred by state leaders that the federal department was endorsing the extant standards 





 During his 2011 state of the union address, President Barack Obama (2011) remarked 
upon RTTT and the adoption of common state standards:  
Race to the Top is the most meaningful reform of our public schools in 
a generation. For less than one percent of what we spend on education each 
year, it has led over 40 states to raise their standards for teaching and 
learning. And these standards were developed, by the way, not by 
Washington, but by Republican and Democratic governors throughout the 
country. (para. 5)  
 
The inclusion of a disclaimer of ownership concerning a central element of what he described 
as being the most meaningful education reform in a generation continued a theme that had 
already been promulgated by federal officials regarding the CCSS. A year and a half prior to 
President Obama’s remarks, on June 14, 2009, the then-U.S. Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan made a speech to governors in which he commended the CCSS initiative while also 
underscoring the fact that it was the product of a state-led effort. In his remarks Duncan 
stated, “It is especially important that this has started at the state level because some people 
will raise concerns that common standards will lead to federal over-reaching” (as cited in 
Rothman, 2011, p. 13)  
Aside from the words of President Obama and Secretary Duncan, a cursory 
examination of political rhetoric regarding national standards reveals a consistent framing of 
federal involvement that predates the CCSS. For example, President Bill Clinton’s (1997) 
State of the Union address, more than a decade earlier, described his antecedent plan for 
common state standards in the following way: “a national crusade for education standards, 
not federal government standards but national standards [emphasis added], representing 
what all our students must know to succeed in the knowledge economy of the 21st century” 
(para. 24). 
 Why have federal officials felt it necessary to publicly and repeatedly disassociate 





Duncan describing when he mentioned concerns about federal overreach? As the literature 
review outlined in this chapter describes, the rules, norms, and cognitive shortcuts associated 
with the institutions of federalism provide one explanation for the backlash against the 
CCSS. 
Social Institutions 
 A social institution is “a normative social structure that influences the behavior of 
those who participate in it” (Hindricks, 2013, p. 910). Described by North (1990) as being 
“the rules of the game in society” (p. 3), social institutions help stabilize the social 
environment and facilitate human interactions by providing structures or mechanisms for 
recurring patterns of behavior (Huntington, 1968; Berger & Luckmann, 1967). All 
institutions are “humanly devised” (North, 1990, p. 3), and they include both formal rules 
(e.g., laws and constitutions) and informal constraints (e.g., norms and conventions) (Greif & 
Kington, 2011).  
 Examples of social institutions include entities such as governmental, legal, 
economic, religious, and educational organizations (Newman, 1997).11 These types of 
institutions are made up of actors with specific and differentiated positions, tasks, and roles 
(Hodgson, 2006). In addition, social institutions also include non-organizational structures 
like property, money, language, table manners, and the rules of the road (Hindricks, 2013).  
 As noted by Newman (1997), “Large social institutions are closely tied to culture” (p. 
97). Primary institutions, such as education, typically reflect cultural values and provide 
mechanisms for the transmission of culture to future generations. Moreover, all institutions 
are comprised of normative dimensions, or social rules, that shape or constrain the behavior 
																																																								






and preferences of participants within particular social or cultural settings (Hindricks, 2013; 
Hodgson, 2006; Newman, 1997).  
 The study of institutions is by no means limited to the field of sociology. Various 
academics from different branches of the social sciences have produced scholarship on how 
institutions influence the ideas and behavior of actors in different contexts, including political 
and economic ones (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; North, 1990; Peters, 2011; Tabelli, 2010).  
Institutional Change and Political Entrepreneurs 
 As already noted, a major function of institutions is bringing stability to social 
environments. Although a characteristic feature of social institutions is their continuance 
across time, they are subject to alteration or transformation. When such shifts in institutions 
occur, it is often the result of the agency and innovation of individual actors (Sheingate, 
2003). In political science, the term given to a leader seeking to engender institutional change 
within political contexts is political entrepreneur (Dahl, 2005).  
 The original concept of the entrepreneur has been traced back to French economist 
Jean-Baptiste Say’s A Treatise on Political Economy, which was first published in 1803. Say 
coined the term entrepreneur to describe enterprising businesspeople vying for opportunities 
and profits in the marketplace (Beattie, n.d.). A footnote in a translation of Say’s (1880) 
Treatise describes an entrepreneur as being an individual “who takes upon himself the 
immediate responsibility, risk, and conduct of a concern in industry…. For want of a better 
word, it will be rendered into English by the term adventurer” (p. 78).  
 A more contemporary representation of the role of entrepreneurs may be found in the 
writings of Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1980, 2008). Notably, his classic book 
from 1942, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, introduced the concept of “Creative 





innovation and competition. Building on, and challenging, Marx’s (1990) explanation of the 
mechanisms of industrial change, Schumpeter emphasized the role of entrepreneurs as 
drivers of economic progress.  
The function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern 
of production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried 
technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old 
one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new 
outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on. (2008, p. 132)   
 
 One of the first scholars to apply the term entrepreneur when describing actors in a 
political context was political scientist Robert Dahl (Sheingate, 2003). In Who Governs? 
Dahl (2005) references Machiavelli’s The Prince in order to convey the types of cunning and 
resourceful behaviors associated with his notion of political entrepreneurship. Moreover, he 
provides the following assessment of the influence of such entrepreneurs over political 
decision making: 
Majorities, parties, interest groups, elites, even political systems are all 
to some extent pliable; a leader who knows how to use his resources to the 
maximum is not so much the agent of others as others are his agents. 
Although a gifted political entrepreneur might not exist in every political 
system, wherever he appears he would make himself felt. (2005, p. 6)  
 
 As Sheingate (2003) observed, “Since Dahl, the figure of the political entrepreneur 
has appeared in a variety of contexts and has been used to explain a myriad of phenomenon 
[sic]” (p. 187). Sheingate defines political entrepreneurs as being “individuals whose creative 
acts have transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions” (p. 185). In essence, 
political entrepreneurs, according to Sheingate, seek to overcome the regulative, normative, 
and cognitive constraints associated with institutions in order to shape political debates, 
advance innovations, and drive progress.  
 Especially significant to the research conducted for this dissertation, Sheingate (2003) 





political entrepreneurs can consistently present their single innovations “from multiple 
perspectives and points of view…[thus] building robust coalitions in support of institutional 
change” (p. 193). This insight parallels the theory on advocacy coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et 
al., 2014) outlined in a later section.  
 Citing Sheingate’s (2003) article, Rhodes (2012) uses the term political entrepreneurs 
when referring to the groups of actors that came together to support the educational standards 
movement in the United States. According to his account of the historical evolution of 
education policy, those entrepreneurs who led the drive toward standards-based reform, and 
ultimately common state education standards, sought to overcome durable institutional 
constraints by “combining disparate ideas, exploiting institutional opportunities, and building 
diverse coalitions” (p. 3). Rhodes’ framework for categorizing the various groups of political 
entrepreneurs and other actors seeking to influence education policy was central to the 
approach adopted for this study (see Table 1).  
The Institutions of Federalism 
 A major focus of the research described here is the impact of the institutions 
associated with the federal system on American education policy. In the words of Rhodes 
(2012), “Any discussion of education policymaking in the United States must begin with an 
appreciation of the influence of federalism on the governance of schooling” (p. 26).  
Federalism is defined by Elazar (1984) as “the mode of political organization that 
unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among 
general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and 
authority of both” (p. 2). In this most basic sense, federalism is an arrangement of 
governmental institutions in which decisions and authority are dispersed. But, as Elazar goes 





certain kinds of cooperative relationships throughout any political system it animates” (p. 2). 
The concept of federalism, therefore, relates to both a system of government and associated 
patterns of rules, norms, and conventions.  
As described by Newman (1997), institutions are “strongly supported by cultural 
norms” (p. 97). In short, over a period of time, certain patterns of behavior within social 
institutions become widely recognized as culturally acceptable and start to be taken for 
granted. Such institutionalized norms constrain the behavior of embedded actors by setting 
limits on what is considered to be typical, doable, and even thinkable. In the same vein, 
North (1990) explained how culturally derived informal rules––including conventions and 
customs––shape the choices and behavior of individuals and back up the formal rules of 
institutions. North also noted that reformers must attend to such informal constraints 
whenever seeking to change the formal rules of institutions (Faundez, 2016).  
In the case of federalism, this system of institutions has come to be recognized as 
legitimate and natural in the United States. For example, the setting of academic standards is, 
according to polling data, broadly viewed as being primarily the responsibility of state and 
local governments, rather than policymakers at the federal level (West, Henderson, Peterson, 
& Barrows, 2017). This belief also was captured in the words of then-Governor of Georgia 
Sonny Perdue during a speech at a press event on the CCSS in 2010 when he stated, “We 
governors believe education is the rightful responsibility of our states” (as cited in Gewertz, 
2010). Moreover, during the interviews conducted for this research, many of the political 
entrepreneurs described the strong opposition that exists in American society regarding 
federal involvement in setting education standards as essentially being “just the way it is.”   
 According to Rhodes (2012), “Entrepreneurs and institutions interact in complex 





consequences” (p. 13). Examples of this, Rhodes argues, include the ways in which long-
standing institutional commitments and the pressures associated with organized interests 
have bounded the scope of entrepreneurial change in American education. As will be 
explained in greater detail in a later section on the history of federal education policy, 
powerful interest groups and established rules, norms, and beliefs pertaining to federalism 
help explain the decisions of entrepreneurs who worked on the CCSS initiative as well as the 
reactions of various constituent groups to the standards. 
Institutional Development 
 Émile Durkheim (2013) described the purpose of sociology as being “to enable us to 
understand present-day social institutions so that we may have some perception of what they 
are destined to become and what we should want them to become” (p. 187). In the same 
article, he suggested that, in order to effectively understand an institution, it is necessary to 
know its various elements and to trace the genesis of these elements back through history.  
 Berger and Luckmann (1967) also describe social institutions as being the products of 
history. Moreover, they proclaim, “It is impossible to understand an institution adequately 
without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced” (pp. 54-55). In 
accordance with this premise, to make sense of the institutional constraints surrounding the 
CCSS, it is necessary to first take stock of the broader history of federalism, federal 
involvement in education, and the evolution of the standards-based reform paradigm. A 
review of the literature on these topics is presented next.  
Federalism 
 Powerful beliefs about the role of the federal government have fueled fierce and 
ongoing political debates since the founding of the United States (Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 





differences of opinion regarding the need for a robust national government prompted much 
conflict, followed by compromise, between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions 
(Collier & Collier, 2007). It was largely to allay the concerns raised by Anti-Federalists and 
encourage the states to ratify the Constitution that James Madison drafted the first ten 
amendments to this fundamental law, known collectively as Bill of Rights (Amar, 1998). 
Ratified by the states in 1791, the Bill of Rights delineated clear limits to the federal 
government’s power and affirmed the rights of states to retain sovereignty over all political 
powers not enumerated in the Constitution. The conflict associated with the opposing 
viewpoints espoused by Federalist adherents of the nationalist tradition and the Anti-
Federalist proponents of states’ rights was never fully resolved, however, and has continued 
to resurface in legal and political disputes throughout the nation’s history (Amar, 1998). 
Federalism and Education 
 The United States Constitution makes no mention of education. Consequently, 
responsibility for the organization and management of public schools has traditionally 
remained under the auspices of state and local governments (Shober, 2012). As described by 
Corcoran and Goertz (2005), the fragmented system of educational governance in the United 
States is a vestige of “the deep-seated fear of centralized authority that shaped the nation’s 
founders’ views of government” (p. 25). Despite the conspicuous omission of education from 
the supreme law of the land, however, the founding fathers were by no means disinterested in 
the subject of schooling. For example, the form of civic republicanism advanced by Thomas 
Jefferson strongly emphasized the connectedness between broad access to education, the 
individual liberty of citizens, and the continued general welfare of the nation (Cogliano, 





 In addition to the Jeffersonian arguments for education as a means to promote the 
public good and longevity of the republic, access to education has also commonly been 
understood as being fundamental to other core American values, including the individualistic 
pursuit of social mobility (Labaree, 1997; Shober, 2012). Thus, inherent in the nation’s 
educational institutions are tensions pertaining to deep core beliefs (Weible & Sabatier, 
2007) about the appropriate balance between national and local interests as well as notions of 
education for the public good and education for individual advancement (Corcoran & Goertz, 
2005). 
Federal Education Policy 
 Though the individual states and their localities have remained principally responsible 
for the governance of public schools, the federal government has had a role, albeit limited, in 
education since the founding of the nation (Cross, 2014; Jefferson-Jenkins & Hawkins Hill, 
2011; Rhodes, 2012). The existence of early federal education legislation, such as the Land 
Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, attests to the fact that public 
education has long been understood to be a matter of national interest (Jefferson-Jenkins & 
Hawkins Hill, 2011). With that being said, federal K-12 education policies in the United 
States remained negligible in scale and influence all the way up until the mid-20th century.12 
Brown v. Board and the NDEA 
 In 1954, the United States Supreme Court ruled to end legal segregation in schools 
(Kluger, 2004). The landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision played a 
significant role in helping move education up the national policy agenda and setting the stage 
for greater federal involvement in the push for educational equity. However, the ruling, 
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which found that racial segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, also reignited long-standing 
tensions regarding federal mandates versus states’ rights and local control (Bell, 2004).  
 Four years after Brown v. Board, consternation regarding the Soviet Union’s 
successful launch of the Sputnik satellite created a policy window (Kingdon, 1995) for the 
first comprehensive federal education law: The National Defense Education Act of 1958 
(NDEA) (Urban, 2010). The NDEA provided funding to improve education as a means of 
bolstering national security. Nevertheless, as was the case with Brown, states’ rights 
advocates expressed grave concerns about the passage of this law—with some contending 
that the NDEA represented the beginning of a federal takeover of schools. As outlined in his 
minority report, Senator Barry Goldwater argued that, “If adopted, the legislation [would] 
mark the inception of aid, supervision, and ultimately control of education in this country by 
federal authorities” (as cited in Sundquist, 1968, p. 178).  
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act       
 The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) was signed into law 
seven years after the NDEA. Inspired by the civil rights movement of the period, the ESEA 
was an expansive federal education statute that sought to offer equitable educational 
opportunities to children living in poverty (Thomas & Brady, 2005). The most extensive 
financial component of the ESEA was Title I, which earmarked federal categorical aid to 
state governments and local education agencies “serving areas with concentrations of 
children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by 
various means…which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of 
educationally deprived children” (The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 





The passage of the ESEA, again, gave cause for the contentious issue of local versus 
federal control to resurface. Regarding the original ESEA statute, Howard W. Smith, an 
outspoken state’s rights advocate and Democratic Representative from Virginia, is recorded 
as having said, “We apparently have come to the end of the road so far as local control over 
our education in public facilities is concerned” (as cited in Sundquist, 1968, p. 215). 
Similarly, Republican Senator John J. Williams opined that, “The needy are being used as a 
wedge to open the floodgates, and you may be absolutely certain that the flood of federal 
control is ready to sweep the land” (as cited in Sundquist, 1968, p. 215).  
Nothing in the original ESEA altered the fact that core decisions regarding curricular 
and personnel matters remained predominantly delegated to local government by the states. 
But the subsequent combination of more precise specifications about the use of Title I funds, 
the proliferation of new categorical aid programs during the 1970s, and the creation of a 
cabinet-level Department of Education under President Jimmy Carter all added to the 
perception among states’ rights advocates that federal authority was expanding at the expense 
of local control (Cross, 2014; Rhodes, 2012). 
Origins of Standards-Based Reform 
 The 1980s marked a period of retrenchment in which conservative politicians pushed 
to cut back on federal aid for education (Hill, Moore, & Williams, 1990; Jennings, 2000; 
Kleinknecht, 2009). Concomitant with this reduction in funding was the rise of what became 
known as the “excellence agenda” (McDonnell, 2005, p. 25). A conventional rendering of the 
origins of the excellence agenda points to a report published by President Ronald Reagan’s 
National Commission on Excellence in Education titled A Nation at Risk (ANAR) (Gardner 
et al., 1983). The excellence agenda supplanted the former equity agenda associated with 





2015) and was driven by a broad range of business leaders, civil rights leaders, state 
governors, and legislators (Cross, 2014; Rhodes, 2012). The focus on excellence was 
motivated by the belief that increased rigor in schools would serve to improve education for 
all students, raise academic achievement, and ultimately boost the national and state 
economies (McDonnell, 2005; Shober, 2016).  
 In 1986, three years after the publication of ANAR, Lamar Alexander, then the 
governor of Tennessee, began arguing for a horse trade with education leaders, “in which 
states would create standards and public accountability for schools in return for state dollars 
and relaxing some internal regulation” (Shober, 2016, p. 33). Alexander’s vision garnered 
widespread support among governors, subsequently culminating in the publication of a report 
by the National Governors Association (1991) titled Time for Results. This report, first 
published in 1986, spelled out what would become a guiding philosophy for the next thirty 
years of education reform: results-based accountability (Cross, 2014).  
 By the early 1990s, standards-based reform had emerged as a refinement of the 
excellence agenda (Rhodes, 2012). The standards-based reform paradigm sought to improve 
education systems through the development and implementation of aligned academic 
standards, curricula, testing, and accountability policies (Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008; 
Smith & O’Day, 1990). It was during a 1989 summit held in Charlottesville, Virginia, that 
President George H. W. Bush and 49 of the nation’s governors agreed in principle to the idea 
of creating national goals for education. This approach was initially mooted as offering a 
remedy for the slow pace, unevenness, and incoherence of the states’ piecemeal excellence 
reforms (Rhodes, 2012). Ultimately, following the Virginia summit, six national goals were 





 Shober (2016) argues that the Charlottesville Education Summit prefigured the CCSS 
in three significant ways: “its focus on international competition, its emphasis on the 
economic consequences of education, and its purported federal-state partnership” (p. 33). 
Certainly, in the decades that followed the summit, these foci remained foundational to the 
framing logic employed by those advocating for standards-based reforms and were manifest 
in the arguments made for the CCSS (Rhodes, 2012; Rothman, 2011).  
 One significant outcome of the Charlottesville Summit was the creation of the 
National Education Goals Panel (NEGP). This board, which was comprised of governors, 
federal administration officials, and members of Congress, was charged with assembling and 
reporting data on the progress made toward meeting the six national goals (Cross, 2014; 
Vinovskis, 1998).13 What is more, in 1991 Congress established a bipartisan council known 
as the National Council on Education Standards and Testing (NCEST) (Cross, 2014). This 
council was given the task of considering the desirability and feasibility of national standards 
and tests (LaVenia, Cohen-Vogel, & Lang, 2015). NCEST came out in favor of national 
content standards (i.e., required knowledge and skills), national performance standards (i.e., 
performance expectations), and school delivery standards (i.e., necessary supports and 
resources) (NCEST, 1992). However, by the time NCEST released their report, support for 
national standards was already fading (LaVenia, Cohen-Vogel, & Lang, 2015).  
 The Bush I administration proposed that student progress made toward meeting the 
national goals would be measured in the fourth, eighth, and 12th grades through the 
expansion of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and the reporting of 
data at the district and state levels. Though the NAEP had been in existence since the 1960s, 
when it was developed to measure civil rights progress, deep concerns pertaining to the belief 
																																																								





that the federal government was seeking to control curricular decisions resulted in significant 
pushback against the proposed expansion (Shober, 2016). Because of this backlash, the 
NAEP remained limited in scope; its data would not be reported at the state level until the 
Clinton administration (Vinovskis, 1998). 
 The architects of President Bush I’s America 2000 plan, as the national goals became 
known, were careful to emphasize that it was “a national strategy, not a federal program” 
(U.S. Department of Education, 1991, p. 11). Nevertheless, the scheme eventually collapsed 
as a result of the opposition by educational liberals, including teachers’ unions (who were 
concerned about the lack of funding for the initiative), and staunch states’ rights advocates 
(Cross, 2014; Rhodes, 2012).  
 Governors were not the only ones looking for more effective methods for school 
reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s; leaders within the business community also began 
advocating for a national approach to education policy, including a call for national standards 
and tests (Business Roundtable, 1989). In addition, an array of educational conservatives 
associated with such organizations as the Educational Excellence Network (which later 
became the Thomas B. Fordham Institute) and prominent actors within civil rights 
organizations, such as The Achievement Council (led by Kati Haycock) and the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, went on record as being in favor of systemic reform 
(Rhodes, 2012). 
 Highly significant to this dissertation, the broad and cross-partisan network of 
supporters that came together around excellence in education and standards-based reforms 
during the 1980s and 1990s (particularly entrepreneurs from the business and civil rights 
communities) went on to become a dominant force in shaping the national education agenda 





The Federal Role in Standards-Based Reform 
 The first federal education policy to successfully pass in Congress based on the 
standards-based reform approach was President Bill Clinton’s Goals 2000: Educate America 
Act, which was signed into law in 1994 (Rhodes, 2012). Clinton had attended the 
Charlottesville Education Summit as the governor of Arkansas, and he was highly supportive 
of the plan to develop national standards as a means of bolstering the economy. Goals 2000 
established a process for the development of voluntary national education standards and 
provided grants for states to institute their own aligned standards and tests. Separate but 
parallel to Goals 2000 was President Clinton’s reauthorization of the ESEA, titled the 
Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA). Following the same logic as Lamar Alexander’s 
(1991) concept of “old-fashioned horse trading” (p. 4), in exchange for adopting academic 
standards and accountability measures, the IASA granted states and localities greater 
flexibility for Title I programs. Into the bargain, the IASA required local education agencies 
(LEAs) to identify the schools not making adequate yearly progress (AYP) and take the 
necessary steps to improve them (Jennings, 1998). 
 According to Rhodes (2012), President Clinton’s education secretary, Richard Riley, 
had gained an understanding and appreciation of the priorities of business leaders during his 
time as the governor of South Carolina. Consequently, the framing of Goals 2000 was 
strongly influenced by the business community’s emphasis on global economic 
competitiveness. At the same time, the coordinated advocacy work of civil rights 
entrepreneurs, including Kati Haycock of the Achievement Council, served to shape the 
design of the IASA and the linking of excellence to equity. Hence, much like Sheingate’s 





appealing to multiple perspectives and points of view, the standards-based reform paradigm 
helped build a robust and diverse coalition to rally behind the Clinton education agenda.  
 Congressional Republicans and educational conservatives were also receptive to the 
Clinton administration’s emphasis on standards and accountability, but their support was 
tempered by concerns regarding the potential expansion of federal influence in schools 
(Rhodes, 2012). Congressional Democrats and educational liberals, on the other hand, were 
less enthused by the standards-based reforms of the era; they argued that Goals 2000 and the 
IASA raised pressure on historically underserved students and the educators serving them 
and were not accompanied by the requisite level of funding (Shober, 2016).  
 Goals 2000 contained a proposal to strengthen the NEGP (United States Congress, 
1993). The law also established the federally operated National Education Standards and 
Improvement Council (NESIC). NESIC was tasked with creating blueprint standards to serve 
as a point of reference for the states. Furthermore, though the states would retain 
responsibility for developing their own standards, they would now be required to submit 
them to the NESIC for approval (Cross, 2014). 
 As a result of what became known as the Republican Revolution of 1994, the GOP 
gained control the House of Representatives and Senate for the first time since 1954 (Rhodes, 
2012). According to Shober (2016), many of the newly elected Republicans were 
ideologically hostile to federal involvement in education. Thus, due to this dramatic shift in 
power, the Clinton administration’s ability to continue pushing its standards-based education 
policy agenda was greatly weakened. One of the casualties of the energized GOP majority 
was NESIC, which was castigated for being a “national school board, which would have the 
power to interfere with state curricula” (Ravitch, 1995, p. 6). The scrapping of NESIC was a 





provide quality assurances regarding state or local standards. Ultimately, according to Shober 
(2016), the support that had existed for national education standards during the 1990s “sank 
under the weight of cultural and federalist critiques” (p. 39). 
 The 2002 reauthorization of the ESEA, the NCLB law, was also grounded in the 
standards-based reform paradigm (McDonnell, 2005). This bipartisan statute sought to build 
on the approaches associated with the IASA while also overcoming the perceived 
shortcomings of the Clinton-era law. Dissatisfied with the slow rate of progress made toward 
raising academic achievement, and frustrated with the slowness of states to meet the IASA 
requirements to implement standards and assessments, federal lawmakers used the NCLB 
law to exert pressure on state leaders (Rhodes, 2012). Under NCLB, a stipulation for 
receiving Title I funding was that states had to administer tests to all students in grades three 
through eight, and at least one time in high school, to ensure that they were making progress 
toward the adopted state standards. Moreover, NCLB required that corrective sanctions be 
attached to accountability measures (Cross, 2014; McDonnell, 2005; Rothman, 2011).  
 The NCLB law also advanced the movement toward common state standards. Though 
the Clinton administration’s IASA had revised the NAEP to allow for state-level 
comparisons, it wasn’t until NCLB that the states’ participation in the NAEP was required 
(Cross, 2014; Shober, 2016). This ability to make state-by-state comparisons carried broad 
implications, as it brought to light clear variations in student achievement between the states, 
which later provided one of the central justifications for the development of the CCSS 
(Shober, 2016).  
 It was in continuing the effort to mitigate the effects of a decentralized and complex 
intergovernmental system of educational governance, and to tackle the uneven patterns of 





legislation that further expanded the federal role in driving standards-based reform. Under 
the NCLB law, states had still been permitted to define “proficiency” for their students. This 
flexibility meant that there continued to be wide variation between states in terms of both 
content and performance standards (Lavenia, Cohen-Vogel, & Lang, 2014; Rothman, 2011). 
Hence, in 2009, using funding from the ARRA as leverage, the federal government began to 
push for the adoption of common state standards and the development of aligned assessments 
(Rhodes, 2012). 
Common Core State Standards 
 The CCSS initiative predates the Obama administration. It was in 2006 that former 
Governor James B. Hunt Jr. of North Carolina first convened a small group of educational 
and political leaders in Raleigh to revisit the possibility of developing national education 
standards (Rothman, 2011). As a follow up to this initial meeting, Hunt and former governor 
of West Virginia Bob Wise organized a second gathering, this time in Washington, DC. 
Attendees of the Washington meeting included members of various prominent education 
policy organizations, such as the Education Trust and the Thomas B. Fordham Institute.  
 The initial rationale provided for the development of national standards by initiative 
leaders included the fact that the NAEP data had uncovered wide variation in student 
achievement across the states (Shober, 2016). Also, drawing on rhetoric that echoed the 
arguments associated with the excellence agenda of the 1980s (Gardner et al., 1983), it was 
argued that the United States was falling behind other nations in terms of academic 
performance and that American global economic competitiveness was at risk (Cross 2014, 
Rothman, 2011).  
 Following two workshops on the desirability and political feasibility of common 





think tank based in Durham, North Carolina, outlined a strategy for the development of 
common state standards (The Hunt Institute, 2008). From the very beginning, the actors and 
organizations involved with the development of the standards were united in the conviction 
that the project must remain a state-led effort to avoid the negative connotations and political 
pitfalls associated with federal involvement (National Research Council, 2008). For that 
reason, two state-centric organizations, the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) 
and the National Governors Association (NGA), were charged with leadership of the 
initiative (Rothman, 2011). 
The Development of the CCSS 
 The development of the standards began with defining the expectations for what 
children should know and be able to do by the time they graduate high school (“About the 
Standards,” n.d.; Shober, 2016). These college- and career- readiness standards were then 
used to inform the creation of aligned content standards, which were written for grades K 
through 12. The process commenced with a brain trust of organizations—Achieve, ACT, the 
College Board, the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association (SHEEO), and the 
National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE)––identifying a set of criteria to 
be used by the drafters, the primary criterion being that the standards should reflect the 
requisite skills, knowledge, and dispositions that all students should have to be ready for 
college and a career (Rothman, 2011). Other criteria included that the standards had to be 
evidence-based and internationally benchmarked (Shober, 2016).  
 The leaders from three organizations, Achieve, ACT, and the College Board, were 
then given the responsibility for setting up work groups to draft the college- and career-
readiness standards for English language arts and mathematics (Rothman, 2011). Feedback 





education (NGA & CCSSO, 2010). According to Rothman’s (2011) account of events, 
because the initiative leaders wanted to ensure that the standards remained focused, “The 
NGA and CCSSO tried to shield the groups from the public eye so that they could do their 
work without getting bombarded with comments from the broader community” (p. 67). This 
fact was later used by some groups, including those who felt that too few teachers had been 
involved, to criticize what they perceived as a lack of transparency surrounding the 
standards-writing process (Cavanagh, 2009).  
 The drafted college-and career-readiness standards were released for public 
comments in September 2009 (“Development Process,” n.d.). Then, while the public was 
submitting comments, the CCSS leaders initiated the process of developing the K-12 
standards (Rothman, 2011). During this phase, the CCSSO and the NGA formed work 
groups consisting of experts from the fields of cognition and instruction for English language 
arts and mathematics. Again, the initiative leaders set up feedback groups. They also created 
a validation committee “to evaluate the final product and determine whether it reflected the 
research on college and career readiness and international expectations” (Rothman, 2011, p. 
71).  
 The CCSSO and the NGA released the draft K-12 standards for public comment in 
March 2010 and received close to 10,000 comments (“Development Process,” n.d.). It was 
around this time that initiative leaders began to flag concerns being raised by various interest 
groups. Rothman (2011) says there were three groups that were particularly vocal in their 
criticisms of the CCSS during these early stages: the emerging Tea Party movement; groups 
that voiced particular concerns regarding the issue of early childhood education; and groups 






The Politicization of the Common Core 
  The narrative of what happened next provides a major focus of this research. As 
previously mentioned, the Obama administration used ARRA money to spur standards-based 
education reforms across the states. In 2009, former Secretary of Education Arne Duncan 
announced the RTTT competitive grant program, which awarded points to states based on 
their adoption of certain education reforms (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). One of the 
main criteria for the competition was the development and adoption of common, high-quality 
academic standards. In addition, points were offered for the development and implementation 
of high-quality, common assessments that were aligned to the common standards. 
 According to Cross (2014), “Although there had been neither federal funding nor any 
participation by the federal government in the development of the [CCSS], over time there 
were charges that this was a federal ‘plot’ to control schools and the curriculum” (p. 164). 
Such accusations, typically voiced by “Tea Party” conservatives,14 stressed centuries-old 
concerns about centralized federal authority diminishing local control (Rothman, 2011). This 
opposition was further exacerbated by the perception that RTTT had been used to coerce 
states into the adoption of the standards and participation in the federally funded testing 
consortia (Shober, 2016). 
 Beyond the anxieties that existed regarding the expansion of federal influence, Tea 
Party conservatives’ critiques of the CCSS tapped into partisan opposition to President 
Obama and the Democratic Party (Shober, 2016). This group of critics framed the CCSS 
initiative as a nefarious socialistic project to indoctrinate children and push a radical, secular, 
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left-wing agenda. For example, in her book The Long War & Common Core, conservative 
author Donna Hearne (2015) offered the following assessment of the motives behind the 
CCSS initiative:  
Common Core is the latest effort by a progressive, autocratic elite to 
completely transfer all decisions concerning children from parents, teachers 
and school boards to themselves, and to completely transform America from a 
nation of responsible, moral, independent human beings endowed by their 
Creator with unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to 
robots and servants of the state. (p. xiv)  
 
 Criticisms of the CCSS were not restricted to those emanating from conservatives 
concerned about states’ rights, federal intrusion, and liberal indoctrination. Many educational 
liberals, including the previously supportive American Federation of Teachers (AFT), also 
voiced opposition to the standards. Their grievances included the verdict that educators had 
not been adequately prepared for such a significant transition (Simon, 2014). Moreover, the 
unions were concerned about the fact that, as incentivized by RTTT, student performance on 
the more rigorous CCSS-aligned tests was going to factor into teacher evaluation ratings 
(Shober, 2016). Educational liberals also argued that the CCSS created or reinforced an 
almost inexorable sense of failure for children of color and children from low-income 
families (Ravitch, 2016). Meanwhile, critical scholars voiced consternation about the 
influence of private foundations in the development of the CCSS, which they argued was part 
of a neoliberal agenda to privatize public education (English, 2010, 2016).  
 Concerns about the CCSS that cut across the political spectrum included ones related 
to testing (Shober, 2016). Growing resentment regarding the amount of time spent taking 
tests, opportunities for profiteering by test companies, and the pressure that high-stakes 
testing created for students culminated in the emergence of a nationwide opt-out movement 
in 2014, which was organized by a coalition of disgruntled parents, teachers, and students 





the CCSS-aligned assessments and, over time, opposition to testing became increasingly 
conflated with the standards initiative itself. Another worry felt by parents on both sides of 
the political spectrum concerned data usage and student privacy. Essentially, because RTTT 
included the policy assurance areas of common standards, aligned assessments, and the 
building of data systems, they came to be understood as one “Orwellian” federal project 
(Shober, 2016).  
 As the chart in Appendix A illustrates, public opinion regarding the CCSS declined 
from 2012 to 2016. With the popularity of the standards initiative waning, several states 
decided to abandon the CCSS, while others moved to overhaul or rename them (Gewertz, 
2015; Norton, Ash, & Ballinger, 2017; Ujifusa, 2016b). Furthermore, various prominent 
Republican candidates competing in the 2016 presidential primary elections, including Ted 
Cruz and Donald Trump, used their campaign platforms to denounce the CCSS (Boyer, 
2016). Then, in July 2016, Wikileaks released emails from the Democratic National 
Committee revealing internal correspondence in which the CCSS was described as being a 
“political third rail that we should not be touching at all” (Ujifusa, 2016a). The Common 
Core was now considered too much of a damaged brand for even previously supportive 
political actors and aspirants to mention by name in public. 
Institutional Constraints, Hostile Interests, and Politicization 
 A focus of this investigation was the perceived impact of institutional constraints on 
the political entrepreneurs’ efforts to establish national education standards. In other words, 
how did the structures, rules, norms and interests associated with federalism and education 
constrain the advocacy coalition’s work?  In addition, based on the premise that large 
institutions reflect cultural values and are supported by institutionalized norms and shared 





offered by the participants regarding the politicization of the CCSS reveal about the effects of 
sociocultural factors on subsystem participants and the initiative? 
 As will be explicated in Chapter IV, the participants in this study described 
fragmented education governance structures, laws, and taken-for-granted modes of activity as 
constraining their efforts to establish and implement common state standards. Furthermore, 
according to the entrepreneurs interviewed, the backlash against the CCSS may be 
understood, in part, as a manifestation of popular opposition to what was perceived as being 
federal involvement in the setting of educational standards. Cited reasons for this resistance 
included a valuing of local control, a distrust of centralized policymaking, and a widespread 
ideological preference for individualism. Such ideas and attitudes proved to be especially 
significant to the topic of the politicization, the political entrepreneurs argued, as actors and 
groups with vested interests in existing institutions had strategically emphasized these wedge 
issues to mobilize opposition to the initiative. 
The Major Players 
 Rhodes (2012) identifies five overarching groups that have “defined the trajectory of 
the federal role in education policymaking over the past thirty years” (p. 23). These groups 
are listed in Table 1 along with examples of the organizations that fall within each of 
Rhodes’ categories. Though Rhodes’ analysis places the greatest emphasis on the political 
entrepreneurship of business and civil rights leaders, his account of the history of the 
standards movement reveals that other actors, including academics in conservative think 











Major Players: Groups of Organizations Associated with Education Policymaking in the US 
Source: Adapted from Rhodes (2012, pp. 18-19) 
Group Example 
Business Entrepreneurs • The Business Coalition for Education Reform 
• Business-Higher Education Forum 
• Business Roundtable 
• US Chamber of Commerce Foundation 
Civil Rights Entrepreneurs • The Education Trust 
• The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 
Rights 
• The NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
• National Urban League 
• UnidosUS (Formerly the National Council of La 
Raza) 
Educational Liberals • American Federation of Teachers 
• The Council of Chief State School Officers 
• National Association of State Boards of Education 
• National Education Association 
Educational Conservatives • American Enterprise Institute 
• Foundation for Excellence in Education 
• The Heritage Foundation 
• The Hoover Institute 
• Thomas B. Fordham Institute 
Organizations Representing 
State Elected Officials  
• National Conference of State Legislatures 
• National Governors Association  
 
A more detailed description of each of the categories listed in Table 1 and their 
positions on standards-based reform is provided below. 
Business Entrepreneurs  
 Business entrepreneurs operating within organizations such as the Business 
Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have proven to be strong advocates for 
standards, testing, and accountability policies (Rhodes, 2012; Shober, 2016). These actors 
and their organizations view raising academic requirements and achievement as being vital 
for workforce preparation and global economic competitiveness. The priorities of business 





in policy debates to argue that economic wellbeing is dependent upon preparation of the 
young to “carry out useful economic roles with competence” (p. 42).  
Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
 Civil rights organizations include the Education Trust, the Leadership Conference on 
Civil and Human Rights, and UnidosUS. Like business entrepreneurs, civil rights 
entrepreneurs have long been strong supporters of standards, testing, and accountability 
policies. Civil rights entrepreneurs focus on standards-based accountability as a vehicle for 
drawing attention to the underachievement of low-income students and students of color, 
which they view as being essential for generating the political pressure necessary for 
improving schools serving these students (Rhodes, 2012).  
 Based on Labaree’s (1997) typology of the goals underpinning debates on the purpose 
of American education, civil rights entrepreneurs’ focus on educational equity represents a 
combination of both democratic equality and social mobility goals. Democratic equality 
goals, according to Labaree, view education as a “purely public good” (p. 43) and emphasize 
the pursuit of full civic participation, equal treatment, and equal access. Social mobility 
goals, meanwhile, assert that schools should provide all students with the opportunity to 
pursue the private goods associated with social status and financial security. The common 
ground between these egalitarian and meritocratic ideals is termed progressive educational 
politics by Labaree.  
 Labaree (1997) describes the dispute between proponents of social efficiency and 
progressive reformers as being a major source of conflict in American educational politics. 
However, according to Rhodes (2012), business entrepreneurs (who tend to favor social 





social mobility goals) have been the heart of the coalition driving the standards-based reform 
agenda since the 1990s.  
Educational Liberals (Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders) 
 According to Rhodes (2012), educational liberals’ organizations are typically closely 
linked with the Democratic Party. Both of the major teachers’ unions—the National 
Education Association (NEA) and the AFT—and organizations representing state and local 
level educational leaders, such as the CCSSO, NASBE, and the American Association of 
School Administrators (AASA), fall within this category. Educational liberals have 
traditionally emphasized the lack of resources for districts and schools serving low-income 
students and students of color as being the cause of achievement gaps, rather than the 
absence of standards-based accountability (Rhodes, 2012). However, this position has shifted 
somewhat since the late 1990s. According to Shober (2016), the accumulation of data from 
the NAEP and state assessments gave cause for educational liberals to reconsider their 
resistance to school accountability: “Massive amounts of spending did not seem to correlate 
with substantive changes in achievement, and least of all the ‘test-score gap’” (p. 43). 
 As will be discussed in the findings of this study, the misgivings of teachers’ unions 
about the use of student achievement data in teacher evaluations meant that their backing for 
the CCSS deteriorated over time. This tempering of support set them apart from other groups 
of educational liberals who remained on board with the initiative. Also described in greater 
detail in Chapter IV, conversations with the leaders of organizations that Rhodes (2012) 
categorized as educational liberals revealed less of a consistent political ideology than was 
the case for educational conservatives. For that reason, the decision was made to rename this 







 Educational conservatives are the actors associated with organizations such as the 
Thomas B. Fordham Institute, the Foundation for Excellence in Education (FEE), and the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI). According to Rhodes (2012), educational conservatives 
are generally supportive of standards-based accountability reforms. He describes their policy 
priorities as including the boosting of economic competitiveness and promoting both moral 
and civic virtue. Where this group is quite different from business entrepreneurs and civil 
rights entrepreneurs, however, is that educational conservatives are also strong proponents of 
local control of education. As highlighted in the cases of the Clinton administration’s Goals 
2000 and the Obama administration’s RTTT, educational conservatives remain suspicious of 
any effort to expand federal authority (Rhodes, 2012; Shober, 2016). Hence, though this 
group is open to the idea of federal funding to support local efforts, they much prefer block 
grants and the protection of local discretion regarding the design of standards and 
accountability systems.  
 The conservatives that came together to support the CCSS were primarily center-
right, fiscal conservatives, also known as “Main Street conservatives” (Shober, 2016, p. 40). 
This fact is significant because, as the interviews conducted for this research revealed, the 
influence of the more moderate brand of American conservatism began to decline during the 
Obama era. What is more, as a result of this shift, many educational conservatives found 
themselves at odds with the social conservatism associated with the Tea Party and, later, the 
Trump administration.  
Organizations Representing State Elected Officials 
 The final category identified by Rhodes (2012) is organizations that represent state 





Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). According to Rhodes, state leaders often share the 
priorities of business entrepreneurs regarding the need to bolster economic competitiveness, 
and they view standards-based accountability as a policy lever for achieving this goal. Like 
educational conservatives, organizations representing state officials advocate for state and 
local control of education, rather than prescriptive federal regulations. For the purpose of this 
study, this category was expanded to include organizations that view state policymakers as 
their primary target audience, rather than just membership organizations that represent the 
interests of state elected officials.  
  Though the five types of organization identified by Rhodes (2012) approach the 
issues surrounding education with their own perspectives and policy priorities,15 the 
convergence of concerns between the groups helps create opportunities for the formation of 
coalitions. A useful framework for analyzing the formation and beliefs of such coalitions is 
provided by the ACF (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). 
Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 The ACF was developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith during the 1980s to 
understand and explain policy change when there is goal conflict and technical disputes 
between actors in policy subsystems (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Policy subsystem is the term 
given to a stable configuration of policy actors (including representatives from the private 
sector, members of nonprofit organizations, elected officials from all levels of government, 
consultants, scientists, and members of the media) defined by both a policy topic and 
territorial scope (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Within 
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each policy subsystem, policy actors form coalitions in order to influence subsystem affairs 
and achieve their desired policy objectives (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014).16   
Belief Systems 
 The ACF recognizes the extent to which the actors seeking to influence policy 
subsystems are “boundedly” rational, meaning that they have limited capacity to know how 
to achieve their goals (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). As a result, these individuals tend to 
simplify and interpret the world by way of the adoption of, and adherence to, a belief system 
(Weible & Sabatier, 2007). Similar to the concept of political ideology (covered in a later 
section), belief systems encapsulate the value priorities and causal assumptions about how to 
realize policy objectives shared by actors within a coalition (Sabatier, 1993). According to 
the ACF, it is as a result of the divergence of belief systems that different coalitions view 
problems and solutions in various ways (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  
 The ACF posits that policy beliefs exist within a three-tiered model consisting of 
deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; 
Sabatier, 1993). Deep core beliefs are generalizable (i.e., not policy-specific) and can, 
therefore, be applied across subsystems. Deep core beliefs are normative, fundamental, and 
resistant to change—including perceptions related to relative value priorities (e.g., individual 
rights vs. social rights) and socio-cultural identity (e.g., race/ethnicity and religion) (Weible 
& Sabatier, 2007). Policy core beliefs, by way of contrast, are only concerned with the 
specific policy topic (e.g., education standards) and geographic breadth of the subsystem 
(e.g., North Carolina), which means that they are more bounded in scope than deep core 
beliefs. Secondary beliefs, meanwhile, correspond with “a subset of the policy subsystem or 
the specific instrumental means for achieving the desired outcomes in policy core beliefs” 
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(Jenkins-Smith, 2014, p. 191). These secondary concerns are narrower in scope than policy 
core beliefs (less than subsystem wide) and typically relate to how policy is implemented; for 
example, legislative mandates vs. competitive grants.   
 In the words of Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014), “Advocacy coalitions are defined by 
actors sharing policy core beliefs who coordinate their actions in a nontrivial manner to 
influence a policy subsystem” (p. 195). The ACF conceives that actors within an advocacy 
coalition will demonstrate strong consensus regarding issues that relate to the policy core, but 
that there may be less agreement within the coalition when it comes to deep core and 
secondary beliefs.  
Policy Processes and Change 
 According to the ACF, public policies may be viewed as translations of belief 
systems (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Essentially, a successful advocacy coalition is able to 
translate their value priorities, causal theories, and perceptions about the state of the world 
into adopted policies and programs (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). Because the processes 
of policy change are considered to be ongoing, researchers using the ACF typically adopt a 




















Figure 1.  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework  
Source: Adapted from Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, p. 194) 
 
 The schematic in Figure 1 provides a visual outline of the framework. The ACF 
posits that the majority of policymaking decisions occur as a result of the interactions of 
specialists within the subsystem, but that the behavior of these actors is affected by, and 
sometimes affects, events and factors in the broader societal context (Sabatier & Weible, 
1999; Weible & Sabatier, 2007). The policy subsystem shown in the chart (represented by 
the rectangle on the right) contains two different coalitions (Coalition A and Coalition B) that 
are competing to influence the decisions of governmental authorities, with the expectation 
being that these decisions will ultimately result in the realization of the prevailing coalition’s 
desired policy outputs and impacts (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). It is the policy core beliefs of 
coalition actors and the resources that they have at their disposal that differentiate these 





Weible (2007) include having the formal legal authority to make decisions, skillful 
leadership, access to information, and mobilizable supporters. 
  In subsystems where coalitions are vying for dominance, coalition actors deploy their 
resources and use “various strategies to influence decisions by government authorities” 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014, p. 193). The ACF’s term for the strategies used for altering the 
behavior of governmental institutions is guidance instruments. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993) identify two main categories of guidance instruments available to coalitions: direct 
effects on agency rulemaking and indirect effects via sovereigns. Examples of direct effect 
instruments include the persuasion of agency officials by way of testimony, publicizing 
agency performance gaps in the media, and the development and dissemination of research 
reports. Examples of indirect effects include the pursuit of litigation, influencing public 
opinion (in order to sway the opinion of sovereigns), and seeking to change the policy 
preferences of sovereigns by electing policymakers who better represent the values and 
priorities of the coalition.  
 As already mentioned, policy subsystems exist within, are affected by, and sometimes 
affect, the societal context (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). As shown in Figure 1, the ACF groups 
the various factors contained within the broader environment using two categories of 
variables (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The first set of external 
variables is termed relatively stable parameters, and it includes the basic attributes of the 
problem area and the social, cultural, economic, and institutional structures that embed the 
subsystem. These relatively stable parameters are unlikely to change over the period of a 
decade or so, thus they rarely provide the impetus for policy change within a subsystem 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007). According to Weible and Sabatier (2007), such factors do, 





participants, establish the rules and procedures for changing policy and reaching collective 
decisions, and broadly frame the values that inform policymaking” (p. 125). The second set 
of exogenous variables is called external subsystem events. These variables, which include 
major socioeconomic changes and changes in political leadership, are more prone to change 
over shorter periods of time than the relatively stable parameters. External subsystem events 
shift public attention toward or away from a policy subsystem, thus creating opportunities 
and constraints for subsystem actors, and they can, therefore, be critical factors when it 
comes to policy change (Weible & Sabatier, 2007).  
 The intermediary set of concepts shown in between the relatively stable parameters 
and the subsystem in Figure 1 is dubbed long-term coalition opportunity structures. These 
factors are considered by-products of the relatively stable parameters, and they include the 
openness of the political system (i.e., the number of political venues that exist and level of 
accessibility to these venues) and the degree of consensus needed for policy change (i.e., the 
number of veto points that major reforms must go through) (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; 
Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The long-term opportunity structures provide examples of the 
ways in which the relatively stable parameters affect the availability of resources and the 
behaviors of subsystem actors (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). In addition to these long-term 
structures, the short-term constraints and resources (represented by the box between external 
subsystem events and the subsystem in Figure 1) associated with changes outside of the 
subsystem are significant because they create circumstances for coalitions to respond to or 
exploit (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014).  
 Both sets of variables associated with the broader societal context (relatively stable 
parameters and external subsystem events) are relevant to the topics explored in this 





associated with federalism have long created constraints for political entrepreneurs seeking to 
establish and implement federal education policies and programs. Furthermore, according to 
interview participants, external subsystem events, including changes in governing coalitions 
within state legislatures and the Tea Party’s rise to prominence, served to undercut the 
resources available for the CCSS advocacy coalition.  
 The four conceptual pathways to policy change offered by the ACF are external 
perturbations or shocks, policy-oriented learning, internal shocks, and negotiated 
agreements (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). External shocks include 
regime changes, changes in socioeconomic conditions, and extreme crises or disasters. 
According to Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014), such events “increase the likelihood of major 
policy change but require one or several enabling factors (causal mechanisms), including 
heightened public and political attention, agenda setting, and, most importantly, 
redistribution of coalition resources and opening and closing of policy venues” (p. 202). 
Policy-oriented learning refers to changes in the ideas and behaviors of subsystem 
participants resulting from experience or new information (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Policy 
changes stemming from learning tend to be incremental in nature, unfolding over longer 
periods of time (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Internal shocks are events, including scandals 
and failures, that occur within the territorial scope and topical area of the subsystem (Sabatier 
& Weible, 2007). Like external shocks, internal shocks serve to redistribute the political 
resources of coalitions, thus shifting or tipping the balance of power within a subsystem. 
When responding to these types of shocks, advocacy coalitions engage in framing contests: 
seeking to control discourse and perceptions about the severity, causes, and implications of 
the problem (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Negotiated agreements between competing 





 As already stated, the ACF’s recognition of the impact of external variables on the 
resources and behaviors of subsystem participants proved relevant to the accounts provided 
by political entrepreneurs for this study. In addition to the influence of such external factors, 
the interviews with advocacy coalition members revealed a major disagreement between 
certain subsystem actors, which subsequently led to a coalitional schism. According to 
multiple participants, members of the education reform community and members of 
organizations representing educators fell out regarding the decision to factor student 
achievement data into teacher evaluations. This internal event created doubts about the core 
beliefs of the coalition, brought into question decisions that had been made regarding 
changes in teacher evaluation policy, and, according to many of the informants, ultimately 
proved to be a principal factor leading to the politicization and declining popularity of the 
initiative.  
The Standards-Based Reform Advocacy Coalition 
 Rhodes (2012) argues that the rise and sustained dominance of the standards-based 
reform paradigm from the 1990s through the Obama administration may be largely attributed 
to the efforts of the coalition that formed between business entrepreneurs and civil rights 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, despite their opposition to strong federal involvement, state 
officials and educational conservatives frequently supported the main principles of the 
standards movement. From an ACF perspective, the perceived need for higher academic 
standards and increased accountability allowed for the convergence of policy core beliefs that 
enabled the formation and maintenance of the standards-based reform advocacy coalition.  
 According to Rhodes’ (2012) depiction of events, organizations representing 
educators and educational leaders, including both of the major teachers’ unions, were 





major players. What is more, some actors from within this category (e.g., academics in 
schools of education) actively spoke out against the standards movement, characterizing it as 
“a conservative ideological attack on educational equity or a corporate take-over of 
schooling” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 67). Over time, however, open hostility toward standards and 
accountability became increasingly difficult to defend among groups advocating for students 
of color and students from low-income families, especially when faced with the gaps in 
achievement highlighted by NAEP data (Shober, 2016). As a result, organizations 
representing educators and educational leaders began to offer their cautious support for 
standards-based reforms in education, provided that such policies and programs were 
accompanied by adequate levels of funding and resources (Rhodes, 2012).  
The CCSS Coalition 
 The coalition of organizations that were directly involved in the development of the 
CCSS, offered official statements of support, or are on record elsewhere as supporters 
includes representatives from all five of the groups identified by Rhodes (2012) as being 
major players in the education reform space (see Table 1). Notable examples taken from each 
category include the NGA (state officials), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (business 
entrepreneurs), the Education Trust (civil rights entrepreneurs), the Thomas B. Fordham 
Institute (educational conservatives), and the CCSSO (organizations representing educators 
or educational leaders).  
 The research described here sought to understand the perspectives of political 
entrepreneurs from each of these five overarching groups of organizations regarding the 
politicization of the initiative. The investigation also was designed to examine the policy core 
beliefs held by actors within the coalition. The goal of gaining insights into the perceptions 





           Qualitative Research: “What is it?”    
 As described by Bogdan and Biklen (2007), the goal of qualitative research “is to 
better understand human behavior and experience” (p.43). In essence, according to Van 
Manen (1990), “Qualitative research (qualis means ‘whatness’) asks the ti estin question: 
What is it?” (p. 33). This quest to know what something is involves a “conceptualization of 
the matter under investigation as a whole and in its various parts, the way these parts are 
related and organized as whole, and how the whole is similar to and different from other 
things” (Wertz et al., 2011, p. 2). Furthermore, understanding the what may require 
knowledge of the how, including its processes and temporal unfolding, and its when and 
where, which are especially important factors when seeking to understand the contextual 
effects of the wider world on the object being observed (Wertz et al., 2011).   
Realism and Constructionism 
 The field of qualitative research may, for the most part, be divided into two separate 
camps with differing orientations toward analyses: realism and constructionism (Gergen, 
1998; Sandelowski, 2012). Realism is founded on the assertion that there is an external world 
that exists independently of human representations of it (Burr, 2015). Researchers of a realist 
orientation seek to document perceptions and events without questioning the facticity of the 
world (Sandelowski, 2012). In short, realist researchers believe that “truth” can transcend 
opinions, values, and personal biases, and realist research is concerned with accurately 
conveying what is “really” going on (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).17 Constructionism takes less 
for granted than realism, denying that human knowledge is a direct perception of reality 
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(Creswell, 2007).18 Rather than attempting to establish the nature of an “objective reality,” 
constructionist research emphasizes realities as perceived by participants: an emic view of the 
social world (Creswell, 2007; Galvan, 2009; Sadovnik, 2014).19 As stated by Creswell 
(2007), the goal of constructionist research is “to make sense [of] (or interpret) the meanings 
others have about the world” (p. 21). 
 According to Burr (2015), “Social constructionism insists that we take a critical 
stance toward our taken-for-granted ways of understanding the world and ourselves” (p. 2). 
Researchers of a social constructionist orientation subscribe to the idea that all meaning is 
indeterminate and that ways of knowing are, thus, historically and culturally relative. 
Moreover, social constructionism postulates that, “It is through the daily interactions between 
people in the course of social life that our versions of knowledge become fabricated. 
Therefore social interaction of all kinds, especially language, is of great interest to social 
constructionists” (Burr, 2015, pp. 4-5). As will be described in greater detail in the later 
section on narrative inquiry, social constructionism treats the narratives that humans tell as 
interpretive acts rather than as direct perceptions of reality.  
 Though the terms social constructionism and constructivism are sometimes used 
interchangeably, these concepts are not synonymous (Burr, 2015). Constructivism places 
emphasis on the role that each individual agent plays in actively constructing her or his own 
world of experience (Andrews, 2012). Conversely, social constructionism underscores the 
																																																								
18	In this dissertation, constructionism is used as an umbrella term to refer to the idea that 
knowledge is constructed, either by individual people or by way of social interactions. The 
term social constructionism, meanwhile, refers specifically to knowledge being socially 
constructed.		
	
19	Qualitative research rooted within the interpretive or constructionist traditions rejects, in 







extent to which such constructions are the product of structural or interactional social forces 
(Burr, 2015). The research described in this dissertation is social constructionist in 
orientation.  
Relativism  
 As mentioned above, realists believe in the assertion that truth exists “out there” to be 
discovered by the researcher. Social constructionists, on the other hand, contend that there is 
no one singular truth, instead arguing that there are multiple and varying interpretations of 
reality, all of which are constructed by way of social processes (Creswell, 2007). The 
suggestion that meaning is indeterminate has often led to social constructionism being 
labeled relativist (Hammersley, 1992).20 Relativism suggests that if there is such a thing as 
reality, it is not accessible to humans, thus making all interpretations and representations of 
the world equally valid. A criticism often leveled at the concept of relativism is that if all 
accounts carry equal validity, the idea of morality and justification for political action are 
fundamentally nullified (Burr, 2015). However, as the next section clarifies, the charge that 
all research rooted in the social constructionist tradition represents a form of crude relativism 
is an erroneous one. 
The Social Construction of Reality 
 Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) book The Social Construction of Reality bridges the 
gap between the social world as objective reality and the social world as subjective reality. 
Building on the sociology of knowledge outlined by the German philosopher Max Scheler 
(Scheler & Scheler, 1960) and the Austrian philosopher Alfred Schutz’s (1962) 
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constructionism views scientific knowledge as being only partly the product of social 
negotiation. Weak constructionism, therefore, avoids the charge of relativism: that all 
interpretations are equally valid. Strong constructionism, contrastingly, conceives that all 






phenomenological approach to sociology, Berger and Luckmann developed a framework for 
examining the relationship between human thought and the sociocultural context within 
which cognition is embedded. Though their central argument is that human reality is socially 
constructed, they posit that these constructs are commonly experienced as possessing an 
external and objective reality. Stated differently, “Berger and Luckmann saw the relationship 
between the individual and society as operating in both directions: human beings continually 
construct the social world, which then becomes a reality to which they must respond” (Burr, 
2015, p. 210). 
 In the words of Berger and Luckmann (1967), “Social order is not part of the ‘nature 
of things’ and it cannot be derived from the ‘laws of nature.’ Social order exists only as a 
product of human activity” (p. 52). Regarding the processes associated with the construction 
and maintenance of social order, the coauthors delineate an ongoing dialectical process 
consisting of three moments: externalization, objectivation, and internalization. 
 Externalization is the term used by Berger and Luckmann (1967) to describe the 
products of human activity that help stabilize the social environment for subsequent human 
conduct. At its most basic level, “All human activity is subject to habitualization” (p. 53). 
The repetition of actions by human actors helps facilitate the learning of and subsequent 
replication of these actions. Habitualization also makes it unnecessary for humans to 
experience each situation as new and in need of redefinition. Over time, habitualization has 
the potential to become institutionalized. “Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a 
reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors” (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967, p. 54). In other words, as time passes, members of social groups come to recognize 
certain forms of human activity by certain types of actors, which thus gain acceptance as 





predefined patterns of conduct, sometimes by way of sanctions that have been set up to 
support the institution.  
Critical for understanding a central assumption of the research proposed here, Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) describe social institutions as being the product of history. Essentially, 
as the institutional world gets transmitted to subsequent generations through the processes of 
socialization, social institutions become crystallized and start to be “experienced as 
possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and 
coercive fact” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 58). It is at this stage that social institutions 
take on the appearance of an objective reality. The process by which externalized human 
activity is experienced as objective reality is dubbed objectivation. Every social institution 
that exists, Berger and Luckmann argue, is an example of objectivated human activity. 
Moreover, “The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations; it is only 
possible because of them” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 35). 
 Objectivation allows humanly created symbols to carry meaning far beyond the here 
and now (Burr, 2015). An important example of objectivation highlighted by Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) is signification, by which is meant humanly produced signs clustered 
within systems. Berger and Luckmann identify language as being “the most important sign 
system of human society” (p. 37). They describe language as being encountered by human 
actors as having an objectivated, external facticity, which coerces them into ready-made 
patterns such as rules of syntax, grammar, and established vocabulary. Though language is 
expansive and pliant enough to enable a human actor to make personal, subjective 
experiences available to other people, it is also used to typify experiences so that they may be 





 Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe language as developing and being ordered in 
linguistically circumscribed zones of meaning, known as semantic fields, which serve as 
classification schemes. These semantic fields help with the ordering of social experience. The 
subject of semantic fields will be revisited in a later section of this chapter. 
  “Because of its capacity to transcend the ‘here and now,’ language bridges different 
zones within the reality of everyday life and integrates them into a meaningful whole” 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 39). This capacity for transcendence and integration means 
that language can make present a whole world of events and objects that are spatially, 
temporally, and socially absent. These qualities are what make language an appropriate 
subject for research when seeking to understand the relationship between the individual and 
society as well as when investigating how actors construct meaning from events in their lives 
(Burr, 2015). 
 The third moment described by Berger and Luckmann (1967) is internalization. The 
internalization of reality provides the basis by which humans are able to understand one 
another and comprehend the world as a meaningful social reality. Internalization begins with 
the primary socialization of children by early caregivers or parents. It is during this phase 
that a child starts to develop a sense of identity and place in the world. Primary socialization 
is also the time when a child first acquires language and comes to understand the objectivated 
meanings and institutions of her particular culture. The processes of socialization do not, 
however, conclude with the transition from childhood. In fact, socialization is never 
finalized. Secondary socialization is the term given by Berger and Luckmann to the 
“internalization of institutional or institution-based ‘subworlds’” (p. 138) that occurs 
following primary socialization. Secondary socialization requires the acquisition of role-





interpretations and conduct within specific social spaces. Internalization is essential as it 
enables the individual actor to function as a member of society and engage in meaningful 
interactions with other people. 
Commonsense Reality 
 Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) sociology of knowledge made commonsense reality, 
rather than academic or theoretical ideas, the central focus of investigation. Commonsense 
reality refers to taken-for-granted interpretations that are understood “by the ordinary 
members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967, pp. 19-20). Stated differently, commonsense reality is intersubjective 
knowledge that is shared by members of a society or social group within the normal, self-
evident routines of everyday life.  
 Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) book strongly influenced the design of the research 
described here. Interview data were analyzed in order to identify and compare the 
perceptions of political entrepreneurs regarding objectivated institutions—especially those 
associated with federalism and education—and how these humanly devised rules and 
constraints were understood as having impacted their entrepreneurship while working on the 
CCSS. In addition, Berger and Luckmann’s description of the use of language by actors to 
integrate events into a meaningful whole was a determining factor in the methodological 
decision to analyze oral narratives.  
Narrative Inquiry 
 Chapter III of this dissertation provides details about the specific methodology 
underlying the research design of this investigation. It is also important, however, to 





that guided the research. For that reason, the following section outlines information about the 
form of qualitative research used for the analysis: narrative inquiry.  
 According to Squire, Andrews, and Tamboukou (2013), although narrative inquiry 
has disciplinary roots in the fields of literary theory, history, and anthropology, the core ideas 
of contemporary narrative social research may be traced back to two parallel academic 
movements. The first of these movements is the humanist approaches associated with 
western sociology and psychology that first emerged during the mid-20th century (e.g., 
Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988). The second movement is Russian structuralism (e.g., 
Bahktin, 1981), which spawned the later French poststructuralist, postmodernist, and 
deconstructionist approaches to narratives within the humanities (e.g., Derrida, 1972; 
Foucault, 2010; Foucault & Deleuze, 1977).  
What is a Narrative? 
 The term narrative comes from the Late Latin narrativus (telling a story), which itself 
comes from the Latin narrare (to make known) (Narrative, 1993). Narrativus and narrare are 
both related to the Latin word gnārus (knowing or expert), which is derived from the ancient 
Indo-European root gnâ (to know) (Prince, 2000). “Thus, a narrative is a form of knowledge 
that catches the two sides of narrative, telling as well as knowing” (Kim, 2016, p. 6). A 
narrative recounts and organizes events in an unfolding temporal and meaningful sequence 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). Though the term story is sometimes used interchangeably with 
narrative, a story is a more detailed organization of narrative events (not necessarily in 
chronological order) with a beginning, middle, and end. Therefore, “Narratives constitute 
stories, and stories rely on narratives” (Kim, 2016, p. 9).  
 In the words of Polkinghorne (1988), “The products of narrative schemes are 





present in people’s thoughts, conversations, and dreams. Narratives are evident in the 
messages emanating from the news media, history books, documentaries, movies, folk tales, 
parables, legal defenses, and novels. Narratives are also present in all forms of inquiry, 
whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or interpretivist (Kim, 2016). We understand 
our lives as a series of interlocking narratives, and narratives help us understand the actions 
of others (MacIntyre, 2007).  
What is Narrative Inquiry?  
 There is no single or dominant approach to narrative inquiry (Kim, 2016), but 
because the analysis of narrative data emphasizes subjectivity and identity, Riessman (1993) 
suggests that, “It is inappropriate for topics and theories in which the characteristics of actors 
as active agents remain unexplored or implicit” (p. 5). Indeed, the value of narratives 
includes that they provide an account of personal experience and offer insight into the 
multiple perspectives that make up social reality (Creswell, 2007).  As described by Wertz et 
al. (2011), “Narrative research takes as a premise that people live and/or understand their 
lives in storied forms, connecting events in the manner of a plot that has beginning, middle, 
and end points” (p. 224). Narrative modes of inquiry are predominantly concerned with 
determining how individuals and groups make sense of, emplot, and attach causality to 
events in their lives through the examination of the structure and function of stories that they 
tell. 
Narrative inquiry also recognizes the impact of the social environment. Vitally, 
though the stories told by participants may appear natural on face value, closer analysis can 
begin to identify the ways in which their content and form are culturally and historically 






Micro- and Macro-Level Techniques of Narrative Inquiry 
 Narrative modes of inquiry may be divided into both micro- and macro-level 
techniques (Sandelowski, 2012; Turvey, 2016). Micro-level techniques are concerned with 
interpreting the linguistic practices and structures employed within narratives (the linguistic 
intent). Macro-level techniques, on the other hand, are directed toward identifying examples 
of collective or cultural stories (the ethnographic intent). In the case of the investigation 
described here, the narratives told by members of an advocacy coalition were primarily 
analyzed for examples of macrostructures: the collective stories told by groups of political 
entrepreneurs.  
 As previously discussed, Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe language as being the 
most important objectivated sign system of human society. A language coerces its users into 
set patterns, or rules, and provides “a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification 
of…unfolding experience” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 39). Stated simply, language 
allows a person to communicate their subjective experiences to others, but it also serves to 
typify and categorize experiences so that others may understand them. Moreover, the 
narratives that people tell tend to follow structures that resemble other stories, thus resulting 
in a blend of both uniqueness and universality (Kim, 2016). 
 The approach to narrative inquiry used for the research described here made both the 
uniqueness and the commonalities of the stories told by political entrepreneurs the object of 
the study. As has already been explained, a major focus of this research was comparing and 
contrasting the narratives of a purposeful sample of political entrepreneurs within an 
advocacy coalition so as to identify common themes and differences in interpretations 
regarding the politicization of the CCSS, the challenges associated with seeking to establish 





the work of two scholars within the field of narrative inquiry was particularly influential in 
shaping the methodological framework outlined in Chapter III: Jerome Bruner (1986) and 
Donald Polkinghorne (1995). 
Jerome Bruner and Narrative Modes of Knowing 
According to Wertz et al. (2011), American psychologist Jerome Bruner was “drawn 
to linguistic philosophy for insight into human language capacities and to cultural 
anthropology for insight into how thinking is culturally bound” (p. 64). Bruner’s research 
interests included exploring how people create meaning, construct reality, and are influenced 
by the historical and cultural factors associated with their specific social context. Over the 
course of his career, he conducted research that focused on “perception, language, 
communication, and culture, all leading eventually to an integration of these phenomena into 
what is called the ‘narrative paradigm’” (Wertz et al., 2011, p. 64). 
 Bruner viewed narratives as the “fundamental building blocks of human experience” 
(Wertz et al., 2011, p. 65), theorizing that stories help facilitate the processing of events and 
the making of meaning. He believed that people are innately predisposed to organize their 
experiences in narrative form and that the stories people tell are strongly influenced by the 
culture in which they are embedded (Kim, 2016). We, in essence, create stories about our 
lives and live out our stories. Narratives are used to construct reality and meaning, make 
sense of the events and experiences of life, and create a sense of order.  
According to Bruner, culture provides ready-made structures for the telling and 
interpreting of narratives so that they are comprehensible to both the narrator and to an 
audience. Moreover, “Cultures create the realm of stories that are deemed acceptable, 
defining a tension between the expected life and what is humanly possible. Sharing common 





Bruner (1986) argued that there are two types of cognition, or modes of thought, used 
to make meaning of reality: the paradigmatic mode and the narrative mode. The 
paradigmatic mode relies on positivistic logic and empirical evidence, and it is used to 
identify elements that fit within general categories, taxonomies, or patterns. The narrative 
mode, on the other hand, is used to combine elements into emplotted stories. The narratives 
produced through this mode serve the purpose of providing explanatory knowledge of why a 
person acted in a certain way. The narrative mode is less rigid than the paradigmatic, and this 
flexibility allows for multiple interpretations of particular episodes, capturing the nuances of 
the human experience and looking for connections between events.  
Polkinghorne’s Narrative Configuration in Qualitative Analysis 
Building on Bruner’s (1986) theory of modes of thought, Polkinghorne (1995) argues 
that there are two main types of analysis that can be used within narrative inquiry: analysis of 
narratives and narrative analysis. Analysis of narratives is based on the paradigmatic mode, 
while narrative analysis relies on narrative cognition (Kim, 2016).  
Polkinghorne (1995) describes narrative analysis as being a research procedure in 
which elements of data are organized into a “coherent developmental account” (p. 15). 
Analysis of narratives, on the contrary, employs paradigmatic reasoning to identify common 
themes and concepts across a database of stories.   
According to Polkinghorne (1995), there are two types of paradigmatic searches:  
(a) one in which the concepts are derived from previous theory or 
logical possibilities and are applied to the data to determine whether instances 
of these concepts are to be found; and (b) one in which the concepts are 
inductively derived from the data. (p. 13) 
 
Rather than seeking to discover or describe unique or particular occurrences, paradigmatic 
analysis of narratives is concerned with identifying relationships among categories and 





is Polkinghorne’s analysis of narratives that was selected as the basis for the approach used 
in this investigation. Specifically, the narratives told by political entrepreneurs were analyzed 
for patterns of interpretations and beliefs both between and within the five overarching 
categories of organizations (see Table 1).  
Polkinghorne’s (1995) second type of analysis, narrative analysis, is based on 
Bruner’s (1986) description of the narrative mode of thought. Narrative analysis seeks to 
construct narratives as the product of the research. The data used for this type of analysis are 
typically not in storied form; it is the job of the researcher to organize or synthesize data 
elements into a coherent plotline, linking past events together to make meanings and account 
for an outcome. The researcher constructing the narrative may use a plot type as an 
organizing template, such as the Aristotelian categories of tragedy (where the protagonist 
does not achieve her goal) or comedy (where the protagonist does achieve her goal) 
(Aristotle, 1996). In addition, where gaps exist in the data on events and actions, the 
researcher may use a narrative smoothing process, filling in these omissions in order to make 
the participant’s story coherent to the reader (Polkinghorne, 1995; Spence, 1986). Unlike his 
description of analysis of narratives, Polkinghorne’s narrative analysis attends to particular 
human actions in a particular setting and does not seek to generate generalizable knowledge 
(Kim, 2016). This approach was not appropriate for this study because the aim was to 
examine and compare multiple perspectives of events, rather than establishing a singular or 
coherent plotline. With that being said, Bruner’s (1986) writing on narrative modes of 
thought and the suggestion that there may be multiple interpretations of particular events was 





Self-Narrative and Emplotment 
In his book, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, Polkinghorne (1988) 
explains how “We achieve our personal identities and self-concept through the use of the 
narrative configuration, and make our existence into a whole by understanding it as an 
expression of a single unfolding and developing story” (p. 150). As already described, a story 
is a detailed organization of narrative events and actions into a unified whole with a 
beginning, middle, and end (Kim, 2016).  Writing about Polkinghorne’s theory of the self-
narrative, Wertz et al. (2011) offer the following description: 
Because we are in the middle of the plots of our lives, we have no 
clear idea about how they will evolve and end. We have to revise our stories 
constantly, reshuffle the memories of the past and perform new selection of 
events and characters, in accordance with the new current experiences or life 
development, and with the changing expectations regarding our future. (p. 66)  
 
According to Polkinghorne (1995), the act of emplotment functions to configure events and 
actions into a story by delimiting a temporal range marking the beginning and ending of the 
story; providing the criteria for selecting events to be included in a story; ordering events into 
a temporal, unfolding plotline that culminates in a conclusion; and clarifying the meaning 
events have to the story as a unified whole. 
 During the interviews conducted for this investigation, the prompts encouraged 
participants to focus on the events occurring since the implementation of the standards (see 
Figure 2). In several instances, however, respondents elected to begin their stories regarding 
the events and factors associated with the politicization of the initiative at an earlier period, 
thus indicating that they understood the politics of the CCSS as being part of a broader 
plotline.  
Undoubtedly, the specific timing of the interviews will have influenced the reflections 





conducted during the early months of the Trump presidency likely impacted the political 
entrepreneurs’ expectations regarding the future of common state standards. This issue is 
revisited in the section on limitations.  
Theory on Narrative Data Analysis 
 Narrative inquiry typically consists of the analysis of first-person accounts in order to 
see “how respondents in interviews impose order on the flow of experience to make sense of 
events and actions in their lives” (Riessman, 1993, p. 2). The analytic approaches associated 
with this type of research explore how informants’ stories have been constructed, the cultural 
and linguistic resources that their stories draw upon, and the ways in which they persuade 
listeners of their authenticity. As articulated by Riessman (1993), analysis of narrative data is 
not merely concerned with content, it also asks, “Why was the story told that way?” (p. 2). 
The distinction between the linguistic and the ethnographic intent of stories told may be 
examined by way of the aforementioned micro- and macro-level techniques associated with 
narrative inquiry (Sandelowski, 2012).  
Methods for Organizing and Analyzing Data: Building on Analysis of Narratives 
 Though Polkinghorne’s (1995) analysis of narratives offers a general approach for 
engaging in narrative inquiry, it does not provide specific methods for organizing or 
analyzing the data, beyond his suggestion of conducting paradigmatic searches based on 
existing theory or inductive reasoning. This investigation, therefore, drew from other sources 
while developing the framework for analysis. Specifically, aspects of Labov and Waletzky’s 
(1997) model for narrative extraction and McBeth et al.’s (2014) description of narrative core 
elements were combined and used within the theory-generated provisional coding framework 






Labov and Waletzky’s Model 
 Labov and Waletzky’s model (1997) offers a framework for the analysis of first-
person accounts of personal experience. The Labovian approach is event-centered, rather 
than context-centered, and treats personal narratives as a form of text that functions to 
represent past experiences in storied form (Patterson, 2013). Based on Labov’s (1972) 
definition, “a sequence of two clauses which are temporally ordered” (p. 360) constitutes a 
minimal narrative. 
Labov and Waletzky’s (1997) analytic method consists of parsing the clauses 
contained within a transcribed oral narrative into numbered lines. These numbered clauses 
serve as the basic units for analysis. Each individual clause is then categorized using the six 
elements that Labov and Waletzky suggest constitute the overall structure of most narratives 
(see Table 2).  
Table 2. 
Labov and Waletzky’s Common Elements of Narratives 
Source: Adapted from Labov and Waletzky (1997) 
Narrative Element Description 
Abstract  A summary of the story. 
Orientation The time, place, participants, and situation. 
Complicating Action The sequence of events. 
Evaluation The significance of events and actions. 
Result or Resolution What finally happened? 
Coda Returning the verbal perspective to the 
present. 
 
 Abstract. The abstract element is optional within the telling of a story, typically 
occurs toward the beginning, and functions as an introduction. An example of an abstract is 





Sometimes the abstract provides a summary of the whole story (Labov, 1972). For example, 
“I’ve just had the hardest time trying to find the books I need at the Davis Library.” In an 
interview situation, the question asked may constitute the abstract of a narrative, thus 
negating the need for the narrator to provide her own (Patterson, 2013).  
 Orientation. Orientation clauses function to provide information about the time and 
place of the narrative as well as the people who were involved and the situation being 
described (Labov, 1972). For instance, “I was between the stacks on the sixth floor last 
Saturday.”  
 Complicating action. Complicating action clauses provide the spine of the narrative, 
emplotting the temporal sequence of related events. As described by Patterson (2013), “The 
series can be added to, indefinitely, as if in response to ‘and then what happened?’ as long as 
the events are related in chronological order” (p. 31). Where deviations from the 
chronological order of events occur, explanatory clauses are used to indicate the actual order 
of events. The ordered complicating action clauses, also known as narrative clauses, form 
what is termed the skeleton plot (Kim, 2016).  
 Labov’s (1972) definition of narrative clauses specifies that, “It is only independent 
clauses which can function as narrative clauses” (p. 362). Moreover, Labov designates that 
the narrative clauses that make up the complicating action must refer to past events that are 
inferred to have actually happened, not to general events, which may have occurred on 
multiple occasions, or future events that are unrealized at the time of telling.  
 Evaluation. According to Labov (1972), evaluation is “perhaps the most important 
element in addition to the basic narrative clause” (p. 366). Evaluation clauses serve to 





narrator regarding the story told. Essentially, “Narrators say in evaluation clauses (the soul of 
the narrative) how they want to be understood and what the point is” (Riessman, 1993, p. 20).  
 The evaluation of a narrative is described by Labov (1972) as forming a “secondary 
structure which is concentrated in the evaluation section but may be found in various forms 
throughout the narrative” (p. 369). He conceived evaluation clauses as coming in three main 
forms: external evaluation, embedded evaluation, and evaluative action. External evaluations 
occur when the narrator stops the complicating action and overtly states what the point is. 
Embedded evaluations are built into the storyline, thus preserving the continuity of the 
plotline. An example of embedded evaluation would be where the narrator tells how she felt 
at a given moment: “I was delighted.” Evaluative action clauses also occur within the story, 
but they work by conveying emotions without the emotions being explicitly named; for 
example, “I was shaking like a leaf.”  
 Labov (1972) further categorizes evaluative elements into several types of device, 
which may be deployed within narratives. These devices include intensifiers, comparators, 
and explicatives. According to Labov, intensifiers select events and intensify them using 
gestures, expressive phonology (e.g., it took a lo-o-ong time), quantifiers (e.g., I was aching 
all over), or repetition. Comparators compare the events that did occur to events that did not. 
An example of a comparator is, “I was convinced that I was going to die.” Explicatives serve 
an evaluative function and involve causality. For example, “I was shaking like a leaf 
[because] I was so nervous.” 
 Result or resolution. Resolution clauses communicate how the story ends. They 
mark the conclusion of the plotline or the termination of the complicating action. An example 






 Coda.  Like abstract clauses, the coda is not always present in narratives. The coda 
occurs at the end of the telling and provides a transition, or sign off, from the storytelling 
back to the present time. As described by Labov (1972), “Codas may also contain general 
observations or show the effects of the events on the narrator” (p. 365).  
 Narrative elements as questions. Labov (1972) suggests that narratives be viewed as 
a series of answers to the following underlying questions: 
a. Abstract: what was this about? 
b. Orientation: who, when, what, where? 
c. Complicating action: then what happened? 
d. Evaluation: so what? 
e. Result: what finally happened? (p. 370) 
 Effective narratives. Labov and Waletzky’s model (1997) describe the complicating 
action clauses as being the most essential elements of a narrative. The abstract, orientation, 
result and evaluation clauses all function to create what Labov (1972) terms an “effective 
narrative” (p. 370), with the first three clarifying the referential functions and the evaluation 
clauses answering the functional question of why the story was told. Coda clauses do not 
answer any of the five questions listed above and instead are used to signal that questions c 
and d are now irrelevant (Labov, 1972).  
 Using the Labovian model. According to Riessman (1993), Labov and Waletzky’s 
structural approach is paradigmatic: “Most investigators cite it, apply it, or use it as a point of 
departure” (p. 18). Labov and Waletzky’s (1997) model may be used to reduce and organize 
the data in such a way as to identify the core meaning of oral narrative accounts. Researchers 
that use the Labovian approach extract the narratives contained within a full transcript and 





Any clause that does not fit under these categories is excluded. The data are then re-presented 
by the researcher, leaving out all of the extracted clauses that do not fit into the categories of 
abstract, orientation, complicating action, or resolution. Together, these four types of clause 
make up what is known as the core narrative. The core narrative is referential, as it provides 
a representation of what happened without the narrator’s evaluation of events. The evaluation 
clauses may then be reintroduced in order to examine the perspective of the narrator 
regarding the events of the story.  
 As argued by Patterson (2013), an advantage of the Labovian approach is that it 
“utilizes a detailed and rigorous method for the analysis of personal experience narratives, 
and can provide an excellent starting point for analyzing transcripts of talk produced in a 
variety of different contexts” (p. 33). Moreover, this type of reduction offers a powerful 
technique for a comparative analysis of a collection of narratives from a range of 
respondents.  
Patterson’s (2013) description of the use of Labov and Waletzky’s model to produce 
“detailed comparative analyses of evaluation across a sample of narratives” (p. 34) aligns 
well with Polkinghorne’s (1995) paradigmatic analysis of narrative data. Specifically, the 
Labovian approach to the identification of core narratives and evaluation clauses makes it 
possible to compare descriptions and evaluations of the same events as provided by different 
narrators across a database of stories.    
 Limitations of the Labov and Waletzky model.  The Labovian model is not without 
its limitations. For example, Mishler (1986b) suggests that the Labovian approach of 
extracting a core narrative ignores the extent to which narratives are influenced by the 
context in which they are told. Building on this same critique, Patterson (2013) argues that 





recognize how the telling is a form of self-presentation, where the past is reconstructed for an 
audience. As described by Riessman (1993), “Labov’s model leaves out the relationship 
between the teller and listener” (p. 20). The problem with this is that asymmetries of power 
between interviewers and interviewees have the potential to strongly influence the content 
and shape of the narratives that appear (Mishler, 1986b).  
Another major criticism is that the model’s focus on past tense narrative clauses 
means that other kinds of talk used within stories, including details about events that were not 
directly experienced by the narrator, or events that may happen in the future, are not included 
(Patterson, 2013). What is more, according to Kim (2016), the model has been criticized for 
its tendency to depend on monological narratives. This criticism is also cited by Patterson 
(2013), who suggests that interview data often do not conform to the structure of text that the 
model has been designed to analyze.  
 Patterson (2013) and Kim (2016) both advise that Labov and Waletzky’s (1997) 
model should not be treated as being absolute or fixed. Instead, they suggest that the 
Labovian approach ought to be used as a foundation or point of departure, which may then be 
modified as needed. In the words of Patterson (2013), “There are many ways in which 
narrative analysts can utilize the valuable aspects of Labov’s work by using more inclusive 
definitional criteria” (p. 43). Indeed, while the research described here borrowed from Labov, 
the narratives provided by participants were not structured in such a way as to make the 
extraction of core narratives feasible. Additionally, given that the focus of this analysis 
included predictions regarding the future of the common state standards movement, focusing 
solely on past tense clauses would have been inappropriate.  
 The Labovian model is far from the only framework for analyzing narrative data. 





Framework (NPF), which focuses specifically on the narratives told by “policy 
entrepreneurs” (McBeth et al., 2014, p. 225). 
Narrative Policy Framework 
 In recent years, the NPF has grown in popularity as a framework for studying the 
narratives constructed and told by politicians and political strategists (McBeth et al., 2014). 
The NPF asserts that the competing narratives told by policy entrepreneurs to advocate for or 
against a policy contain specific elements that are generalizable across policy contexts: a 
setting, characters, a plotline, and the overarching moral of the story.  
 Setting. The setting element refers to the specific policy context in which policy 
problems are located. Policy entrepreneurs call attention to the setting as it contains a range 
of consequential phenomena, including “legal and constitutional parameters, geography, 
scientific evidence, economic conditions, agreed-on norms, and other features that most 
actors agree are part of the considerations one must come to terms with when dealing in a 
particular policy area” (McBeth et al., 2014, p. 228).  
 Characters. Policy narratives told by entrepreneurs typically also contain at least one 
character, who may be a victim, villain, or hero (McBeth et al., 2014). Descriptions of these 
characters help convey the impact, or human element, of problems and associated policy 
solutions.  
 Plot. According to the NPF, the plot establishes the relationship between characters 
and the setting.  The plotline “provides the arc of action and typically has a beginning, 
middle and end” (McBeth et al., 2014, p. 228).  
 Moral. Policy narratives are told to gain support for or against specific policy 
solutions. Thus, these narratives typically lead to a suggested course of action, which under 





 Comparing Labovian and NPF narrative elements. The elements contained within 
the NPF (McBeth et al., 2014) are similar to those associated with the Labovian model 
(Labov & Waletzky, 1997). For example, the setting and characters elements of the NPF 
could both be categorized as Labovian-type orientation clauses. In addition, the description 
of plots within the literature on the NPF is similar to that of Labov and Waletzky’s 
complicating action clauses. Also, the moral element of the NPF combines aspects of both 
the resolution and evaluation clauses of the Labovian approach. One major difference 
between the two frameworks is that while the Labovian model is used to describe past events, 
the NPF is used to offer solutions and make predictions about future results. As outlined in 
greater detail in Chapter III, the NPF’s narrative core elements were adapted and used within 
the coding framework (see Table 5) during the analysis phase.  
 Policy beliefs in the NPF. According to McBeth et al. (2014), policy narratives also 
contain policy beliefs, which (like the ACF’s description of policy core beliefs) help to build 
consensus around an issue or policy solution. Researchers using the NPF examine the policy 
beliefs embedded in policy narratives in order to measure intra-coalitional behavior 
(Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013). Furthermore, the NPF posits that advocacy 
coalitions engage in the strategic use of narratives to influence the beliefs and policy 
preferences of others, including through the deployment of responsibility and blame 
ascriptions. 
 NPF assumptions. The NPF is founded on a number of core assumptions (McBeth et 
al., 2014). As is the case with Labov and Waletzky’s (1997) model, the NPF takes a 
structuralist stance, “defining narratives as having specific generalizable structures such as 
plots and characters that can be identified in multiple narrative contexts” (McBeth et al., 





the framework recognizes that there is variability in the meanings assigned to policy objects 
and processes by individuals and groups, resulting in different policy realities. These 
different realities are, however, bounded by factors such as belief systems and norms and, 
therefore, are not random.  
 Another assumption associated with the NPF is that policy narratives operate 
simultaneously at three different levels: “the micro (individual level), the meso (group and 
coalitional level), and the macro (cultural and institutional level)” (McBeth et al., 2014, p. 
230). These three categories were used when developing the research questions for this 
dissertation. 
 The NPF and advocacy coalitions. Of particular relevance to this investigation, the 
NPF offers an approach for analyzing the relationship between policy narratives and 
coalitional formation and change. According to McBeth et al. (2014), “The NPF 
hypothesizes that members of coalitions will use the perception of costs and benefits to 
heresthetically expand or contain coalition membership in their favor” (p. 240). To that end, 
advocacy coalitions tell policy narratives in order to influence the public and decision 
makers’ policy preferences. 
 Strategies used by advocacy coalitions include the construction and deployment of 
narratives to broaden or narrow people’s understanding of policy issues, often by way of 
emphasizing the distribution of costs and benefits of specific policies (McBeth et al., 2014; 
Pralle, 2006). The narratives constructed and told by advocacy coalitions also tend to contain 
responsibility and blame ascriptions known as causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms 
function much like logic models, linking actions or events to outcomes (Delahais & 
Toulemonde, 2012). During the analysis conducted for this research, the narratives told by 





 Like the ACF, the NPF posits that shared policy beliefs are fundamental to the 
formation and maintenance of advocacy coalitions. As outlined in the earlier section on the 
ACF, the concept of belief systems is highly germane to this investigation, which explored 
commonalities and differences in the ideas and values held by members of different 
organizations within the coalition that formed around the CCSS.  
Political Ideology 
 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) suggest that the same conceptual definition may 
be used for both public policies and belief systems: “sets of value priorities and causal 
assumptions about how to realize them” (p. 178). There are also some parallels between these 
two concepts and that of political ideology, which Ball, Dagger, and O’Neill (2014) define as 
follows: “a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social 
conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social 
and political action” (p. 5).  
 According to Ball et al. (2014), a political ideology serves four main functions: 
explanation, evaluation, orientation, and political program. Descriptions of these four 
functions are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
Four Functions of a Political Ideology  
Source: Adapted from Ball, Dagger, and O’Neill (2014, pp. 5-6) 
Function Explanation – A political ideology… 
Explanation Offers an explanation of existing social, 
political, and economic conditions, helping 
to simplify and interpret complex events 
and circumstances. 
Evaluation Provides “standards for evaluating social 
conditions” (Ball et al., 2014, p. 5) and 
helps determine whether these conditions 
are good, bad, or somewhere in-between. 
Orientation 
 
Provides a sense of identity, supplying 
adherents with a sense of whom they are 





Function Explanation – A political ideology… 
Political Program Sets out a program of action in light of 
existing social, political, and economic 
conditions. 
The functions listed in Table 3 were adapted and used within the pre-figured coding 
framework for this research in order to organize the data on the policy core beliefs of 
political entrepreneurs (see Table 5).  
Ideology in Discourses 
Another scholar whose work proved valuable while developing the framework for the 
analysis of narratives outlined in this dissertation was sociolinguist James Paul Gee. 
According to Gee (2015), all claims and beliefs made and held by humans are partly 
ideological. Similar to the description of belief systems associated with the ACF (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2014), Gee argues that people’s ideas are founded on sets of simplified 
frameworks of meaning, which he terms theories. While describing this concept, Gee 
emphasizes that theories are not the exclusive domain of academics. On the contrary, 
“humans always have theories and never really make claims without them” (Gee, 2015, p. 
11). Such theories may be tacit or overt, and they may stem from a person’s own research 
and deep reflections on an issue (primary theories) or from less direct sources, such as what 
they have heard other people say (non-primary theories). 
 Akin to the literature reviewed on social constructionism, Gee (2015) views human 
thought, language, and behavior as being strongly influenced by the sociocultural context in 
which they are located. Gee uses the term Discourses (with a capital D) to describe the 
typified ideas and behaviors of human groups: “Discourses are ways of behaving, interacting, 
valuing, thinking, believing, speaking, and, often, reading and writing that are accepted 





orientation function of political ideologies identified by Ball et al. (2014), Discourses are 
socially situated identities that signal membership within a meaningful social network or 
group. Moreover, they incorporate tacit theories about what counts as typical or normal.   
 Similar to Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) description of the typification of 
habitualized actions leading to institutionalization, Gee (2014) suggests that shared 
conceptions of normative beliefs and behaviors provide frameworks for understanding the 
complexities of the world, stabilizing the social environment, and helping people to “go 
about the business of life when one is not allowed the time to think through and research 
everything before acting” (p. 113). Gee uses the term cultural models when describing such 
frameworks of stories or theories about the world. Cultural models are stored both in 
people’s heads and in externalized human products, and they exist in a range of different 
forms, including images, metaphors, and narratives. Gee’s (2015) writings on the Discourses 
and cultural models of human groups offer a useful theory when analyzing the language used 
by different groups of political entrepreneurs with differing perspectives and policy priorities.  
All of the participants interviewed for this dissertation were political entrepreneurs 
from different organizations. One of the questions guiding this research was whether the 
narratives told by these individuals revealed anything about the policy core beliefs of the 
coalition members and the types of organizations with which they were affiliated. As 
described in Chapter IV, the interview data were found to conform to the Discourses (i.e., 
ways of speaking, thinking, valuing, etc.) and the cultural models (e.g., typical stories and 
metaphors) associated with the broader coalition as well as the specific types of organizations 
with which the participants were affiliated.21  
																																																								
21	Though beyond the scope of the research outlined in this dissertation, a more detailed 
comparison of the language used by political entrepreneurs could be achieved by way of a 






 Other literature reviewed in preparation for the analysis of policy beliefs and 
narratives included George Lakoff’s (2002; 2009) writings on political frames. In his book 
The Political Mind (2009), Lakoff, a professor of linguistics at Berkley, describes how, 
“Complex narratives—the kind we find in anyone’s life story, as well as in fairy tales, 
novels, and dramas—are made up of smaller narratives with very simple structures. Those 
structures are called ‘frames’ or ‘scripts’” (p.22). Similar to Gee’s (2015) concept of cultural 
models, frames offer simplified frameworks for viewing the world based on typical stories or 
everyday theories. 
As explained by Lakoff (2009), frames are cognitive structures that humans use to 
organize their thinking:  
When you read a murder mystery, there is a typical frame with various 
kinds of characters: the murderer, victim or victims, possible accomplices, 
suspects, a motive, a murder weapon, a detective, clues. And there is a 
scenario in which the murderer murders the victim and is later caught by the 
detective. (p. 22) 
 
Lakoff describes the neural circuitry of the brain as creating the frame structures used for 
much of our thinking. Each frame consists of several core elements, including roles (or 
characters), relations between these roles, and the typical scenarios carried out by actors in 
those roles. According to Lakoff, it was Erving Goffman (1986) who first discovered that all 
institutions are structured by these types of conceptual frames. For example, in a school, 
there are the common understandings about the roles of teachers, administrators, students, 
and support staff. Moreover, there are also typical scenarios, such as lessons, faculty 
meetings, lunch in the cafeteria, and teacher evaluations. The frame structure would be 
broken if, for example, the custodial staff were evaluating the teachers. Frames help humans 





Semantic Fields and Frames 
 Lakoff (2009) identifies the linguist Charles Fillmore as being the first scholar to 
hypothesize that “Groups of related words, called ‘semantic fields,’ are defined with respect 
to the same frame” (p. 22). An example of this would be the following group of words: cost, 
sell, goods, price, buy––which Lakoff describes as existing within the same conceptual 
frame:  
The roles are Buyer, Seller, Goods, and Money, and the scenario is 
simple: first the Buyer has the Money, and the Seller has the Goods and wants 
the Money; then they exchange Goods and Money; then the Buyer has the 
Goods and the Seller has the Money. (p. 22) 
 
This specimen frame is based on a shared understanding of commercial exchanges and the 
words that can be used to describe them. Moreover, the words that exist within this semantic 
frame may be used to activate or evoke the concept of commercial exchanges in people’s 
minds. Such frames are not entirely rigid. Simple frames can be combined with other frames 
to make more complex variations; for example, a bake sale in which the sellers are bakers 
and the buyers are charitable donors (Lakoff, 2009).   
As previously mentioned, Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe the language that 
builds up in semantic fields as accumulating to form a social stock of knowledge, which is 
subsequently passed along from one generation to the next and is available to all individuals 
to draw from during their daily lives. Because individual actors know that other people share 
at least part of the same stock of knowledge, it makes daily interactions more predictable and 
helps to stabilize the social environment.  
Simple and Deep Narratives 
 Lakoff (2009) refers to narratives as being a special type of frame, which may be 





Simple narratives have the form of frame-based scenarios, but with 
extra structure. There is a Protagonist, the person whose point of view is being 
taken. The events are good and bad things that happen. And there are 
appropriate emotions that fit certain kinds of events in the scenarios. (Lakoff, 
2009, p. 23)  
 
The narratives that people tell also contain themes, images, and icons associated with the 
culture in which the story is being told. However, “Once you factor out the cultural specifics, 
a lot of the narratives look familiar” (Lakoff, 2009, p. 24). One example of a cross-cultural 
narrative is the Rescue narrative. The semantic roles, or main characters, of the Rescue 
narrative include the Hero, the Victim, the Villain, and the Helpers. Lakoff (2009) provides 
this outline of the narrative: 
The main actions form a scenario, usually in this order: the Villainy, 
committed by the Villain against the Victim; the Difficulties undergone by the 
Hero; the Battle of Hero against Villain; the Victory of Hero over Villain; the 
Rescue of the Victim by the Hero; the Punishment of the Villain; the Reward 
for the Hero. The Villainy upsets the moral balance. The Victory, Rescue, 
Punishment, and Reward restore the moral balance. (p. 24) 
 
Whether the story is about Perseus or Luke Skywalker, the basic rescue structure remains the 
same. These kinds of narrative structures are known as deep narratives (Lakoff, 2009). As 
has already been discussed in an earlier section, collective or cultural stories may be 
investigated using a form of narrative inquiry that employs macro-level techniques 
(Sandelowksi, 2012; Turvey, 2016). Cultural narratives also provide insight into the 
transmission of norms and values, which serve to establish preferences and limit the ideas 
and behavior of socio-culturally embedded actors. The impact of institutionalized norms and 
sociocultural beliefs and values is discussed further in Chapter IV of this dissertation.  
Political Narratives and Frames 
 Lakoff (2009) argues that “Politics is very much about cultural narratives” (p. 35). 
Political candidates tell stories about the lives that they have lived and are currently living, 





opponents in a negative or villainous light. Moreover, the news media creates an ongoing 
stream of stories about politicians, their constituents, and the policies being proposed, giving 
the world of politics the appearance of a drama. Lakoff offers several examples of narrative 
frames used by politicians, including President George W. Bush’s use of the “redemption 
narrative” (p. 35). According to Lakoff, Bush frequently recounted overcoming his youthful 
indiscretions, such as his struggles with alcoholism and failure as a businessman, in the 
narratives he told. Ultimately, by telling stories about giving up drinking and finding God, he 
was successful in endearing himself to certain segments of the American public  
 Lakoff (2009) argues that variance in perspectives between groups of people 
regarding public policy or political decisions may be attributed to differences in the cognitive 
structures of their brains. Basically, different modes of thought, made up of different 
conceptual frames, manifest as different belief systems and different political ideologies, 
including conservatism and progressivism. This is not to say that frames and ideologies are 
synonymous concepts. Frames are mental structures that are used to interpret and respond to 
events and circumstances. In contrast, an ideology is a deeply held “system of meaning that 
couples assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant 
to promoting or resisting social change” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 43). Stated differently, 
ideologies are more comprehensive sets of ideas that may be used to evaluate social 
conditions and rationalize a program of social or political action (Ball et al., 2014); frames, 
on the other hand, are less comprehensive frameworks that serve as mental organizers. As 
will be outlined in Chapter III, this research examined the narrative data for similarities and 
differences between the perspectives and policy core beliefs of the participants. The analysis 





types of political ideology (with the exception of the category labeled educational 
conservatives).  
Political Framing 
 As already discussed in the section on the NPF, politicians and advocacy coalitions 
engage in the construction and deployment of narratives when arguing for or against policy 
solutions (McBeth et al., 2014). The strategic construction of narratives for political purposes 
involves the act of framing. In the words of Entman (1993), 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52) 
 
Essentially, political entrepreneurs use frames to define problems, diagnose causes, and 
suggest remedies by strategically calling attention to certain information, while 
simultaneously directing the attention of the audience away from competing ideas. According 
to Entman (1993), a common practice used by politicians when framing an argument or 
policy is to embed culturally familiar symbols within the narratives told in order to make the 
information comport with the audience’s values and belief systems. 
 Entman’s (1993) description of the use of cultural symbols to raise the salience of 
political messages bears some resemblance to political scientist Murray Edelman’s writing 
on the symbolic uses of politics. In the words of Edelman (1985), “Every symbol stands for 
something other than itself, and it also evokes an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of 
events associated through time, through space, through logic, or through imagination with the 
symbol” (p. 6). This description parallels Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) account of 
objectivated symbols carrying meaning across contexts and generations.  
 Edelman (1985) describes politics as being “a parade of abstractions” (p. 10) to the 





onlookers, the political world with its legislative processes, speeches, and addresses takes on 
the appearance of theatre. Additionally, because voters are generally uninformed on the 
issues, and because many of the issues addressed by politicians are complex or ambiguous, 
political insiders rely on culturally resonant political symbols to keep the political outsiders 
satisfied and quiescent. In the words of Edelman, “The mass public respond to currently 
conspicuous symbols: not to ‘facts,’ and not to moral codes embedded in the character or 
soul, but to the gestures and speeches that make up the drama of the state” (p. 172). 
 Edelman (1985) suggests that there are two main types of symbols used by 
politicians: referential and condensation. Referential symbols provide “economical ways of 
referring to the objective elements in objects or situations: the elements identified in the same 
way by different people” (Edelman, 1985, p. 6). The use of this type of symbol (e.g., state-
level data on NAEP scores) helps people to employ logic when thinking about a situation. 
Condensation symbols, in contrast, “evoke the emotions associated with a situation” 
(Edelman, 1985, p. 6). This type of symbol is used to condense into a single symbolic act, 
event, or sign feelings of patriotism, anxiety, solemnity, humiliation, excitement, or some 
other emotion. Furthermore, according to Edelman, “Practically every political act that is 
controversial or regarded as really important is bound to serve in part as a condensation 
symbol. It evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response because it symbolizes a threat or 
reassurance” (p. 7). 
 The literature read about the CCSS and the interviews with political entrepreneurs 
conducted for this dissertation provided evidence to support Edelman’s thesis that political 
operatives rely on emotive symbols and the oversimplification of facts to frame ambiguous 
and complex issues for an ill-informed public. For example, various opponents of the CCSS 





even using the moniker “ObamaCore” (Shober, 2016, p. 68)––to evoke negative emotions 
pertaining to the notion of centralized, or “socialistic,” government programs.      
 Lakoff’s (2009), Entman’s (1993), and Edelman’s (1985) writings on frames, 
framing, and the use of symbols offer useful perspectives for theorizing about political 
discourse. For reasons explained in the next section, the narratives gathered from political 
entrepreneurs were treated as forms of political discourse. It was assumed, therefore, that the 
narratives told emphasized certain facts about the events surrounding the CCSS while 
minimizing or omitting others.  
Elite Interviewing 
 Elite interviewing yields rich insights into the inner workings of the political process 
as well as the norms, attitudes, and evaluations associated with groups of actors operating in 
close proximity to policymaking (Dexter, 1970). Nevertheless, this type of data collection is 
inevitably impacted by significant limitations. In the words of Richards (1996), “By their 
very nature, elite interviewees provide a subjective account of an event or issue. Thus, elite 
interviewing should not be conducted with a view to establish ‘the truth,’ in a crude, 
positivist manner” (p. 200). 
 The subjectivity of elites’ accounts, flagged by Richards (1996) as a concern, makes 
narrative inquiry an appropriate approach for analyzing data from interviews with political 
entrepreneurs. As described in greater detail in Chapter III, narrative inquiry views the 
narratives that people tell as representations and self-presentations for an audience, with no 
hard distinction between fact and interpretation. In the words of Riessman (1993), “Human 
agency and imagination determine what gets included and excluded in narrativization, how 
events are plotted, and what they are supposed to mean. Individuals construct past events and 





not seek to ascertain the objective “truth” of what happened during the course of events 
surrounding the CCSS. Instead, its purpose was to explore similarities and differences in the 
oral accounts of political entrepreneurs regarding such topics as the politicization of the 
CCSS and the current status of the associated advocacy coalition, thereby charting the 
perspectives that constitute social reality for members of an advocacy coalition.  
 Beyond the issue of subjectivity, the interviewing of elites presents some further 
challenges, including how to gain access to members of elite groups and how to protect the 
confidentiality of participants (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Both of these issues will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter III. Another significant issue raised by Dexter (1970) pertains 
to interviewing elites with specialist knowledge; he states, “The interviewer must have some 
capacity to catch the interviewee’s meaning, to perceive the framework within which he is 
talking, if he is to get much out of the interview” (p. 19). This specific challenge is addressed 
next.  
The Frontstage and Backstage of Politics  
 Comparable to the aforementioned literature on narrative inquiry that describes the 
narratives told by people as a form of self-presentation (Mishler, 1986b; Patterson, 2013), 
Wodak (2011) suggests that political elites stage their work, or “perform,” so as to project a 
self-image that is based on how they would like to be perceived by their audience. Borrowing 
from Goffman’s (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Wodak distinguishes 
between the frontstage and backstage of politics. Her description of the frontstage refers to 
the spaces where both the performer and the audience are present. The backstage, on the 
other hand, denotes the spaces where the performer is present without an audience. While 
backstage, “The performers can step out of character without fear of disrupting the 





may speak more informally and more openly about facts and subjects that are suppressed 
while on stage. The backstage of politics is generally closed to outsiders, who are viewed as 
members of the audience, making it difficult for researchers to gain access.  
 Wodak (2011) uses the Bourdieusian concepts of habitus, field, and communities of 
practice to investigate the frontstage and backstage performances of political elites. Similar 
to Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) account of social constructionism, Bourdieu understood 
the relationship between actors and social structures as a dialectical process where the 
internal is externalized and the external is internalized (Swartz, 1997). Habitus is the term 
used by Bourdieu to describe the ingrained habits, skills, tastes, and dispositions associated 
with a person’s life experiences or social conditions (English & Bolton, 2016). Habitus does 
not develop in a vacuum but, rather, forms in social spaces known as fields. “Fields are 
networks or configurations that impose values and rules in specific social spaces” (English & 
Bolton, 2016, p. 32). Each field consists of a differentiated arrangement of actors, who are 
positioned in relation to each other based on their relative volume of economic, social, and 
cultural capital (Swartz, 1997). Community of practice is Bourdieu’s term for a group of 
people who share a domain of interest and practices. As described by Wodak (2011), 
communities of practice provide ways for teaching newcomers the “routines of the 
organization in terms of specific expertise; in this way, communities of practice relate to the 
professional activities whereas the habitus relates to (subconscious) strategies and 
perceptions” (p. 13). The expert or organizational knowledge of actors within organizations 
also, according to Wodak, serves to exclude other actors who are not part of the recognized 
community of practice.  
  Paralleling Dexter’s (1970) comments about the importance of interviewers 





responses of political elites, Wodak (2011) suggests that it is “difficult for outsiders to 
understand the specific logic of any professional field and organization” (p. 15). In other 
words, unless they have first spent time in the field, it hard for outsiders to be able to 
immediately comprehend the habitus of unfamiliar human groups. As a possible solution to 
this challenge, Wodak recommends ethnographic methods, which can provide a bridge 
between the macro- and micro-level structures of social interaction. The research described 
here does not include an ethnographic case study. Instead, as will be described in greater 
detail in Chapter III, preparation for the collection of data included time spent in the field 
interacting with people who are familiar with the community of practice (i.e., the different 
organizations that make up the CCSS advocacy coalition). Preparation for the data collection 
also involved reading organizational literature in order to gain familiarity with the 
interpretive frames used by members of the coalition when talking or writing about the 
CCSS. 
 Though the interviews conducted for this investigation were conducted on a one-to-
one basis away from a mass audience, it would be naïve to view the data collected as a 
reflection of the backstage of politics. The interviewer’s status as an outsider was 
unavoidable. Thus, the narratives told by political elites were treated as a form of frontstage 
political discourse. For that reason, the literature on political narratives, political ideologies, 
and framing, informed the analysis. 
Summary of Literature  
The CCSS originated from and was led by state officials. Over time, however, largely 
due to its relationship with the Obama administration’s RTTT, the initiative came to be 
misunderstood and mischaracterized as a federal program (Shober, 2016). During this same 





educators, politicians, and members of the public (see Appendix A). This research explored 
the explanations offered by political insiders regarding these events.  
 A purposeful sample of 15 political entrepreneurs (three from each of the five 
overarching groups shown in Table 1) who were involved with the CCSS initiative between 
2011 and 2016 were identified and recruited for this study. Involvement with the initiative 
was defined as having completed work on behalf of the initiative during at least one of the 
following stages: development (e.g., problem identification, policy agenda setting, or policy 
writing), implementation (e.g., providing guidance or technical assistance to practitioners), or 
promotion (e.g., advocacy for the standards).  
In order to investigate and document the experiences of these entrepreneurs, interview 
participants were each asked to recount the events surrounding the politicization of the 
initiative. The data gathered from these interviews were then analyzed using an approach 
based on Polkinghorne’s (1995) paradigmatic analysis of narratives: identifying common 
themes and conceptual manifestations among the stories told by the individual actors within 
the advocacy coalition. The theory-generated coding framework used for this section of the 
analysis employed elements of Labov and Waletzky’s (1997) model and the NPF (McBeth et 
al., 2014). Emergent codes and categories were also used to label and organize the data.  
In addition to investigating the perceptions of political entrepreneurs about past 
events and experiences, the semi-structured interviews were designed so as to produce data 
on this group of insiders’ predictions regarding what the politicization of the initiative might 
mean for the future of the CCSS and the coalition that formed to advocate for the standards. 
Again, these data were compared and contrasted using a thematic approach based on 





Social institutions are normative social structures that influence the behavior of actors 
who participate within them (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Hindricks, 2013; North, 1990). The 
research discussed in this dissertation was designed to explore the perceptions of political 
entrepreneurs who worked on the CCSS regarding the existence and impact of “institutional 
constraints” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 13). According to Rhodes (2012), the institutions associated 
with federalism have long had a powerful influence on educational policymaking in the 
United States. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, the institutions and associated hostile 
interests that bounded the entrepreneurship of groups seeking to establish common state 
standards included the large, decentralized, and complex system of education governance in 
the United States, which created issues when it came to the establishment and 
implementation of the new standards, and the resistance that emerged from individuals and 
groups on either side of the political spectrum who opposed the idea of federal involvement 
in education.   
The interviews were also designed to reveal insights into the policy beliefs of the 
actors and groups within the coalition that formed to advocate for the CCSS. The data were 
examined for manifestations of policy core beliefs, as defined in the literature on the ACF 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Theory-generated, pre-figured codes and categories, as well as 
in vivo and descriptive codes inductively derived from the data, were used during this phase 







Introduction to Chapter III 
 The preceding chapter reviewed the literature that informed the design of the research 
described in this dissertation. The following chapter begins by revisiting the question of why 
a qualitative approach was deemed appropriate for this study. The remainder of the chapter 
then outlines the specific techniques used for gathering and analyzing data so as to answer 
the research questions listed in Chapter I.  
Qualitative Research 
 In the words of Denzin and Lincoln (1994), 
Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, 
or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning that people bring to them. 
Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of 
empirical materials—case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, 
interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts—that 
describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives. 
(p. 2) 
 
 The purpose of this investigation was to explore the experiences and beliefs of 
political entrepreneurs who worked on the CCSS initiative. Interview data were gathered and 
analyzed in order to study the policy core beliefs of coalition members, the different points of 
view of these insiders regarding reasons for the politicization of the initiative, and their 
perceptions of the influence of institutional and sociocultural constraints on their 
entrepreneurship. The desire to examine beliefs, personal experiences, and meanings meant 





Qualitative Policy Research: Criticism and Response  
 Common criticisms of qualitative research include that it is unscientific, only 
exploratory, non-generalizable, and full of bias (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In recent decades, 
this framing of qualitative methods has provided a justification for the privileging of 
positivistic, quantitative approaches and experimental designs by such organizations as the 
National Research Council (St. Pierre, 2011). Nevertheless, although quantitative 
methodologies remain the dominant paradigm in policy research, qualitative methods do 
offer useful techniques for policy researchers to examine a range of topics, including the 
contextual knowledge and judgments of policy subsystem participants and the ways in which 
different communities experience social problems and policy effects (Sadovnik, 2007).  
 The qualitative research described in this dissertation was concerned with public 
policy. Specifically, it was designed to provide insights into the ideas and experiences of 
political entrepreneurs operating within a policy subsystem. Though the findings presented in 
Chapter IV are subjective in nature, the value in analyzing the narratives of subsystem 
participants is that such research sheds light on a “causal driver for political behavior” 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 122): the beliefs of political entrepreneurs.  
Worldviews or Paradigms 
 The word ontology refers to “beliefs regarding reality or what kinds of things make 
up the world” (Glesne, 2011, p. 5). Though a researcher’s ontology may address the question 
of what things are, it is the researcher’s epistemology, sometimes described as a theory of 
knowledge, that is concerned with how (or why) they know that something exists (Creswell, 
2007). A researcher’s ontological and epistemological beliefs shape and justify the 
methodology that they choose to employ in order to answer their research questions. “Every 





sometimes are not aware of these theories because they are embedded in their assumptions 
about the nature of reality and knowledge” (Glesne, 2011, p. 5). The sets of philosophical 
beliefs or assumptions held by researchers regarding such things as reality and knowledge are 
known as worldviews or paradigms (Creswell, 2007). 
 The worldview of a researcher determines how language may be analyzed as part of 
her or his research practices. Researchers who hold realist positions concerning reality and its 
perception, including qualitative researchers in the positivist and post-positivist traditions, 
view language as a means of studying an object (Burr, 2015). They analyze written and 
spoken language to understand their area of focus better and answer their research questions. 
By contrast, constructionist researchers view language as the object of their study; they strive 
to uncover the ways in which language has been constructed to communicate or conceal 
meaning (Burr, 2015). Indeed, the analysis of language and other symbolic forms is at the 
heart of the constructionist orientation and associated research methods. From a 
constructionist viewpoint, the accounts provided by humans are interpretive acts, not direct 
perceptions of an external reality. In the words of Creswell (2007), “The goal of 
[constructionist] research, then, is to rely as much as possible on the participants’ view of the 
situation” (p. 20). One way in which constructionist researchers explore the various 
viewpoints that make up social reality is through the analysis of narrative data. 
Representations of Reality 
 Like other forms of qualitative research, narrative inquiry seeks to understand reality 
as perceived by the participants (Creswell, 2007; Galvan, 2009). Moreover, because 
researchers are unable to gain direct access to the experiences of others, narrative inquiry 
usually avoids the hard distinction between fact and interpretation. As Riessman points out 





 Representations of people’s experience come in a range of forms, including the 
spoken word and written texts. According to Riessman (1993), when it comes to 
investigating and documenting experiences, “It is not possible to be neutral and objective, to 
merely represent (as opposed to interpret) the world” (p. 8). What is more, at each stage of 
the research process, the distance between the phenomenology, or lived world of immediate 
experience, and how it is represented grows wider.  
 Riessman (1993) suggests that there are at least five levels of representation 
associated with narrative research, beginning with the participant attending to her primary 
experiences of everyday life. During this stage, the participant makes certain phenomena 
meaningful within the totality of her lived reality just by thinking about them. The second 
level consists of the participant telling the researcher about her experiences in the form of a 
personal narrative. Because it is impossible to communicate every aspect of an experience, 
events are re-presented during the telling, resulting in an inevitable gap between the 
experience “as lived” and the experience “as told.” Further, at this second level, meaning can 
also shift as a result of the interaction between the teller and the listener. In telling about an 
experience, the participant is actively creating a self, projecting how she would like to be 
known. The third level is the transcription of the telling, during which the spoken language is 
transformed into written text. The gap between lived experience and the transcribed 
representation grows even wider here as the researcher engages in interpretive practices and 
decides how much detail to include. The fourth level of representation is analyzing 
experience. This stage is where the transcribed interview is examined, reduced to categories 
or themes through coding and recoding, and then re-presented in figures, tables, and 
narratives (Kim, 2016.). Finally, the fifth level of representation is where a reader encounters 





it is open to multiple readings and interpretations by different readers—and also by the same 
reader.   
 The issue of representation is one that must be attended to by researchers engaging in 
narrative inquiry. Like other forms of qualitative research, the trustworthiness of narrative 
data may be assessed by way of sharing the transcriptions and analysis with participants 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Member checking was used for this investigation. Every 
participant was sent a transcription of her or his interview. Participants were encouraged to 
read over the data and edit the content (add or delete details) wherever they deemed 
necessary.   
Narrative modes of inquiry allow for the portrayal of nuance and ambiguity within 
people’s explanations of human experiences (Bruner, 1986). Stated differently, 
“Narrativization assumes point of view” (Riessman, 2002, p. 257). Thus, though it is 
important to ensure that the researcher’s reconstruction of the participant’s narrative is 
recognizable as an adequate representation, the concept of trustworthiness must not be 
conflated with ensuring that the stories told are representative of an objective reality or truth 
(Riessman, 1993). Other than the member checking the data, no attempts were made to verify 
the facts contained within the descriptions provided by participants. 
Selection of Sample 
 The data source for this analysis was semi-structured interviews with a sample of 15 
political entrepreneurs from a range of organizations representing the five overarching 
categories identified by Rhodes (2012) as being the major players in education policy (see 
Table 1).  
 The selection of study participants was founded on purposeful stratification criteria. 





were on record as having been involved with the CCSS. This process of identification relied 
on several main sources: the literature read for Chapter II (Cross, 2014; Rhodes, 2012; 
Rothman, 2011; Shober, 2016), the list of organizations that offered statements of support on 
the CCSS website (“Statements of Support,” n.d.), and information gleaned from the 
organizations’ own websites. Involvement with the initiative was defined as any work 
conducted on behalf of the initiative during at least one of the following stages: development 
(e.g., problem identification, policy agenda setting, or policy writing), implementation (e.g., 
providing guidance or technical assistance to practitioners), or promotion (e.g., publishing 
materials that supported or promoted the initiative). These organizations were then 
categorized using the a priori schema of groups provided by Rhodes (2012) (see Table 1).  
 Having identified the organizations from which individuals would likely be 
interviewed, an initial sample of participants was identified and contacted. The targeted 
sample included 15 individuals, representing three different organizations from each of the 
five a priori categories. Priority was given to political entrepreneurs who were actively 
involved with the initiative from 2011 or earlier. The selection of participants was also 
informed by the recommendations of sponsors from within the same community of practice. 
These sponsors were asked to supply the names of actors with expert knowledge of the CCSS 
initiative and the events that occurred during the identified temporal window (see Figure 2). 
All but one of the initially identified individuals agreed to be interviewed. A replacement 













Figure 2.  
Time Period for Analysis (2011-2017) 
Source: Adapted from Testing Debate Timeline, by B. Mann (personal communication, 
November 4, 2016). Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Identities of Participants 
 The interview data gathered were anonymized. In other words, the names of 
participants and the organizations that they worked for were removed from the data. In the 
place of their names, each participant was given an identification code based on the five 
overarching groups of organizations outlined by Rhodes (2012). Rather than reporting the 
participants’ job titles, their positions were categorized using labels that indicated levels 
within the organizations: Executive (e.g., president or CEO), Senior Leadership (e.g., vice 
president), Advisory Board (e.g., board chair), Leadership (e.g., director), and Senior Policy 
Staff (e.g., senior policy analyst). This information was not reported at the individual level, as 
it could be used to identify the participants.  
 As shown in Table 4, seven of the 15 participants in the study were the most senior 
leaders within their organizations (Executive level), two were one level below the Executive 
level (Senior Leadership level), one participant was on an organization’s advisory board, 





the participants had worked on projects associated with the CCSS and, therefore, had direct 
knowledge of the politics of the initiative.  
Table 4.  
Sample: Participants by Organization Type and Position 
Participant Code Group: Organization Type 
BE1 Business Entrepreneurs 
BE2 Business Entrepreneurs 
BE3 Business Entrepreneurs 
CR1 Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
CR2 Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
CR3 Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
EC1 Educational Conservatives 
EC2 Educational Conservatives 
EC3 Educational Conservatives 
ED1 Representing Educators or Educational Leaders 
ED2 Representing Educators or Educational Leaders 
ED3 Representing Educators or Educational Leaders 
SO1 Representing State Officials  
SO2 Representing State Officials 






Positions of Participants within Their Organizations 
Position Categories: Example of Job Title Within Categories (Number Interviewed) 
Executive: President (7) 
Senior Leadership: Vice President (2) 
Advisory Board: Board Member (1) 
Leadership: Director (3) 
Senior Policy Staff: Senior Policy Analyst (2) 
 
Positionality 
 As already described, it is impossible for researchers to gain direct access to the 
personal experiences of other people. For that reason, narrative inquiry deals with the 
ambiguous representations of reality contained within talk, text, and observations (Riessman, 
1993). Furthermore, there remains an inexorable gap between the reality of everyday 
experiences and subsequent portrayals of the same experiences as they are attended to, 
described to a researcher, transcribed, analyzed, and read. In the words of Riessman (1993), 
“It is not possible to be neutral and objective, to merely represent (as opposed to interpret) 
the world” (p. 8). This subjectivity exists not only within the narrative accounts of 
participants but also in researchers’ representations of narratives told. Therefore, consistent 
with other forms of qualitative research, narrative inquiry invites reflexive consideration of 
the stance of the researcher so as to account for the ways that her or his positionality might 
affect the research findings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).  
Discovery of Research Subject 
 I was drawn to the subject of this investigation during my time working as a policy 
analyst at an organization that played an important role in the genesis of the CCSS: The Hunt 
Institute. Though my work at The Hunt Institute came years after the organization’s direct 





me the formative opportunity to interact with a range of political entrepreneurs from different 
organizations that had partnered on the initiative. It was during these informal conversations 
that I began to develop an interest in the ongoing political debate that existed around the 
common state standards movement. Moreover, meeting with prominent actors from such 
organizations as the CCSSO, the Education Trust, NASBE, the NGA, and the United States 
Department of Education presented me with the opportunity to observe interactions between 
different political entrepreneurs and policy organizations. Upon reflection, these observations 
tallied with what had, for me, previously been abstract theories about the work of advocacy 
coalitions that I had read during my time as a doctoral student.  
Personal and Professional Experiences 
 The social history, personal experiences, and ideas of a researcher constitute and 
influence her or his positionality (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).  In the case of this project, 
my observations of social institutions in the United States are informed by my status as a 
non-American European who was born and raised in northern England. At the time of 
writing this section, I am entering my fourteenth year living in the United States. This period 
of my life has included nine years working as a teacher and administrator in North Carolina’s 
public schools and nine years as a graduate student (studying educational leadership and 
policy at the University of North Carolina). I am not, therefore, unfamiliar with American 
politics or education. However, my previous experiences as a student and teacher in England 
continue to provide me with valuable counterpoints with which to draw comparisons to the 
American system.   
 I am aware of the ways in which my primary socialization in the United Kingdom has 
shaped my worldview. My mother and father were both educators with long careers working 





teacher was, I believe, strongly influenced by my parents. Furthermore, having grown up 
attending to an abundance of family narratives about my ancestors’ working-class lives and 
their generational affiliation with trade unions and the Labour Party, I am cognizant of the 
extent to which my upbringing has influenced my self-identity and belief system, which 
tends toward the leftward side of the political spectrum construct. My espoused belief that 
the government should play an active role in promoting the public good is one example of 
what I perceive as being the influence of my primary socialization. 
Position Regarding the CCSS 
 Having grown up in a country that had a national curriculum, the contentious nature 
of national or common state standards was unfamiliar to me when I first learned about the 
CCSS initiative (during a faculty meeting at the school where I was teaching). Thus, the 
states’ rights arguments against the standards were a surprising contrast to my worldview. 
The purpose of this investigation is not to critique the initiative itself, and I do not hold 
strong opinions either for or against the CCSS. Consequently, my ideology should not affect 
my ability to bracket my own beliefs about common state standards.   
Researcher’s Biases 
 Because this research was devised to examine the perspectives of political 
entrepreneurs, the issue of positionality remained an important consideration. With every 
stage of the investigation and each re-presentation of the participants’ experiences, I reflected 
on my identity, perspectives, and assumptions in order to limit bias. One way in which such 
self-reflections were generated was through the creation of detailed field notes (Glesne, 
2011; Marshall & Rossman, 2016). These field notes (see Appendix C for the Field Notes 
form) were consulted during the analysis phase, which itself included the writing of analytic 






 Given my existing relationships with actors within the field of practice, the research 
design included clearly delineated boundaries regarding what was reported as data. 
Specifically, only the narratives told during designated interview times were used.  
 Prior to the collection of data, I provided full disclosure to participants about the 
focus of the investigation and the research design. I also provided the interview protocol to 
each participant a week prior to her or his scheduled interview.  
 In order to gather the requisite data for analysis, participants were encouraged to 
deliver extended narrative accounts about events. Triggers to induce a flow of narrative data 
included the use of a timeline (see Figure 2) and a chart graphing public opinion data (see 
Appendix A). Like the interview protocol, these visual aids were provided to participants 
before their interviews.  
Reciprocity 
 Interviewees did not receive compensation for their participation. The final report will 
be shared with all participants who are interested in learning about the findings of the study. 
Ethics 
 Informed consent was secured from all participants. In keeping with the Office of 
Human Research Ethics (OHRE) and the Institutional Review Board’s (IRB) requirements, 
all research subjects were provided with information about the study so that they could make 
informed decisions about whether or not to participate. Participants were not required to 
respond to questions that they did not wish to answer. Moreover, all participants were 
informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.  
 Given the status of the participants as prominent actors, I utilized a range of measures 





individual entrepreneurs and their specific organizations were removed from the data during 
the transcription phase. Identification codes were generated and used for each participant 
based on the category of the organization with which they were affiliated (see Table 4). In 
addition to removing names and organizational affiliations, I removed all other information 
that I felt could be used as an identifier. The transcribed data were then returned to 
participants to be member checked. Following the member-checking phase, any additional 
information identified for removal by participants was expunged from the data.  
Data Collection 
 An assumption undergirding the most common form of data collection used for 
narrative inquiry, oral interviews, is that the people interviewed are an important source of 
knowledge and that the narratives told during an interview contain meaningful insights into 
the participants’ beliefs, feelings, and experiences (Kim, 2016; Marshall & Rossman, 2016; 
Mishler, 1986b).  
 Data collection for narrative inquiry typically consists of semi-structured or 
unstructured, open-ended interviews (Kim, 2016). Semi-structured interviews contain a series 
of general questions that are used to guide the interview and maintain focus. The questions 
asked in this type of interview are flexible enough to expand the scope of the interview based 
on the responses of participants. In unstructured interviews, the interviewer keeps 
interruptions to a bare minimum and allows the participant to tell her story in her own way. 
During unstructured interviews, it is the participant who determines the content and scope of 
the narratives told.  
During both semi-structured and unstructured interviews, it is important for the 
interviewer to be an active listener and create the space and rapport necessary for narratives 





respondents to continue in their own way until they indicate they have finished their answer, 
we are likely to find stories” (p. 235). 
 The research outlined here used a semi-structured interview protocol (see Appendix 
B). This decision was made because it was important for the data to be similar in scope, 
content, and structure in order for the analysis of narratives approach to be effective. 
Moreover, because many of the elites interviewed had limited availability for a conversation, 
the use of a protocol enabled the researcher to maintain the focus of each participant during 
the allotted windows of interview time.  
Interviewing Elites 
 Marshall and Rossman (2016) describe elite interviewing as “a specialized case of 
interviewing that focuses on a particular type of interview partner” (p. 159). Elites are 
individuals who are considered to be powerful, prominent, or well informed within a 
community of practice. Because of their expertise in areas relevant to research, the 
interviewing of elites can elicit rich insights about a field or organization’s history and inner 
workings. With that being said, a limitation of elite interviewing is that this type of actor 
tends to provide highly subjective accounts of events and issues (Richards, 1996). 
 The analysis for this dissertation employed an approach that accounted for the 
subjectivity of elite interviewing by producing a comparative analysis of divergent 
interpretations and evaluations across a database of stories: paradigmatic analysis of narrative 
data (Polkinghorne, 1995). The fact that elites often present information from their own 
standpoint was not a concern here, because the intention of this research was not to determine 
which version of events constituted objective reality. Rather, this investigation was 





political entrepreneurs associated with various organizations and groups within the CCSS 
advocacy coalition.  
Access 
 One of the major challenges associated with elite interviewing is gaining access to 
these individuals, who typically maintain busy schedules, are difficult to contact, and, in the 
case of political elites, prefer to be in control of the structure of the interview situation 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Access to the participants for this research was, therefore, 
facilitated by personal contacts within the community of practice. These individuals helped 
identify key actors and, where necessary, served as sponsors to assist with getting past 
organizational “gatekeepers.”  
Gaining Entry 
 The purposeful sample was initially contacted via phone or email with a request for 
an interview. The entry script/email outlined the purpose of the research and provided details 
about what partaking in the study would entail for participants. All potential participants 
were also sent a copy of the informed consent form, which itemized the research purpose, 
duration, methods, and possible risks. Wherever necessary, sponsors made contact with the 
targeted actors prior to the researcher to assist with gaining access.  
Preparation for Data Collection 
 Wodak (2011) uses the Bourdieusian concepts of habitus, field and communities of 
practice to theorize about actors’ ideas and behaviors within political organizations. As 
outlined in Chapter II, habitus refers to subconscious perceptions and preferences, fields are 
configurations of relations within specific social spaces, and communities of practice are 





professional activities of a community of practice that newcomers learn about the particular 
knowledge and routines associated with a field or organization.  
 In the words of Wodak (2011), 
It takes a lot of time for new insiders to be socialized into a profession, 
into a new field and into new communities of practice, and to learn the 
explicit and tacit rules. It is, of course, even more difficult for outsiders to 
understand the specific logic of any professional field and organization. (pp. 
14-15)   
 
 Similarly, Dexter (1970) describes how, when interviewing elites with expert 
knowledge, “the interviewer must have some capacity to catch the interviewee’s meaning, to 
perceive the framework within which he is talking, if he is to get much out of the interview” 
(p. 19). Such descriptions of organizational norms and frameworks of meaning also bear 
some resemblance to Gee’s (2014) concept of Discourses, outlined in Chapter II, which 
comprise of “ways of behaving, interacting, valuing, thinking, believing, [and] speaking … 
by specific groups” (p. 4). Based on these insights, I made the decision to spend some time 
familiarizing myself with the specific ideas and beliefs of political entrepreneurs prior to any 
data collection.  
 In preparation for investigation outlined here, I spent two years working within a 
think tank organization that worked on the CCSS. During this period, I engaged in informal, 
but in-depth, conversations with political entrepreneurs from multiple organizations that 
worked on the initiative in order to build a baseline of knowledge about common frames of 
reference and interpretations of what happened. In addition, I read hundreds of documents 
written by actors within the CCSS advocacy coalition and spent time researching the 
biographies, organizational roles, and levels of involvement of the actors that were identified 





 The interview protocol was piloted with two different actors from within the 
community of practice. These individuals were asked to provide feedback and 
recommendations on the questions asked. Their feedback was used to revise the protocol.  
Collecting the Data 
 All of the interviews were conducted by phone. With the permission of participants, 
the conversations were captured using a digital audio recorder. Field notes were taken during 
the course of each interview. The majority of the interviews lasted approximately one hour. 
Three were close to an hour and a half, and two lasted slightly longer than 30 minutes.  
 A semi-structured interview protocol was utilized to guide the interview (see 
Appendix B). The protocol consisted of four main series of questions that provided a general 
order and structure. The one section of the interview that was more structured was the series 
of questions used to operationalize policy core beliefs.  
 Each interview began by asking the participant to provide their summative evaluation 
of the initiative: “Do you consider the Common Core to have been a success?” This first 
question helped identify the overarching frame for understanding responses to subsequent 
questions regarding policy outcomes.  
 Having established their descriptions of resolutions (i.e., the final outcome of events), 
the next series of questions were designed to gather information about the policy core beliefs 
of participants. Specifically, based on a series of suggested questions provided by Weible and 
Sabatier (2007), the political entrepreneurs were asked to comment on the problem that the 
CCSS initiative addressed, the seriousness of this problem, the causes of this problem, and 
their policy preferences (in addition to standards) for resolving this problem.  
 The next section of the interview focused on the participants’ experiences working on 





gain a shared understanding of the term politicized, participants were shown polling data 
displayed in a chart created by Peterson (2016) for a presentation at The Hunt Institute (see 
Appendix A). This graph showed that public opinion regarding the Common Core had 
declined between 2012 and 2016, and that this decline was fairly consistent across political 
affiliations––indicating that the standards had become politically contentious on the right and 
the left. In addition, for the questions about past events, a visual aid was used to facilitate 
recall (Riessman, 1993). This visual aid provided a skeleton timeline with major events 
plotted, including the initial adoption of the CCSS, the first legislative repeal battles, and the 
presidential campaigns (see Figure 2).  
 The questions asked during this section of the interview were designed to elicit 
extended accounts, or plot lines, which described the arc of action and causal events 
surrounding the politicization of the CCSS, the main characters and organizations involved 
along the way, more details regarding the participants’ evaluations of the initiative, and 
predictions for the future of common state standards and the associated advocacy coalition. 
Following each narration phase, the participant and I engaged in a conversation phase. As 
described by Kim (2016), “The conversation phase is an in-depth interview process where 
questions and responses comprise the interview” (p. 169). During this phase, I used semi-
structured sub-questions in order to gain clarification about information shared during the 
narrative and encourage elaboration on the part of the participant.  
 The final section of the interview focused on the broader issue of the challenges faced 
by political entrepreneurs seeking to establish national or common state standards. 
Participants were also asked to reflect on the lessons that they learned during their 
experiences working on the CCSS (i.e., the moral of their stories) and offer advice to future 






 I transcribed the interview response data. All data were stored in a secure electronic 
file, which was set up by the University of North Carolina Information Technology Services 
department. Only my dissertation adviser and I had access to the interview data collected. 
During the transcription process, information that could be used to identify the participants 
was removed. Moreover, the names of participants and their organizations were replaced 
with identification codes (see Table 4). Response data will be destroyed following the 
conclusion of the study (after two years). 
Narrative Meaning 
  According to Polkinghorne (1988), the study of human behavior must include an 
investigation of the meaning systems associated with human experience. He argues that 
narratives are the primary form by which humans make sense of events in their lives. In 
Polkinghorne’s own words, “Narrative meaning is a cognitive process that organizes human 
experiences into temporally meaningful episodes” (p. 1).  
Because narrative meaning cannot be observed directly, narrative inquiry makes the 
stories and histories told by human subjects the object of analysis.  The interpretation of 
narrative meaning, however, is far from a straightforward endeavor (Kim, 2016). As outlined 
in an earlier section of this chapter, there are multiple levels of representation associated with 
narrative inquiry, and meaning can shift across these levels and even as a result of the 
interview process itself (Riessman, 1993). It is, therefore, important for researchers engaging 
in narrative inquiry to remain attuned to the nuances of narrative meaning and seek to 
maintain a faithful account of meaning as presented during the interview (Kim, 2016). 







 The form of narrative inquiry used in this research examined the reflections of 
members of an advocacy coalition on their experiences working on the CCSS, their 
perspectives on the events surrounding the politicization of the initiative, and their 
predictions regarding the future of the coalition and the common state standards movement. 
This investigation was, thus, both retrospective and prospective.  
 The chosen analytic method was based on Polkinghorne’s (1995) description of 
paradigmatic analysis of narrative data, in which “Researchers collect stories as data and 
analyze them…[resulting] in descriptions of themes that hold across the stories or in 
taxonomies of types of stories, characters, or settings” (p. 12).  
 The interview data were coded using a form of thematic analysis (Saldaña, 2016). 
Informed by Creswell’s (2007) description of the “Data Analysis Spiral” (p. 150) and 
Saldaña’s (2016) writing on coding methods, each transcript was first broken into smaller 
units, labeled, and organized using theory-generated and emergent codes and categories.22 
The data were then gradually winnowed down through a process of description, 
classification, and interpretation (Creswell, 2007). Analytic memo writing was used during 
the first cycle of coding. These memos contained detailed reflections and evolving insights 
into the patterns and themes emerging from the data (Saldaña, 2016). During the second 
cycle, the data were further condensed into common categories and themes, eventually 
arriving at what were determined to be major themes (Saldaña, 2016). NVivo software was 
used throughout both cycles, which helped with the recording and organization of codes. In 
addition, the Mind Map feature of NVivo was used to chart the perceived relationships 
between the identified codes, categories, and themes.   
																																																								





 Though Labov and Waletzky’s (1997) model for narrative extraction provided a point 
of departure for the conceptualization of the analytic approach, the data gathered did not 
conform to the structure required for the Labovian model. Thus, the identification of 
narratives was based on a broader definition than Labov’s (1972) description of the 
recapitulation of past experiences in temporally ordered clauses. Adhering to 
recommendations made by Riessman (1993) and Patterson (2013), rather than just focusing 
on linear past tense clauses, the narratives extracted from the data included the stories, or 
sustained accounts, told about events, subjective experiences, and states of affairs across 
time, including the present and predictions about the future.  
 The narratives told by political entrepreneurs were compared so as to gain insight into 
commonalities and differences between the perspectives of actors within the advocacy 
coalition at the individual, organization type, and coalition levels. Specifically, the oral 
accounts of entrepreneurs were compared at each level regarding the institutions, hostile 
interests, and other factors that gave rise to the politicization of the initiative. The 
interpretations of these elite actors were also compared regarding such topics as the present 
status of the CCSS and the coalition as well as the future of common state standards.  
 Given that a major focus of this research was to examine different perspectives of the 
same phenomenon (i.e., the politicization of the CCSS), the analysis intentionally sought to 
capture nuances in the viewpoints of individual participants. In addition, because this 
research was also designed to explore the shared understandings of coalition members, the 
narratives were analyzed for examples of notions that appeared across the data. In accordance 
with Polkinghorne’s (1995) description of the paradigmatic analysis of narratives, the data 
were examined and coded so as to identify “common themes or conceptual manifestations 





during the analysis of narratives is shown in Table 5. These prefigured categories, codes and 
sub-codes were derived from a combination of the narrative elements outlined in Labov and 
Waletzky’s (1997) model and the NPF (McBeth et al., 2014). Additional categories and 
codes were added to the framework as they emerged during the analysis.  
 Finally, the data were again examined at the levels of individual, organizational 
category, and coalition so as to compare the manifestations of policy core beliefs held by the 
political entrepreneurs. During this phase, the ACF’s description of policy core beliefs 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) and Ball et al.’s (2014) four functions of an ideology (see Table 
3) were adapted and used as a priori codes and categories for analyzing and comparing the 
data. Again, a form of thematic analysis was used based on Creswell’s (2007) data analysis 
spiral and Saldaña’s (2016) description of coding processes. The first cycle involved 
breaking each transcript into discrete parts and assigning descriptive codes that summarized 
the topics covered (Saldaña, 2016). These codes then were arranged based on both the 
theory-generated categories shown in Table 5 and the codes and categories that emerged 
through the process of analytic memo writing (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The second 
cycle entailed condensing and merging codes and categories in order to identify salient 
patterns and themes across the data (Creswell, 2007; Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Saldaña, 
2016). The “specific themes” (Cresswell, 2007, p. 154) were then categorized according to 
commonalities and combined under more general “major theme headings” (Saldaña, 2016, p. 
202).  
Codes and Sub-codes 
 During the analysis phase, the data were coded based on a priori, theory-generated 





categories, codes, and sub-codes derived from the literature review are listed in Table 5 
(grouped by research question). 
Table 5. 
Pre-Figured Coding Framework: Theory-Generated Codes Grouped by Research Question  
Research Question Categories, Codes and Sub-codes 
1) How do the narratives of these political 
entrepreneurs, grouped by organization 
type, compare/contrast regarding the 
politicization and declining popularity 
of the CCSS? 
● What do these narratives reveal 
about the current status (circa 
2017) of the CCSS? 
● What do these narratives reveal 
about the current status (circa 
2017) of the CCSS advocacy 
coalition? 
● How do the narratives of these 
actors and organizations 
compare/contrast regarding the 
future of the CCSS and common 
state standards policy? 
● What do these narratives suggest 
about the future of the standards-






















A. Setting > i) geography, ii) political 
climate, iii) economic conditions, iv) 
condition of public education, v) condition 
of state standards, vi) regime change in state 
legislatures, vii) regime change of federal 
administrations. 
 
B. Characters > i) victims, ii) heroes, iii) 
antagonists, iv) troublemakers.  
 
Complicating action:  
C. Sequence of events (open coding).  
 
Result or Resolution: 
D. What happened at the end? > i) was the 
initiative a success? ii) why or why not? 
 
Moral/Evaluation: 
E. Significance of Events and Actions?  
 
F. Moral of the Story? > i) lessons learned 
from seeking to establish/implement 
common state standards,  
ii) recommendations for future policy 
workers? 
 
Present and Future: 
G. Present of CCSS > i) current status of the 
CCSS, ii) current status of the CCSS 
coalition. 
 
H. Future of CCSS > i) predictions 
regarding the future of the CCSS,  
ii) predictions regarding the future of the 







Research Question Categories, Codes and Sub-codes 
2) What do the narratives told reveal 
about policy beliefs of actors from the 
organizations with which the 
entrepreneurs interviewed are 
affiliated?  
● What do the narratives told reveal 
about the policy core beliefs of the 
coalition?  
Policy core beliefs:  
Beliefs concerning the specific policy topic 
and territorial scope of the subsystem  
 
H. PCB Explanation > i) descriptions 
offered regarding the condition of state 
standards (pre-CCSS), ii) descriptions of 
other elements of SBR. 
 
I. PCB Evaluation > i) the problem 
(evaluations of the condition pre-CCSS 
state standards), ii) causes of a problem, iii) 
blame ascriptions (whose fault is it?)   
 
J. PCB political program > i) why common 
standards are important, ii) preferences for 
resolving problem described in PCB 
Evaluation (in addition to standards), iii) 
responsibility (who can/should fix it?) 
 
 
3) What do these narrative accounts reveal 
about the challenges and institutional 
constraints associated with seeking to 
establish and implement national or 
common education standards in the 
United States? 
Challenges and Institutional Constraints:  
K. Social, cultural, and institutional forces 
that impacted entrepreneurship > i) 
federalism (fragmented/decentralized 
governance structures), ii) other legal and 
constitutional parameters, iii) hostile 
interests left, iv) hostile interests right, v) 
political partisanship, vi) institutionalized 
norms vii) sociocultural beliefs or values.  
 
Limitations 
 Although the research methods outlined in this chapter were carefully thought out, I 
was aware of a range of limitations. Five of the more significant limitations are outlined 
below.  
 First of all, because the sample was limited to 15 participants, no claim can be made 





members from other organizations that advocated for the CCSS means that important 
perspectives will, inevitably, have been missed.  
 A second limitation was associated with the underlying assumption that the 
participants’ points of views were aligned with the organizations with which they were 
affiliated. In other words, there is a possibility that the perspectives expressed by individual 
employees diverge in some significant ways from the “company line” and members of other 
major organizations within the same overarching group.  
 A third limitation was based on the structure of the interview. Because the interviews 
were semi-structured and encouraged participants to provide extended accounts, it is 
impossible to know whether the failure to mention a specific topic is indicative of a belief or 
preference. For example, the fact that a particular participant did not raise the topic of school 
choice should not be understood as denoting a position for or against that type of policy.   
 A fourth limitation concerns the impact of the broader temporal context on interview 
responses. For instance, the fact that the interviews were conducted during the early stages of 
the Trump presidency makes it likely that the political environment during that specific 
moment in time shaped participants’ predictions for the future of the standards movement.   
 A fifth limitation was related to the section on the coalition members’ policy beliefs. 
The original plan had been to examine the participants’ deep core, policy core, and secondary 
beliefs. It was later determined, however, that the data gathered were too limited in scope for 
any valid conclusions to be drawn regarding the political entrepreneurs’ deep core beliefs or 
worldviews. Moreover, the responses contained few insights into secondary beliefs (i.e., 
instrumental decisions or preferences regarding subcomponents of the subsystem). For those 






Summary of Methods 
 The data source for this research was a sample of 15 political entrepreneurs with 
inside knowledge of the work undertaken by a powerful advocacy coalition. These interviews 
yielded rich insights into the beliefs of coalition members, the events surrounding the 
politicization and declining popularity of the CCSS, and the lessons that were learned by the 
political entrepreneurs as a result of their direct involvement in the coalition’s activities. 
Though interviews with elites present an opportunity to explore subjects with individuals 
who have specialist knowledge, a commonly cited limitation of such data is that they are 
often highly subjective (Dexter, 1970). However, because a major focus of the research 
delineated here concerned comparing different accounts of the same basic factors and events, 
the issue of subjectivity was not viewed as a limitation. Instead, trustworthiness was 
established through the process of member checking: asking each participant to review their 
transcript and ensure that it provided an accurate portrayal of their perspectives. The 
member-checked data were then coded using a form of thematic analysis that pulled 
descriptive units together into categories, inferential patterns, and eventually groupings of 
common concepts and themes categorized under major theme headings. The next chapter 







Introduction to Chapter IV 
 This chapter reports the research project’s findings. There are three main sections, 
each representing the three major research questions listed in Chapter I (see page 13). The 
order in which these questions are addressed differs slightly from their original listing. 
Section I describes findings about the participants’ policy core beliefs. These are presented 
first because they provide insights into the ideas and priorities of each of the five groups and, 
thus, offer a framing for the subsequent narratives told about events. The policy core beliefs 
are presented for individual participants but are grouped based on the types of organizations 
that the participants belong to. The manifest and latent topics identified in the data from each 
group are also presented in a series of matrices. At the end of the section, these topics are 
further condensed, re-categorized based on commonalities, and summarized under major 
theme headings. The second major section of this chapter reports findings on the narratives 
told by participants about the politicization of the CCSS and what it might mean for the 
common state standards movement in the future. The third section outlines the participants’ 
accounts of the challenges, including institutional constraints, associated with establishing 
and implementing national or common state standards.  
The Policy Subsystem and Advocacy Coalition 
 The writings of Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994), and their collaborators, on 
advocacy coalitions informed the research outlined in Section I of this chapter. Specifically, 





the CCSS were examined for insights into the policy core beliefs that bound this coalition 
together.    
 Weible and Sabatier (2007) describe a policy subsystem as being “defined by its 
territorial boundary, a substantive topic, and by the hundreds of participants from all levels of 
government, multiple interest groups, the media, and research institutions” (p. 126). 
According to the ACF, “The policy subsystem is the primary unit for understanding policy 
processes” (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014, p. 189). Although policy processes were not a central 
focus of this investigation, the concept of political entrepreneurs operating within a 
subsystem provided a useful model for conceiving of the relationships between actors, 
organizations, and groups. The subsystem from which participants were interviewed was 
concerned with the substantive topic of K-12 education standards, and the territorial scope 
was limited to the 42 U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) that initially adopted the 
initiative.  
 Within a policy subsystem, actors who share policy core beliefs coordinate their 
actions in a non-trivial manner to influence subsystem affairs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). 
Such strategic configurations of subsystem participants are known as advocacy coalitions. 
The focus of this investigation was the policy core beliefs and narrative accounts of actors 
representing a range of organizations that constitute a singular advocacy coalition. Although 
the degree of coordination varied between their respective organizations, each of the 






Section I: The Policy Core Beliefs of Coalition Members 
 The advocacy coalition that formed in support of the CCSS was comprised of many 
different subsystem actors and organizations. In keeping with the ACF, an assumption 
underlying this research was that the beliefs of subsystem participants serve as a “causal 
driver for political behavior” (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 122). This first section 
of Chapter IV outlines the findings on the beliefs and preferences of the advocacy coalition 
members who were interviewed.  
 The ACF uses a three-tiered model for categorizing the beliefs of coalition actors: 
deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs. Situated on the highest tier of 
the model, deep core beliefs are broad, generalizable, and resistant to change. Examples of 
deep core beliefs include the packages of ideas associated with the various types of political 
ideology, including liberal- and conservative-type beliefs regarding social rights vs. 
individual rights (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). On the middle tier of the model are policy core 
beliefs. Policy core beliefs are subsystem specific and, therefore, much narrower in scope 
than deep core beliefs. “The subsystem specificity of policy core beliefs makes them ideal for 
forming coalitions and coordinating activities among members” (Weible, Sabatier, & 
McQueen, 2009, pp. 122-123). Secondary beliefs are on the lowest tier of the model. These 
beliefs are narrower in scope than policy core beliefs, more empirically based, more likely to 
shift over time, and typically concern the instrumental means for achieving desired policy 
outcomes in specific locales (Weible & Sabatier, 2007).  
 One of the research questions that guided this project was, given the apparent 
diversity of actors (e.g., union officials, experts from conservative think tanks, and business 
leaders), what were the policy core beliefs that bound the CCSS coalition together? 





entrepreneurs differ? A series of questions based on Weible and Sabatier’s (2007) 
recommendations for operationalizing policy core beliefs was asked during the course of the 
interviews to elicit responses that revealed information about the actors’ viewpoints. These 
questions included the following: 
§ From your perspective, why were the Common Core standards important?  
§ What problems did the Common Core address or help to resolve? 
§ What are the causes of these problems? 
§ In addition to standards, what are your preferences for solving these problems? 
To supplement the participants’ responses to these questions, findings on policy core beliefs 
were also based on information contained within the narratives told during later stages of the 
interview.  
 Although the original plan had been to also explore the deep core beliefs of 
participants, it was later determined that the narrow CCSS focus of the interviews, as well as 
the time constraints associated with elite interviewing, would not generate sufficient data on 
the political entrepreneurs’ personal philosophies or worldviews.23 The data gathered also 
revealed very few insights into instrumental decisions and preferences pertaining to 
subcomponents (substantively or territorially) of the subsystem. Thus, findings on the 
participants’ beliefs systems were limited to their policy core beliefs.  
																																																								
23	In	order	to	operationalize	deep	core	beliefs,	Ripberger et al. (2014) recommend using a 
form of grid-group analysis, based on Douglas’s (1970) Cultural Theory (CT), in which 
participants are surveyed on a range of questions designed to capture the respondents’ 
orientations toward the four worldviews specified by CT: individualism, egalitarianism, 






Findings on Policy Core Beliefs 
 Findings on the policy core beliefs of political entrepreneurs are presented in the 
following order: business entrepreneurs, civil rights entrepreneurs, educational conservatives, 
organizations representing educators or educational leaders, and organizations representing 
state elected officials. Matrices are also presented for each of these groups, showing the 
number of participants that spoke about the topics identified in the data and the perceived 
relationships between these policy core beliefs.  
Policy Core Beliefs: Business Entrepreneurs 
 Each of the business entrepreneurs interviewed worked for a different organization 
advocating for the needs of the business community. As outlined in Chapter II, business 
entrepreneurs have been major players in the excellence and standards movements since the 
1980s.  
Business Entrepreneurs on the Importance of the Common Core 
 Based on Weible and Sabatier’s (2007) assertion that “Policy participants often have 
short 10- to 20-second statements that summarize their beliefs regarding a particular policy 
issue” (p. 128), each political entrepreneur was asked why they believed that the Common 
Core standards were important. Consistent with Rhodes’ (2012) description of the priorities 
of business entrepreneurs, the topics discussed by the interview participants from the 
business community principally corresponded with workforce preparation.  
 Preparing students for postsecondary education and workforce. The responses of 
the three business entrepreneurs revealed that the need to prepare students for the workforce 
provided a primary justification for their CCSS advocacy work. BE1, for example, offered 
the following account: 
The reason [my organization] got involved in this is because if you 





jobs today. In addition to the 6,000,000 jobs, the resumes that [employers] are 
getting and the interviews they are conducting, and even some of the 
individuals who ultimately are offered a position, don’t have the skills that are 
required on the job. So there is this mismatch in the articulation of what is 
important as defined by the educational system—K-12 and higher 
education—and what employers need.   
 
 The responses of the three business entrepreneurs also emphasized the role of K-12 
standards in preparing students for postsecondary education, which, again, was described as 
being important for addressing workforce needs. 
Academic standards are important because they articulate the common 
knowledge and skills that students should master in order to be successful in 
postsecondary education, whether that is an industry certification in welding, 
or a two-year credential, or a four-year credential. But even beyond obtaining 
a postsecondary credential, standards are critical to students being able to 
demonstrate what they know and what they can do—the application of those 
standards in the workplace, which is where we all end up. (BE1) 
 
 As discussed in Chapter II, from its inception the coalition that advocated for the 
initiative emphasized the objective of increasing the career and college readiness of students. 
This basis for the CCSS reflected the same fundamental rationale undergirding antecedent 
efforts to develop national standards led by political entrepreneurs with links to the business 
community, including the Clinton administration’s Goals 2000. Essentially, raising academic 
standards was viewed as an important strategy for meeting workforce needs and, thus, 
increasing economic outputs at the state and national levels. This understanding, which 
closely resembles Labaree’s (1997) description of social efficiency goals, was manifest in the 
interview responses of all three business entrepreneurs. 
  Preparing students for a rapidly changing economy. Within their discussions of 
the importance of addressing workforce needs, the three business entrepreneurs each 
espoused the belief that updating the pre-CCSS state standards had been necessary because 





The performance of the education system is more important now than 
it was in 1985 when [Lamar] Alexander led the governors, [and] it’s more 
important than it was in the early nineties under the Clinton administration. 
We are in a rapidly changing, knowledge-based economy where the quality of 
our schools matters a whole lot for everybody—at least it should matter for 
everybody. (BE3)  
 
 The informants’ descriptions of the necessity of new educational standards as a means 
of meeting the demands of an economy founded on knowledge or “21st century skills” also 
communicated a broader concern relating to specific policy outcomes. Essentially, the 
business entrepreneurs indicated that public investments in education should result in 
enhanced productivity and economic growth. This input-output framing was employed by 
BE2 when she stated, “Why do you spend the amount of years and the amount of public 
investment in education? It’s not just to develop a well-rounded citizen; it’s also to develop 
the next economy.” 
 Global competitiveness. Another belief shared by the three business entrepreneurs 
regarding the importance of the standards initiative related to the topic of global 
competitiveness. This focus, which was closely interconnected with both workforce 
preparation and economic development, depicted the CCSS as providing a vehicle for raising 
student achievement in order to match or better the performance of students from other 
countries. As stated by BE2, “If we were going to raise expectations and have aligned 
assessments, that was directly related to our ability to compete on a global scale.” 
    According to the business entrepreneurs interviewed, the importance of global 
competitiveness made state educational standards a matter of national interest. Moreover, 
they asserted that the necessity of a national response provided a principal justification for 
the establishment of the CCSS. This belief was best captured in the following remarks made 





When we were in the run up to the Common Core, [there was] lots of 
interest in economic competitiveness, internationally, and a sense that the 
academic performance of U.S. students was lagging behind countries with 
whom we compete. And one way to boost U.S. performance, or at least one 
foundation for that, would be to actually internationally benchmark state 
standards: make sure that the expectations in your state are as rigorous and as 
demanding as in Japan or Singapore, or name your favorite country. Nobody 
thought that each state needed to do that by itself 50 times over. Right? You 
have the basis for a collective effort.  
 
 The topic of global competitiveness and the associated idea that students in the 
United States are falling behind students from other nations echoed the framing logic 
employed in forerunner federal legislation and reports, including the NDEA of 1958, ANAR 
in 1983, and the Clinton administration’s Goals 2000. In short, the development of 
internationally benchmarked academic standards was viewed as offering a policy lever for 
maintaining the economic supremacy of the United States and thus bolstering national 
security.  
 Equitable opportunities. Another example of the business entrepreneurs’ policy core 
beliefs concerned ensuring equitable opportunities for all students. A noteworthy insight 
provided by BE1 was that the business community prefers using the term “opportunity” 
instead of “equity.” When asked why this was, BE1 explained, 
I don’t distinguish between the two. The way I use them, I think we 
are conceptually talking about the same thing. For some reason, for reasons I 
cannot explain, the corporate community does not, or has rarely, used the 
word “equity.” I think we just prefer to capture it as “opportunity,” in order to 
portray that everyone deserves an equal chance at the opportunities that this 
country has to offer. 
 
 The idea that the education system should offer all students the same opportunities to 
achieve success evoked a framing based on free market ideals. Expressly, all students should 
be equipped with the requisite knowledge and skills to compete in a free enterprise economy. 
This student-centric notion of equitable opportunities was, therefore, interconnected with the 





 Somewhat contradicting BE1’s suggestion that business entrepreneurs prefer not to 
use the term “equity,” BE2 described the common standards as being part of a broader effort 
to build a more equitable education system. She did go on to emphasize, however, that her 
conception of equity related to meeting the needs of every student and not just historically 
underserved groups:  
I do think that there was a real focus on trying to understand equity, 
and the equity issues as it sort of stands in this country, and the challenges that 
go into making sure that there is a high-quality education for every student, 
period. Not every White student or every Black student, every student, period. 
 
BE3 also spoke about the standards initiative helping to ensure that children across the 
country are held to higher and more equitable expectations. In his words, the CCSS helped 
“make sure that [all students] are academically prepared for postsecondary success and to 
make some choices and have some options.” 
 During her interview, BE2 described how the organization she worked for had a long 
history of partnering with civil rights organizations when advocating for education policies. 
This finding tallied with Rhodes’ (2012) description of the alliance between business 
entrepreneurs and civil rights entrepreneurs that has existed at the heart of the standards-
based reform movement for decades.    
 The anchor for systemic reform. An additional explanation given by the business 
entrepreneurs when discussing the importance of the CCSS was that the standards provide 
the foundation for systemic reform efforts. Encapsulating this central tenet of the standards-
based reform paradigm, BE3 stated, 
There’s been a belief in the education world, probably since the late 
eighties or early nineties, that the way to get better results is to have a 
systemic approach that’s anchored in challenging standards to which 
curriculum, instruction, professional development, assessment, etcetera, are all 
tightly aligned—so that there is a level of coherence that, frankly, is often 
prevalent in high-performing countries and which has eluded the U.S. for a 






 The same basic sentiment regarding the centrality of standards was also evident in 
BE2’s suggestion that common state standards are important because they define 
expectations, create greater consistency between schools, and help focus students, parents, 
educators, and other school system stakeholders on specific behaviors and outcomes: “There 
has to be clarity on what that benchmark is and what students should be aiming for, and how 
each person can help that student get where they need to go.” The belief that standards 
provide the anchor or foundation for systemic reform was evident across the interviews with 
political entrepreneurs from every group. It was clear, therefore, that members of the 
coalition were conversant with the underlying logic behind the standards-based reform 
agenda.  
 A common yardstick (comparability). Related to the topic of defining expectations 
and creating greater consistency was the belief that common standards allow for more 
accurate comparisons to be made between schools, districts, and states. An example of this 
line of thought was provided by BE3 when he described how the states that adopted the 
CCSS could now all be “measured by the same, or at least comparable, yardstick.” 
Standardization was basically viewed as being essential for building a better understanding of 
how well schools and systems were performing in relation to each other.  
Business Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions of Subsystem-Wide Problems  
 Having been prompted to reflect upon why they felt the initiative was important, the 
next question asked participants to describe the specific problem, or problems, that the 
standards help to address or resolve. Though there was often some overlap with their 
responses on the importance of the initiative, the question presented in terms of antecedent 
problems allowed for more detailed descriptions of the condition of educational standards 





 Students not prepared for postsecondary education or the workforce. As already 
alluded to, an overarching problem identified by the business entrepreneurs related to what 
they perceived as being a mismatch between academic standards and the job market. In the 
words of BE1, “Employers got involved because they wanted to increase the likelihood that 
the pool of qualified candidates coming through the educational system would reflect what 
they need in the workforce they are trying to hire.” This belief that students are not 
graduating from high school with the knowledge and skills that they need to successfully 
enter the workforce provided the overarching frame for the other problems discussed by this 
group of political entrepreneurs.  
 Antiquated standards. The policy core belief that students were not adequately 
prepared for postsecondary success was interconnected with the perspective that state 
educational standards prior to the CCSS had been, for the most part, antiquated and, 
therefore, inadequate for readying workers for the knowledge-based economy of the 21st 
century. 
I think from [my organization’s] perspective, it sort of elevated the 
conversation about the skills that are necessary to compete in today’s 
economy, which aren’t necessarily the same as the skills that were necessary 
to compete when our agrarian society created the system that we all know and 
love today. (BE2)  
 
 Uneven and inequitable expectations for students. All three business entrepreneurs 
identified what they viewed as being uneven and inequitable expectations for students, within 
and between schools, districts, and states, as being a cause for concern. This belief, again, 
linked back to the idea that many students were not leaving school with the knowledge and 
skills that they needed for postsecondary success. 
 Negative impact on students moving between states.  Elaborating on the problem of 





negatively impacted by the absence of common standards and, as a result, often lacked the 
necessary skills for postsecondary education and the workforce: 
We have children who are moving across borders. And there are 
parents in Mississippi, where the standards have very low expectations, yet 
their children were performing quite well. When they moved up to 
Connecticut, where the standards were much higher, and the stakes were 
much higher on the assessments, those “A” students in Mississippi, once they 
moved up to Connecticut, were actually middle-of-the-pack students. So there 
is a discrepancy between states, but that also leads to the problem that a 
number of students in some of these states like Mississippi were getting to 
college completely unprepared and ending up in remedial courses. 
 
 The specific example that BE1 provided when discussing the problem of students 
moving between states was military families. As will be shown, political entrepreneurs from 
other groups also discussed the adverse effects of uneven state standards on students moving 
around the country. Interestingly, the “type” of student mentioned as being negatively 
impacted varied between the groups: immigrant students were identified by a civil rights 
entrepreneur, students whose parents move for work were brought up by an educational 
conservative, and a member of an organization representing state elected officials spoke of 
the more general issue of student mobility.  
 Lower expectations for career and technical education. Also connected to the topic of 
inequitable expectations was BE1’s assertion that standards for students enrolled in 
vocational training programs have traditionally been lower than for students on track for 
four-year colleges. 
The career technical education schools have two big problems. One is 
that they’re not using real time labor market data to determine what programs 
we should have. In other words, that if you go through these programs, you’ll 
end up with a good job. Secondly, many of the students who go through some 
of these programs—until, I would argue, the Common Core—were not being 
taught to the same set of rigorous standards that my daughter would be taught 






BE1’s qualms regarding the lower standards for students in career and technical education 
(CTE) were interconnected with the issues of workforce needs and the demands of a shifting 
economy.  
Not everyone needs a four-year degree. Not everyone can afford a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, and many of the jobs growing in the United 
States—high-wage, high-skilled jobs—don’t require a four-year degree. They 
require industry certification, they require an associate degree, and 
apprenticeships are a pathway to doing that. (BE1) 
 
 Evident within BE1’s concerns vis-à-vis CTE were beliefs that resembled Labaree’s 
(1997) writing on social efficiency and vocationalism. According to Labaree, the 
vocationalist movement first emerged in the late 19th century and has, since then, sought to 
shift curricula away from broad liberal arts educations and toward “programs that [provide] 
training in the skills and knowledge required to carry out particular job roles” (p. 47).  
Business Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions of the Causes of Subsystem-Wide Problems  
 The next interview question asked the respondents to describe the specific causes of 
the problems they had identified. This question gave them the opportunity to ascribe 
responsibility and blame. 
 Traditional standards development and review processes. When asked to 
elaborate on the reasons for inadequate standards prior to the CCSS, two of the business 
entrepreneurs pointed to the traditional processes associated with developing and reviewing 
state standards. BE1 described the pre-CCSS review processes in the following way:  
We had some states that would go through a process on a regular basis 
where they would collect teachers and other professionals, and also parents 
and others, to reevaluate existing state standards. What would often happen is 
that the debate about what to include and not include in a specific state’s 
standards often ended up being more inclusive, and that’s not a good thing 
actually. It was so inclusive that they really never made hard decisions 
about—based on research—what the essential standards were that needed to 






Fundamentally, according to BE1, because they were typically developed and reviewed by 
non-experts (i.e., individuals with a lack of specific training or expertise within the field of 
standards writing), state standards became too all encompassing, did not adequately define 
progressions of knowledge and skills from one grade level to another, and failed to pay 
attention to extant research on student learning. These exact same concerns were voiced by 
BE3, who cited the findings of Dr. William Schmidt, a professor of education and statistics at 
Michigan State University, when describing previous educational standards in the United 
States as having been “a mile wide and an inch deep.” Elaborating on this topic, BE3 
explained that “Everything [was] crammed into [the standards]. They [were] unmanageable, 
un-teachable, incoherent, etcetera.”  
 Reflecting on why the individuals who have traditionally been charged with the 
responsibility for writing standards lack the requisite competencies, BE1 described there 
being uneven levels of capacity at the state level:     
There is varied capacity in state education agencies. These agencies 
are the entities that are charged with the responsibility of developing 
standards. Yes, they solicit input from local teachers, parents, and other 
community members, but I think, despite their efforts, Mississippi has a very 
different capacity level than a New York state or a California, or even a 
Pennsylvania.  
 
Moreover, BE1 asserted that such disparities in capacity provided a major justification for the 
development of common state standards: “I think bringing states together to do this work and 
pool the collective wisdom, understanding, and knowledge of the research had tremendous 
value.” 
 Lowering expectations to avoid federally mandated sanctions. BE2 explained her 
perspective on the problem being addressed by the initiative in the following way: “I think 
what was sort of attempting to happen in the debate on Common Core was to define what the 





other words, the initiative sought to do more than universalize expectations: It sought to 
elevate expectations for all students. This emphasis on increased rigor tallied with the central 
causal theory associated with the excellence agenda of the 1980s and the ensuing standards-
based reform agenda. In essence, the underperformance of students was viewed as being the 
product of low expectations; by raising academic requirements, it was believed that school 
performance and student achievement would also increase.  
 The interview with BE2 revealed that she understood the CCSS as being a direct 
descendent of Reagan-era education reforms. She identified ANAR as the “first starting point 
to having this conversation about, ‘What does one need and want to expect out of the 
American education system?’” What is more, following the same basic chronology outlined 
in the literature on the evolution of standards-based reform, BE2 described the focus on 
results-based accountability during the 1980s and 1990s as paving the way for the 
accountability provisions in the NCLB law: “No Child Left Behind came around and said, 
‘Okay, we’re going to turn on the lights here…We’re going to be writing the checks, and we 
want to know what you’re doing with that money’” (BE2). As will be outlined in later 
findings, several of the political entrepreneurs provided similar accounts of the policy 
trajectory leading up to the CCSS. These narratives provided an example of human actors 
connecting and comprehending events in a mutually understood, storied form.  
 BE2 went on to assert that NCLB’s emphasis on accountability and the reporting of 
state-level data were positive developments, but she also suggested that the law had failed in 
one major way: “When it turned on the lights, it told the states that they could define what 
success meant.” Again, BE2’s account paralleled the narratives presented by such scholars as 
Rhodes (2012) when outlining the events leading up to the CCSS and other Obama-era 





define what success meant and instead of saying, ‘We want to define success by raising the 
bar for our students,’ they just lowered it to the ground so anyone and everyone could walk 
through it.” Basically, according to this version of events, state standards were kept low to 
ensure a higher rate of student proficiency and avoid the sanctions mandated by the NCLB 
law. This lowering of expectations provided another justification for the adoption of the 
CCSS: Common state standards would eliminate the temptation to increase student 
achievement by depressing proficiency levels. 
 Teachers’ unions & inequitable funding. Other reasons BE2 cited for the existence 
of inequitable expectations between schools, districts, and states included school funding 
methods based on local taxes and the obstructionism of teachers’ unions. Regarding the 
latter, she said, “I think the monopoly that has been created and the role of the teachers’ 
unions in keeping the status quo has been one of the biggest challenges to making any 
potential changes to a system where it requires change.”  
Business Entrepreneurs’ Preferences for Solving Subsystem-Wide Problems  
 In addition to their shared preference for common career- and college-readiness 
standards developed by experts, the business entrepreneurs identified a range of policy 
solutions for addressing the abovementioned problems. Major examples of core policy 
preferences they named included aligned assessments, statewide accountability systems, 
aligned curricula, and school choice. 
 Aligned assessments. There was consensus among the business entrepreneurs that 
the CCSS must be accompanied by aligned assessments. In the words of BE1, “We felt that 
improving the standards was the first step because that’s just the input side of the equation. 
The assessments are also equally as important in this debate.” Following a logic similar to the 





investment, the use of common assessments was viewed as essential for measuring student 
achievement against the common standards: “The standards are only as good as the 
assessments that are developed to measure student performance” (BE1).  
 All of the business entrepreneurs agreed that the assessments being used by the states 
in the run up to the CCSS had not been of adequate quality. BE1, for example, provided the 
following appraisal:  
The assessments have been direct recall, regurgitation of facts, and I 
think we were striving for states to work together to develop more robust 
assessments that required a demonstration of knowledge in a way that has not 
typically been expected of them. 
 
As discussed earlier, the importance of aligning assessments to standards has been a core 
tenet of the standards-based reform paradigm since its genesis (Smith & O’Day, 1990). Also 
fundamental to standards-based reform is a focus on results-based accountability.  
 Statewide accountability systems. BE2 emphasized the importance of statewide 
accountability systems during her description of state responses to the NCLB law. As already 
mentioned, she asserted that state leaders had failed to rise to the challenge of elevating state 
standards and holding low-performing schools accountable. The CCSS was designed, she 
argued, to ensure that all schools were being held to the same set of standards. 
So there isn’t one right answer to making it better, but I think state 
accountability has a huge part in this. For a really long time, no one cared—
there was just no accountability. Then we turn on the accountability arm and 
the only focus was, “How do we get points?” It’s almost like the answer isn’t 
automatically, “How can we do it right or better?” It’s “How can we just get 
points to do whatever we’re going to be doing anyway?” That just creates 
such challenges. (BE2) 
 
 A similar framing of events was provided by BE3, who had both observed and 
participated in the evolution of the standards movement since the 1980s. He described a 
“linear progression” reaching from Lamar Alexander’s time as the governor of Tennessee 





administration. He pointed out that student achievement following the NCLB law had 
remained flat, thus providing the impetus for the Obama administration and standards-based 
reform advocates to ratchet up accountability measures by way of the provisions within 
RTTT. Recalling the sentiments expressed within the reform community at that time, BE3 
stated, “Teacher evaluations and stronger intervention in low-performing schools? Man, 
that’s what you do when you think the people at the local level still haven’t gotten the 
message. We’ll tighten the screws even more!”.   
 Within her discussion of the importance of accountability, BE2 spoke of the need for 
disaggregated student assessment data:  
I think the understanding of disaggregatable data by subgroup, and not 
by super subgroup, is one way to hit at that issue. Like, not just define what it 
means to be failing or passing by a school, but really dig into ethnicity and 
what does it mean. How are Black students in this school being served? How 
are White students being served? How are Indian students being served? Just 
going down the line.  
 
This description of subgroup accountability linked back to her comments on equity issues 
and the need to make sure that every student is receiving a fair and high-quality education.  
 Aligned curricula. Each of the business entrepreneurs identified the development of 
rigorous curricula as being an important strategy for successful school reform. BE3 explained 
the relationship between standards and curricula in the following way: “As soon as you start 
dealing with standards… people understand that it’s really not just about the standards, it’s 
ultimately about the curriculum.” In essence, while standards delineate what will be taught, it 
is the curriculum that defines how the standards will be taught. Standards and curricula are, 
therefore, tightly coupled. BE1 described how the CCSS had sought to circuitously improve 
decisions regarding curricula:  
We were also driving, indirectly, to suggest there needs to be a closer 





textbook, but that there are a variety of instructional tools and resources that 
maybe states work together on. 
 
The explanation BE3 offered as to why the CCSS coalition avoided any effort to directly 
influence curricula was that it would have been interpreted as an effort to usurp local control 
and, thus, a step too far:  
That would have been the death! I mean, we would never have 
developed the standards if we came out and said, “The goal is [for] states to 
work together on standards, and we’re going to work together on assessments, 
which is the ‘what.’ Oh, and by the way, we’re going to teach you how to 
teach it.” The “how” is the curriculum. No one wants to give up control over 
how a defined set of standards are taught.  
 
Nevertheless, though the coalition sought to emphasize the differences between standards 
and curricula, this distinction failed to resonate with opponents of the initiative and proved to 
be a major factor when it came to the politicization of the CCSS. 
 School choice. A further core policy preference identified by BE2 was that of school 
choice: “I think there’s a number of ways that states and districts combat [inequities], with 
choice being one of the major ways to provide other experiences for kids and for parents.” 
She also conceded, however, that school choice policies have not yet resulted in greater 
equity for students. Choice, she said, “is not uniformly creating equitable delivery of 
services, either. So there isn’t one right answer to making it better, but I think state 
accountability has a huge part in this.”  
The Policy Core Beliefs of Business Entrepreneurs 
 As shown in Table 6, there were a variety of beliefs regarding the importance of the 
CCSS, problems that the standards address, the causes of these problems, and policy 
solutions for addressing these problems that were shared by all three of the informants. 





justification upon which the business entrepreneurs’ CCSS advocacy work was founded.24 
Table 6. 
Policy Core Beliefs of Business Entrepreneurs 
Importance of the Standards Presence of Topic 
Preparation for Postsecondary Education and Workforce 3/3 
       Preparing Students for Work in a Shifting Economy 3/3 
       Global Competitiveness 3/3 
       Equitable Opportunities (Educational Equity) 3/3 
       Foundation for Systemic Reform 3/3 
       Comparability 2/3 
Subsystem-Wide Problems  
Students Not Prepared for College/Career 3/3 
      Antiquated Standards 1/3 
      Uneven and Inequitable Expectations for Students 3/3 
              Negative Impact on Students Moving Between States 1/3 
              Lower Expectations in Career Technical Education 1/3 
Causes of Problems  
Traditional Standards Development Processes 2/3 
Avoidance of Federal Sanctions 1/3 
Teachers' Unions 1/3 
Inequitable Funding  1/3 
Policy Core Preferences (Solutions)  
Common College and Career-Readiness Standards 3/3 
       Aligned Assessments 3/3 
       Accountability Systems 2/3 
       Aligned Curricula/Coursework 3/3 
       School Choice 1/3 
Policy Core Beliefs: Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
 The three civil rights entrepreneurs interviewed worked for different organizations 
advocating for civil rights and racial justice. All three of these organizations had supported 
the CCSS effort as part of their focus on educational equity.   
																																																								
24	Though examples of shared beliefs were identified, it is important to remember that the 
topics discussed during the interviews were, to a certain extent, participant-led. Unlike a 
survey, which can ask each respondent to provide a rating on a prescribed set of topics, the 
semi-structured design of the interviews used for this research allowed participants to answer 
in their own ways. It is impossible to know, therefore, whether the omission of a topic (e.g., 





Civil Rights Entrepreneurs on the Importance of the Common Core 
 According to the civil rights entrepreneurs interviewed, their organizations were 
drawn to the CCSS because they viewed college and career readiness as an important factor 
when it came to ensuring equitable opportunities and outcomes for historically underserved 
groups of students.  
 Preparing students for postsecondary education and career. When asked why 
they considered common educational standards to be important, the civil rights 
entrepreneurs, like the business entrepreneurs, all described the initiative as an important 
strategy for ensuring that students are prepared for postsecondary education and a career. The 
framing they offered, however, placed much greater emphasis on improving postsecondary 
outcomes as an issue of equity. Their words communicated what Labaree (1997) terms 
democratic equality and social mobility goals. Essentially, these entrepreneurs viewed 
ensuring equal treatment and access to common educational standards as creating more 
equitable opportunities for historically underserved students to attain the private goods of 
financial security and social power. Moreover, they believed that raising the academic 
achievement of these students served to generate the broader public goods associated with a 
more open and inclusive society.  
 Educational equity for historically underserved students. All of the civil rights 
entrepreneurs interviewed described educational equity as a principal factor in their 
organizations’ decisions to engage in work on behalf of the CCSS. In the words of CR3, 
I think [academic standards] serve a really important role in making 
sure that all students have access to the knowledge and skills that they need to 
be successful later in life. I do think that academic standards help to ensure 
consistency across schools, which is incredibly important for achieving the 






The entrepreneurs spoke of the need to raise the achievement of students of color, students 
from low-socioeconomic status (low-SES) backgrounds, immigrant students, and students 
with disabilities, so that they are afforded the same life chances as their White, more affluent, 
and non-disabled peers.  
 Raising the expectations of teachers. Building on this idea of ensuring equity, CR1 
and CR2 both pointed specifically to the need to elevate teachers’ expectations. As CR1 
described it, educational standards are important because they give “teachers something to 
aim for.” The desire to spell out expectations for educators was primarily founded on the 
belief that teachers tend to expect less from students of color, students from low-SES 
backgrounds, immigrant students, and students with disabilities. CR1 explained that 
standards help ameliorate this issue of low expectations by providing teachers with “clear 
images of what kids should be able to do by the time they leave a grade level, grade span, or 
school entirely.” Relatedly, CR2 depicted the CCSS as creating a vehicle for raising the 
expectations of teachers and ensuring that “all students are held to the same standards.”  
 Standards provide an advocacy tool for parents. Also connected to the broad topic of 
educational equity, CR2 told how, from her perspective, standards are important because 
they offer an advocacy tool for parents and other advocates. Expanding on this belief, CR2, 
whose organization focuses exclusively on civil rights for Latinos, said, 
The standards are important with families because you can’t have a 
conversation about assessments and why tests matter unless you are also 
showing—and again this is all Latino families, Spanish-speaking families, and 
immigrant and newcomer families—without also showing them these are the 
ways that your child can prepare for these tests, or these are the benchmarks 
by which they will be evaluated on these tests. 
 
She stressed the importance of equipping Latino families with information about the 
standards being used to assess student success in order to prevent asymmetries of information 





 An anchor for systemic reform. CR2 used the same metaphor as BE3 when 
describing the importance of standards: “From my perspective, academic standards are really 
important because they are the anchor of the education that is being delivered to students.” 
This depiction of the centrality of standards within school reform efforts is consistent with 
the underlying logic behind the standards-based reform paradigm. CR1 and CR3 also 
communicated this policy core belief. CR1, for example, asserted, “If you don’t have 
standards, there is no reason to do any of the other things. They are at the core of what makes 
it possible.”  
Civil Rights Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions of Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Students not prepared for postsecondary education or a career. An overarching 
reason why high and consistent standards for all students were understood to be important by 
the civil rights entrepreneurs was that K-12 academic achievement is correlated with 
postsecondary success. In the words of CR3, “The problem I am most concerned about is 
inconsistency in the rigor of education and the degree to which education that’s being 
provided is aligned to college readiness, which I think is absolutely an equity issue.” 
 Uneven standards and inequitable expectations for students. Like the business 
entrepreneurs, the civil rights entrepreneurs described a central concern of theirs as uneven 
and inequitable expectations for students. More explicit in the responses of the civil rights 
entrepreneurs, however, was the belief that expectations were often lower for historically 
underserved students: “The first lesson everyone should learn is that the fundamental 
problem in American education is inequity—mostly along racial lines, but also along lines of 





 Lower expectations for students of color and students from low-SES backgrounds. 
The three civil rights entrepreneurs all expressed the belief that historically underserved 
students are often not held to the same standards as other students. In the words of CR1, 
It is a horrific problem! We are focused, as an organization, primarily 
on low-income kids and kids of color, and there is no question that the 
standards and expectations for them are considerably lower than for other 
kids. Standards are not a panacea for addressing that, but the absence of 
common standards is certainly a handicap when you’re trying to address that 
problem. 
 
When asked how serious the issue of educational inequity was, CR3 said, 
Extremely. I think it is the foundational problem. I think it is the 
biggest problem in education. I think it has always been the biggest problem 
in education, and I think any conversation about educational quality if it isn’t 
first a conversation about educational equity, will never achieve quality. 
 
 The interview data from this group of political entrepreneurs conveyed a shared belief 
that their advocacy work was student-centric. With that being said, the responses of the civil 
rights entrepreneurs also revealed a secondary framing that emphasized equity as a public 
good: Holding schools accountable for the performance of all students was considered “really 
important to moving the country forward” (CR1).  
 Negative impact on students moving between states. Inequitable expectations, CR2 
explained, also created a major problem for students moving between states: 
We know that there is a lot of, at least when immigrant families first 
come here to the U.S., movement across states, whether it is for a job or to be 
closer to family…. Having the same high-quality academic standards across 
states is important because it allows students to be on the same playing field 
across states.  
 
Though this concern matched BE1’s description of the negative impact of uneven standards 
for students moving around the country, CR2’s focus on transient immigrant students offered 






Civil Rights Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions of the Causes of Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 The most prevalent explanation the civil rights entrepreneurs offered for inequitable 
expectations for students was systemic racism.  
 Systemic racism. Each of the civil rights entrepreneurs spoke of what they perceived 
as racism within education systems, as well as the broader social and institutional context. 
For example, when asked to name the causes of educational inequities, CR3 said, 
“Fundamentally, racism in the United States. The origin of the U.S. as a country that was 
premised on the enslavement of one group of people, then the marginalization and 
exploitation of other groups of people.” This depiction of conditions conveyed a conviction 
that structures and beliefs stemming from the United States’ plantation economy and Jim 
Crow laws continue to influence and shape educational institutions in the 21st century. CR1 
responded to the same question in the following way:  
Well some of this is bound up in sort of lingering beliefs among many 
Americans, including many American educators, that some kids—especially 
those who are poor or those who are members of ethnic minority groups—are 
less capable, or that their lives are so otherwise challenging that challenging 
them in schools is somehow wrong. 
 
CR1’s description of teachers in the United States failing to challenge groups of students, due 
to either prejudice or pity, also signified a core belief regarding the culpability of educators in 
upholding an inequitable system.  
 The failings of educators (teacher quality). All of the civil rights entrepreneurs 
named teachers as being a major cause of educational inequities for students during their 
interviews. In the words of CR3, “My argument about the standardization or the consistency 
across schools is directly because I believe that teachers, on their own, will reinforce 
inequitable opportunities to education.” Likewise, CR2 identified the failure of teachers to 





I mean, I hate to put the blame on teachers because I come from a 
family of teachers, but [the CCSS] is fixing the problem of not holding 
students of color to the highest expectations and highest standards…. We 
know that during No Child Left Behind, and even before that, English learners 
and Latino children, and Black children as well, were receiving a different 
level of rigor depending on what state they were in. Some of it was because 
the schools and the teachers didn’t know how to serve those students—
English learners or students with additional learning needs—and some of it 
was more nefarious: just like direct racism.  
 
 In addition to the suggestion that educators fail to hold all students to the same high 
expectations, CR1 suggested the existing teacher workforce does not have the requisite 
knowledge and skills to provide a high-quality and equitable education to students: 
The most significant [challenge faced by reformers] is the lack of 
capacity in our current teacher force to actually teach kids to those standards. 
Honestly, many of those teaching in today’s classrooms wouldn’t themselves 
meet the standards for exiting high school that are articulated in Common 
Core and much less be able to know how to get their kids there. 
 
 Local control and teacher autonomy. Another cause cited by CR1, when speaking 
about the problem of inequitable expectations, was the system of education governance in the 
United States and the tradition of local control: 
Some of it is also bound up in both the United States’ refusal to have 
high-end common standards nationally, like many other countries do, and in 
our refusal to have anything that looks like a national, or frankly even state, 
curriculum. So, the tendency to leave it up to individual teachers to define 
both what is appropriate to teach kids and for them to learn is, unfortunately, a 
long-standing characteristic of American education. 
 
Interconnected with the issue of local control and the perceived failings of educators, CR3 
described her opposition to the “supremacy of teachers”—the belief that “Teachers should be 
the sole decider of everything.” CR3 acknowledged that this viewpoint set her apart from 
people who believe that “teachers are in the best position to make the right decision.” 
Civil Rights Entrepreneurs’ Preferences for Solving Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Along with the shared belief in the need for high and consistent standards, which 





education system in which every child receives the education they need and deserve,” the 
civil rights entrepreneurs discussed a range of other policy core preferences that have long 
been associated with the standards-based reform paradigm. The clearest articulation of the 
necessary elements for standard-based systemic reform was provided by CR1: 
Better curriculum materials, actual curriculum. Teacher preparation 
that actually focused on what kids [are] supposed to learn. Lots of 
professional learning opportunities that are tied to both new standards and 
new curriculum, [and] better assessments. I mean you kind of name it—it is 
one strategy. And then extra catch-up work for kids that are behind. If you 
don’t have standards, there is no reason to do any of the other things. They are 
at the core of what makes it possible. 
 
The interview with CR1 revealed that she is a strong proponent of standards-based reform 
and has been active in the standards movement for decades.   
 Aligned assessments. Like the business entrepreneurs, the civil rights entrepreneurs 
all spoke of the importance of having better assessments that were aligned to the standards: 
“I would like to believe that states that have roughly similar standards would end up at some 
point with roughly similar assessments” (CR1).  
 Aligned curricula. Paralleling their business entrepreneur counterparts, CR1 and 
CR2 both identified the need for a high-quality curriculum aligned to state standards as a 
means to improve instruction for historically underserved groups of students. In the words of 
CR2, “For Latino children, it’s really important because the standards are what curricula are 
based on and really what drive teaching practices, too.”  
 Accountability systems. All three civil rights entrepreneurs expressed a shared belief 
that teachers, schools, and districts should be held accountable for student achievement. 
Moreover, they each expressed a preference for strong federal oversight. CR1 told how civil 





direction than the teacher’s unions, who, she argued, have traditionally emphasized the lack 
of resources as the main cause of low-performing schools, rather than teacher behaviors:  
Eventually, as [civil rights] organizations realized the up-sides of 
standards, assessments, and accountability systems that help schools be 
responsible for all groups of kids, the civil rights community came over fully 
and basically said to the unions, “Screw you. We’re going to support this no 
matter what. You’re not going to stop us taking a position on it.”  
 
 These differences in perspective between the teachers’ unions and civil rights groups 
offer an example of what the ACF terms an internal shock (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This 
rift between the unions and other education reformers, which proved to be a major source of 
conflict during the implementation of the CCSS, is discussed in greater detail in Section II of 
this chapter.  
 Paralleling comments made by two of the business entrepreneurs, CR1 identified the 
testing and accountability provisions in the NCLB law as gifting standards-based reform 
advocates with “much broader support for common standards.” According to CR1, this 
support grew in response to the perceptions of state-level actors that their districts and 
schools were being unfairly punished because they had tougher tests than schools in 
neighboring states. In the words of CR1, “That helped build a kind of groundswell of, ‘We 
should at least have an even playing field; it should be fair across the country,’ which then 
helped build the politics.” 
 Teacher preparation and professional development. CR1 and CR2 both suggested 
that educators require better training in order to meet the needs of all students. CR2 described 
how teachers serving students of color often lack the requisite cultural competence to be 
effective:  
Just like not good awareness about Black and Brown kids. I mean, I 
think the underlying cause is racism, or just discrimination, a little bit of 





supported…. Teachers have not been equipped with a nuanced training on 
how to serve kids. Like, they are not given enough resources to do it well. 
 
An example provided by CR2 to support this claim was a conversation that she had with a 
member of one of her organization’s state affiliates. This member told CR2 that he had 
attended a regional meeting that was being held by his state’s department of education in 
which the leaders of the meeting had conflated the needs of English learners with those of 
students with disabilities. In the words of CR2, “From his perspective, it wasn’t because they 
hate English learners—they just have no idea.” 
 Targeted resources. All three civil rights entrepreneurs described a shared belief that 
supplementary, targeted resources should be made available for students that have 
historically been underserved. CR3, for example, said, 
In addition to high and consistent standards and greater consistency 
across schools, districts, and states, is providing resources that are aligned to 
meet the needs of students in schools so that we have a system where higher-
needs schools and districts have greater resources to meet their students’ 
needs than do schools and districts with students who have fewer needs.  
 
In the same vein, CR1 spoke about the need to provide targeted remediation for students that 
have fallen behind, and CR2 identified robust, targeted parental engagement as being an 
important strategy for helping to empower communities with the requisite knowledge and 
skills to advocate for newcomers and English language learners.  
The Policy Core Beliefs of Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
 The civil rights entrepreneurs were united in their understanding that preparing 
students for postsecondary success is a matter of equity. Common educational standards were 
viewed as being important because they help ensure that historically underserved students are 
being held to the same high expectations as other students. This group viewed systemic 
racism as being a major source of educational inequities and identified educators as being a 






Policy Core Beliefs of Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
Importance of the Standards Presence of Topic 
Preparation for Postsecondary Education and Workforce 3/3 
       Educational Equity  3/3 
              Raising Teacher Expectations 2/3 
              Standards as an Advocacy Tool for Parents 1/3 
        Foundation for Systemic Reform 3/3 
Subsystem-Wide Problems  
Students Not Prepared for College/Career 3/3 
       Uneven and Inequitable Expectations for Students 3/3 
              Lower Expectations for Historically Underserved Students 3/3 
              Negative Impact on Students Moving Between States 1/3 
Causes of Problems  
Systemic Racism 3/3 
       Failings of Educators (Teacher Quality) 3/3 
       Local Control and Teacher Autonomy 1/3 
Policy Core Preferences (Solutions)  
Common College and Career-Readiness Standards 3/3 
       Aligned Assessments 3/3 
       Aligned Curricula/Coursework 2/3 
       Accountability Systems 3/3 
       Teacher Preparation/Professional Development 2/3 
       Targeted Resources 3/3 
Policy Core Beliefs: Educational Conservatives 
 The three educational conservatives interviewed were affiliated with non-profit 
organizations that support conservative education reform efforts. Each of these organizations 
had, in various ways, advocated for the CCSS as a means of raising academic requirements 
in schools.  
Educational Conservatives on the Importance of the Common Core 
 The interviews with the educational conservatives revealed a great deal of belief 
convergence with the business entrepreneurs and civil rights entrepreneurs, particularly 
around such areas as the need for higher and clearer expectations for all students and the 





 Preparing students for postsecondary success and the workforce. The overarching 
reasons cited by the educational conservatives as to why the CCSS was important were to 
prepare students for postsecondary success and to meet workforce needs. When speaking 
about why his organization engaged in advocacy work on behalf of the CCSS, EC1 
communicated a policy core belief that high and consistent standards are important for 
promoting economic growth and national security: “I think that’s what the coalition wanted: 
better, higher, more rigorous expectations for kids so that we have a more productive 
economy and security for our country.” Moreover, as was the case in the responses of the 
business entrepreneurs, EC1 described the CCSS as being a strategy for better meeting the 
demands of employers: “Whether you are pulling [kids] out of Minnesota or Wisconsin, they 
are going to know the same things…. You don’t have to worry about where students are 
geographically located when you’re hiring.” 
 EC2 and EC3 framed the relationship between common educational standards and 
postsecondary success by deploying the cultural narrative of the American dream, also 
known as the “Rags-to-Riches, or Pull-Yourself-up-by-Your-Bootstraps, Narrative” (Lakoff, 
2009, pp. 28-29). In the words of EC2, “The argument has been if you want to interrupt 
intergenerational poverty, if you want to give poor kids a real shot at success—at the middle 
class—you’re actually not doing any favors by having those lower expectations.” Similarly, 
EC3 explained,  
So, I think it is clear that there is an educational caste system in 
America. But I think one of the things that I had greatest hopes for with 
Common Core—and still have hopes for with ESSA—is the idea that we can 
establish a standard that will help lift some of those students from that lowest 
income level and give them the opportunity to break through to the middle 
class and have an intergenerational, multigenerational effect. 
 
Essentially, by ensuring that all students are taught to the same set of standards, it levels the 





rewarded. Although this description was similar to the business entrepreneurs’ accounts of 
the need to prepare students to compete in a free enterprise economy, it placed greater 
emphasis on the needs of individual students so that they might get ahead. This distinction 
paralleled what Labaree (1997) identifies as the difference between social efficiency and 
social mobility goals in American education. Interestingly, this finding challenged Labaree’s 
assertion that social efficiency goals represent the conservative position.  
 Raising the bar. Interrelated with the educational conservatives’ desire to prepare all 
students for postsecondary education and a career was a shared belief regarding the need to 
elevate academic standards. This principle harkened back to the underlying logic behind the 
excellence agenda of the 1980s: Increased rigor was viewed as an approach for engendering 
wide-scale systemic improvements.  
 Speaking about the purpose of the initiative, EC1 suggested that the CCSS sought to 
establish “a set of standards that have much broader depth, more critical thinking, and raise 
the bar on standards in many states across the country.” Similarly, EC3 described how he 
felt compelled to engage with the CCSS because, “While there is no educational panacea, 
academic standards do provide some measure of academic quality that you might not 
otherwise have.”  
 Related to the idea that common standards help raise the bar, EC2 described the 
CCSS as bringing “the latest and greatest research” findings into the classroom. This focus 
on evidence-based practices has been a common feature of the standards-based reform 
paradigm since the 1990s (Hamilton, Secher, & Yuan, 2008).     
 Laying the foundations for systemic reform. EC1 described standards as “laying the 





business entrepreneurs and civil rights entrepreneurs that standards create an anchor for other 
important reform strategies.  
Just having a good set of standards doesn’t necessarily mean you’re 
going to have a good education system or good student outcomes, but it is 
definitely the starting point to set the context for what is actually expected of 
students, and then figuring out how it is that you teach students to accomplish 
those things. (EC1) 
 
This understanding of standards being at the center of broader systemic reform efforts was 
also evident in the words of EC2 and EC3.  
 A common plumb line. The educational conservatives all described common 
educational standards as offering a vital strategy for creating greater consistency in 
expectations between and within states. EC3 used the metaphor of a “common plumb line” 
while explaining how the CCSS had provided a more uniform measure of success for 
students. He asserted that the common standard allowed for more valid comparisons to be 
made regarding the performance of students from different states, districts, and schools. 
 Educational equity for students from low-SES families and students of color. All 
three of the educational conservatives said that ensuring higher expectations and greater 
consistency between and within states was related to educational equity. EC1, for example, 
spoke about the need to make sure that students in less wealthy states are held to the same 
expectations as students from more affluent regions. Similarly, EC2 spoke about the need to 
address regional inequities within states: 
Most fundamental is the notion that, as a cause of equity, we need to 
make sure that all kids in a given state are being held to equally high 
expectations. For a long time, there has been evidence that students in more 
affluent areas were being asked to do more—to meet a higher standard in 
order to, say, get an A or graduate from high school—than kids in lower-
income areas.  
 
In addition, EC3 emphasized the need to raise expectations for students from low-SES 





While we’re quick to point out, and rightly so, how disadvantaged 
Hispanic, African American, and other minority students are, I think if we 
drill down into that lowest poverty level, those are the students that are most 
at risk and educational standards have the potential to help most. 
 
Educational Conservatives’ Perceptions of Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Uneven standards and inequitable expectations for students. Like the business 
and civil rights entrepreneurs, the educational conservatives identified inequitable 
expectations for students as a major problem prior to the CCSS. EC1, for example, discussed 
the differences in academic standards between states: 
They had very different expectations of what kids were expected to 
know and do by grade level, or even at all. So just a qualitative review of 
standards really demonstrated that there was a difference whether you were 
getting your education in Texas versus California versus Minnesota versus 
Louisiana. They were very different sets of expectations of what to know and 
be able to do.  
 
EC2 and EC3 also emphasized the problem of uneven expectations within states and, more 
specifically, the lower expectations for students living in poverty.  
 Uneven standards and the negative impact on students moving between or within 
states. Echoing points made by BE1 and CR2, EC1 spoke about disparate state standards 
impacting students moving between or within states. When describing the problem of uneven 
standards, EC1 used the example of children from families whose parents moved for work-
related reasons: 
Just with the increasing transience of the population and the increasing 
opportunity to work anywhere in the US, it is important that we have similar 
expectations for students when they move from school to school, either in the 
state or across states; [it is important] that we have some very consistent 









Educational Conservatives’ Perceptions of the Causes of Subsystem-Wide Problems  
 The failings of educators (teacher quality). Two of the educational conservatives 
identified teachers having lower expectations for low-SES students as being a major factor 
contributing to educational inequities. EC2, for instance, stated, 
I just think that over time, before the standards movement started, 
schools that serve lots of poor kids––who are coming in way behind and bring 
in all kinds of tough issues related to poverty and trauma that they 
experience—I think that it is natural for educators in those places to be trying 
to help those students be successful. But perhaps unintentionally, what that 
can look like sometimes is lowering expectations. 
 
This framing of teachers’ behaviors resembled the civil rights entrepreneurs’ portrayal of the 
failure of educators to maintain high expectations for historically underserved students.  
 The impact of poverty and broken homes. A further explanation offered by EC3 
when describing the causes of inequitable expectations and outcomes for students concerned 
the broader issue of poverty. Moreover, he suggested that the effects of poverty are a root 
cause of problems faced by racial and ethnic minorities: 
I think one of the areas that we don’t give enough attention to is the 
bottom quintile of poverty. That’s one of those metrics that’s been very clear, 
and it does transcend race and ethnicity and other issues that we often point to. 
While we’re quick to point out, and rightly so, how disadvantaged Hispanic, 
African American, and other minority students are, I think if we drill down 
into that lowest poverty level, those are the students that are most at risk and 
educational standards have the potential to help most.  
 
 Elaborating on this belief, he identified a range of challenges and obstacles that are 
associated with poverty. His main example was the impact of “broken homes.”  
The truth is these are homes that generally don’t have intact parental 
structures. And if they do, those parents are working more hours than parents 
outside of that group. Very often, they are suffering from mental health and 
other issues…. They are at a much higher risk just in terms of crime and other 
issues as well. (EC3) 
 
In the absence of nuclear family structures, EC3 explained, students are often raised without 





are critical because they serve as a backstop—ensuring that all students are being held to 
high expectations.    
 The impact of cultural norms. EC1’s response to the question of causes focused on 
cultural norms: 
Just the norming of expectations when you’re in a state and your kids 
are faring well enough for what you’re expecting, and you’re living in the 
Mississippi Delta, and you’re setting expectations for them to be able to be 
successful and thrive in that community and the state of Mississippi. It could 
be vastly different than the normed expectations of somebody who is in New 
York City, Silicon Valley, or some of the other places across the country 
where there are a lot more diverse expectations than what we have in a lot of 
our smaller states, rural states, and rural communities.  
 
All of the political entrepreneurs who spoke about inter-state inequities identified Mississippi 
as their main example of a low-performing state. As discussed in Section III of this chapter, 
such descriptions of regional differences offered an illustration of the types of constraints that 
were perceived as impacting national school reform efforts. 
Educational Conservatives’ Preferences for Solving Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 In addition to their belief that state academic standards need to be elevated, the 
educational conservatives outlined a series of other policy core preferences for improving 
schools. These included aligned assessments, accountability, teacher training, aligned 
curricula, school choice, and local control.  
 Aligned assessments. All three educational conservatives spoke about the importance 
of having aligned assessments. Such assessments were described by EC2 as being essential 
for providing vital information to teachers and parents about whether or not students are on 
track for postsecondary success. EC1, meanwhile, discussed the importance of using 
assessments to determine whether or not a teacher is effective. As EC3 observed, “It’s clear 





 Accountability systems. Closely connected to the topic of aligned assessments was 
the educational conservatives’ preference for rigorous accountability systems. These three 
political entrepreneurs agreed that schools and teachers need to be held accountable for 
student achievement. Furthermore, EC2 specifically identified the need for external 
accountability pressure: “It is helpful, if done well—big if—to have external pressure on the 
school and the school system so that those systems might make decisions that are in the 
interest of kids and that raise performance.” This perspective was similar to the civil rights 
entrepreneurs’ belief that educators, if left to self-regulate, would not act to raise standards.  
 Professional development and supports for teachers. Describing teachers as the 
“key to success for students,” EC1 stated that her organization’s preferred policy solution, in 
addition to the standards, was ensuring the equitable distribution of effective educators. In 
order to achieve this goal, she emphasized that current teachers must be provided with the 
necessary supports, including training on the standards. The topic of teacher training was also 
raised by EC2 as a means for ensuring that the standards are being implemented with fidelity.  
Furthermore, EC1 specified that as part of each state’s accountability system, monitoring 
checks must be in place to ensure that educators are teaching to the standards.  
  Aligned curricula. Another core policy preference identified by EC2 was the 
development of curricula aligned to the standards. In addition, EC2 pointed out that there are 
“real benefits” to economies of scale in using common textbooks and other materials.   
 School choice. Like BE2, EC2 spoke about having a preference for school choice 
policies, which he emphasized as a useful strategy for raising the achievement of low-SES 
students: 
I also am a big fan of expanding parental choice, especially via charter 
schools, which I think in high-poverty areas have been shown to be a very 





done right. I think those high-performing charter schools are a big part of the 
solution.  
 
 State and local control. One of the ways in which Rhodes (2012) describes 
educational conservatives as typically differing from business entrepreneurs, civil rights 
entrepreneurs, and educational liberals is in their preference for local control and limited 
federal involvement. This core preference was very much apparent during the interview with 
EC2. 
Though I support the Common Core, I still do support federalism: a 
limited federal role in education…. I think anything that is national has got to 
be something that the states lead and work cooperatively with one another in a 
voluntary way, not something that is going to be forced on them from 
Washington. (EC2) 
 
The topic of federalism was also broached by EC3, who described the ideas of small 
government and local control as being major planks of the conservative agenda. He linked 
these preferences to the religious teachings of evangelical Christianity, thus providing an 
example of the impact of deep core beliefs on the policy core. 
The whole idea [regarding] the checks and balances system, at some 
level, has a clear tie to evangelicals’ beliefs. Because we’re fallen—because 
man is subject to the vicissitudes of all kinds of corruption—you have checks 
and balances built in. And the federal government having too much power in 
any regard is problematic. (EC3) 
  
 Notably, EC1’s reflections on the role of the federal government in education were 
somewhat inconsistent with the traditional conservative positions espoused by EC2 and EC3. 
From her perspective, local control of education should really be viewed as an anachronism.  
We just have to get rid of the idea in the Constitution that states are 
their own governing jurisdictions and entities. I mean, with such a mobile 









The Policy Core Beliefs of Educational Conservatives 
 The responses of the educational conservatives revealed shared understandings that 
correlated with the main principles of the excellence agenda. A major priority of this group 
was raising academic requirements for all students. The elevation of standards would, it was 
believed, create opportunities for social mobility and bolster the economy. Two of the 
conservative entrepreneurs expressed how they, despite being advocates for the CCSS, firmly 
believed in local control. To these two informants, ensuring higher standards across the states 
was more of a priority than the standards being truly common.  
Table 8. 
Policy Core Beliefs of Educational Conservatives 
Importance of the Standards 
Presence of 
Topic 
Preparation for Postsecondary Education and Workforce 3/3 
       Raising Standards (Excellence) 3/3 
       Foundation for Systemic Reform 3/3 
              Comparability 3/3 
       Educational Equity  3/3 
Subsystem-Wide Problems  
Students Not Prepared for College/Career 3/3 
       Uneven and Inequitable Expectations for Students 3/3 
              Negative Impact on Students Moving Between or Within States 1/3 
Causes of Problems  
Teacher Quality 2/3 
The Impact of Poverty and Broken Homes 1/3 
The Impact of Cultural Norms 1/3 
Policy Core Preferences (Solutions)  
Common College and Career Readiness Standards  3/3 
       Aligned Assessments 3/3 
       Accountability Systems 3/3 
       Professional Development and Supports for Teachers 2/3 
       Aligned Curricula  1/3 
       School Choice  1/3 






Policy Core Beliefs:  
Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders 
 Rhodes (2012) uses the label educational liberals for the category of actors and 
organizations that have historically been closely linked with the Democratic Party. Examples 
of the types of organizations Rhodes mentions as being liberal include teachers’ unions, 
school administrator groups, NASBE, and the CCSSO. However, based on the interviews 
conducted for this research, it was apparent that some actors within this group, specifically 
those representing state-level educational leaders, view their organizations as being strictly 
bipartisan. For example, when asked whether he felt his organization had more in common 
with the teachers’ unions or organizations representing state elected officials, ED3 replied, 
I would say we are much more like the NGA, because our folks are 
officials; they are either elected or appointed, and they are public officials that 
have a responsibility. I wouldn’t say we are anywhere near like the NEA or 
AFT. 
 
Based on that finding, this category was renamed organizations representing educators or 
educational leaders for this research project.   
Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on the 
importance of the Common Core 
The responses of the three political entrepreneurs interviewed from this category 
revealed shared understandings with members of other groups within the coalition. For 
instance, as was the case with the three aforementioned groups, members of the organizations 
representing educators or educational leaders all cited the need to improve the preparedness 
of students for postsecondary education and the workforce as a primary justification for their 
CCSS work.  
 College readiness and career preparation. ED1 said that a guiding principle of the 





education and of the business workforce community.” Similarly, ED2 stated, “We need to 
ensure that education is aligned to what kids need to know and be able to do to be prepared 
for life, college, and career.” Closely related to the topic of college readiness and workforce 
preparation was the belief that students now require a particular set of skills, founded on 
critical thinking, for success in a rapidly changing economy.  
 Preparing students for work in a shifting economy. ED2 described how her 
organization had initially engaged in advocacy work on behalf of the CCSS because the 
standards had been billed as a way to “create both a focus and a curriculum around critical 
thinking—mastery of critical thinking—which is an essential skill that you need in the 21st 
century.” In essence, the CCSS offered a strategy for ensuring that schools are preparing 
students for postsecondary success in a shifting, knowledge-based economy. 
 Correspondingly, ED3 described the standards as being important for increasing the 
productivity of citizens:   
That’s what the standards did: they told us this is what our citizens, in 
order to be productive, in order to be literate, in order to be productive 
participants in a civic society, this is what they must know, this is what they 
will be expected to do.  
 
ED3’s framing of standards for postsecondary success, including the need to prepare students 
for civic participation, reflected an understanding that education is essential for “democratic 
equality” (Labaree, 1997, p. 43). This belief was akin to Jeffersonian-style arguments for 
civic republicanism (Cogliano, 2011). 
  Global competitiveness. Also evident in the words of one member of this group of 
political entrepreneurs was the idea that workforce preparation was connected to global 
competitiveness. ED1 spoke about the importance of making sure that expectations for 





stated, “Not only do we want to be competitive, but we want to be leaders in the world, in 
America.”     
 Raising standards. In addition to the three interconnected topics of workforce 
preparation, 21st century skills, and global competitiveness, the members of organizations 
representing educators or educational leaders communicated the desire to elevate standards 
for all students as a core reason for their support of the initiative. This group all spoke, in 
various ways, about the CCSS as having been an initiative that was conceived to raise 
standards. ED1 and ED3, who both worked for organizations representing educational 
leaders, identified raising academic requirements for all students as a priority for them. ED1, 
for example, spoke about the need to “elevate the set of expectations for a high school 
diploma to the degree that it would be a representative statement to those students that they 
are truly ready for the next step in their life plan, be that in college or career.” Thus, 
according to ED1, raising academic standards was part of a broader concern related to 
boosting postsecondary outcomes.   
 Educational equity. Closely allied with the need to raise expectations was the belief 
that common standards are essential for achieving educational equity for students across the 
country. An example of this was when ED3 described the CCSS as “raising the bar for many 
low-performing states as well as causing the middle states—the middle tier states—to look at 
concepts and the shifts that needed to happen.” Essentially, as ED1 explained, the idea had 
been to ensure that every state’s standards were “no lower than the expectations in the 
highest-ranked state, which at that time seemed to be Massachusetts.”  
 Ensuring opportunities to learn. ED2’s understanding of educational equity diverged 
somewhat from that of other coalition members. A point of emphasis for ED2 was ensuring 





educational liberals viewing a lack of resources, rather than low standards or insufficient 
accountability, as being “the cause of the most serious problems facing American schools” 
(p. 21). In the words of ED2, 
I thought it would be something that would help—if there were a 
common set of expectations for what kids should know and be able to do—
standards, not standardization. It would be a basis and a way for getting kids 
the resources and support they needed for meeting those standards.  
 
 Though the civil rights entrepreneurs also spoke about the need to provide targeted 
resources for historically underserved students, ED2’s framing more strongly emphasized the 
idea that the standards provide the basis for advocacy efforts aimed at equalizing access to 
resources and reducing financial disparities between schools and school districts. This belief 
mirrored the call for “opportunity-to-learn” standards by educational liberals and 
congressional Democrats during the policy debates surrounding the Clinton administration’s 
Goals 2000 and the IASA (Cross, 2014; Rhodes, 2012). 
 Foundation for systemic reform. ED1 and ED3 both conceived of the CCSS as 
providing a base upon which to layer other reform efforts, including the development of 
better curricula, assessments, and professional development. ED3, for instance, described the 
CCSS as creating the “foundation of exactly what [the coalition] is trying to accomplish. It 
sets the expectations for students, for schools, for districts, for states, and for the nation.” 
 A common yardstick (comparability). Like BE3, ED3 used the metaphor of a 
“common yardstick” when explaining how the standards provided a measure that could be 
used to compare the performance of classrooms, schools, districts, and states. Speaking about 
the challenges associated with seeking to make valid comparisons prior to the CCSS, ED3 
said, “There was no way of knowing how A compared to B, school to school, let alone state 





Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders’ 
Perceptions of Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Students not adequately prepared for college or career. A belief shared by the 
three members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders was that, prior 
to the CCSS, students had not been leaving school with the necessary skills for 
postsecondary success. An example of this was when ED1 described various states during the 
early phases of implementation as “struggling with serious policy issues around the 
alignment of these college- and career-ready standards—the Common Core expectations—
with the reality of the lower performance of current graduates.” Basically, the older state 
standards and graduation requirements had been set too low, which meant that students were 
not adequately prepared to enter postsecondary education or the workforce. As a result, 
according to ED1, leaders in CCSS states were faced with the daunting task of explaining to 
parents and community members that what had previously been accepted as “proficient” 
would no longer meet state standards.  
 Uneven standards and inequitable expectations for students.  The topic of uneven 
and inequitable expectations was prevalent across the responses of all three members of 
organizations representing educators or educational leaders when diagnosing subsystem-wide 
problems. Speaking about the pre-CCSS landscape of education, ED1 described the 
excellence and standards-based reform agendas from the Reagan administration and ANAR 
through the Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations as seeking to improve “this low 
expectations, low-delivery system with unacceptable outcomes.” This rendering matched 
BE2’s and BE3’s depictions of the CCSS being the result of a much longer policy trajectory.  
 Paralleling ED1’s description of state standards before the CCSS, ED3 spoke about 





worked in a state,” ED3 explained, “it was even a problem between district to district and 
school to school, but especially state to state, because folks set very low expectations and 
considered themselves successful.” 
 Inequitable resources for students. Interrelated with the problem of uneven 
expectations were ED2’s concerns regarding the inequitable distribution of resources and the 
impact of social and economic conditions on schools: “I thought [the CCSS] would help 
create equity in a very inequitable situation for students who faced austerity, a lack of 
funding, and a lack of resources and other supports that they needed.” This framing assigned 
primary blame for chronically low-performing schools on social and economic factors and 
the lack of additional funding for schools serving high percentages of low-SES students. 
Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders’ 
Perceptions of the Causes of Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Regarding the causes of educational inequities, ED1 and ED3 both focused on 
traditional standards development processes. ED2, on the other hand, shared her perspective 
that a major source of the inequities between districts and schools is the impact of neoliberal 
reformers who are seeking to defund and destabilize public education.    
 Traditional standards development processes. Like BE1 and BE3, ED1 and ED3 
both described how teachers, who typically lack expert knowledge on standards writing, had 
traditionally been charged with the task of writing state standards. Rather than seeking the 
advice of the research community about how to develop high quality standards, ED1 
explained that teachers would instead engage in a form of bargaining:  
So, “If you allow me to put my piece in there, I will allow you to put 
your piece in.” What happened was they became large-volume documents 
written in fairly nebulous language, with the only separation being a verb 






ED1 was also critical of these processes for failing to involve the business and higher 
education communities in discussions about what to include.   
 ED3 offered a similar critique: “Prior to [the CCSS], each teacher and each school 
determined [what students need to know]. You could have a social studies teacher that loved 
the Civil War, and that is all they taught: the Civil War.” The end result of these processes, 
according to ED1 and ED3, was a set of standards that were incoherent, overly broad, and 
ignored research findings on evidence-based practices. 
 Lack of teacher involvement in the development process. ED2 provided a 
counterargument to ED1 and ED3’s suggestion that teachers lack the necessary expertise to 
write standards. ED2 contended, instead, that a problem with the standards development 
process during the CCSS initiative was that it had excluded educators: “Standards are 
important, but there has to be educator and community involvement in the development of 
them and some sense and trust that they’re being implemented with fidelity.” ED2 argued 
that teachers are the actors who best understand how to meet the learning needs of children. 
 Neoliberal reformers. The explanation offered by ED2 regarding the causes of the 
problems affecting students and school systems was quite different from the other political 
entrepreneurs interviewed. She described efforts by education reformers with ties to elected 
officials and private foundations as seeking to standardize public education and ushering in 
punitive measures that destabilize schools. During her interview, she rejected the suggestion 
that public schools are failing students, and she pointed the finger of blame at “those who 
divest in schools and those who want to blame schools [and] have used social and economic 
conditions to justify their lack of commitment to children.” Specifically, she described high-
stakes accountability as punishing students and punishing schools, while also failing to 





Accountability pressures, ED2 argued, create much anxiety, which, subsequently, 
undermines school improvement efforts.  
 ED2 also described how education reformers had failed to recognize the significant 
problems that they were creating for students and teachers: 
The people who were behind the testing—like the Gates Foundation or 
the Arne Duncans and Michelle Rhees and Joel Kleins of the world—seemed 
to be more interested in the test results and in the algorithms than they were in 
what was happening to children. 
 
 Reflecting on the challenges faced by schools, ED2 questioned why it was that 
reformers weren’t interested in building the capacity of educators and equipping them with 
the resources they need, instead of “constantly trying to destabilize and defund public 
education, which is the only entity that really is about equalizing society, that really is 
foundational to our democracy.” Though ED2 never used the term neoliberal, her version of 
events paralleled a common narrative told by critical scholars about nefarious efforts to 
introduce market-based reforms and privatize public education (Apple, 1995).  
Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders’ 
Preferences for Solving Subsystem-Wide Problems  
 Teacher preparation and professional development. All three members of 
organizations representing educators or educational leaders expressed a policy core 
preference for improved teacher preparation and professional development. ED1, for 
example, explained that his organization had long been invested in the idea of “increased and 
more effective teacher support and teacher development.” Similarly, ED3 spoke about the 
necessity of developing “the quality workforce needed to deliver on [the CCSS].”  
 Building on the idea that schools have to adapt their practices in order to prepare 
students for success in a knowledge-based economy, ED3 submitted that the role of 





of learning.” Concerning this perceived shift, ED3 identified both teacher and principal 
preparation as currently being important areas for reform. ED2, likewise, emphasized the 
need to “ensure that the workforce has the skills and the knowledge, and the agency and the 
voice, to actually engage kids in powerful learning and meet them developmentally.” 
 Targeted resources. Both ED1 and ED2 spoke about the importance of addressing 
the specific needs of underserved students. For example, ED1 said that his organization had 
been “very concerned about equitable opportunities to learn and, more recently, about 
equitable outcomes as well as fair treatment of students in the system.” ED2 was even more 
explicit; she outlined a vision for school reform based on community schools, wraparound 
services, and a “culture of collaboration” between teachers, administrators, and the broader 
community.  
 Aligned assessments. Several of the preferences mentioned by ED1 and ED3 tallied 
with the main elements of the standards-based reform paradigm. For that reason, the policy 
preferences of these two political entrepreneurs were more consistent with the broader 
coalition than those of ED2. For example, ED1 and ED3 spoke about the importance of 
assessments aligned to the CCSS, which, they said, would allow for better comparisons 
between states. 
 Accountability systems. Another core preference shared by ED1 and ED3 that fit 
within the traditional standards-based reform paradigm was the development of better 
accountability systems based on the expectations enumerated in the CCSS. These new 
systems, ED3 explained, would also include “many more elements…than simply test scores.”  
 Aligned curricula. A further preference identified by ED3 was the development of a 





The Policy Core Beliefs of Members of Organizations Representing Educators or 
Educational Leaders 
 The responses of the members of organizations representing educators or educational 
leaders indicated a shared belief that the CCSS would help equip students with the skills that 
they need to be successful after graduation from high school. In many ways, the responses of 
ED1 and ED3, both of whom are members of organizations representing educational leaders, 
correlated with the perspectives of entrepreneurs from other groups within the coalition, 
especially regarding core elements of the standards-based reform paradigm. ED2’s responses, 
on the other hand, demonstrated some divergence from the broader coalition. As will be 
discussed further in Section II of this chapter, these differences of opinion between the 
unions and other organizations reflected a fracture within the coalition that was understood 
by many of the interviewees as having contributed to the backlash against the standards. 
Table 9. 
Policy Core Beliefs of Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational 
Leaders 
Importance of the Standards Presence of Topic 
Preparation for Postsecondary Education and Workforce 3/3 
       Preparing Students for Work in a Shifting Economy 3/3 
       Global Competitiveness  1/3 
       Raising Standards (Excellence) 3/3 
       Educational Equity  3/3 
              Ensuring Opportunities to Learn 1/3 
       Foundation for Systemic Reform 2/3 
              Comparability 1/3 
Subsystem-Wide Problems  
Students Not Prepared for College/Career 3/3 
       Uneven and Inequitable Expectations for Students 3/3 
              Inequitable Resources for Students 1/3 
Causes of Problems  
Traditional Standards Development Processes 2/3 
       Lack of Teacher Involvement in Standards Development 
Processes 1/3 





Policy Core Preferences (Solutions)  
Teacher Preparation and Professional Development 3/3 
Targeted Resources 2/3 
Aligned Assessments 2/3 
Accountability Systems 2/3 
Aligned Curricula 1/3 
Policy Core Beliefs: Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials 
 In the words of Rhodes (2012), “Because states possess constitutional responsibility 
for education, no discussion of education politics can neglect organizations representing 
state elected officials” (pp. 22-23). Members of organizations representing state elected 
officials played a prominent role in the initial excellence in education movement (Alexander, 
1991) and were major players within the CCSS coalition (Rothman, 2011).   
 The organizations Rhodes (2012) identified were professional associations that 
represent state elected officials (e.g., the NGA). For the purpose of this research project, 
however, the criteria used for the identification of organizations also included non-profit 
policy entities that view state elected officials as their primary target audience. 
Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials on the Importance of 
the Common Core 
 Preparing students for postsecondary education and the workforce. Advancing 
opportunities for postsecondary success was a major topic discussed by the members of 
organizations representing state elected officials regarding the importance of the standards 
initiative. An example of this was when SO1 asserted that state standards “seal the fate of 
students. If they’re not held to very high standards, then doors are effectively closed to them 
for their future.” As was the case with the other groups of political entrepreneurs, these 





college and, most importantly, the workplace. According to SO2, the importance of preparing 
students for postsecondary success remains a bipartisan issue among state elected officials:  
I do think that the whole notion of having standards that ensure that 
students are ready for college and career when they graduate, that is 
something that [state elected officials] very much agree with. I don’t know if I 
would find [an elected official] who would say that that’s not something you 
should do. 
 
SO3, meanwhile, described college- and career-readiness standards as being an imperative 
for promoting economic growth: “Every state has become increasingly conscious of how 
well educated and how well prepared its workforce is.” This awareness, SO3 asserted, was a 
central factor in motivating education reformers, including business leaders, from across the 
states to engage in advocacy work for the CCSS.  
It’s not only that we need a higher quality workforce; I need to know 
that if I am interviewing someone from Mississippi vs. someone from 
Manhattan… I shouldn’t have to look behind where they went to school to 
determine their level of knowledge and their ability to do the job we’re 
interviewing them for. (SO3) 
 
 As detailed by Rhodes (2012), state elected officials share many of the same priorities 
as the business communities in their states. It was, therefore, not surprising to discover that 
the framings offered by members of organizations representing state elected officials 
commonly emphasized social efficiency goals and the relationship between education and the 
economy.  
 According to SO2, though there was much consensus regarding the importance of 
college- and career-readiness standards among state elected officials, the questions of what 
the standards should be and how accountability systems should be structured were greater 
sources of conflict. Regarding the latter, SO2 observed, “There seems to be less and less 
agreement on whether a statewide accountability system is important. That does seem to be 





 Preparing students for a changing economy. Another belief identified within the 
broader topic of workforce preparation was that the CCSS effort was especially important 
given the shifting nature of the economy. For instance, citing data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, SO1 proclaimed that, “In order for people to be successful in the economy, they 
need something beyond high school.” According to members of this group, the CCSS was 
conceived as an initiative that could better prepare students for postsecondary success by 
equipping them with the requisite critical thinking skills for work in a knowledge-based 
economy. This understanding paralleled perspectives provided by business entrepreneurs and 
members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders.  
 Educational equity. All three members of organizations representing state elected 
officials spoke about the common standards initiative as being a means to promote 
educational equity. Specifically, this group described how the CCSS was developed to 
address inequities in expectations between and within states.  
 A roadmap for reform. Another explanation members of this group offered for the 
importance of the common standards was that they create a shared understanding about 
expectations for students, which then helps guide the various strategies used for school 
improvement efforts. This reason resembled other political entrepreneurs’ descriptions of 
standards being at the core of systemic school reform. Similar to the metaphor of an “anchor” 
used by BE3 and CR2, and EC1 and ED3’s notion of a “foundation,” was SO1’s description 
of standards serving as a “roadmap.” Expanding on this representation, SO1 stated, 
Standards are important because unless you know where you are 
heading, you don’t know how to get there. Teachers need to know, students 
need to know, and parents need to know what the expectations are for students 
in school. They need to know what is expected of them and what achievement 
of those standards will ultimately lead to. Standards are important. You can’t 






Likewise, SO3 described standards as important because they enumerate what students 
should be learning at particular points in time and they provide “guidance for everything that 
leads to that.” SO2, similarly, said that standards are important because they help states and 
districts communicate to educators “what is to be expected [and] what students are supposed 
to learn.” Basically, as was the case with almost every other participant interviewed for this 
project, the members of organizations representing state elected officials viewed standards as 
providing the base upon which to layer other elements of education reform, including aligned 
assessments and accountability systems.  
 Comparability. Interrelated with the belief that common standards provide a roadmap 
for systemic reform was SO1’s assertion that “Everybody needs some kind of standard 
against which to measure a product, an achievement, or whatever,” and that such 
measurements allow for valid comparisons to be made between schools, districts, and states.  
Similarly, SO3 stated, “We understand that every state is supposedly unique and a laboratory 
of democracy, but it also helps states to be able to learn from one another.” Prior to the 
CCSS, he explained, the only way in which state-by-state comparisons could be made was 
using NAEP data. A limitation of these comparisons, however, was that students were still 
being taught based on different sets of standards across the states:  
With the Common Core, you not only had the ability to look at how 
your students were doing by one benchmark, NAEP, but you also were then 
able to draw certain inferences because the standards that each of these states 
was teaching to were the same. (SO3)  
 
Stated differently, if all students were being taught to the same standards, it became possible 







Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials’ Perceptions of 
Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Students not prepared for postsecondary success. All three of the members of 
organizations representing state elected officials maintained that the CCSS initiative was 
developed to address the problem of students not being adequately prepared for college or a 
career. In the words of SO1, “We had too many kids who were graduating from high school 
that were clearly not prepared for postsecondary, in a world where we know something 
beyond high school is really important for kids to be successful in the economy.” This 
framing emphasized what Labaree (1997) described as being social mobility goals: 
Education is essential for affording all students the opportunity to get ahead in life. This 
group also spoke about the importance of meeting workforce needs (i.e., social efficiency 
goals).  
 Antiquated standards. A reason cited by SO1 for the failure of schools to adequately 
prepare students for postsecondary success was that the pre-CCSS standards were outdated. 
In her words, “We were still working off of a 20th century model of expectations, and states 
were slow to adjust.” This description, again, advanced the idea that the economy has shifted, 
and the skills students need to be successful are fundamentally different from what they were 
up until recently. 
 Uneven standards and inequitable expectations. This group of political 
entrepreneurs spoke about the unevenness of standards between and within states resulting in 
inequitable expectations for students. In the words of SO1, “There was huge variation in 
achievement standards around the country, from state to state and, by the way, also within 





differences between what is being taught from school to school and what is being expected 
across grade levels.”   
 Regarding this issue of uneven standards, SO3 expressed a policy core belief that all 
standards should be based on the same basic learning goals for students: “At some point, 
there is a bedrock, a foundation of learning that students need, and these standards were one 
way to introduce comparability and a uniform way of assessing.” This remark underscored an 
underlying assumption behind the CCSS: There is a “common core” of knowledge that all 
students need to be successful later in life. 
 Negative impact on students moving between states. Also related to the problem of 
uneven standards was the impact on students moving between states. SO3 emphasized this 
point when he asserted, “We had very different standards [across the states], even though [we 
know about] student mobility and the need for there to be common expectations, whether you 
were in Montana or Manhattan.” Unlike other political entrepreneurs from the different 
groups, SO3 did not mention a particular type of student when discussing the topic of student 
mobility.  
Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials’ Perceptions of the 
Causes of Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 The impact of cultural norms and low expectations. When asked to share their 
perspectives on the causes of the problems that they saw when first deciding to engage in 
work on behalf of the CCSS, all three of the members of organizations representing state 
elected officials spoke about the variation in expectations based on regional or community 
norms. Like BE1 and EC1, SO1 pointed to the state of Mississippi as an example of such 
discrepancies: “[The CCSS] surfaced those incredible variations, which mean that kids in 





already mentioned in the subsection on workforce preparation, SO3 contrasted Mississippi 
with Manhattan when stating “I shouldn’t have to look behind where they went to school to 
determine their level of knowledge and their ability to do the job we’re interviewing them 
for.” SO2 painted a similar picture: 
There were places where it was OK to have lower expectations for 
certain groups of students, and so those students graduated not with the same 
level of knowledge or academic achievement as students from other schools 
who had higher expectations placed on them. I think as a country we have 
really come to the conclusion that that’s not OK. That’s not who we want to 
be.  
 
 These three political entrepreneurs all posited that the CCSS provided a response to 
this problem by helping to establish higher standards in communities that have traditionally 
depressed expectations for their students.   
 Standards development processes. Another cause of the variations that SO1 
identified were the traditional processes used to write state standards. Similar to the 
explanations of BE1, BE3, ED1, and ED3, SO1 focused on the fact that non-experts were 
writing the standards: 
The causes are very simple. It was that in most states the process is a 
very small “d” democratic process. Generally, they bring groups of teachers 
together who then determine what they believe is appropriate at the fourth-
grade level, for example. And that varies. That varies among individuals, and 
that varies across states. It also varies in terms of what expectations teachers 
have. 
 
The traditional democratic processes of writing standards, SO1 argued, meant that many 
concessions were made, and the standards became too all encompassing. As more and more 
standards were added, it became increasingly difficult for teachers to cover all of them. 
Moreover, it also became difficult for those developing the state assessments to be able to 





 Teacher quality. SO1 and SO2 both identified teacher quality as a factor contributing 
to the problem of educational inequities. For example, SO1 suggested that one of the main 
issues with teachers writing the standards was that “they themselves haven’t been educated to 
the highest levels.”  
Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials’ Preferences for 
Solving Subsystem-Wide Problems 
 Beyond their shared preference for college- and career-readiness standards, the 
members of organizations representing state elected officials identified a range of preferences 
as solutions for the subsystem-wide problems they had named. 
 Accountability. SO1 and SO2 both expressed a preference for robust accountability 
systems. As SO2 explained, 
If you have common standards, then we have a better understanding 
through our accountability systems and can actually compare how schools are 
doing, so that we have a better insight. When you are gathering and reporting 
out that sort of data, it really helps to address those differences. 
 
Likewise, SO1 said she wanted there to be “clear information provided to parents so that they 
can track how their students are doing.”  
 Aligned and high-quality assessments. A preference for aligned assessments was 
voiced by both SO1 and SO3. Furthermore, above and beyond the idea of deep alignment 
between standards and tests, SO1 advocated for the use of better-quality tests: “Well, 
obviously aligned assessments are also critical. And those assessments have to be of the 
highest quality and include a variety of modalities: multiple choice, written response, or 
constructed response—all that good kind of stuff.”  
 Professional development. SO1 and SO3 also spoke about the need to provide 
professional development for teachers so that they could more effectively implement the 





Whether that’s learning communities or online, but opportunities for 
teachers to learn how to implement the standards and how to make good 
judgments on a day-to-day basis as to whether young people are actually 
working at the level of the achievement standards that have been set. 
 
 State control. Another policy core preference articulated by SO2 was that state 
leaders must retain discretionary authority over the decision as to whether or not to 
participate in education reform initiatives, including the adoption of new standards. Her 
strong preference for state-level decision making squared with EC2 and EC3’s states’ rights 
standpoints.  
[My organization] will always argue for states to have the right to 
determine for themselves what makes the most sense. If it makes sense, for 
example, for all the states to have the same standards, that’s up to the states to 
decide if they want to be a part of that. If they don’t, then that’s their right. It 
shouldn’t be something, from [my organization’s] perspective, that would be 
forced upon them. (SO2) 
 
This statement is in line with Rhodes’ (2012) account of organizations representing state 
elected officials opposing prescriptive federal rules and seeking to limit outside interventions 
in state affairs.  
The Policy Core Beliefs of Members of Organizations Representing State Elected 
Officials 
 The members of organizations representing state elected officials shared many of the 
same priorities as other groups, especially the business entrepreneurs. The preparation of 
students for college and a career provided a principal justification for their advocacy work. 
Of the five groups, this one and the group of educational conservatives were the only two 












Policy Core Beliefs of Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials 
Importance of Standards Presence of Topic 
Preparation for Postsecondary Education and Workforce 3/3 
       Preparing Students for a Changing Economy 2/3 
       Educational Equity 3/3 
       Foundation for Systemic Reform 3/3 
              Comparability 2/3 
Subsystem-Wide Problems  
Students Not Prepared for College/Career 3/3 
       Antiquated Standards 1/3 
       Uneven and Inequitable Expectations for Students 3/3 
              Negative Impact on Students Moving Between States 1/3 
Causes of Problems  
Impact of Cultural Norms and Low Expectations 3/3 
Traditional Standards Development Processes  1/3 
       Teacher Quality  2/3 
Policy Core Preferences (Solutions)  
Accountability Systems 2/3 
Aligned and High-Quality Assessments  2/3 
Professional Development  2/3 
State Control  1/3 
Major Themes: The Policy Core Beliefs of Coalition Members 
 Having identified patterns of topics in the responses of the political entrepreneurs, the 
coded data were further condensed into specific and general themes (Creswell, 2007). Two 
major themes surfaced from the data at the coalition level. These superordinate themes are 
listed below, along with the subordinate themes of which they are comprised: 
1. Education as a public and private good. Meeting the needs of the market, polity, and 
individual: 
a) The CCSS is important for workforce development and economic growth (i.e., 
social efficiency). 






c) The CCSS is important for ensuring equitable opportunities for attaining 
individual advancement (i.e., social mobility).  
2. Casting anchor: The centrality of standards within systemic school reform efforts: 
a) The CCSS addresses the issue of uneven and inequitable expectations for 
students. 
b) The CCSS addresses the issue of antiquated and low academic requirements. 
c) The CCSS provides a shared axis upon which to affix academic requirements, 
align instruction, and gauge student performance. 
Education as a Public and Private Good 
 Given the CCSS initiative’s billing as college- and career-readiness standards, it was 
unsurprising to discover that each of the different groups of political entrepreneurs 
interviewed spoke about the importance of preparing students for postsecondary education 
and the workforce. Where there was some divergence of emphasis between these categories 
of subsystem actors, however, was in their descriptions of the principal beneficiaries: 
whether they viewed the CCSS as primarily a student-centric initiative or one that chiefly 
sought to address employer and workforce needs.25, 26 Upon reflection, these findings 
conveyed a coalitional conception of public education as both a public and a private good.    
 Labaree’s (1997) typology of social efficiency, democratic equality, and social 
mobility goals provided a useful framework for conceptualizing the different viewpoints of 
																																																								
25	This is not to suggest that such goals were viewed as a simple dichotomy. In fact, many of 
the participants made reference to both the meeting of human capital demands and the 
fostering of equity objectives for students. Moreover, every group argued, in various ways, 
that the initiative benefitted individual students and the broader society. 
 
26 The civil rights entrepreneurs were the only group in which no member described the 
meeting of workforce needs as being a priority. Members of this group did, nevertheless, 
speak of elevated standards for historically underserved students as helping to produce public 





coalition members regarding the importance of the common standards. As described in 
Chapter II, social efficiency goals focus on preparing students for carrying out economic 
roles. According to Labaree, “The idea [of social efficiency] is that we all benefit from a 
healthy economy and from the contribution to such an economy made by the productivity of 
our fellow worker” (p. 42). Democratic equality goals, in contrast, are ones that argue the 
need to prepare all students to take on the full responsibilities of citizenship. This type of 
goal fosters equality and inclusion in order to promote social cohesion and a sense of 
community. Social efficiency and democratic equality goals both treat public education as a 
public good; in other words, a strong education system benefits all members of society. 
Social mobility goals, on the contrary, conceive of education as a private good or a consumer 
commodity. Those who advocate for social mobility goals view education as a means for 
providing students with the opportunity to gain a competitive advantage and get ahead in life.  
 Labaree (1997) describes the differences between these three types of goals as a 
source of political conflict regarding the purpose of public education in the United States. 
Yet he also argues that these goals have oftentimes been combined in order to build broader 
political support for particular policy proposals. For example, the common ground between 
democratic equality and social mobility goals has provided the basis for a range of 
progressive policies that emphasize a more open society in which every child has the same 
opportunity to achieve social status and financial security. Additionally, proponents of social 
efficiency and social mobility goals have converged around the idea that schools should 
focus on providing students with the specific skills they need to compete in the marketplace, 
instead of what some policymakers view as overly broad liberal educations.  
 Two decades ago, Labaree (1997) described the standards-based reform agenda as 





democratic equality’s aim of equal treatment. Certainly, all three of Labaree’s goal types 
were on display in the data gathered for this project. The entrepreneurs interviewed did not 
indicate that their differences in priorities between meeting the needs of the market, the 
polity, or individual students represented a significant source of conflict. Instead, it was 
apparent that the power of the framing of “college- and career-readiness standards” was that 
the CCSS could be interpreted as being both student- and market-centric, thus broadening the 
initiative’s appeal. As a result, the CCSS was initially supported by a broad range of 
stakeholders, including policymakers, employers, civil rights advocates, taxpayers, and 
educators.  
 The ACF conceives of advocacy coalitions as being comprised of subsystem actors 
glued together by similar policy core beliefs (Weible & Sabatier, 2009). One should not 
assume, however, that there is always strict homogeneity in the beliefs of coalition members 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Instead, the overlapping policy core beliefs that bind 
a coalition may represent quite different interpretations of the same policy topic. For that 
reason, policy core beliefs may be viewed through a constructionist lens; essentially, as was 
the case with the college- and career-readiness standards of the CCSS, the ability to present 
the basis for an initiative in a way that reflects back the different worldviews and priorities of 
political entrepreneurs helps with building support among actors from divergent groups.27 
This finding supported Sheingate’s (2003) claim that “The capacity to present single 
innovations consistently from multiple perspectives and points of view allows entrepreneurs 
to consolidate their innovations by building robust coalitions in support of institutional 
change” (p. 193). 
																																																								
27 Findings on the participants’ worldviews were limited in this study due to the omission of 







 The other major theme that emerged at the coalition level was the shared belief that 
educational standards are fundamental to systemic reform efforts. Expressly, from the 
perspective of the informants, common standards ensure high and equitable expectations for 
students and provide the basis for aligned assessments, accountability systems, curricula, and 
professional development. One metaphor used by the entrepreneurs when describing the 
importance of common standards was that of an anchor: The CCSS would hold reform 
efforts in place and avoid drift.28 This construal of the centrality of standards was not 
surprising given that this has long been the foremost tenet of the standards-based reform 
paradigm. The fact that so many of the participants appeared to share the same basic 
understanding of the underlying logic behind standards-based reform, and often used very 
similar terms to explain their priorities, brought to mind what Gee (2015) refers to as 
Discourses: ways of valuing, thinking, and speaking that are accepted instantiations of 
particular identities by specific groups.29 Based on the data gathered, many of the informants 
were fluent in both the Discourse of their particular group (e.g., the civil rights entrepreneurs 
shared very similar accounts regarding the impact of systemic racism) and that of the broader 
standards-based reform movement.    
 Across the groups, participants expressed the belief that expectations for students 
were uneven and inequitable between and within states. Explanations offered regarding the 
causes of such inequities included cultural norms (with Mississippi often being cited as an 
example of a low-expectation state), the failings of educators, attempts to circumvent 
																																																								
28 Other similar metaphors used by participants included a roadmap and a foundation.  
 
29	The shared understandings among coalition members could also be viewed as representing 
the type of ingrained values, expectations, and dispositions that Bourdieu labels habitus 





accountability, traditional processes used for writing standards, and the destabilization of 
public education by neoliberal reformers. Though the blame ascriptions deployed varied, the 
entrepreneurs were bound together by the shared conviction that the nation’s students were 
not all receiving a fair, equal, and high-quality education.  
 Another conceptual manifestation running through the interviews was the belief that 
the nature of the economy is shifting, and that education must, therefore, adapt to meet 
changing demands. As explicated under the heading of Education as a Public and Private 
Good, this need to adapt to the demands of the market was framed by the participants as 
being either primarily a student-centric concern or mainly an issue based on employer and 
workforce needs. The belief that existing standards had been antiquated or too low, in 
conjunction with the aforementioned belief that students were not receiving an equitable 
education, provided the most commonly cited justifications for the developments of the 
common state standards.   
The CCSS was viewed by all of the political entrepreneurs interviewed as providing 
common expectations that could serve as a shared anchor upon which to affix and gauge 
various strategies for promoting postsecondary success and reducing inequities of provision. 
In this sense, the initiative was regarded as a means for overcoming the broader issue of a 
decentralized and fragmented system of governance. However, as described in the next two 
sections of this chapter, it was this very desire to “standardize” that ultimately culminated in 
the initiative running afoul of institutionalized norms and deeply held beliefs pertaining to 
federalism and American education. 
Section II: Narratives on the Politicization of the Common Core 
 The following section presents the main findings on the political entrepreneurs’ 





Section I, findings are presented for each of the participants but are organized based on the 
five overarching groups. Matrices are used to summarize the findings for each group, and the 
section concludes with the major themes that emerged at the coalition level. 
Interview Structure 
 The first question asked during each interview was, “Do you consider the Common 
Core to have been a success?” The responses of informants to this question helped the 
interviewer understand the overarching evaluations of the various entrepreneurs regarding 
policy outcomes. Every participant was then asked to share their perspectives on how and 
why the CCSS had become so politicized and unpopular. In order to gain a shared 
understanding of the term politicized, Peterson’s (2016) chart displaying public opinion data 
(see Appendix A) was used as a visual aid. In addition, a skeleton timeline of events (see 
Figure 2) was shown, so as to engender descriptions of the same temporal window. 
Informants were asked to provide an extended account of what happened, and the interviewer 
purposely sought to avoid interjections. 
 Following each narration phase, some follow up questions were asked in order to 
ensure that the participants all discussed similar topics. This semi-structured approach was 
necessary given that a major focus of the research was comparing perspectives on the same 
basic series of events and factors. For example, the political entrepreneurs were all asked to 
share their opinions on the future of the CCSS and the coalition that formed to advocate for 
common state standards.  
The Analysis of Narratives 
 During the analysis phase, the narrative accounts provided by the political 
entrepreneurs were extracted from the transcribed interviews and coded using the pre-figured 





theory-generated categories used for this section of the analysis were primarily based on a 
combination of the common elements of narratives identified by Labov and Waletzky’s 
(1997) and McBeth et al.’s (2014) description of “narrative core elements” (p. 228). 
Specifically, codes were chiefly organized using the following major categories: Orientation 
(i.e., setting and characters), Complicating Action (i.e., the sequence of events leading up to 
the backlash against the initiative), Resolution (i.e., whether or not the initiative was 
successful), Moral/Evaluation (i.e., the significance of events and the lessons learned), and 
Present and Future (i.e., the current status of the CCSS and coalition as well as predictions 
for the future).  
 As discussed in greater detail in chapters II and III, the analytic method used for 
comparing the narratives was based on Polkinghorne’s (1995) analysis of narratives, which 
seeks to “locate common themes or conceptual manifestations among the stories collected as 
data” (p. 13). A major objective was to arrive at general themes illustrating the shared 
understandings of the coalition members. This research was also designed, however, to 
capture differences in viewpoints between the individual participants. For that reason, some 
examples are included in which an individual’s perspective did not conform to those of their 
particular group or the broader coalition.  
The Narratives Told by Business Entrepreneurs 
 The first question asked during each of the interviews with participants was whether 
they considered the CCSS to have been a successful initiative. The political entrepreneurs’ 
responses to this lead-off question helped the interviewer to understand their perspectives 







Resolution: Business Entrepreneurs on the Result of the CCSS  
 The three business entrepreneurs were united in the conviction that the CCSS had 
been a success. The main reason offered by these participants regarding this verdict was that, 
despite the political backlash, state standards were now higher and more common than they 
had been prior to the initiative. In the words of BE3, “I think it’s safe to say that the advances 
that were built into the Common Core are still in place, for the most part, even in states that 
have un-adopted the Common Core or reviewed, revised, and written their own standards.” 
 A second reason identified by BE2 as providing evidence of the initiative’s success 
was that it had “elevated the conversation about the skills that are necessary to compete in 
today’s economy.” In other words, the CCSS had helped propagate and embed the idea of 
college- and career-readiness standards across the states.  
Complicating Action in the Narratives of Business Entrepreneurs 
 In order to elicit extended narrative accounts regarding the events and factors 
surrounding the politicization of the CCSS, the participants were each shown a chart of 
declining public opinion regarding the initiative (see Appendix A) and a skeleton timeline 
that sketched out some of the major initiative-related events (e.g., President Obama’s State of 
the Union address). After reviewing these visual aids, the political entrepreneurs were asked 
to provide their perspectives on how and why the initiative had grown unpopular and 
contentious over time.  
 There is something going on here. Each of the business entrepreneurs described the 
specific point in time at which they first noticed that the initiative was becoming politicized.  
For BE1, this realization occurred in 2013, when he first started to hear the criticisms of 
individuals and hostile interest groups advocating for states’ rights and localism: 
When did I realize that the tornado was going from an F1 to an F3? 





first place where the opposition capitalized on the notion that standards should 
be developed locally.   
 
BE2 also identified the period around 2013 as a pivotal time. She described touring the 
country for work and meeting with members of different state chapters of her organization to 
talk about various education reform issues. At almost every chapter meeting, attendees 
pinpointed the implementation of the CCSS as being a major concern.  
I remember that [tour] being the first time that I was like, “There’s 
something going on here.” Because, I had not heard it on the federal side. 
Like, there wasn’t really a lot of conversation about it at on the federal side; 
yet, on the state side, it was definitely a pain point. (BE2) 
 
 BE3 first detected the potential for significant politicization even earlier. He said it 
was automatically clear to him that the 2011 State of the Union address “was a problem.” His 
organization had long been embedded in the work of states around issues in education and 
had been helping states prepare for the implementation of the CCSS. He therefore had 
observed the shifting political dynamics at play. “We had a pretty good sense of what was 
going on in many places around the country,” he recalled. “We saw the backlash beginning 
quickly.”  
 Resistance from within. BE1 and BE3 both identified a faction of rival content area 
experts as creating problems for the CCSS coalition. This group of what BE3 labeled 
“academics and quasi-academics” had been involved in antecedent standards-writing efforts 
and felt disgruntled by the idea that their work was going to be supplanted by the CCSS. BE3 
told how, rather than allowing their standards to be replaced, these experts “basically went 
around the country complaining” about what they regarded as the inferior quality of the 
CCSS. 
 A very similar portrayal was offered by BE1, who described the “very small group of 





of this hostile faction that BE1 expressed regret at ever having included them in the initial 
conversation about the CCSS. 
In developing the standards, we had this model of keeping your 
enemies close, and we made them part of the process. Boy, if I had known we 
were going to end up in the position we were, I would not have included 
them! Because they caused us too much grief during the process, and then I 
had to go through it again when we were experiencing state-by-state 
pushback. (BE1) 
 
 Pushback from the poles. All three of the business entrepreneurs described the 
backlash to the CCSS as coming from both ends of the political spectrum. Talking about the 
resistance that formed against the standards, BE3 proclaimed, “In the political arena, it’s the 
extremes who can have an impact on a relatively small number of legislators [and] can 
overwhelm everything else.” The two main groups identified as major antagonists were 
states’ rights conservatives and the teachers’ unions. From BE2’s perspective, the fact that 
opposition was mainly coming from either pole was not necessarily a bad thing:  
It was sort of like the polars on both sides hated it. Which, for me, 
meant we were doing the right thing. Like if we had both polars hating what 
we were doing, we were probably somewhere right in the middle of what we 
should be doing.  
 
BE2 explained that ten years ago the organization she worked for had traditionally been 
viewed as ideologically aligned with conservatives: “When I first started working here, we 
could definitely be looked at as saying ‘bipartisan’ but really meaning Republican.” Given 
this established affiliation with groups on the political right, she said she had become used to 
criticism from the left and, therefore, was not fazed by the disapproval of such groups 
regarding the CCSS. “For us as an organization,” she said, “we’re sort of used to that group 
not liking where we are going on any issue. So that in and of itself was less challenging for 





becoming politicized, her organization began to find itself at odds with former allies on the 
right. 
At that moment of time—really like the 2013 timeframe—we weren’t 
in a place where we had had conservatives hating what we were doing, and 
very vocally hating what we were doing, so that was a little bit different for 
us. (BE2) 
 
In essence, what BE2 was describing was a growing political divide in the United States and 
a shift in American conservatism. This topic is discussed in further detail in the subsection on 
the shifting political environment. 
 Business entrepreneurs on conservative opposition. According to BE1, Indiana 
was the first place where political resistance began to manifest. He explained how Indianan 
states’ rights conservatives and homeschooling advocates had combined with a faction of 
content area experts to oppose the CCSS. 
I think of “locally” as local communities, but they defined locally as 
the state: states should define their standards—not this national movement! 
“We don’t need a one-size-fits-all.” That was enough to get the 
homeschoolers in Indiana. These two mothers just took it and ran with it, and 
they got support from the three, four, or five [content area experts], and then it 
just started to…. We had what I used to call a prairie fire here and a prairie 
fire there. Then we were really on defense. (BE1) 
 
BE2 said that her organization had been surprised to find itself under attack by conservatives 
for its support of the CCSS: “We were all like, ‘Yeah, of course this makes sense! Why 
wouldn’t we do this?’ Then all of a sudden, we got all of this backlash.” Still somewhat 
perplexed by what had led to the negative reaction from conservatives, BE2 revealed that she 
had recently had a conversation with a pollster in which she asked him for his thoughts. This 
researcher told her that Tea Party Republicans had considered the CCSS to be the “last 
straw” following a series of what they viewed as political losses, and that they, therefore, had 
decided to channel their energies into opposing it. Relaying this conversation, BE2 divulged 





[Tea Party conservatives] saw consistent losses across the board, 
whether it be healthcare, whether it be the White House, whether it be either 
the House or the Senate—you name it! They were systematically being told 
this is the direction that we are going with or without you. And when it came 
to defining this challenge, they sort of looked at this as the last straw. They 
were happy to make this an issue that they focused on because it was a) one 
that they could win and b) one that they could get hearts and minds around, 
because it’s about kids. It’s about the formation of our children, and what is 
more precious than that? For them, it was sort of the last frontier of what you 
could or could not...—what you had to win! You had to win this fight. 
 
BE3 explained his perspective as being that the initiative became a major target for 
denunciation by states’ rights conservatives and members of the Tea Party because of the 
antipathy that existed toward the Obama administration. According to BE3, when President 
Obama mentioned the initiative during his State of the Union address in 2011, his opponents 
began to view the CCSS as a federal program: “It was basically Obama’s State of the Union 
address that set this up as though it was a federal initiative, which it was not. That then 
engaged a broader part of the conservative end of the political spectrum.”  
 BE1 and BE3 both expressed regret about the fact that the CCSS had been 
incentivized through RTTT, as they believed that this association had caused the initiative to 
be misunderstood and misrepresented as a case of federal overreach. According to BE1, 
coalition leaders had, unsuccessfully, advised the then-U.S. secretary of education to 
reconsider his decision to create a federal incentive for participation: 
One of the criteria for Race to the Top was that you were participating 
in the development of these standards—the Common Core standards. And we 
urged Secretary Duncan not to do that over, and over, and over. And he did it. 
By the time he retracted that requirement, it was too late. The damage was 
done! That’s where many people had the perception these are federal 
standards. 
 
BE3 shared this understanding: “We should have done a better job of just telling the Obama 





 Business Entrepreneurs on liberal opposition. Regarding opposition from the 
political left, BE3 again criticized the decision of the Obama administration to incentivize the 
CCSS as part of RTTT: 
It was basically Race to the Top and the push that the Department and 
Obama administration gave to supporting Common Core, to supporting the 
assessment consortia, and to using those tests as at least one of the tools to 
evaluate the effectiveness of teachers.  
 
In short, because RTTT had incentivized the states to move forward with the CCSS and 
aligned assessments at the same time as developing and implementing performance-based 
evaluations for teachers and principals, educators came to view the common standards 
initiative as part of a federal project to heap pressure on schools. Moreover, though the 
teachers’ discontent primarily concerned the changes being made to evaluation systems, the 
conflation of policies meant that the teachers’ unions turned against the CCSS in general. To 
illustrate this point, BE3 used the example of New York:  
New York State is probably Exhibit A for that—where the New York 
State United Federation of Teachers basically made an argument against 
teacher evaluation by wrapping the Common Core, the tests, and teacher 
evaluation all together and saying the Common Core was screwing everything 
up. 
 
BE1 suggested that the unions’ frustration was chiefly borne out of the sense that educators 
had not been adequately trained to teach to the standards. In his own words, “When those 
investments in professional development didn’t come through as a means of helping teachers 
teach to the standards, or supporting them in making the transition, then we started to get 
some more vocal opponents from the teacher ranks.”  
 The unions hadn’t always been against the CCSS. In fact, according to BE2, her 
organization had met with both the AFT and NEA early on to discuss what could be done to 
help ensure the successful implementation of the standards. After teacher evaluations were 





(BE2). Reflecting on this turn of events, BE2 described how she had originally supported the 
idea of moving ahead with teacher evaluations at the same time as the standards, but that she 
later came to recognize that it had been a big mistake: “Going back—and hindsight is 
20/20—I would say, ‘Absolutely there should be no teacher accountability tied to this! This 
is a terrible idea!’”  
 The politics of local control. The main principle described by BE3 as galvanizing 
both poles in their opposition related to the politics of local control: Education was widely 
understood as being the prerogative of state and local leaders as well as educators and 
community members. A major problem, he argued, was that the public did not understand the 
difference between standards and curricula:  
We said, “No, no, no! It’s just what kids are going to learn, not how 
we are going to teach.’ Except when you say you want the curriculum aligned, 
it already gets confusing. That distinction breaks down in public debate.  
 
 Because people began to view the CCSS as an effort by the federal government to 
dictate what should be taught in schools, the initiative provoked the ire of educators (who felt 
it de-professionalized teaching) and states’ rights conservatives (who believed it was an 
attempt to usurp state and local control). BE3 explained, 
Whether it’s the Tea Party on one end of the spectrum or the teachers’ 
union looking to push back on teacher evaluation, it’s just such a ripe target 
for that kind of political hijacking, if you will, that really has little to do with 
the standards, but they are weaponized in this!  
 
 Also concerning the topic of local control of education, BE2 spoke about some of the 
feedback that she heard from parents while sitting in on focus groups discussing the CCSS: 
Parents and community members alike sort of saw this as a federal 
overreach at its core. And the fact that somebody on Capitol Hill, which you 
know is arguably the worst place in the world, is trying to tell you how to 
raise your child and tell you what’s acceptable for your child to read, or do, or 






 Uneven implementation. A further explanation BE1 and BE2 offered regarding the 
reasons why the CCSS grew unpopular over time amongst stakeholders was its uneven 
implementation. Both of these business entrepreneurs identified Kentucky as a state in which 
educational leaders and the business community had made the CCSS a priority and sought to 
provide the necessary supports to ensure its success. But, according to these informants, this 
had not been the case in every state. The main counter-example provided by BE2 was New 
York State, where leaders “dropped the curriculum on every single teacher’s desk on August 
21 and said, ‘This is what you’re teaching this year.’” The lack of groundwork, BE2 
believed, meant that teachers felt ill-prepared and began to oppose the initiative. BE2 also 
tied educator opposition in New York to the emergence of the opt-out movement, in which 
parents—with the support of some teachers—decided that their children would not 
participate in end-of-year assessments, as an act of protest against over-testing.  
 Disinformation campaigns. Another major development during this time period that 
BE2 discussed was the proliferation of “misinformation and myths” being used by opponents 
of the CCSS. She described her organization being “caught flatfooted” by a disinformation 
campaign waged by right wing sources, including Breitbart: “You could not debate false or 
inaccurate facts because they were almost inexplicable! You were sort of trying to debate 
reality with this mythical world that didn’t exist.” Examples provided by BE2 of the types of 
falsehoods being propagated included a story about the CCSS-aligned assessments 
containing subliminal advertising messages: “You heard that Pepsi was advertising in [the 
assessments], and the kid read so much about Pepsi that he walked out and just wanted a 
Pepsi. And you’re like, ‘Oh my God! That didn’t happen!’” Another example was a concern 
raised by a congressman that tracking devices were being attached to students: “He had heard 





where that kid was and what they were doing after school.” This second example 
demonstrated the way that such disinformation campaigns sought to conflate and 
misrepresent the various policies associated with RTTT (in this case, the standards and the 
development of data systems) to generate anxiety about a perceived Orwellian-type plot to 
indoctrinate children. This topic of “fake news” or disinformation was present across the 
interviews with other political entrepreneurs.   
 The rising tension of federal influence. During the interviews with BE2 and BE3, it 
became clear that they understood the CCSS as being an event within a broader policy 
trajectory or plotline. BE2, for instance, described the movement toward common state 
standards as originating in the 1980s: 
If you just want to use A Nation at Risk as sort of like the first starting 
point to having this conversation about, “What does one need and want to 
expect out of the American education system?” And if you include the debates 
that happened after that, I think there was this natural raising and lowering of 
expectations in the classroom to make sure that we were accounting for 
success on the multiple fronts that we were expecting and hoping for.  
 
Having identified ANAR as the starting point, she fast-forwarded through time to the Bush II 
administration and NCLB. According to BE2, the NCLB law had a positive impact on school 
reform by “[turning] the lights on in what’s happening in public education.” Expressly, this 
federal statute had helped expose the unevenness of student achievement between and within 
states, thus creating the justification for intervention. Yet she also described the NCLB law as 
ultimately failing to ensure that all states were being held to the same high standards: “The 
biggest failure is that when it turned on the lights, it told the states that they could define 
what success meant.” In effect, because states were still able to define proficiency for 
themselves, they often maintained low expectations so as to avoid federal sanctions. The 
CCSS initiative was, therefore, understood as a natural progression; the states would now be 





 A very similar account was provided by BE3. He had been involved with education 
reform since the 1980s and even attended the historic Charlottesville Education Summit in 
1989. Reflecting on the events leading up to the development of the CCSS, he described 
what he viewed as a “straight line” that could be traced back through time to occurrences that 
he had observed during the mid-1980s. His narrative began with Lamar Alexander’s 
chairmanship of the NGA in 1985-86. Alexander, who was then the governor of Tennessee, 
made the decision to establish an organization-wide initiative focused on education in which 
governors would be appointed to a range of different task forces looking at potential reform 
issues. According to BE3, “One of the common features of the recommendations [made by 
the NGA task forces] at that time was a focus on performance and outcomes, rather than on 
regulating inputs, if you will.” This decision was consequential, BE3 contended, as it marked 
the beginning of what became a guiding philosophy for the next thirty years of school 
reforms. 
So Lamar Alexander summarized this report [titled Time for Results] 
in a press conference that said, “We the governors have a horse trade to make 
with you the educators: We will hold you accountable for results, and we will 
give you the flexibility to figure out how to produce them.” Seems fair 
enough. Of course, the presumption was the system had the capacity to deliver 
the results—it’s just that the damn bureaucrats were tying everybody’s hands! 
If we untied their hands, God knows, great things will happen! So think about 
that as the dominant notion here. That sort of horse trade—you’d see signs of 
that in all the policy contexts. (BE3)  
 
 Tracing this idea of a horse trade through time, BE3 explained that the Clinton 
administration’s Goals 2000 and IASA had both offered states increased flexibility in 
exchange for accountability: “Hell, we gave waivers to folks; we allowed states to waive 
federal requirements.” Following the Clinton-era reforms, however, political leaders had 
grown increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of improvement, thus setting the stage for 





Now fast forward to No Child Left Behind. If you’d been in Congress 
at that time, you’d look at this and say, “Well, shit. We’ve set the standards, 
we’ve raised the bar, we’ve got tests, we’re holding people accountable, but 
we’re not getting any results! We gave them flexibility for crying out loud! 
We probably need to squeeze a little bit harder so that folks at the local level 
will finally get the message.” Think about the accountability provisions in No 
Child Left Behind as squeezing harder. (BE3) 
 
According to BE3, even with the tighter federal prescriptions of the NCLB law, there was 
still a sense that student achievement was not increasing at the expected rate. The policies of 
the Obama administration were, therefore, the next logical progression.  
Now fast forward to Race to the Top. Oversimplifying, but the results 
still looked pretty flat after all this time. Right? Teacher evaluations and 
stronger intervention in low-performing schools? Man, that’s what you do 
when you think the people at the local level still haven’t gotten the message. 
We’ll tighten the screws even more! (BE3) 
 
Thus, from the mid-1990s through to the Obama administration, federal involvement in 
education increased as part of an effort to induce better results from the states. BE3 described 
how this rising tension created resentment at the state level and ultimately culminated in a 
backlash—including the politicization of the CCSS.  
 The narrative told by BE3 may be understood as an example of dramatic structure, or 
a story arc, in which the amplification of federal influence and standards-based 
accountability over time represents the rising action leading to the climax of the political 
backlash against the Obama administration and the CCSS. Furthering this plotline, the shift 
toward increased devolution associated with the ESSA could be viewed as the falling action. 
As shown in Figure 3, the arc of action in BE3’s narrative fits a structure, or template, known 












The Rising Tension of Federal Influence and Standards-Based Accountability 
 
 Interestingly, while discussing the backlash resulting from the rising action described 
above, BE3 suggested that there were, in effect, two separate critiques of test-based 
accountability that he had encountered. He described a conversation that he recently had with 
an advocate of personalized and competency-based learning. Though this individual had 
communicated his disapproval of standards, testing, and accountability, it later became clear 
that his opposition was largely based on “the age-graded nature of standards, tests, and 
accountability” (BE3), which he saw as being obstacles to individualized learning 
opportunities. Reflecting on this exchange, BE3 stated, 
It is hard to tell when you’re seeing a backlash against standards, tests, 
and accountability—just “If you can measure it, I’m not interested”—versus 
people who are trying to think through what’s a better system than what we 
have now. So I don’t really know how to predict the future around this yet.   
 
Either way, BE3 indicated that support for the type of test-based accountability associated 
with the NCLB law had waned in recent years. 
The Orientation of Business Entrepreneurs’ Narratives 
 The term used in the Labovian model for information about the setting (i.e., the 





orientation (Labov & Waletzky’s, 1997). These elements of the business entrepreneurs’ 
narratives are discussed next.  
 The setting of business entrepreneurs’ narratives. The narratives told by the 
business entrepreneurs included similar depictions of a shifting political environment. This 
context was understood to have played a significant role in the events leading up to the 
politicization of the CCSS.   
 A shifting political environment. A primary factor cited by the business 
entrepreneurs as contributing to the backlash against the CCSS was the growing partisan 
polarization between the two major political parties, and constituents, that occurred during 
the Obama administration. Moreover, there was a shared sense among these informants that 
the identities of the Republican and Democratic Parties had changed during this period of 
time. BE2 observed, “I think there is a new definition of Democrat and Republican. Living in 
[Washington, D.C.], I think it has been a real identity crisis for a lot of people.”  
 According to the informants from this group, the CCSS had originally been received 
with bipartisan support at the state level:  
We were able to get the governors of 47 states, the senate majority 
leader, the house speaker in each state, the state board president and, in some 
cases, the state superintendent of schools. They all agreed to move forward 
and adopt the standards, and we did that in record time. (BE1) 
 
Things began to change, however, around the 2010 elections. In the words of BE1, “As time 
passed and candidates were running for elected office—governor or a legislative seat in their 
state—the Common Core took on a much more political tone.” In essence, according to BE1, 
formerly supportive incumbents and newly emerging aspirants from the Republican Party 
sought to distance themselves from the increasingly unpopular and politicized CCSS. BE2 
described the shifting nature of American conservatism during this period as creating tension 





capital on this, and I did not make any friends within the building while doing it.” What is 
more, according to BE2, her organization’s positions on the CCSS, as well as things like 
trade and immigration, meant that they were now widely viewed as being “centrist,” rather 
than conservative. 
I mean a number of things have sort of redefined where we sit in the 
political spectrum…. We move either side on a number of different issues, but 
just the fact that it does move on either side has been a real change, at least in 
my 10 years. (BE2) 
 
 One of the major groups of conservatives mentioned by the business entrepreneurs as 
opposing the CCSS was the Tea Party. This conservative movement had emerged as fierce 
advocates for small government, and they attacked what they viewed as the Obama 
administration’s attempt to expand federal influence. The business entrepreneurs described 
how, as this grassroots wing of the GOP gained support among conservative voters, the 
Republican Party was drawn further to the right. Moreover, the influence of moderate 
conservatives, or “Main Street Republicans,” was diminished. According to BE1, the shifting 
nature of the Republican Party meant that many political leaders from within the party sought 
to distance themselves from the CCSS. This rejection of the initiative was most evident 
during the run up to the 2016 elections.   
The Republican National Committee as part of the platform in the last 
election took issue with Common Core—this was a big part of the presidential 
election! Or at least, it was a big part of what candidate Donald Trump talked 
about. Some of the other candidates did as well, and we had to fight like hell 
to make sure the Common Core was not part of the platform…. We found 
every political operative within the RNC we could to fight back on language 
that would be part of their platform. (BE1) 
 
Especially frustrating for BE1 was the sense that one of the original initiative leaders—the 
NGA—saw opposition to the initiative take hold within the organization. A consequence of 
this internal backlash was that, as the states looked for assistance pushing back against the 





It was almost as if the National Governors Association disowned their 
own idea. I think the politics of NGA took such a turn where the majority of 
governors at NGA, even today, are Republicans. Like two-thirds of them are 
Republicans. So it became very difficult as a staff person to be for something 
when two-thirds of your membership was all of a sudden not for it. So, the 
direction staff got was, “Lay low. Say nothing. Let others do the work.” 
That’s OK if it wasn’t your idea to begin with, but you gave birth to this idea! 
(BE1) 
 
 Characters in the narratives of business entrepreneurs. The narratives told by the 
political entrepreneurs interviewed contained a variety of different characters. Many of the 
individuals and groups mentioned were portrayed either in a positive light, as supporters of 
the initiative, or as having a negative influence. During the analysis of narratives, supporters 
were coded as “heroes.” Opponents, on the other hand, were categorized as “antagonists.” 
Organizations that had been supporters of the initiative but created problems for the coalition 
were labeled as “troublemakers.” The fourth type of character identified across the storied 
data was the “victims,” who are individuals or groups that were harmed in some way by 
events.  
 Business entrepreneurs on heroes and heroines.  The main groups named by the 
business entrepreneurs as providing support for the CCSS coalition’s work were the 
employer community, moderate Republicans and Democrats, civil rights organizations, the 
teachers’ unions (early on), national non-profit organizations, and state officials and leaders 
(including governors and state education chiefs).   
 BE1 described the employer community as “a champion for more rigorous standards 
that were aligned to research and aligned to what we know from the research on 
postsecondary readiness and success.” Furthermore, according to BE1, the business 
community has emerged in recent years as a leader in the push for such progressive issues as 





When asked why prominent individuals from the business community had adopted 
progressive positions on education reform issues, BE1 offered the following explanation: 
If we don’t do a better job of teaching our students in K-12 and getting 
them interested in science, technology, engineering, and math, we will never 
fix the problem of making sure our workforce looks like what America looks 
like. CEOs have a deep interest in trying to hire a more racially and ethnically 
diverse workforce. You can’t do that just from the college pool. You have to 
get more in the pipeline from the K-12 system interested in pursuing those 
areas of study.  
 
 The fact that business leaders supported standards-based reform efforts enabled them 
to coalesce with civil rights groups. “No one would ever expect the business community and 
the civil rights groups to work together,” BE1 admitted, “[but] we have more in common 
than we have uncommon.” Regarding this common ground, he described both groups as 
wanting every child to have the opportunity to secure a high-paying job and provide for their 
families.  
We don’t want something different for White kids than we do for 
Brown kids or Black kids. Our tactics are different [than the civil rights 
groups]. The civil rights groups are much more aggressive; we are not quite as 
aggressive. Our strategies and tactics vary but, nonetheless, we all want the 
same thing. (BE1) 
 
BE2 also described the business community and civil rights community as having had a 
“long history” of working together:   
We’ve had, especially in the education and workforce space…we are 
always finding these–quote, unquote–strange bedfellows to work with, just 
because education is an issue that transcends all other issues. We’ve had a 
long history of working with the civil rights organizations, a long history of 
working with even unions on education issues.30  
 
 Though critical of the unions’ maintenance of the “status quo,” which she described 
as being “one of the biggest challenges to making any potential changes to a system where it 
requires change,” BE2 talked about her organization dialoguing with the AFT and NEA 
																																																								
30	This account paralleled Rhodes’ (2012) depiction of business entrepreneurs repeatedly 





about how to make the CCSS a success during the early stages of implementation. Similarly, 
both BE1 and BE3 described their organizations as having engaged in efforts to meet with 
representatives of union locals regarding the CCSS. They explained how, during these 
meetings, the union representatives were given the opportunity to respond to drafts of the 
standards.   
The American Federation of Teachers and the National Education 
Association were intimately involved. We actually asked each of those 
associations to fly in teachers who worked with us for two days to give us 
their feedback on the substance of the standards—hugely beneficial! (BE1) 
 
 National non-profit organizations such as the Collaborative for Student Success were 
also mentioned as making a significant contribution to the advocacy coalition’s work. Many 
of these organizations received funding from the same philanthropic foundations (e.g., the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). According to BE2, sharing common funders helped foster 
information sharing between these national organizations. Moreover, members of the 
different organizations forged closer bonds with one another as they worked to counter a 
common enemy. 
Because a lot of people were working in very similar grant cycles, they 
felt very secure about being able to share information. But I also think that 
there was sort of like that common battle. We all now had the same enemy, 
and the enemy was the myth-sharer in the states that was trying to garner 
support in the state capitol and get a terrible bill to be passed. Right? So, we 
all were focusing on the same problem. (BE2)  
 
 The other major groups of supporters mentioned by the business entrepreneurs were 
state officials and state-level educational leaders, including state governors, state legislators, 
state board presidents, and state education chiefs. During the early stages of the initiative, the 
support given by such elected and appointed officials was broad and uncontroversial. BE1 
described feeling confident that the CCSS would be a success because it had the backing of a 





I thought this is great because the federal government has nothing to 
do with these standards. So, if we can achieve agreement even among a 
bipartisan group of [state officials], which we did in record time…. We were 
able to get the governors of 47 states, the senate majority leader, the house 
speaker in each state, the state board president and, in some cases, the state 
superintendent of schools. They all agreed to move forward and adopt the 
standards, and we did that in record time. (BE1) 
 
As will be described in later findings, however, this bipartisan support quickly dissipated.  
 Business entrepreneurs on antagonists and troublemakers. The actors and groups 
the business entrepreneurs mentioned as opponents of the initiative included rival content 
area experts, the Republican Party (including the Tea Party), conservative media, the 
teachers’ unions (later on), the opt-out movement, and handwriting advocates. In addition, 
the Obama administration and NGA were identified as troublemakers.  
 Among the opponents of the CCSS named by the business entrepreneurs was a 
faction of academics who had been involved with antecedent efforts to establish new state 
standards. 
One of the reasons we were [on defense] is because there was a very 
small group [of content area experts, including some] who wrote the 
Massachusetts standards…. If we had cut and pasted the Massachusetts 
reading standards, which [they] wrote, and adopted those as Common Core, 
we wouldn’t have this problem. But that’s not what we did. So that’s one of 
our big problems. (BE1) 
 
As previously discussed, this clique of rival content area experts teamed up with conservative 
groups, including some homeschooling advocates in Indiana, to rally against the CCSS.   
 A second group of opponents was individuals with connections to the Republican 
Party. This faction included established politicians within the Republican National 
Committee (RNC) and members of the emergent Tea Party movement. They opposed what 
they viewed as escalating federal influence, and they sought to characterize the CCSS as a 
product of the Obama administration in order to mobilize their base. What is more, 





“incredible amount of misinformation and myths” on conservative media platforms. This 
disinformation, or “fake news,” was viewed as having played a significant role in mobilizing 
opposition. BE1 recalled observing the shift in Republican support unfolding across the 
states: 
The resistance among those elected officials or elected wannabes was 
not…. It was state-by-state; it wasn’t as if all the Republican governors 
through the Republican Governors Association said, “We’re going to be 
against this. We need to have, the nation needs to have, a majority of 
Republican governors, and one way to do that is to be against Common Core.” 
It just happened state-by-state.  
 
 The third group mentioned in the narratives of the business entrepreneurs was the 
teachers’ unions. According to the informants, although the unions had been supporters of 
the CCSS early on, they later “fell out of love with the initiative when there were teacher 
evaluations that were tied to school accountability” (BE2). The business entrepreneurs 
suggested that educators felt like they hadn’t been given an adequate amount of time or 
resources to adapt to teaching to the new, higher standards. Teachers, therefore, balked at 
having their evaluations tied to student performance.   
 BE2 described the objections of teachers as stoking the fire of a fourth group of 
opponents: the opt-out movement. This group viewed the CCSS as one of the factors within a 
broader crusade that was pushing “stress-inducing, vomit-inducing, stressors on their kids” 
(BE2). These parental concerns, according to the informants, were interconnected with the 
issue of local control and a sense of distrust regarding centralized decision making (i.e., the 
idea that the federal government was seeking to influence curricula).  
 A fifth antagonist named by the business entrepreneurs was an organization that 
advocated for teaching handwriting in schools. Their main gripe was that the CCSS had not 





That group pushed back pretty hard on the importance of cursive 
writing, and they argued that it should be included in the standards. So that 
was another group that pushed back. They are such a small group; I can’t 
believe they would be so difficult. (BE1) 
 
 In addition to all these antagonists, the business entrepreneurs named two groups of 
troublemakers: the Obama administration and the NGA. According to the business 
entrepreneurs, although these entities had both played significant roles in advocating for the 
CCSS, they had also created problems for the initiative. During their interviews, both BE1 
and BE3 emphasized the point that the CCSS did not originate with the Obama 
administration.  
This work did not emerge because the Obama administration told us to 
do it or asked us to do it. The development of this effort is national because, 
nationally, states decided to come together independent of the federal 
government to explore the possibility of developing these standards. (BE1) 
 
Yet with the incentive to adopt common, high-quality standards by way of RTTT, and 
because of President Obama’s mention of the CCSS during his State of the Union address, 
BE1 and BE3 indicated that the administration had transmitted the perception that the 
initiative was a federal product: “It was basically Obama’s State of the Union address, which 
basically set this up as though it was a federal initiative, which it was not” (BE3). Both BE1 
and BE3 argued that the misconception that the standards originated at the federal level was a 
central factor in their politicization.  
 Another troublemaker named by BE1 was the NGA. This organization was originally, 
along with the CCSSO, an initiative leader. Nevertheless, according to BE1, the shifting 
political environment and the politicization of the standards meant that the NGA later 
“disowned” the initiative. 
One of my greatest disappointments is that, over time, resistance to the 
Common Core took hold within NGA. As states were looking for help on 
implementation of the Common Core, as states were looking for help to push 






 Business entrepreneurs on victims. Victim-type characters in narrative accounts are 
the individuals and groups that are harmed in some way. Two main groups of “victims” were 
apparent in the narratives told by the business entrepreneurs: students and employers. In both 
instances, these groups were primarily portrayed as being victims within the entrepreneurs’ 
explanations of why the CCSS had been necessary. Regarding the idea that students were 
being harmed, the business entrepreneurs discussed the impact of low and uneven standards 
between and within states on college and career readiness. The notion that employers were 
victims, meanwhile, was based on the belief that the pool of candidates coming through the 
education system did not have the requisite skills for employment, thus creating a problem 
for business owners.   
Business Entrepreneurs on the Present and Future 
 Unlike the Labovian model (Labov & Waletzky, 1997), which only focuses on the 
narratives told about past events, the data gathered for this research project included the 
participants’ descriptions of the present and predictions for the future. Specifically, the 
political entrepreneurs interviewed were prompted to talk about the current status and future 
of the initiative itself as well as the coalition that formed to advocate for the CCSS. 
 Business entrepreneurs on the present and future of the CCSS. All three of these 
informants felt that state standards were higher and more common than they had been prior 
to the CCSS. This belief is exemplified in the following statement by BE3: “We’ve been 
looking at state standards that have been reviewed and revised and, with one or two 
exceptions, the standards are alive and well with, generally speaking, minor changes. So, the 
strength of the standards persists.” The business entrepreneurs were also cautiously 
optimistic about the future of common state standards. The general consensus was that, 





would make any drastic changes to the standards that would result in expectations being 
lowered or becoming significantly less common. The fact that some states were adding to the 
standards was not seen as an issue moving forward. In the words of BE2, “As long as you’re 
not lowering the bar! ‘I want you to have cursive, and I want you to have handwriting.’ Like, 
that’s great! As long as we’re layering on top of, not lowering the bar.”  
 Despite having advocated for increasing the “commonness” of academic 
requirements, this group did not necessarily believe that every state’s standards should be 
exactly the same; it was more important that state standards had been raised. Moreover, the 
fact that some states were moving to change the name was also not seen as a problem. BE3, 
for example, stated, “We don’t care about the brand; we don’t care about the label. We care 
about the quality of the standards and the ways in which they can be used to help improve 
teaching and learning.” Likewise, BE1 asserted that his hope for the future was that “we’re 
not talking about Common Core!” If that were to happen, BE1 argued, the distracting issues 
surrounding the politicization of the standards could be forgotten and people could refocus 
on school reform issues.  
My hope is we’re talking about whether or not remediation rates are 
going down; whether or not more students are ready to do postsecondary work 
when they graduate from high school. My hope is people will say, “Wow look 
at the results on the PISA in comparison to performance on state tests—
they’re equal.” Or, my hope is that more states than Kentucky will say, “Wow 
look at the growth!” Yeah, it’s inching as opposed to significant gains, but 
student performance is inching up over time, and that’s a good thing. We need 
more states to tell those stories, otherwise we risk the public misunderstanding 
how well implementation is, or is not, going. (BE1) 
 
 According to BE3, the official CCSS project has now concluded: “This was a project 
to develop standards. You couldn’t find the Common Core Standards Initiative now. I guess 





hope that the changes the initiative had helped bring about would remain in place for the 
foreseeable future.   
 Business entrepreneurs on the present and future of the coalition. The 
perspectives of the business entrepreneurs on the present and future status of the CCSS 
coalition were mixed, with two suggesting that the coalition no longer exists and the other 
arguing that the coalition has, in actual fact, gained strength. According to BE1, the coalition 
that formed to advocate for the CCSS “doesn’t exist” any longer. This perspective was 
shared by BE3, who suggested that there was very little appetite for conversations about 
common standards at the moment. 
Most states right now are gun shy. If you wanted to call a meeting of 
chief state school officers under the heading of “What do you say we get 
together and do something collectively around standards?” nobody would 
show up. Or, “How about a group of us get together and create common 
tests?” There’s just not an appetite for that right now, politically. I think it will 
come back again at some point. Some groups of governors will discover why 
their predecessors thought this was a great idea: comparability mattered. But 
not so much now. (BE3) 
 
 
The belief that the idea of common standards will come back in vogue again at some point 
was also shared by BE2, who suggested that it was likely that federal influence will also 
return in the future: 
It’s interesting because even if you look at the last 35 years, since A 
Nation at Risk. Even if you look at that as, policy-wise, being a linear process, 
you can certainly also look at implementation, and it’s been cyclical. We sort 
of go from “All of this is the role of the federal government,” to completely 
back down to the role of the states, then this is the role of the federal 
government again. 
 
 With regard to the current status of the coalition, BE2 suggested that some of the 
organizations that first worked together on the CCSS—particularly the business and civil 
rights groups—have since increased their level of coordination. According to BE2, the work 





What is more, she believed that the experience of the CCSS was foundational in forging 
stronger links between various advocacy organizations.   
I would say the greatest opportunity that came from Common Core 
and the debate that ensued is that we have…. There is no shortage of 
organizations that work on education and education reform-related activities 
in this country, and there is no shortage of them in the town of Washington, 
DC. I think, prior to Common Core, there was a real concern about sharing 
information and about open and honest dialogue between these organizations, 
because everything is proprietary. Right? We’re all competing for the same 
funders to fund the same ideas. So, there was a lot of angst and concern about 
any open dialogue before anything was published, or whatever. It was sort of 
like, “This is proprietary information, and I can’t give it to you because I don’t 
want you to take this and then sell it to somebody else.” I think Common Core 
sort of ripped the top off of that. (BE2) 
 
As discussed later, this version of events matched those of civil rights entrepreneurs, who 
also claimed that the Gates-funded national organizations that came together to support the 
CCSS had been galvanized by the experience.  
Business Entrepreneurs on the Moral/Evaluation  
 In the Labovian model, evaluation clauses communicate the “so what?” of the story 
and reveal the perspective of the narrator (Labov & Waletzky, 1997). Although the analytic 
approach used in this study did not conform to Labov’s method of extracting and 
categorizing narrative clauses, the data gathered were still examined for examples of 
evaluations. Specifically, the interview data were combed for insights into the lessons that 
had been learned and the participants’ recommendations for future policy work. Three main 
topics emerged concerning the lessons learned by the business entrepreneurs: the importance 
of messaging, the importance of engaging and supporting stakeholders, and the benefits of 
scaling up.  
 The importance of messaging. All three of the business entrepreneurs spoke about 





criticisms being propagated by opponents. Comparing the messaging campaigns of 
opponents to those of the coalition, BE1 stated, 
I mean you can end up with a pretty crisp message to fight to oppose 
something. It’s easier to oppose than to be for. We had so many groups that 
were supporters of the Common Core, but we could never get the message 
right. 
 
A major problem, according to BE1, was the lack of coordination between the coalition’s 
member organizations when it came to explaining what the initiative was and why it was 
important. 
The collaboration to unify and have a clear, concise message that Joe 
Six-pack understood, that the general public understood—we never 
accomplished that. We would have been well-served if we had spent as much 
time on the communications strategy in parallel with the development of the 
standards. I think we underestimated the—no pun intended here, given the 
current administration—we underestimated the resistance. (BE1) 
 
This evaluation was shared by BE3: 
We weren’t prepared to deal with, even before a backlash, just 
communicating effectively around this. So, there was a big scramble among a 
number of organizations to figure out how to do that. Even then, it was at best 
a loosely coordinated effort with lots of moving parts and lots of issues to 
address. And there was nobody really responsible for saying, “Wait a second. 
There is a storm brewing here, it is coming our way, and here is the strategy 
for getting through it.” That just never happened.  
 
BE2 described her organization as being caught “flatfooted” in knowing how to respond to 
and combat the disinformation that was being circulated. Having recognized the lack of 
understanding that existed regarding the CCSS, her organization secured some funding to 
develop counter-messaging resources, which were then disseminated by way of a roadshow. 
In the words of BE2, “We spent half of our life over the two subsequent years just all around 
the country talking about this and sort of trying to parse the myth and the fact of the reality.”  
 It was while speaking at meetings across the nation that BE2 discovered that the 





way that she had imagined. According to BE2, although members of large multinational 
companies understood and accepted the prepared talking point about the CCSS being a 
“globally competitive imperative,” smaller business owners did not view it the same way. 
These sort of mom and pop shops were looking at global 
competitiveness as if it was a bad thing….The last thing they wanted was sort 
of a kid that was like growing up in Seoul, where they were having 12 or 14 
hours of school every single day. That’s not what they want for their kids. 
They want a well-rounded student that’s able to read and do math, but also 
able to have fun with their friends and play soccer. That was almost more 
important for them than this idea that we need to expect more of our kids 
because they are going to be up against more. (BE2) 
 
 Based on the responses of the three business entrepreneurs, the lack of coordinated 
and effective messaging by the coalition rendered the initiative vulnerable to attacks by 
antagonists, which ultimately proved to be a central factor in the CCSS’s politicization.   
In hindsight, we didn’t clearly communicate what we meant by 
“Common Core” and why the states had come together to define a set of 
common expectations that all children should be able to learn and demonstrate 
once they graduate from high school. Since we weren’t defining what it was, 
others defined “common” for us, and that was in a negative light. (BE1) 
 
 The importance of engaging and supporting stakeholders. Connected to the issue 
of messaging, each of the business entrepreneurs spoke about the lessons that they had 
learned concerning the importance of engaging with stakeholders. BE2 offered this advice: 
“Have a lot of conversations with a lot of people. Go to every single Rotary Club meeting or 
any club meeting that you can imagine and just talk.”  
 The three business entrepreneurs all spoke about the importance of communicating 
with educators. In the words of BE3, “The process of engaging stakeholders in the education 
community on the Common Core was not nearly as robust as it needed to be.” He said that 
each state had, for the most part, been left to their own devices to figure out how to 
communicate with the K-12 community. This had proven to be unsuccessful, however, 





communication campaign efforts. A major consequence of failing to effectively engage the 
teachers, these entrepreneurs said, was that they lost their support. As BE3 recalled, “It was 
the hard-charging accountability effort that helped fracture [the CCSS] coalition.” Basically, 
the rush to bring about wide-scale reform on many fronts all at one time—including changes 
to teacher evaluations and higher standards—meant that the educators pulled back. Losing 
the support of teachers also contributed to losing the support of parents. 
I think there were just a lot of changes happening all at once, and I 
think we expect a lot from our teachers. We expect them to pivot, and to 
move, and to change on a dime, and you can’t do all of that and expect them 
to sort of not ask questions or not think there is something off here. And then 
any confusion that happens to a teacher is then easily translated to confusion 
for a parent, as teachers are the most trusted source of information. (BE2) 
 
 BE3’s description of hard-charging accountability fracturing the coalition provides an 
example of what the ACF terms an internal shock (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This 
development was understood by the business entrepreneurs to have been a significant factor 
when it came to the backlash against the CCSS. 
 The benefits of scaling up. The third major lesson discussed by this group related to 
the benefits of scaling up. This belief was captured in the words of BE3: 
If I were advising governors five or 10 years from now, or whenever 
they wanted to do this, part of my advice would be find some way to get this 
going at the bottom: make it more of a bottom-up initiative. 
 
A reason for starting at the bottom and scaling up, the informants explained, was that this 
could help to avoid the politics of national education reform in the United States. 
Interestingly, BE1 suggested that selecting the CCSSO and NGA as initiative leaders had fed 
the belief that this was not a truly state-led effort: “The organizations led this—the National 
Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers—and that probably 
didn’t help us, because everyone equates national with federal.” He therefore suggested that 





 Though she described the CCSSO and NGA as being “the right people” to move the 
CCSS along, BE2 also suggested that having governors and state chiefs in charge created 
some additional problems for the initiative. Specifically, the fact that these officials are term 
limited means that turnover in state legislatures and state agencies can be disruptive for 
multi-year reform efforts.  
If it is a governor that is making that decision, a governor that is 
signing that M.O.U., a governor or a state chief that is the one coming to the 
table—their term is up and it’s time-limited. So that creates some challenges. 
(BE2) 
 
This argument, again, communicated a belief that the initiative may have been more 
successful had it been more of a bottom-up effort. 
  As already discussed, BE1 and BE3 both believed that including the federal 
government had been a mistake. BE3, for example, stated, “We should have told the federal 
government to leave its hands off it, period! Don’t tie it to Race to the Top. Don’t fund 
testing consortia. Just leave your hands off!” Both of these political entrepreneurs felt that the 
inclusion of the common standards as a RTTT requirement had caused the initiative to be 
misinterpreted as a federal program. 
 Also within his discussion of the benefits of scaling up, BE3 suggested that the 
politics of national or common standards could have been avoided if the reform had been 
more incremental and less rushed. Rather than seeking to get all of the states to sign on, he 
argued it likely would have worked better if initiative leaders had started small, avoided 
media attention, not sought to tie participation to federal funding, and been more proactive in 
attending to politically motivated threats on a state-by-state basis.  
 Build capacity first. As they discussed scaling up, BE1 and BE2 pointed out the need 
to build capacity first. Both of these informants suggested that some states had failed to 





The Narratives of Business Entrepreneurs 
 The narratives told by the business entrepreneurs interviewed revealed a shared belief 
that the CCSS had been successful in achieving the goal of raising standards across many 
states. Moreover, these informants demonstrated similar understandings regarding shifts that 
had occurred in the political environment and how these had resulted in pushback against the 
standards from both sides of the political spectrum. Table 11 provides an overview of the 
topics discussed by the business entrepreneurs.  
Table 11. 




Orientation: Setting Presence of 
Topic 
A successful initiative 3/3 Polarized partisan 
environment 
3/3 
Complicating Action   Orientation: Heroes   





Resistance from left and right  3/3 Gates Foundation 1/3 
The politics of local control 
3/3 
(Bipartisan) Moderate 
Rs and Ds 
1/3 
States’ rights conservatism 3/3 Civil rights community  3/3 
Union opposition 
3/3 
Teachers' unions  
(early on) 
3/3 
Parental opposition 1/3 National non-profits  3/3 
Uneven implementation: The 
failure to help states with 
implementation 






The rising tension of federal 
influence 1/3 
Rival content area 
experts 
2/3 
Future of the CCSS   Republicans/Tea Party 3/3 
State standards will remain higher 
and more common 
3/3 Conservative media 1/3 
Future of CCSS Coalition 
  
Teachers' unions  
(later on) 
3/3 
Evolved and stronger now  1/3 The opt-out movement  1/3 















Importance of engaging 
stakeholders 3/3 
The NGA 1/3 
Benefits of scaling up  3/3 Orientation: Victim   
Build capacity first 2/3 Students 3/3 
 Employers 1/3 
The Narratives Told by Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
Resolution: Civil Rights Entrepreneurs on the Result of the CCSS  
 The three civil rights entrepreneurs each had a different perspective on whether or not 
the CCSS has been a successful initiative. CR2 was the most optimistic when describing the 
end result. She viewed the CCSS has having been a success in two ways. First, the initiative 
had resulted in the raising of academic standards across the states. Second, the experiences 
gained by the coalition while advocating for the CCSS meant that a greater number of 
political entrepreneurs in the school reform space now understood the importance of parent 
and community engagement: “State-level advocates and national education reform 
organizations are [now] thinking of working more intentionally to engage diverse 
stakeholders or shareholders.”   
 CR1 was more equivocal in her evaluation of the initiative’s success: “I don’t think it 
is yet possible to assess their success or not.” To her, though the standards had been adopted 
by a “huge number” of states, it was still too early to judge their impact: “The bottom line is, 
are they instrumental in helping us to achieve higher achievement for our kids?” In addition, 
CR1 stressed that the standards were only one piece of a much larger effort and that they 
should not be viewed as a panacea for reform. She stated, “You know, standards don’t 






 The perspective offered by CR3 was bleaker: “I would say I do not think the effort to 
promote the concept of high and consistent standards across states has been successful, 
overall.” Despite believing that the standards had, in some states, helped support student 
achievement, she felt that the impact of the initiative had been undermined due to there being 
inadequate public support.  
I think that the brand of Common Core is so maligned that it is now…. 
The result of that is that people are resistant to the entire concept of high and 
consistent standards across states. And I think one of the things that the 
Common Core initiative should have done is build political will for that. I 
think they did not achieve that objective. (CR3) 
 
Complicating Action in the Narratives of Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
 Everyone hated it. Both CR2 and CR3 described the CCSS as being a deeply 
unpopular initiative. CR2, who started working for her organization after the standards had 
already become politicized, said that she quickly discovered that “Everyone hated it.” She 
also found that the CCSS could not be mentioned by name without provoking a negative 
response from the people she was seeking to engage with. 
I mean “Common Core” is like using the F-word. You just can’t use it. 
I learned that pretty quickly…. If you walk into a room [and say those words], 
and let’s say families have kind of heard of Common Core, you completely 
shut them down. Teachers? Oh my, do not use “Common Core!” Like, that 
was a really bad word. It still is; it still is. (CR2) 
 
CR3, meanwhile, suggested that the way in which the initiative had come to be viewed as 
part of the Obama administration’s education agenda meant that it lacked a natural 
constituency: “The universe of people who supported the agenda that he was pushing was a 
very, very small world of very wealthy, very powerful people who had zero connection to 
communities.” According to CR3, a consequence of the lack of broad public support was that 





 The far right, extreme left, and education establishment. Like the versions of events 
provided by the business entrepreneurs, the narratives told by the three civil rights 
entrepreneurs regarding how and why the CCSS became so politicized and unpopular 
depicted the opposition as coming from both sides of the political spectrum. Speaking about 
where they viewed their own organizations as fitting on the left-right scale, CR1 and CR3 
both argued that civil rights organizations couldn’t be categorized using the traditional 
concept of a political spectrum. CR3, for example, proclaimed, “I would say we’re just on a 
totally different planet!” Both of these informants described having major differences of 
opinion with individuals and groups on the political left and right.  
 Regarding groups on the left, CR1 stated, “The traditional public schools 
establishment—both the unions and administrator organizations—might theoretically be 
considered on the left, but in terms of advancing equity, or advancing the future of the kids 
we’re focused on, hell no!” Likewise, CR3 offered the following explanation: “The civil 
rights community consistently supports strong federal involvement and opposes things like 
school closure and charterizing, but it is not supportive of the idea that teachers should have 
unbridled autonomy in the classroom.” 
The fundamental difference between civil rights groups and educational liberals, 
according to CR3, concerned the question of “whether or not schools are working well and 
whether or not schools can be expected to educate children in poverty.” In other words, while 
organizations representing educators and educational leaders seek to promote the idea that 
public schools are already effective, civil rights entrepreneurs emphasize that too many 





The main differences of opinion between civil rights organizations and groups on the 
political right outlined by CR1 and CR3 concerned federal involvement in education and the 
importance of promoting educational equity.   
 Civil rights entrepreneurs on conservative opposition. CR1 identified Tea Party 
conservatives as being the “official opponents” of the CCSS. She described this group as 
having played a significant role in shifting the values and policy beliefs of the Republican 
Party away from their previous support for standards-based accountability. This 
understanding resembled the business entrepreneurs’ accounts of there having been a 
fundamental shift in American conservatism. The Tea Party was also cited by CR3 as a major 
opponent of the initiative. To CR3, however, a broader underlying issue was racist beliefs 
and practices on the political right.  
One of [the problems] was opposition from the right: the Tea Party—
the descendants of those who had opposed the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, who opposed the Civil Rights Act of '64, who opposed 
desegregation, who opposed any federal effort in education generally—
especially when it looks like it might have a benefit for people of color. (CR3) 
 
The racist worldviews of conservatives, according to CR3, also prejudiced their perceptions 
of President Obama, engendering bias against every policy that he touched, including the 
CCSS: “I think [the CCSS coalition] would have been well served if they’d have avoided 
Obama having anything to do with it because people were racist and opposed to him.” 
 CR2 didn’t mention the Tea Party by name, but she did discuss observing opposition 
by conservatives in Republican-controlled states. According to her, the main concerns being 
voiced by the conservatives that she met primarily related to the perception of federal 
overreach and the idea that the CCSS would lower expectations for higher-achieving 
students. Regarding the latter, CR2 explained that in the minds of “White suburban” 





the rigor of instruction and “teaching to the middle.” A similar understanding was evident in 
the words of CR3, who asserted, “Equity is a turnoff, especially for conservative White 
communities.”  
 Civil rights entrepreneurs on liberal opposition. According to CR1, antagonists on 
the leftward side of the political spectrum teamed up with opponents on the “far right” to 
resist the CCSS. In her own words, “I mean, it’s hard to think of Diane Ravitch as the left 
since she used to be the right, but she certainly fanned the anxieties of the extreme left 
around this as well.”   
 Education establishment opposition. Though she suggested that many viewed the 
main opposition as this unlikely combination of the “far right” Tea Partyers and “extreme 
left” Ravitch-types, CR1 said that, in her opinion, the strongest resistance came from 
educators: “I think the more powerful opposition, as is true in opposition to all sort of 
reforms in education, is really from the teachers—both unions and individual teachers.”  
According to CR1, teachers’ resistance was partially the result of ingrained attitudes toward 
change: 
Some of this was inevitable. Right? When you significantly raise 
expectations for what kids—especially if you use the term “all kids”— should 
know and be able to do, you are likely going to have some backlash against 
that…. Particularly from the teachers who are newly charged with getting 
from kids levels of achievement they never were before. That is sort of built 
in.31 
 
Expanding on this, CR1 suggested that the backlash from educators had been a key factor in 
undermining prior attempts at raising standards in the United States. She also submitted that 
this resistance was largely borne out of a sense of anxiety about being asked to do more and 
being made to “look worse.”    
																																																								
31	The topic of political entrepreneurs’ perceptions of constraints associated with 






I mean, the previous effort at standards was certainly characterized by 
this, and it was inevitably going to happen that teachers would feel stressed 
and over-challenged and decide that [the standards] were impossible. All of 
those things were quite predictable. (CR1) 
 
 Based on what she viewed as being the inevitability of teacher resistance, CR1 
suggested that CCSS leaders were responsible for making some “unforced errors.” The 
biggest preventable mistake fueling educator opposition, she said, was tying teacher 
evaluations to student test scores.    
That decision in and of itself was not a bad decision, but the timing of 
it was horrendously bad. For us, at scale, to evaluate teachers with test results 
the first time we were putting in place these much tougher tests—tests that 
teachers have never seen before—was an insanely stupid thing. So, what 
could already have been predicted—teacher opposition to this—was just sent 
into the stratosphere by that decision. (CR1) 
 
Likewise, CR3 felt that making changes to teacher evaluation policy while also 
implementing new state standards created the most significant setback for the CCSS. “The 
biggest problem, overall,” she said, “was the effort to move forward on teacher evaluations 
that included measures of student learning at the same time that there was a conversation 
about radically changing the way instruction worked.” Her critique echoed the business 
entrepreneurs’ accounts of the CCSS standards becoming conflated with the other areas of 
RTTT. In short, because teachers came to view the CCSS as part of one federally driven 
project, their opposition to the changes being made to evaluations, as well as to school 
turnaround efforts, contributed to their disdain for the standards initiative.  
The efforts to—both in Race to the Top and in other Obama 
initiatives—push teacher evaluations and the really aggressive school 
improvement strategies, things like school closure and charterization…. I 
think that there was a perfect storm that was created there where it became 
easy for those who had opposition to teacher evaluation, the school 
improvement agenda, school closure, and charterization, to then trace their 






 Both CR1 and CR3 believed that had the CCSS not been implemented at the same 
time as the new teacher evaluations, the initiative could have “withstood the public support 
issue” (CR3). Moreover, had the initiative retained the support of educators, they could have 
also kept parents on board.  
Had the evaluation thing not coincided, that alone in my judgment 
would have been a huge thing. It wouldn’t have slowed the far right’s critique, 
but it certainly would have slowed the opposition from rank-and-file teachers 
and kept them out of the ears of parents. (CR1) 
 
Regarding declining parental support, CR1 connected the disaffection of educators to the rise 
of the opt-out movement: “The opt-out stuff—that is very much a function of teachers talking 
to parents.” The combination of opt-out movement parents and teachers was also mentioned 
by CR2 as being a major source of opposition to the CCSS. In her own words, “Parents are 
the ones who drove this opt-out movement and drove a lot of anti-Common Core…. I mean, 
teachers, too.” 
 Opposition to capitalist profiteering. CR2 offered another explanation regarding the 
opposition from the left. She described the resistance as primarily stemming from the Obama 
administration’s decision to use federal funding to support the work of multi-state consortia 
in the development of CCSS-aligned assessments. According to CR2, the fact that the work 
of these consortia resulted in the awarding of contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to 
major test vendors meant that the CCSS came to be associated with scurrilous profiteering: 
“It felt like a capitalist venture that wasn’t actually doing the best for all students. It was 
about just giving more money to big testing companies.” For that reason, and because of the 
anti-testing and over-testing sentiments expressed by the opt-out movement, CR2 described 
the CCSS as having “just kind of pissed people off on different levels.” 
 Anti-federal sentiments. Within the narratives told by the civil rights entrepreneurs 





federal involvement in education. CR1, for example, described meeting with a state 
lawmaker who had originally been an ardent supporter of the CCSS and aligned tests in 
which he told her that, “The President’s decision to put federal money [into the testing 
consortia] just completely blew the legs out from under me.” Essentially, federal backing of 
the consortia added to the perception that the standards were a federal product. According to 
CR1 and CR3, such beliefs were further cemented by the Obama administration’s decision to 
offer waivers from the NCLB requirements in exchange for the adoption of certain federal 
prescriptions, including new state standards. 
The other part of all of this, all three of these things occurred during 
the waivers from NCLB. The decision to require teacher evaluations with the 
test, the dollars coming through for the consortia tests, and then you have to 
adopt college- and career-ready standards in order to receive a waiver from 
the horrible NCLB. You know? It was clear, when you actually read the 
waiver, that it didn’t have to be Common Core. But the waiver could have 
been clearer that that didn’t need to be the case. (CR1) 
 
 Also associated with the topic of federal vs. local control was CR2’s description of 
antipathy toward the CCSS stemming from the perception that the CCSS was a top-down 
initiative: “At the beginning of this effort, it was very much a top-down effort. It was very 
much a top-down initiative, and that’s how it was perceived.” According to CR2, because 
community stakeholders viewed the standards as a distant mandate, the requisite buy-in at the 
local level was never successfully built. 
 Nevertheless, CR1 suggested that such states’ rights arguments had been less of a 
factor than the issues surrounding teacher evaluations: “The decision that the administration 
made to use ARRA money to support the consortia is widely believed to have also 
contributed, and I think it did, but I think much less than the teacher evaluation thing did.” 
Similarly, CR3 described herself as being skeptical regarding the suggestion that federal 





CR1, she suggested that a bigger issue was the decision to move ahead with the new teacher 
evaluations at the same time.  
The Orientation of Civil Rights Entrepreneurs’ Narratives  
 The setting of civil rights entrepreneurs’ narratives. As was the case in the 
narratives told by business entrepreneurs, the civil rights entrepreneurs described the political 
environment surrounding the subsystem as having had a strong influence on what happened 
with the CCSS.   
 A “crazy-ass” partisan environment. Comparable to BE2’s and BE3’s accounts of 
the CCSS being the result of a longer trajectory, CR1 and CR3 both spoke about antecedent 
policies paving the way for common state standards. Looking at the timeline visual aid (see 
Figure 2), CR3 stated, 
I would start the timeline earlier. You could start it with A Nation at 
Risk. You could talk about the “rising tide of mediocrity” and the Republican 
interests in school quality as being a national concern; [a concern] that was 
separate, or distinct, from school segregation, which had been the focus prior 
to A Nation at Risk. Or you could look at the ‘94 reauthorization of ESEA: the 
IASA. I know that there was a conversation at that point about national 
standards and there was a lot of resistance to it.  
 
CR1, meanwhile, suggested that the NCLB law was the point at which political support for 
common state standards had really gained traction. According to her, because educators and 
educational leaders felt the standards in their own states were more rigorous than in 
neighboring states, they believed that their schools were being unfairly adjudged as failing. 
Thus, “that helped build a kind of groundswell of, ‘We should at least have an even playing 
field; it should be fair across the country,’ which then helped build the politics.”  
 Both CR1 and CR3 described the standards-based reform agenda as having long been 
supported by members of both major political parties. As CR1 recounted, 
In the early standards-based reform agenda, Republicans were the ones 





standards, tests, and accountability based on them; and the Democrats said, 
“Fine. Standards and getting kids to them is a good thing, and that is our 
excuse to put more resources in the system.” 
 
 Despite this history, according to the civil rights entrepreneurs interviewed, the 
bipartisan backing of standards and accountability has fallen away in recent years. CR1 had 
been a stalwart supporter of the standards-based reform movement for decades. Reflecting on 
the politicization of the CCSS, she described the backlash as being emblematic of a broader 
shift in the political environment and, more specifically, a shift in American conservatism. 
She explained that the CCSS—which had been an initiative with bipartisan roots and 
bipartisan support—became something that Republicans rallied against: “In this crazy-ass 
partisan environment of ours, people will politicize anything! …What happened is what is 
happening in all points of our life, which is the incredible politicization of stuff that shouldn’t 
be political.”   
CR1 posited that a major reason for the politicization of the CCSS and the opposition 
of Republicans was the growing partisan polarization between the two major parties and the 
concurrent rise of the Tea Party. Moreover, she described a schism opening up within the 
Republican Party, which, again, was attributed to the rise of the Tea Party: “The Republicans 
who were involved with [the CCSS] are the Main Street Republicans: the business-oriented 
Republicans who are out of favor now. They would not have been terribly influential with the 
Tea Party folks anyway” (CR1). Additionally, because of the diminishing power of centrist 
Republicans, the various national organizations advocating on behalf of the CCSS found that 
they also had less political influence. As CR1 observed, the standards-based reform 
movement’s influence with Republicans is now “pretty much gone.” 
 This shift in the conservatism of the Republican Party was also discussed by CR3. 





administration during the NCLB years: “You know, we had our disagreements with the Bush 
administration, but I think on some level there was an effort by the Bush administration to 
raise student achievement as a primary concern within the education debate.” Recent events, 
however, were described by CR3 as signifying a deleterious change in direction amongst the 
Republican leadership. Specifically, she suggested that the Trump administration’s desire to 
allow for increased devolvement of decision making meant that the federal government was 
abdicating its responsibility for promoting educational equity.  
I think now from Secretary DeVos the only concern is about returning 
authority to superintendents and state education chiefs, and that is not what 
education should be focused on. If the concern is about ensuring that they 
have power, we will not see good things happen for students. So we are 
absolutely concerned. (CR3)  
 
 This concern about the weakening of federal oversight was shared by CR1. While 
discussing the current opposition that exists regarding federal involvement in education, CR1 
stated, “It’s really mostly a function of our history. Then you add to that our current moment 
where there is a celebration of all things locally determined—even when we know that gets 
us in horrible trouble as a country!”    
 According to CR1, as the Republicans moved away from the idea of strong federal 
oversight and accountability, the Democratic Party stepped into the void. In her own words, 
“Republicans [traditionally] did the accountability and the Democrats did the resource side. 
That has flipped entirely in this political environment. Democrats, this time, carried the 
accountability issue on their shoulders, which was interesting to say the least.”    
 With that being said, CR1 suggested that Democratic Party members were still not 
considered to be dependable allies by standards-based reform advocates within the civil 
rights community. The narrative she told to illustrate this point was about a congressional 





have a hearing on the ESSA, the Democrats scheduled their own unofficial one and arranged 
for witnesses and testimony. Among those people testifying at this hearing was the civil 
rights leader Wade Henderson. According to CR1, during the hearing, many of the House 
Democrats in attendance expressed their skepticism concerning test-based accountability:  
Especially the Black and Brown Democrats on the committee just 
dragged Wade through the hot coals around his support for testing. They just 
could not imagine why, but he did not give an inch. He was certainly 
respectful, but it was fascinating to watch the differences there. In the end, 
because the leading Dems—both Patty Murray [from the Senate] and Bobby 
Scott on the House side—defined subgroup accountability as a thing 
Democrats were going to support, they all voted that way. But it is not 
because these are strongly felt positions on the part of many Democrats. This 
was the thing that Republicans, Ted Kennedy, and George Miller drove down 
their throats in the NCLB years, and they don’t really love it any better today.    
 
The suggestion that members of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party do not, 
for the most part, share the values and priorities of civil rights entrepreneurs added to the 
notion that civil rights groups do not fit within the traditional left-right spectrum of American 
politics.    
 White supremacy and racism. Another example of the impact of the “setting” on the 
initiative was CR3’s account of racism in the United States.32 She described the issue of 
educational inequity along racial lines as a “foundational problem.” Moreover, the main 
cause of this problem, she said, is “the origin of the United States as a country that was 
premised on the enslavement of one group of people, then the marginalization and 
exploitation of other groups of people.” Basically, the vestiges of slavery and segregation, in 
CR3’s opinion, all continue to have an effect on education systems. 
Education has been such an important part of preserving White 
supremacy and racism in this country that you cannot talk about education 
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without implying something about race. Whether that was the criminalization 
of enslaved people learning how to read, whether it was the preservation of 
legal segregation, whether it was remedies to past discrimination, education 
and race are inextricably linked in this country. (CR3)   
 
As discussed earlier, all three of the civil rights entrepreneurs mentioned institutional racism 
as a major problem in American education. What is more, the issue of systemic racism, in 
their minds, provided a principal justification for their advocacy work around standards-
based reform.  
 Characters in the narratives of civil rights entrepreneurs. The characters 
portrayed as supporters of the initiative by civil rights entrepreneurs included the business 
community, moderate Democrats and Republicans, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
national non-profit organizations, and the teachers’ unions (early on). Groups and individuals 
that acted as antagonists in their narratives included Tea Party conservatives, Diane Ravitch, 
teachers and their unions (later on), the opt-out movement, and the Trump administration. In 
addition, the Obama administration was mentioned as creating problems for the CCSS 
coalition’s work and historically underserved groups of children were depicted as victims.   
 Civil rights entrepreneurs on heroes and heroines. CR1 described organizations 
representing the business community as fundamentally agreeing with the goals of civil rights 
entrepreneurs. This convergence of beliefs, she pointed out, has enabled both of these groups 
to come together in support of standards-based accountability.   
If you’re an employer and you look at what the numbers tell us about 
where our kids are at, both generally and for different groups of kids, you 
worry about that—that’s essentially what gets them to the table. But key staff 
there are also veterans of the Bush No Child years, and they believe, as we do, 
that holding schools accountable not just for overall performance but for the 
performance of every group of kids is really important to moving the country 
forward. (CR1)  
 
Both CR2 and CR3 also said that the business community was a major ally in their work 





during the debates on the ESSA. Moreover, the business community was closely affiliated 
with another supportive group: Main Street Republicans.  
 Another significant “hero” that the entrepreneurs described as supporting the CCSS 
was the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. All three of the civil rights entrepreneurs 
suggested that this organization was at the heart of the coalition’s work: “The Gates 
Foundation played a huge, huge role” (CR1); “Gates was a big one that supported our work, 
but also everyone’s work” (CR2); “First and foremost I would say the Gates Foundation 
[supported the coalition]” (CR3). One of the reasons for the Gates Foundation’s importance 
was that it had provided funding for many of the national non-profit organizations that made 
up the coalition. Examples of the Gates-funded national organizations named by the civil 
rights entrepreneurs included the Collaborative for Student Success and Achieve. This 
assessment of the importance of Gates in supporting the work of the coalition echoed 
comments made by BE2. 
 The other major group of organizations that CR1 and CR3 mentioned as allies during 
the early phases of the CCSS was the teachers’ unions. CR1 cited the fact that the unions had 
been supporters, initially, as providing evidence that their later opposition had nothing to do 
with the actual standards: “The unions officially blessed the standards early on…. So, it’s not 
like there is anything about the standards themselves that they thought was problematic.” 
 Finally, CR1 spoke about the important role that Democrats had played in advocating 
for standards-based reform in recent years, although she also described them as not being 
strong supporters of results-based accountability.  
 Civil rights entrepreneurs on antagonists and troublemakers. As already discussed, 
CR1 and CR3 mentioned Tea Party conservatives as major antagonists. This group, they said, 





Also on the conservative side, all three civil rights entrepreneurs criticized the Trump 
administration for opposing both the CCSS and strong federal oversight of state education 
systems. In the words of CR1, “This current Secretary has made it quite clear that she is not 
going to push states around on much of anything, if anything.”  
 Another major group of antagonists mentioned in the narratives of the civil rights 
entrepreneurs was teachers and their unions. According to CR3, resistance from the left was 
“largely driven by the teachers’ unions and opposition to the idea that teachers can directly 
have an impact on student learning.” She described how, because RTTT had encouraged the 
states to factor student performance data into teacher evaluations, the unions turned against 
the entire Obama education agenda, including the CCSS. This understanding was also shared 
by CR1.   
 The civil rights entrepreneurs also portrayed teachers in a villainous light when 
explaining the reasons why their organizations had initially elected to advocate for the CCSS. 
Specifically, they criticized teachers for the role that they play in upholding an unjust system. 
This belief was manifest in the following statement made by CR3: “I believe that teachers on 
their own will reinforce inequitable opportunities to education.” Both CR1 and CR2 argued 
that the resistance of teachers had fueled the opposition of another group of antagonists: 
parents associated with the opt-out movement.  
 With regard to troublemakers among the supporters, CR1 and CR3 both indicated that 
President Obama’s involvement in the initiative had created problems for the CCSS. CR3, 
for example, criticized the administration for failing to build broad support for the President’s 
agenda. 
The Obama administration should not have pursued its own education 
agenda in the way that it did, superseding Congress and disregarding 
advocacy from the civil and human rights community about the types of 






 Civil rights entrepreneurs on victims. The main examples of victim-type characters 
identified in the interview data from civil rights entrepreneurs were groups of historically 
underserved students. As was the case in the interviews with business entrepreneurs, the civil 
rights entrepreneurs’ depictions of students as victims were primarily in the segments 
describing the problems that the CCSS and other standards-based reforms seek to address.   
The first lesson everyone should learn is that the fundamental problem 
in American education is inequity—–mostly along racial lines, but also along 
lines of disability, language, and national origin. Any effort to improve 
American schools that does not have as its primary focus achieving greater 
equity is not going to solve the real problem, and it is going to fail. That is the 
first and most important lesson: if you’re not talking about equity, whatever 
else you are talking about is irrelevant. (CR3) 
 
Civil Rights Entrepreneurs on the Present and Future 
 The three civil rights entrepreneurs believed that state standards would remain higher 
and more common as a result of the CCSS. They also believed that the initiative had helped 
strengthen the bonds between advocacy organizations. They shared a concern, however, that 
the federal government was now backing away from strong accountability, which, they 
feared, could result in the perpetuation of inequitable outcomes for students of color, low-
SES students, immigrant students, and students with disabilities.  
 Civil rights entrepreneurs on the present and future of the CCSS. All three of the 
civil rights entrepreneurs believed that the CCSS had helped raise standards across the states 
and that these advances would remain in place moving forward. Reflecting on the future of 
the CCSS, CR1 said, “I still think that we are generally on track to keep roughly similar 
standards.” She indicated that the politicization of the CCSS and the resultant efforts by 
states to refashion their standards had not translated into drastic changes. Likewise, CR2 





States would start revising their standards and news outlets would take 
it and be like, “They’re getting rid of Common Core. Common Core is going 
away.” And like, “Ohio did this” and “New York did this,” too. But they still 
adopted high-quality standards; they just changed the name! They now 
became the “Ohio Academic Standards.” So states themselves realized—they 
went through a review process of course, and it was very public, and it was 
intentional––but in the end, when you looked at what changed, it was so 
minimal. It was just, “Oh, you changed the name? OK, I get that.” 
 
CR2 said she did not have a problem with the name change. She believed that despite their 
renaming, the post-adoption modifications made to the content of the standards were, for the 
most part, superficial: “We started to see what changed. We were like, ‘Oh, call it whatever 
you want. If in the end it means that all children are receiving a good education, then that’s 
OK. Call it whatever you want!’”  Similarly, CR3 had no concerns about the future of the 
CCSS. Though she believed the initiative would “sunset” and that people would stop using 
the name, she also suggested that most of the states that had adopted the CCSS would 
continue to implement the standards. 
 The main areas where all three civil rights entrepreneurs had concerns about the 
future were testing and accountability. For instance, CR1 said one of her worries was that the 
positive effects of common standards would be nullified in the absence of common 
assessments: 
What is in your assessment is, in effect, the actual standards in your 
state. So we might end up in a situation for the next eight or 10 years where 
we have what looks like common standards, but the actual standards in states 
remain quite different.   
 
Similarly, CR3 suggested that the debate about the use of assessments was still creating 
issues in the states and that these disputes added to the friction between civil rights 
entrepreneurs and the teachers’ unions: 
I think the assessment debate is still related to the Common Core 
debate. So, as long as there is opposition by the AFT and NEA to assessment, 





student outcomes, it will be hard for us to work together with them on those 
issues.  
 
 CR2, meanwhile, described feeling concerned about the shift away from federal 
oversight. She viewed the Trump administration as “wiping its hands off” from ensuring the 
equitable treatment of students of color and low-SES students:  
I’m not worried about it for standards. I am worried about it for 
accountability. The systems by which the state is making sure that the schools 
are serving all…. So, I am worried about whether or not states are going to 
hold schools and districts accountable for all children.  
 
This criticism of the Trump administration was also expressed by CR1 and CR3.  
 Regarding the question of whether states would ever come back together again in an 
effort to reestablish truly common or national standards, CR1 suggested that it was probable. 
She echoed BE2’s description of policy ideas being cyclical:  
If you can predict anything about American education policy, it is that 
it is a pendulum. The pendulum swings far one way, and it will inevitably 
swing back. I think the question for me is how much carnage there is in the 
meantime. Because I don’t think that there is any question that, left to their 
own devices, the kids I care about are not going to be taken seriously by 
states. And we will relearn that lesson as if…. You know, some people have 
obviously forgotten it, but we will relearn that lesson over the next four to 
eight years and hopefully find our way back.  
 
CR3, on the other hand, expressed some doubt that such an endeavor would be attempted 
again: 
I hope that this is not the end for a conversation about national 
standards. I’m hoping that we will see a renewed effort in the future to create 
greater consistency across states and across districts and schools. But I am 
skeptical of that.  
 
 Civil rights entrepreneurs on the present and future of the coalition. The civil 
rights entrepreneurs believed the struggle for the CCSS had, in some important ways, helped 
galvanize groups and individuals advocating for standards-based reform. For that reason, all 





evolution of the standards-based reform coalition since the 1990s, CR1 stated, “That 
coalition is, at some level, stronger than ever before, in that in the early parts of the 
standards-based reform, the civil rights community was largely absent.” CR2 and CR3 both 
claimed that the CCSS coalition’s work has expanded in recent years. CR2, for example, 
described the coalition as currently being “very active” and suggested that the Common Core 
work had evolved into work around the ESSA. Likewise, CR3 stated, 
Most of the work that most of those organizations were doing has just 
broadened. For example, we were doing a lot of work focused specifically on 
Common Core, and we have merged that work into broader educational equity 
work and work around the implementation of the Every Student Succeeds Act. 
I don’t think that it has gone away; I think it has morphed into broader 
advocacy.  
 
 While the entrepreneurs all suggested that the coalition—particularly the relationship 
between the civil rights and business groups—had been fortified by events, they also 
acknowledged that their sway over subsystem affairs had been impacted by broader 
contextual shifts. In the words of CR1, “Yeah, that coalition is still there. What it doesn’t 
have is the same political environment.” Essentially, because their traditional allies in 
government (i.e., the Main Street Republicans) had fallen out of favor within the party, 
standards-based reform advocates discovered that they now had less access to key players in 
the policymaking arena.  
[The coalition’s] influence with Republicans is pretty much gone. And 
those were critical relationships early on. So yeah, the coalition is still strong, 
still together. If anything, stronger and better, trusting relationships, but it is 
much harder getting traction with Republicans. And since Republicans are in 
charge, you see what we’ve got. (CR1) 
 
Civil Rights Entrepreneurs on the Moral/Evaluation 
 Civil rights entrepreneurs said they had learned two major lessons as a result of their 
involvement with the CCSS: the importance of messaging and the importance of engaging 





 Issues with the framing of the Common Core. All three civil rights entrepreneurs 
believed that a major flaw in the CCSS coalition’s advocacy work was its messaging. The 
coalition, they argued, had not effectively communicated to community members the 
rationale behind the initiative.  
Knowing that the new standards, and new assessments built on them, 
were going to make schools look worse, make teachers look worse, we needed 
to get out ahead of that with really good campaigns to help parents know why 
these things were necessary, why higher standards were necessary, what the 
standards actually require, [and] what they were based on. So a lot of that and 
why it was in their children’s interests, as well as America’s interests more 
generally, to have these tough standards. In most places, that was either not 
done or not well done. (CR1) 
 
From CR3’s perspective, a major issue had been the way in which the CCSS had been 
framed as an “economic development strategy,” instead of one focused on achieving equity 
for students: “It was about global competitiveness, and the conversation happened absent any 
conversation about the disparities that exist in our public education system.”33 A 
consequence of this failure to deploy a resonant message was, according to CR3, that the 
initiative failed to build support among key constituencies:  
I would say that was the first and the biggest mistake: not to conceive 
of this as a way to make schools better for children who have been longest 
underserved. I think that there is fertile ground, especially among 
communities of color, of support for something like national standards. And if 
the strategy had been to begin with those communities rather than the business 
community or White moderates, I think it would have been more successful. 
 
CR2 also suggested that the initiative’s communication efforts had not proven effective with 
certain communities. She talked about having to consciously adapt her talking points while 
she was working in the field:  
It was really hard at first for me. Then I just learned I had to change 
the way I was describing what I was doing and sort of lead with, “This is a 
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way to empower families and to help children be better prepared for these 
high expectations that they are being held to, which will help them.” Like 
focusing on “why” and the “so what?”  
 
Upon recognizing the challenges associated with conveying the benefits of the standards, her 
organization decided to hire an external organization that specialized in the area of 
communications to conduct message testing for Latino families.  
It was focused on persuasion. Like, how do we best persuade people to 
support this? So based on that, we shifted our language. We didn’t talk about 
Common Core; we talked about standards. I think we talked about Common 
Core at first then started changing it. But more than anything, understanding 
the best way to describe what [the standards] were. (CR2) 
 
One of the lessons learned by this group of political entrepreneurs was the importance of 
explaining the benefits of any given reform in a manner that resonates with the communities 
that will be impacted.  
 The importance of engaging communities at the grassroots. Closely related to the 
issue of messaging was the importance of engaging with community members. The three 
civil rights entrepreneurs each suggested that initial outreach had been directed toward the 
wrong groups of actors. Specifically, as described by CR2, the CCSS coalition originally 
focused on meeting with “grass-top advocates” and political elites on Capitol Hill, instead of 
the community members who were going to be directly impacted. Reflecting on this 
approach, she stated, “We didn’t start at the grassroots level. We did not start by talking 
about building support for this movement in a way that was more grassroots driven…. [It] 
was kind of flashy and external facing.”   
 CR3 suggested that a lot of the backlash could have been ameliorated had there been 
“strong understanding, engagement, and support among communities of color.” For CR2, her 
experiences meeting with Latino parents helped cement her opinion that community 





It was incredible how many families had no idea about what the 
standards were, and there was support. Like, once you actually sit down and 
talk with families and show them, “These are the learning goals for your child 
for this grade, and these are ways that you can help your child at home work 
toward these reading goals,” for instance. It was so empowering. It was like 
unlocking this black box. And we, the collective, just sort of missed that. We 
were sort of late in doing that. (CR2) 
 
 Both CR1 and CR3 suggested that the civil rights groups should have played a more 
aggressive role in advocacy efforts early on in the initiative, but that they had not been asked 
to play a primary role until it was already too late. The importance of building grassroots 
support was summed up by CR3 as follows: 
The logic I think on Common Core was that if you had enough 
powerful elite people who were on the same page, it wouldn’t matter what 
regular people thought. And I think that has been proven to fail. There is a 
need to have a grassroots component when you’re seeking social change. 
From our perspective, that would be a grassroots component that first seeks to 
engage marginalized communities, especially communities of color, but, 
regardless, you need grassroots support. 
 
The Narratives of Civil Rights Entrepreneurs 
 Like the business entrepreneurs, the civil rights entrepreneurs all believed that the 
CCSS had been successful in raising academic standards across many states. They also 
shared similar understandings about the pushback coming from both side of the political 
spectrum. A major topic running through the narratives of civil rights entrepreneurs was the 
vital importance of engaging stakeholders at the grassroots. Table 12 provides an overview of 
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The Narratives Told by Educational Conservatives 
Resolution: Educational Conservatives on the Result of the CCSS  
 The third group of political entrepreneurs interviewed was subsystem participants 
working for organizations that championed conservative worldviews. As described by 
Rhodes (2012), “Educational conservatives began to publish briefs favoring excellence in 
education prior to, and immediately following, the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980” (p. 
52). This group has, therefore, been involved with the movement toward what became the 
standards-based reform paradigm since its nascence.  
 Two of the educational conservatives interviewed shared the belief that, despite the 
CCSS becoming politicized, the end result had been higher-quality state standards across the 
nation. As EC1 explained, 
Although Common Core—the name of it—isn’t successful, I think the 
initiative and what it was trying to do has been pretty successful in getting a 
set of standards that have much broader depth, more critical thinking, and 
raising the bar on standards in many states across the country.  
 
Correspondingly, EC2’s perspective was that even after all the “fracas and brouhaha,” the 
standards are “still alive.” He described state standards as having been raised as a result of 
the CCSS and suggested that they still remain “quite common” across many states. EC3, 
however, was less definitive in his appraisal of the CCSS’s success. He believed that the 
politicization had constrained the initiative’s implementation, thus limiting the effects: “I’m 
grateful that it did bring into the national conversation more discussions about educational 
standards, but I think, looking back, I would suggest that it was at best only mildly 






Complicating Action in the Narratives of Educational Conservatives 
 Educational conservatives on conservative opposition. The three educational 
conservatives described how support for the initiative had been broad and bipartisan during 
the early stages. EC2 recalled, “At the beginning, [support] was very widespread. It was sort 
of everybody, save for some gadflies on the far left and far right.” However, as these 
informants explained, things swiftly changed as the initiative became increasingly politicized 
and unpopular among conservatives. They each shared their understanding of why opinions 
started to shift on the political right, which included rich insights into their experiences as 
conservative supporters of the initiative.  
 They looked and felt like federal assessments. Looking at the chart depicting 
declining public support (see Appendix A), EC1 stated, “In my opinion, your chart directly 
correlates with when the two major assessment consortia started testing kids on the 
standards.” From the perspective of EC1, the standards themselves were not the strongest 
source of controversy; instead, the greater matter contributing to the politicization of the 
CCSS was the fact that the testing consortia received federal funding. Though she described 
there having been “a little bit of negative play about federal takeover when the Obama 
administration put it as a competitive priority in Race to the Top funding,” EC1 suggested 
that support for the CCSS really began to deteriorate when the federal government “gave 
these two enormous testing consortia—run by the two biggest test companies in the 
country—money to build tests that were going to be used across a majority of states in the 
nation.”  
 The introduction of the CCSS-aligned assessments, argued EC1, changed the 
conversation about the initiative, “Because it no longer was setting out a framework of what 





described the resistance to the use of the CCSS assessments as arising on two fronts: teachers 
and Republicans. According to EC1, educators opposed the tests because they rejected the 
idea of being held accountable for students’ performance against higher standards. 
Republicans, meanwhile, turned against the CCSS-aligned assessments as they began to view 
them as a “federal system” (EC1). From EC1’s perspective, the fact that only two consortia 
had been established, and that these consortia then contracted with major test companies, was 
problematic because they monopolized the field. 
The vision was that there would be multiple opportunities for test 
companies and states to win these grants, and instead it ended up being two…. 
Tens of millions of dollars’ worth of grants going to test companies that were 
major corporations—in one case a non-profit, but still a testing entity—to 
create these tests to hold schools accountable for student results as to whether 
or not they had mastered those standards. (EC1) 
 
Moreover, the fact that these two consortia were being funded by the Obama administration 
generated much angst amongst states’ rights conservatives because it was perceived as a case 
of federal overreach into education. As described by EC1, it wasn’t just the fact that “it was 
two test companies that were kind of monopolizing the field,” the bigger issue was that it was 
that “two federally funded test companies that were monopolizing the field…. ‘Federally 
funded’ really is what really set a majority of people off.”  
 EC1 identified the summer of 2015 as being the first time that it became clear to her 
that the initiative had become overly politicized and “something that was not going to be able 
to be pulled back from.” This, she said, was when the test results began to be published that 
showed a sharp decline in student proficiency rates—sparking much opposition: “I think 
that’s when for me it really hit that, “You know what? We’re going to lose this battle.” As 
state standards and the rigor of assessments were raised, schools and students that had 
previously been labeled proficient were suddenly told that they were “not proficient 





children were now being told they were not on track for postsecondary success. Such 
frustrations among parents were also interconnected with a general opposition to the federal 
role in pushing test-based accountability: “[Initiative leaders] didn’t do a good job of making 
the assessments that went with these standards, the state assessments…. I mean, they truly 
ended up looking like and feeling like, and being funded by, federal assessments” (EC1). 
 There were strong currents against it. Like EC1, EC2 traced the opposition from 
conservatives as stemming from fears about federal overreach. Moreover, he emphasized that 
the backlash to the Obama administration’s endorsement of the CCSS had been entirely 
predictable. 
We always expected that it would become controversial if it was 
linked to the federal government. And even if it wasn’t linked to the federal 
government, there was some expectation it would be controversial because it 
has always been controversial. (EC2) 
 
EC2 suggested that long-standing resistance to federally driven education policies is the 
result of deeply entrenched beliefs about federalism: “There is a reason why we never had 
national standards and tests in this country, just like we have never had national healthcare: 
There have been strong currents against it.” In essence, many Americans remain hostile to 
the idea of federal involvement in education.   
 According to EC2, because the coalition leaders had anticipated that the CCSS would 
become politicized if it became connected with the federal government, they had originally 
sought to avoid that pitfall. This effort to preempt opposition by states’ rights conservatives 
was nullified, however, when the Obama administration made the decision that it wanted to 
champion the initiative as part of its education agenda. 
The reason that so many folks on the right took to hammering it, I 
think, is mostly because of the Obama administration’s decision to link 
support for Race to the Top to adoption of the Common Core. They made it 





standards in a State of the Union address and then on the campaign trail in 
2012. (EC2) 
 
When the Obama administration showed an interest in endorsing the CCSS, he recalled, the 
coalition had failed to intervene and prevent what they knew would create a backlash.  
I think, first of all, [the coalition should] have done everything we 
could to make sure the Obama administration did not create any federal 
incentives or connections to it. I think when [the Obama administration] did 
that, or if they were thinking about doing it, those of us involved should have 
cried bloody murder and persuaded them not to do it. (EC2) 
 
 As a result of this failure on the part of the coalition, things, in the words of EC2, 
“started to snowball.” The RNC decided to pass a resolution declaring their opposition to the 
initiative. This resolution was then followed by legislative action by Republicans at the state 
level to repeal and abandon the standards.  
It was in 2013 that all of a sudden we saw a hard, real challenge to it 
on the right. Suddenly, bills were being dropped in state legislatures to get 
states to pull out. And very quickly we were back on our heels. (EC2) 
 
 A vicious advertising campaign. Another major factor EC2 mentioned as 
contributing to the politicization of the CCSS was the impact of conservative media on public 
perceptions. He described conservative talk radio and television news channels, in addition to 
social media campaigns, doing damage to the Common Core brand.  
I think the Common Core was subject to a vicious, negative, 
campaign—a negative advertisement campaign. I mean it was just like a 
candidate that gets hit with attack ads non-stop. You know? Common Core 
really got hit, especially on the right, with negative advertising. Most of it was 
in unpaid free media, but on talk radio and on Fox News, and in conservative 
outlets, it was just pummeled for first weeks, then months, then years…. It 
jumped the shark in a few cases where it really went into the popular culture 
as well. You know? Comedy and late-night TV, things like that. (EC2) 
 
EC2 talked about conservative commentators, including Glenn Beck and Michelle Malkin, 
using their media platforms to make the CCSS a “big issue,” which meant that it then became 





gaining more strength, and looking for a win after the election. It really caught fire.” 
Moreover, he said, the initiative drew the attention of other conservative advocacy 
organizations, including the libertarian group FreedomWorks. Such organizations, argued 
EC2, recognized that picking up the issue of opposing the CCSS would “help them raise 
money and build lists for their own purposes.” Negative media coverage was also mentioned 
by EC1 and EC3 as shaping public opinions regarding the CCSS.  
 Imposing a secularized worldview. EC3 explained during his interview how the 
CCSS had grown to be negatively perceived among many members of the Christian right. In 
his faith community, he had heard people suggest that the standards promoted a secular 
worldview and that the initiative would, ultimately, “crush American evangelicalism.” As 
these types of opinions became pervasive among evangelicals, so did the belief that 
supporting the initiative was antithetical to the faith.  
 EC3 identified 2014 as the year when the evangelical community first emerged as a 
strong opponent of the CCSS. Like EC2, he suggested that right wing media had played a 
significant role in drumming up the ire of conservatives, with an igniting spark being “the 
megaphone that Glenn Beck used.” According to EC3, “Glenn Beck was looking for the next 
big thing that he would approach as a salvo against the rise of Barack Obama and his 
policies.” When President Obama’s endorsement of the standards added to the perception 
that the CCSS was a federal initiative, Beck made the calculated decision to latch onto this 
idea and weaponize it. EC3 described Beck as holding a significant amount of sway, at that 
time, over the Christian right. These conservatives were, in the words of EC3, “looking for a 






 As will be discussed in a later subsection titled Conservative Angst, EC3’s account of 
the antipathy of the Christian right toward President Obama resembled BE2’s anecdote about 
a pollster suggesting that the Tea Party viewed the CCSS as the “last straw” following a 
series of losses. According to EC3, Beck and other conservative commentators made 
opposing the CCSS a plank that could be articulated to condemn President Obama. 
Moreover, the informant identified four main talking points used for this express purpose: 1) 
the CCSS originated from a small group of Barack Obama devotees; 2) the initiative is an 
attempt to standardize education; 3) the standards are “the window dressing for a much larger 
political agenda,” which will impose a secularized worldview on children; and 4) “If they can 
impose that and suffuse it into the entire educational system, then, of course, they have won 
the hearts and minds of our children, and America is no longer America.”   
 The tribulations of being a conservative CCSS supporter. EC2 and EC3 both 
discussed their experiences of being a conservative advocate for an initiative that was widely 
opposed by groups and individuals on the political right. EC2 spoke about how defending the 
CCSS had drawn his organization, which prides itself as an independently minded think tank, 
further into the politics of the initiative than he would have liked. However, because he and 
his organization believed in the vision for the standards, they chose to stand their ground, 
which subsequently created some tension with other conservatives. 
We felt like there was a need and nobody else was going to do it, so 
we did it. That did, at times, make it a little bit tricky for us. We wanted to 
maintain our credibility as researchers and our ability to call it like we see it. I 
think that there was some damage to our reputation among some on the right, 
because they saw us as having a very hard, in-the-sand position on this one, 
and it was one they disagreed with. (EC2) 
 
Similarly, EC3’s support of the initiative put him in an uncomfortable position with other 
members of his faith community. When asked if it was a difficult to maintain an overtly 





almost public knowledge that anyone who advocated for Common Core was an enemy to 
evangelicalism and was an enemy to conservatism. It was stunning!” He described other 
members of his organization warning him that his position in the organization was 
“imperiled.” These individuals, he explained, had not done any research on what the CCSS 
was and subscribed to the negative talking points being circulated by conservative media 
sources. According to EC3, the opponents he spoke with firmly believed that supporting the 
CCSS meant that you were a willing accomplice of President Obama: 
People were lining up, there was a bright line dividing these groups, 
and there really was no way that an evangelical could support Common Core 
without supporting these other elements that they would suggest were an 
inherent part of Common Core. 
 
 Educational conservatives on liberal opposition. Though it was less of a prominent 
topic than the opposition of the political right, EC1 and EC2 also commented on groups on 
the political left that contributed to the politicization of the CCSS. In both cases, the 
resistance from the left was founded on opposition to testing and accountability. 
Folks on the left were anti-testing. So, you know, the Badass Teachers 
Association, groups like that. And when it came to the tests, which later 
became part of the issue, the whole opt-out movement and this debate about 
whether states would stay with PARCC and Smarter Balanced—there we lost 
the unions…. They tried to tread this line of being pro-standards but anti-tests. 
So we saw them pull back on that. (EC2) 
 
The Orientation of Educational Conservatives’ Narratives  
 The setting of educational conservatives’ narratives. Like the business 
entrepreneurs and civil rights entrepreneurs, the educational conservatives argued that the 
political environment surrounding the adoption of the CCSS had contributed to the standards’ 
politicization. They discussed the deep resentment felt by conservatives in the wake of 





conservatives, including the members of the Tea Party and Christian right, in opposition to 
the policies of the Obama administration.  
 Conservative angst. EC2 described the CCSS as becoming a “real cause” among 
grassroots conservatives: “This was at a time when the Tea Party was strong, gaining more 
strength, and looking for a win after the election. It really caught fire.” This explanation bore 
a resemblance to BE2’s description of what a pollster had told her about conservative 
opposition to the initiative. 
[Tea Party conservatives] saw consistent losses across the board, 
whether it be healthcare, whether it be the White House, whether it be either 
the House or the Senate. You name it; they were systematically being told this 
is the direction that we are going with or without you. And when it came to 
defining this challenge, they sort of looked at this as the last straw. They were 
happy to make this an issue that they focused on. (BE2) 
 
Basically, BE2 and EC2’s version of events was that grassroots conservatives viewed the 
election of President Obama as a major defeat for their worldviews. The CCSS became one 
of the policies that conservative groups latched onto as something they opposed because 
President Obama had endorsed it and because it could be used as an example of federal 
overreach.   
 EC3 provided a similar account of conservative discontent during this time period. He 
first observed the deep resentment felt by evangelicals toward President Obama during an 
event that he attended in 2010 “as an interested observer.” That year, Glenn Beck had 
organized a march on Washington, D.C., in which approximately 200,000 people gathered in 
an act of protest. Reflecting back, EC3 said that the rationale for the march had been 
conspicuously nebulous. He had therefore spent time during the event interviewing attendees 
to try to make sense of why they had congregated and what they hoped to accomplish.   
Almost to a person, they gave a rather amorphous response, and it was 
something along the lines of they were upset with the changes and they 





beyond that. They didn’t know exactly why they had come beyond that. The 
call was strangely general, but the response was so striking. (EC3) 
 
EC3 described this crowd as a mixture of members of the Christian right and other socially 
and politically conservative groups, such as the Tea Party. While many of the people he 
spoke with struggled to articulate what the “changes” they opposed were, EC3 described 
sensing a general angst regarding the Obama administration. Though Glenn Beck is a 
Mormon, EC3 recalled that the speech he made that day in Washington “used evangelical 
language that was very attractive and compelling to evangelicals and pulled them in.” What 
is more, he explained, “Beck was able to unleash—in evangelicals in particular, but in many 
other groups—a platform that they could use to express this growing angst against the 
Obama administration” (EC3). As noted previously, Beck was one of the main characters 
from the conservative media that played a role in transmitting a series of talking points about 
the CCSS.   
 Characters in the narratives of educational conservatives. Many of the individuals 
and groups mentioned by the educational conservatives as being supporters of the initiative 
were the same as those identified by the business and civil rights entrepreneurs. Examples of 
“heroes” included the business community, Main Street Republicans, civil rights groups, the 
Gates Foundation, and the teachers’ unions (early on). The main groups acting as antagonists 
were conservative media, the Tea Party, the Christian right, conservative advocacy 
organizations, the RNC, parents (including the opt-out movement), and teachers’ unions 
(later on). The Obama administration, meanwhile, was portrayed as being a troublemaker.  
 Educational conservatives on heroes and heroines. According to EC2, the CCSS 
initiative originated with the states and was, in the early days, led by state leaders: “Some of 
us had been haranguing them for years for having low standards, and some of the state 





to fix this.’” EC2 also told how the business community, civil rights groups, education 
groups, and national non-profit organizations—all of which received financial support from 
major philanthropic groups, including the Gates Foundation—later joined these state leaders 
to advocate for the initiative.  
 Later on, when things first started to become politicized, EC2 described the teacher’s 
unions as sticking with the CCSS: “They stuck with it, and that was important. In a lot of 
states, if we had lost the unions, we would have been in a lot of trouble.”  Moreover, 
Democrats continued to offer their support “out of loyalty to their president” (EC2). The 
groups that remained supportive on the right, according to EC2, were “the business wing of 
the Republican Party and the business groups.” These groups, he explained, had mobilized a 
crucial lobbying effort to convey to lawmakers that the standards were a priority for them 
and that they would not be happy if they were pared down. An interesting insight provided 
by EC2 was that a future member of the Trump cabinet had proven to be a key supporter 
during these initial struggles: “Even Rex Tillerson played a key role in this in many states 
where Exxon is big—saving the standards almost single-handedly!”   
 Similar to EC2’s version of events, the groups mentioned as being important 
supporters by EC1 included civil rights organizations, the business community, education 
groups, and organizations representing state elected officials. The supporters remarked on by 
EC3 were moderate Republicans, such as John Kasich and Jeb Bush, organizations 
representing elected officials and state education leaders, and, for a while, a group of silent 
supporters from the Southern Baptist community.  
 Educational conservatives on antagonists and troublemakers. As already outlined, 
members of this group all spoke about the negative influence of conservative media on public 





talking points used to criticize the standards. One of the groups EC2 and EC3 mentioned as 
having been influenced by such conservative campaigns was the Tea Party, which was 
comprised of conservatives who felt deep animus toward the Obama administration. Also 
affected by this sense of angst was the Christian right, who EC3 described as viewing Obama 
as “a very liberal president.” This group felt like their religious worldview was under attack 
and that the CCSS represented a sinister attempt to propagate secular values.  
 At the same time that grassroots conservatives were voicing their dislike of the CCSS, 
a shift was occurring within the Republican Party. In the words of EC2, “The Republican 
National Committee adopted a resolution, that a handful of anti-Common Core people got in 
there without much attention, to be opposed to the Common Core standards.” This marked 
the beginning of an effort by the RNC to not only distance themselves from the CCSS but to 
use it as ammunition against their political opponents in the Democratic Party. This strategy 
was especially evident during the run up to the 2016 presidential elections. As EC1 and EC3 
recalled, Republican campaigns brought to the fore a lot of the misinformation that had been 
circulating on conservative media. What is more, according to EC3, during the election 
season, it became even more apparent that opposing the CCSS had become “the mantra of 
nearly every conservative.”  
During his discussion of the shift within the RNC, EC3 told how formerly supportive 
Republicans pivoted to oppose the standards: 
We had very close discussions with Marco Rubio’s camp early on. He 
was initially supportive and then became part of the opposition. Ben Carson is 
another person who I knew personally. Initially, he was very supportive, as an 
African American man, of common standards, and then he came out strongly 
against them.  
 
 Candidate Trump, meanwhile, used his opposition to the standards as one of his main 





calling out Common Core, despite the fact it didn’t even still exist in the same form any 
longer” (EC3).  
 Another group on the political right that EC2 mentioned working to counter the 
coalition’s work was organizations representing the interests of libertarians:  
[The CCSS] got the attention of some other advocacy organizations 
like FreedomWorks, which is one of the main libertarian groups out there 
funded by the Koch Brothers, and they realized that picking up this mantle 
would help them raise money and build lists for their own purposes. 
 
EC1 also mentioned right-leaning advocacy organizations as opposing the standards. 
Examples identified by her included conservative organizations that sought to reduce the size 
of government: “Education is the responsibility of the states, and all your purists, federalists, 
and AEI—everyone that’s having this conversation, and it’s not just in education—[they 
believe] all of this should devolve back down to the states” (EC1).   
 In addition to the conservative groups identified by the educational conservatives, 
some left-leaning and non-partisan groups were described as contributing to the politicization 
of the CCSS. EC1, for example, spoke of antagonism by parents. In her opinion, parental 
support really dwindled as their children’s test scores fell due to being tested against the 
higher standards. 
I think parents got more engaged in the conversation in 2015 when 
those individual student results came out. That’s what fueled a lot of that 
conversation and backlash. Maybe just the realization or understanding that, 
“You’ve been essentially misleading me about my student’s performance all 
this time?” (EC1) 
 
 
Relatedly, EC2 described this opposition to testing as culminating in the opt-out movement, 
in which parents made the decision that their children would not take the CCSS-aligned tests. 





that they were going to be held accountable based on their students’ performance against 
higher standards.    
 The main troublemaker identified from within the group of supporters was the Obama 
administration. All three educational conservatives argued that the CCSS being incentivized 
through RTTT added to the perception of the standards being a federal initiative, which 
proved to be highly contentious among conservative groups.  
 Educational conservatives on victims. Within their discussions on the importance of 
academic standards, all three educational conservatives spoke about the impact of inequitable 
expectations on students. Moreover, EC2 and EC3 spoke specifically about the impact of 
such inequities on students living in poverty. These framings depicted students as victims of 
an unjust education system.  
Educational Conservatives on the Present and Future 
 The participants from this group described feeling quite optimistic about the future of 
state standards, but they also suggested that the coalition that formed to advocate on behalf of 
the CCSS had fallen dormant as a result of the strong backlash.  
 Educational conservatives on the present and future of the CCSS. The 
educational conservatives described the CCSS brand as having been damaged by the 
politicization of the initiative. As a result of the backlash, they explained, fewer reformers 
now use the name “Common Core” when talking about state standards. Nevertheless, two of 
the informants from this group used the same word to describe the current status of the 
initiative: “alive.” EC1, for example, provided the following positive assessment:  
I think the words and term Common Core, I think that’s probably 
better left done. I think the idea of it and the merit of it are still clearly alive 
and well in the majority of states; they just don’t call it Common Core. So, as 
far as the name of Common Core, I think that is gone and done. Are those 
concepts living on and will they continue to live on? Yeah, I absolutely think 






Similarly, EC2 suggested that the CCSS is still very much up and running: 
After all that fracas and brouhaha, the standards are still alive. In most 
places, they have not gone away. They have been renamed and rebranded, and 
in some places tweaked, but there is only a handful of states that have really 
pulled back from them or made major changes. So, from that respect, for all 
the bad press and for its damaged brand, it is still alive. 
 
 EC2 said that the initiative had been conceived as a long-term effort that had not yet 
been fully realized. He explained the CCSS as being one piece of a system that was being 
built in three phases. The first phase, according to EC2, was setting standards and training 
educators. Phase two had been building and implementing the CCSS-aligned assessments. 
After the standards and tests were in place, the envisioned third phase was that schools would 
use the test data to improve teaching and learning: “They would look for better curricula; 
they would do a better job training their teachers” (EC2). This third phase, he pointed out, 
“[is] the kind of work that is going on right now.” He articulated his hope for the future as 
follows:  
If we can protect this effort from the politics and give it, say, another 
three years, where you have this system completely built out, up and running 
with the standard, tests, accountability systems, the curriculum, and the 
training, we might really start to see some benefits to kids. 
 
Moreover, EC2 felt optimistic that the fights around the CCSS were now in the past and that 
the rebranding efforts had helped quiet down the most vocal of opponents.  
 Although EC3 had been less positive than the other two educational conservatives 
regarding the question of whether the CCSS had been a success, he later suggested that the 
lessons learned by coalition members while advocating for the initiative had been beneficial. 
Specifically, he described how advocates had successfully pushed for some of the best 
elements of the CCSS to be included in the ESSA. For that reason, he concluded, “I think 





 Educational conservatives on the present and future of the coalition. Despite 
suggesting that the reform community is still very much supportive of the ideas behind the 
CCSS, EC1 explained that the coalition has purposely quelled their advocacy efforts in recent 
times: “I do think there is still a coalition. I just don’t think they are going to organize around 
this.” Likewise, EC2 stated, “I think [the coalition] is still there. I think it is a little bit 
dormant right now on this issue because there is not too much of a fight right now.” 
According to this same informant, however, one organization, the Collaborative for Student 
Success, was still actively monitoring the standards across states on behalf of the wider 
coalition. He further suggested that, with the Collaborative on guard, “If suddenly a bunch of 
states started talking seriously again about pulling out, we are better prepared to push back 
than we were before.”  
 EC3 spoke about organizations within the coalition, including his own, deciding to 
stop using the CCSS brand name:   
We really have, like so many groups, felt that the phrase Common 
Core has just become too volatile. But our stance around educational 
standards has not varied. You would read Common Core in our earliest 
statements, and then that was shorn from our narrative sometime after that, 
along with so many other groups. 
 
EC1 described her organization in much the same way: 
The organization chose to put the Common Core conversation on the 
back burner. We did not waver on our support for rigorous expectations and 
college- and career-ready standards. We continued to espouse those 
principles, but we did not use the words “Common Core.”  
 
Educational Conservatives on the Moral/Evaluation 
 Two topics emerged from the educational conservatives’ interview data regarding the 
significance of events and the lessons that were learned while advocating for the CCSS: 






 Keep Uncle Sam far away (scale up from the states).  A topic raised by all three of 
the educational conservatives when discussing what they had learned from their experiences 
advocating for the CCSS was that education reforms must be led by the states and not the 
federal government. EC2 was the most vocal in expressing a preference for federalism. “The 
federal government,” he maintained, “is just too far removed from the action to try to do this 
directly.” Moreover, EC2 advised that there is very little political support among 
conservatives for a strong federal hand in education. For those reasons, he recommended that 
any future efforts to establish national education reforms must be led by the states: “I think 
anything that is national has got to be something that the states lead and work cooperatively 
with one another in a voluntary way, not something that is going to be forced on them from 
Washington.” Offering words of advice to future education reformers, EC2 asserted, “Keep 
Uncle Sam far, far away.” 
 Although EC1 was not opposed to the idea of national reforms, particularly because 
such efforts allow for economies of scale, she believed that the federal government funding 
the test consortia had proven to be a big mistake: “I do think that is one of the biggest 
deteriorations of it was that the tests themselves were federally funded.” Instead, she argued, 
smaller state-funded consortia should have developed the assessments. The counter-example 
that she offered as a better model was the New England Common Assessment Program 
(NECAP), in which New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Maine came together to 
create a common assessment. According to EC1, this effort, which predated the CCSS, had 
proven far less contentious. A major reason identified by EC1 when explaining why NECAP 
had not become politicized in the same way as the CCSS was that it had not relied on federal 
funding: 
It was a very successful model. Obviously, state funded. It didn’t use 





where a few little states got together—even a few big states got together—and 
kind of did their own thing, rather than have it be literally two test companies 
that were doing it, I think that would have made a big difference. (EC1) 
 
 The problem of federal involvement was also raised by EC3, who saw it as a major 
cause of the opposition from the Christian right. He argued that this group, which already had 
a history of opposing the idea of federal involvement in education, was further incited due to 
their deep aversion to President Obama. 
While there has always been pushback against federal government 
controlling too much about education, I think it was especially difficult for 
conservatives, and particularly evangelicals, when the thought was that this 
perhaps was literally driven by Barack Obama. (EC3) 
 
 Given the long-standing opposition that exists to top-down initiatives, EC3 argued 
that the CCSS could have avoided a lot of the politics by starting as a smaller effort involving 
fewer states. This approach would have created a foundation, he explained, which then could 
have been built upon in order to avoid the perception of federal overreach.  
I think the hope was that somewhere between 15 and 25 states would 
sign on initially, and when suddenly it’s 40 and then 45, I think that 
overwhelmed everyone, including the advocates for Common Core! So, I 
think having some sort of scaffolded approach would have been a better way 
to approach this. (EC3) 
 
 The importance of engaging conservative stakeholders. Another major take-away 
this group discussed was the importance of engaging with conservatives, particularly given 
the influence of right-wing media on policy debates.  
I think we just really need to do a better job of educating the American 
public and not allowing all of their knowledge to come from mass media 
markets who spin things, so much so that they have shows called the “No Spin 
Zone” that still have spin. (EC1) 
 
The idea that conservatives had not been adequately targeted by outreach efforts was 
discussed at length by EC3. Specifically, he argued that some of the politicization could have 





“I think the communication around Common Core was so poor that it was one of the primary 
reasons it failed.” Like EC1, EC3 suggested that many conservatives did not understand what 
the CCSS was and were strongly influenced by right wing media sources: “I think just 
massive amounts of Americans rejected Common Core because they felt it was a threat to 
their philosophical and religious way of life.”  According to EC3, the coalition that formed to 
support the CCSS failed to provide an effective counter-message to the misinformation being 
circulated.   
 In order to build support among conservative Christians, EC3 argued that 
representatives from faith communities should have been included in conversations during 
the policy formulation stages: “I think we could have brought together other groups [during 
early discussions]—and of course included evangelical leaders early on in those groups as 
well.” Moreover, part of the effort to engage evangelicals, EC3 argued, should have included 
outreach to the clergy: “If you can get pastors to become your advocates or at least say, ‘This 
is a good thing for our children,’ that’s all people have to hear in many of those 
communities.”   
 A further recommendation made by EC3 pertained to the content of the standards’ 
appendices. In his words, “The standards themselves were fine, but the appendices are where 
I think those who constructed Common Core really missed the boat.” He went on to suggest 
that had the appendices included references to religious texts, this could have been used to 
counter the arguments that the CCSS was seeking to promote a secular worldview.    
That was a huge miss by those who constructed Common Core—to 
not include some element [of religious texts]. I mean, something from the 
Psalms, something from an ancient text, include passages from the Quran. 
Those kinds of things would have made it clear that, if you include those in 
the appendices, you are saying to the religious communities of America that 







The Narratives of Educational Conservatives 
 The narratives told by this group of political entrepreneurs shed some light on the 
particular concerns felt by conservative Americans regarding the CCSS. All three described 
opposition to federal involvement in education as being a major source of the resistance from 
conservatives. Moreover, every informant in the group identified the influence of 
conservative media as having contributed to the challenges faced by the CCSS coalition. The 
topics discussed by the educational conservatives in their narratives about the politicization 
of the CCSS are outlined in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. 
Elements of the Narratives Told by Educational Conservatives 






A successful initiative 2/3 Polarized partisan 
environment 
2/3 
"Mildly successful"  1/3 Orientation: 
Heroes 
  
Complicating Action   Civil rights 
community 
2/3 
Resistance from the right 3/3 Business 
community 
2/3 
States' rights conservatism 3/3 Gates Foundation 1/3 





Antipathy toward Obama 3/3 Teachers' unions 
(early on) 
2/3 
The rise of the Tea Party 2/3 State 
officials/leaders 
2/3 
Influence of conservative media 3/3 Democrats 1/3 
Resistance from Christian right 1/3 Moderate 
Republicans 
2/3 
Resistance from the left 2/3 Southern Baptists  1/3 
Resistance to testing and accountability 2/3 Orientation: 
Antagonists 
  
Parental opposition 2/3 Conservative media 2/3 
Future of the CCSS   Republicans/Tea 
Party 
3/3 
State standards will remain higher and 
more common 









The coalition is supportive but less vocal 3/3 Parents 2/3 
Moral/Evaluation   Educators/teachers' 
unions 
2/3 
Scale up from the states 3/3 Orientation: 
Troublemakers 
  
The importance of engaging 
conservatives 
2/3 The Obama 
administration 
3/3 




The Narratives Told by Members of Organizations Representing Educators  
or Educational Leaders 
Resolution: Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders 
on the Result of the CCSS  
 Rhodes’ (2012) category of “Educational Liberals” (p. 21) is made up of the teachers’ 
unions and major administrator organizations. According to Rhodes, though this group has 
long been supportive of efforts to increase the federal role in education, they have also 
remained skeptical about the methodology of test-based accountability. Moreover, 
educational liberals have demonstrated “ideological opposition toward incentive-based 
systems that create ‘winners and losers’ and thereby harm some students” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 
21). This group’s skepticism of results-based accountability has meant that they have been 
less of a player within the standards-based reform movement (Rhodes, 2012). In the case of 
the CCSS, however, a number of the organizations that Rhodes identifies within this 
category—including the AFT and NEA—were members of the advocacy coalition, and one 
was an initiative leader: the CCSSO.  
 Interviews with members of this group revealed a less consistent political ideology 





that his organization for educational leaders was comparable to the teachers’ unions. He 
argued that his organization had more in common with ones that represent public officials, 
such as the NGA, because its members are elected or appointed. For that reason, the name of 
this group was renamed organizations representing educators or educational leaders.   
 The members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders had 
mixed opinions regarding the end result of the CCSS, with one viewing it as having been a 
strong success, one a moderate success, and the other a failure.  ED1 said that he considered 
the CCSS to have been a success because state standards had been raised and were more 
common than before the initiative: “I consider it to be successful. Look at the lay of the land 
prior to the Common Core and contrast it to today. What I see is a very different educational 
landscape.” ED2’s response was decidedly more negative. Though she described the idea of 
creating a focus on critical thinking as being important, in her words, “the execution was 
terrible.” She argued that the initiative ended up being centered on “the policymaker and the 
elected officials’ need to account and assess, as opposed to being student centered and 
helping students master [critical thinking] skills.” In essence, she believed that the focus 
shifted from improving instructional practices to “the wish to standardize, to assess, and then 
to penalize.”  This line of argument was the one that most closely aligned with Rhodes’ 
(2012) account of educational liberals opposing test-based accountability. The third member 
of this group, ED3, described the initiative as a “moderate success.” “Depending on how you 
define success,” he said, “I think there were some wins and losses.” This informant felt that 
the CCSS had provided the impetus for states to focus on raising standards. However, where 
the initiative had been less successful, ED3 suggested, was in ensuring that all states 






Complicating Action in the Narratives of Members of Organizations Representing 
Educators or Educational Leaders 
 The three members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders 
discussed many of the same topics mentioned by other groups as contributing to the 
politicization of the CCSS. For example, every participant in this group spoke about the 
negative impact of federal involvement and the opposition of states’ rights conservatives. 
Another area discussed by all three informants was the resistance from educators. ED2, who 
worked for an organization representing teachers, was especially outspoken on this topic. She 
provided some rich insights into the thinking of teachers’ union members and leaders and 
offered a valuable counter-perspective to the other political entrepreneurs’ theories on 
educator opposition.   
  The origin of the Common Core as a state-led effort. One of the extended accounts 
provided by ED1 emphasized how the CCSS had originated at the state level. Like BE3 and 
CR1, ED1 had been a player in the standards-based reform movement for decades and, 
therefore, had extensive knowledge about the unfolding of events leading up to the CCSS. 
His account began during the 1980s, when he was working as an education leader at the state 
level: “During this time, the governors were emerging as a powerful force in education 
policymaking across the country. It was the time in which those Southern governors made a 
direct link between economic development and education.” This group of state leaders, ED1 
explained, had decided that an effective strategy for lifting the economic statuses of their 
states was to invest in public education. He told how a number of these activist governors 
ultimately emerged as national advocates for education reform, including Bill Clinton in 
Arkansas, William Winter in Mississippi, Jim Hunt in North Carolina, Richard Riley in 





group “even embraced greater engagement by the federal government.” ED1’s version of 
events was similar to the narrative told by BE3 about the origin of the CCSS, in that both 
highlighted the significance of the role of the governors during the early stages of the 
excellence agenda and how the federal government had helped drive the standards 
movement.  
Ironically, greater federal engagement began with Reagan. I think his 
original intent, supported by the Heritage Foundation, was to eliminate the 
Department, but with the national report that his secretary released—A Nation 
at Risk—it really solidified the effort on the part of the federal government to 
do something about education. (ED1) 
 
ED1 traced the policy trajectory from ANAR, depicting President Bush I, President Clinton, 
and President Bush II as all having built upon the Reagan-era agenda: “All of them were in 
some way trying to have a voice to improve this low expectations, low delivery system with 
unacceptable outcomes.” BE2, BE3, and CR3 shared the perspective that the CCSS initiative 
was the descendent of ANAR.  
 ED1 described himself as watching the standards movement unfold while serving as a 
leader in a reform state that was seeking to aggressively upgrade its education system. Like 
BE3, he depicted federal involvement in education as having caused a mounting sense of 
tension among state-level actors. 
I observed some troubling trends. That is, there has always been the 
separation of powers between the federal government and the states. The 
intent was that the states would have primary power in education 
policymaking, but it seemed to me—and to others—that that was being 
usurped by the feds. (ED1)  
 
According to ED1, the concerns felt by senior state education officials primarily pertained to 
the issue of federal overreach and the shared belief that “states ought to exert what I call their 
‘rightful responsibility’ to set education policy in the country.” The fact that ED1 expressed 





educational liberals are supportive of federal involvement. As discussed later, ED2 also held 
the belief that decisions regarding the instructional core should remain at the state and local 
levels.  
Within the trajectory of events ED1 outlined as leading to the CCSS was a report card 
from President Bush II’s secretary of education, Margaret Spellings, that used NAEP data to 
compare different states’ definitions of proficiency.  
I think that the general opinion of the public at that time was that the 
federal system under NAEP had a much higher set of expectations, and that 
when states were declaring students proficient, they were lying to the citizens. 
And that sort of mindset crystallized across the country. (ED1) 
 
In essence, NAEP data were used as a form of what Edelman (1985) terms referential 
symbols in order to illustrate discrepancies in proficiency standards across the states. These 
data helped create a shared understanding of the issue, which then laid the foundation for the 
arguments used to advocate for a collaborative effort between the states to elevate 
expectations and promote the college and career readiness of students. According to ED1, his 
organization had been part of the original effort to move this idea forward.  
We took upon ourselves to facilitate this [joint] effort to develop our 
standards called Common Core standards. We didn’t know what we’d call 
them at the time we began the effort, but the idea was to secure the support of 
state policymakers to engage in a major effort to write new standards that 
might be referenced by states as they developed or refined their individual 
standards. (ED1) 
 
The first step, he explained, was to invite the states to form a coalition that would engage in 
the collaborative effort to develop new standards. At this stage, initiative leaders 
communicated that there was no obligation to adopt the standards that were developed: “We 
said to the states we did not expect them to support them, endorse them, or adopt them until 
they had seen the final product” (ED1). ED1 went on to provide an extended account of the 





principles: that the standards be aligned with the expectations of higher education and of the 
business community; that the standards be evidence-based; that the standards be 
internationally benchmarked; and that the standards be “no lower than the expectations in the 
highest-ranked state, which at that time seemed to be Massachusetts.”  
 Reflecting on the early stages of the initiative, ED1 recalled that his initial 
expectation had been that “If we could get half the states engaged in this, it would be a good 
beginning.” He explained the original idea as being that the standards would be adopted by a 
small number of states, which could then serve as laboratories for other states. However, 
when the invitation was extended, far more states signed up than had been anticipated. It was 
at that moment that ED1 first recognized that the coalition “would have a bit of a problem,” 
because many of the states that signed up were ones that had “extremely low standards.”  
 ED1 emphasized that the CCSS had bipartisan support during the nascent stages: “We 
actually had Republican governors and Democratic governors in lead positions on this. In 
fact, we announced the Common Core in Georgia with a Republican governor—that’s how 
much support we had.” He also recalled that there had been much outreach with different 
communities, including the teachers’ unions and state department staff, and that the input 
from these stakeholders had been used to improve the quality of the standards. However, 
having provided this account of the broad-based support that existed during the development 
phases, ED1 then went on to discuss how the bipartisan coalition of backers fell apart.  
 Related to his initial depiction of the CCSS’s place within a longer policy trajectory, 
which was paralleled by escalating federal influence, ED1 explained events following the 
initiative’s politicization as marking a significant shift in a long-term trend. Expressly, the 





the design of statewide accountability systems was now moving away from Washington and 
back to the states.  
 An unholy alliance. All three of the members of organizations representing educators 
or educational leaders described the resistance to the CCSS as coming from both sides of the 
political spectrum. ED1, for example, spoke about the unlikely combination of Republicans 
and the teachers’ unions, which he dubbed “an unholy alliance,” as having been able to 
influence public opinion on the standards.  
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on 
conservative opposition. Every informant from this group of political entrepreneurs said that 
the antipathy toward the federal government harbored by conservatives contributed to the 
politicization of the CCSS.  
 A new day of Anti-Federalism. According to ED1, the partisan-ideological 
polarization that occurred in the wake of the 2008 election was something that the coalition 
had failed to anticipate. He also described the rise of the Tea Party as a factor that caught 
CCSS advocates off guard: “I don’t know if anybody in society would have predicted the 
quick emergence of the Tea Party, but they were against anything federal.” As explained by 
ED1, because this wing of the Republican Party opposed “anything that they perceived to be 
driven from afar,” they quickly identified the CCSS as being a “healthy target for them to 
take on.” Before long, the initiative became one of the main issues that the Tea Party used to 
build and rally their political base. ED3 also described “far right conservatives” as fueling the 
idea that the CCSS was an example of federal overreach.   
The number one thing, of course, that hurt Common Core and 
destroyed the reputability was the Department of Education using it as the 
basis for Race to the Top. Once it became endorsed—not owned, but 
endorsed—by the federal government, those that are anti-federal, those that 





opportunity to propagandize it and to say it was a federal initiative, knowing 
full well that it wasn’t! (ED3) 
 
According to ED1, President Obama and his administration exacerbated this problem of the 
CCSS being perceived as a federal initiative: “When the President and Arne Duncan decided 
that they were going to embrace our work, and they had a lot of money to embrace it with 
because of the stimulus, they brought major negative attention to the effort.” He described 
how President Obama had mentioned the CCSS by name in speeches that he had given and 
“even took credit for forwarding the standards in some of those speeches.” Thinking back to 
how this association had caused problems for the coalition, ED1 professed, “I honestly 
believe that had this remained a state-led initiative, without federal embracing and 
promotion, we would still be in much better stead.” 
 ED1 and ED3 shared the belief that the use of federal funding to support the initiative 
had served to invalidate the coalition’s argument that it was a state-led effort. They both 
described how the issue of federal funding had been used to push the idea that the CCSS was 
a product of the Obama administration. ED3, for example, stated, 
The nail in the coffin was the fact that there was federal funding 
directly tied to the adoption of the Common Core. I think that was the nail in 
the coffin. I think minus that, if it was still left with no incentivization from 
the federal level, I do think it would have been a success. 
 
Meanwhile, ED1 described federal funding for the assessments as the “final blow.” The 
Obama administration’s decision to fund the consortia, he argued, meant that the coalition 
could no longer claim that the CCSS was divorced from direct federal involvement. 
Moreover, the elimination of this defense meant that it became easier for opponents to rally 






 Regime change. Another major factor ED1 cited as contributing to the politicization 
of the CCSS was the amount of political turnover at the state and federal levels during the 
2010 and 2012 elections:  
I think another reason for declining support was the loss of a lot of 
state leadership with the election turnover. We not only changed party 
leadership, we lost a lot of folks who had been around a long time: Congress 
turned over, dramatically; the state legislatures turned over; the governors 
turned over; and the chiefs turned over.  
 
Because the newly elected Republican officials felt no ownership of the standards, they felt 
less compelled to defend the initiative against the mounting criticism. This observation was 
consistent with the ACF’s description of the impact of external shocks on subsystem affairs 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). ED1’s account regarding the effects of political turnover also 
tallied with BE2’s argument that regime changes can be disruptive for multi-year reform 
efforts. 
 Politicization and propaganda. The other major topic discussed by both ED1 and 
ED3 in regard to conservative opposition was the impact of media coverage and 
misinformation. ED1 described his growing concern about the politicization of the initiative 
after reviewing polling data on the CCSS that had been gathered by Gallup. The first thing he 
noticed was that the public lacked an understanding of what the CCSS initiative was. In his 
words, “That was one red flag.” But it was the second thing he noticed that caused him even 
greater concern: “The one that really got me was the question that went something like this, 
‘What is your primary source of information about the Common Core?’ And the answer was 
‘the media.’ Oh no!” According to ED1, the fact that the public was learning about the CCSS 
from the media and not from advocates at the state level meant that important stakeholders 
were getting information later than they should have. Moreover, ED1 asserted, the fact that 





receiving accurate information: “The media coverage at that time…they were going to make 
this an exciting story, so they picked up on the resistance and the concerns and all of that.” 
 ED3 went further in his criticism of media reporting. According to this informant, the 
misinformation being circulated was part of an orchestrated campaign staged by opponents. 
I think that the opinions were shaped by false information. I don’t 
know if you’ve read the recent information that was put out by CPRE, by the 
Consortium for Policy Research in Education, that this was a concerted effort 
to destroy the opinion of Common Core via Twitter and all that? This was not 
by happenstance. This was in reaction to a methodical and strategic plan to 
destroy the credibility. (ED3) 
 
Looking at the chart of public opinion data (see Appendix A), ED3 proclaimed, “These 
opinions are not based on the standards. These are based on the politicization and propaganda 
surrounding the standards!” Very few of the critics of the CCSS took issue with the content 
of the standards themselves, he pointed out. Instead, misinformation was intentionally 
disseminated by hostile interests who resented the processes surrounding the standards and, 
in his words, “what the standards represented.”  
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on 
liberal opposition. Speaking about the public opinion data charted in Appendix A, ED1 
observed that the Democratic trend line was “higher and slower and more of a steady line 
that the others.” He then offered the following explanation of this shallower slope: “That 
represents Democrats trying to hold on to the commitments they had made earlier and 
supporting their president.”  
Regarding liberal opposition, ED3 identified Diane Ravitch and others who “have a 
political agenda to move forward the issue that states need to be controlling education and 
not the Federal government.” This observation indicated that, from his perspective, 





 The main topic discussed by all three members of organizations representing 
educators or educational leaders concerning resistance from the left related to the opposition 
of the teachers’ unions. ED1 and ED3, who both worked for organizations representing 
senior educational administrators, suggested that union opposition was in response to the 
pressures of high-stakes accountability. Meanwhile, ED2, who worked for an organization 
representing educators, offered an insider’s perspective on what had led to the resistance by 
teachers and their unions. According to her, the teachers came to resent the CCSS because 
implementation had not been accompanied by the requisite supports.   
 Educator angst. As noted earlier, ED1 reported that there had been outreach to a 
number of different communities during the early stages of the initiative to elicit the feedback 
and recommendations of stakeholders. Among the communities that were included in these 
discussions were both of the major teachers’ unions. 
Initially, we had the engagement of NEA and AFT in the development 
of the standards. We had teacher groups who came in on Friday evenings and 
left Sunday afternoons—giving their time to review the drafts, providing 
feedback on the standards, engaging the leadership of both national 
organizations in this work—and they were wonderful reviewers! We took a 
lot of their suggestions. We met with both organizations during their 
governors’ meetings and talked to them about what we were doing, where we 
were going, and they seemed to be supportive. (ED1) 
 
However, according to ED1, when the Obama administration made the decision to tie teacher 
evaluations to the stimulus funding of the ARRA, the teachers’ unions “pivoted.” Early on, 
the teachers he had spoken with told him that they liked the new standards and believed that 
they were better than what their states had been using. The problem was not with the 
standards themselves; the problem, ED1 explained, was that teachers did not feel prepared to 
teach to the standards. They wanted time to understand them and wanted support in doing so. 
Basically, from ED1’s perspective, teachers wanted state and locally sponsored activities to 





high-stakes accountability until they had been adequately prepared for the transition. The 
decision to implement new teacher evaluations systems factoring in student test score results 
at the same time as implementing the higher standards ignored these educators’ concerns. As 
ED1 explained, “When you overlay the newness of the standard with the requirement that 
states had to evaluate their teachers largely based on test results, before they had time and 
before they had training, the resistance came.” ED3 shared this understanding. He described 
the unions as viewing the changes being pushed by the Obama administration as a threat: 
“When standards-based reform got to the point that it was impacting teacher evaluation and 
the accountability for individuals, that was the point at which it started to be perceived as a 
punitive measure rather than a supportive measure.”  
 ED2 commented at length on the topic of union resistance. As a leader in an 
organization that represents educators, she had an insider’s perspective on the events leading 
up to the unions’ pivot away from supporting the standards. Her organization had advocated 
for the CCSS, she said, because members believed the initiative could be used to promote 
equity: “It would be a basis and a way for getting kids the resources and support they needed 
for meeting those standards.” Yet when it became clear that implementation would not be 
accompanied by the resources and supports teachers believed they needed to be successful, 
educator support dropped. “That’s why teachers felt set up,” ED2 explained. “Because a lot 
of teachers were very supportive of the Common Core. They embraced it and still embrace 
the underlying idea. They felt set up.” This explanation supports ED1’s assertion that 
resistance was not to the standards themselves.  
 This sense of being set up was heightened when the Obama administration “went full 
speed ahead on the assessments” (ED2). The new CCSS-aligned tests, ED2 argued, were 





curriculum. Moreover, the new assessments “were being used in a high-stakes manner for 
both kids and teachers.” ED2 was very critical of the decision to use student test scores as 
part of teacher evaluations. Pointing to the fact that the ESSA prohibits the secretary of 
education from mandating the use of student test scores in teacher evaluation systems, ED2 
argued that RTTT’s emphasis on evaluating educators based on test data was now widely 
recognized as a mistake.  
There are lots of different ways to [evaluate teachers], but the one 
thing you don’t do is reduce everybody to an algorithm and to a series of 
functions and to a number. But there were lots of data geeks who, including 
so-called “education reformers,” just like the industrial Taylorism of the 
assembly line era, thought they could reduce everything to robots or 
everything to one number. Data is important to inform instruction, but data is 
not instruction. (ED2)  
 
ED2 recounted calling on the Obama administration and CCSS coalition to hold off on 
making the assessments high stakes until teachers had had the opportunity to adjust to the 
higher standards. However, when Secretary Duncan chose to ignore this request and failed to 
make any adjustments to the timeline, pressure built up within the unions to “just kill it—to 
just basically throw it out” (ED2), and the teachers’ unions tempered their support. 
According to ED2, losing the support of the unions had been a fatal mistake for the initiative 
because, as a result, “The Common Core as a condition of government funding as well as 
test-based teacher evaluations as a condition of federal funding were both thrown out of the 
law by 2015.”  Like BE3’s account of the rising tension over federal influence culminating in 
a backlash (see Figure 3), resistance to the Obama administration’s agenda was understood 
by ED2 as bringing about the falling action of the ESSA and devolved decision making. 
 A rare alliance. Matching the accounts of other political entrepreneurs interviewed, 
ED2 described the teachers’ unions as forming an unlikely alliance with adversaries on the 





It was so dominant as an issue in 2013, 2014, and 2015 that you had 
both—probably for one of the few times—conservatives and libertarians, who 
hated anything the government did, working with progressive educators to end 
the rigidity of the Common Core. (ED2) 
 
These groups from either side of the political spectrum converged around the belief that core 
decisions about instructional practices should not be dictated from afar: “Education is a state 
and local responsibility. And there is a fierce commitment in the United States of America to 
maintain local control over education” (ED2). The fact that actors considered to be on the 
political left, including ED2, oppose federal involvement when it comes to things like 
decisions regarding the instructional core indicated that such sentiments are not restricted to 
states’ rights conservatives. With that being said, ED2 also made it clear that she is not 
entirely opposed to federal involvement in education, particularly when it comes to providing 
additional resources and protecting the rights of children: “The federal government has a role 
because there is still money for poor kids, and there are still guardrails for equity.”  
 Opportunity to learn. ED2 also evinced a belief that tallied with what one of the 
civil rights entrepreneurs had described as the fundamental disagreement between civil rights 
organizations and the left: “the idea that teachers can directly have an impact on student 
learning” (CR3). ED2 insisted that raising student achievement was not a simple matter of 
elevating teacher expectations. Instead, she argued, a more serious issue facing schools was a 
lack of resources, especially for those serving high concentrations of low-SES students. 
Speaking about union members’ opposition to the CCSS, she exclaimed, 
They weren’t given the resources, they weren’t given the support, and 
they weren’t given the opportunity or latitude to adjust. And they were 
basically being held responsible for their kids’ education and their own 
employment based on things they had no control over! 
 
In the words of ED2, “The standards movements that have failed are the ones that have been 





how the equity focus of President Johnson’s War on Poverty during the 1960s and the early 
decades of ESEA had brought “huge improvements in education standards to America, 
particularly for poor kids.” Nevertheless, she argued, the later shift from the equity agenda to 
the excellence agenda had changed the emphasis from inputs to outputs: “No other industry, 
no other profession, would announce a set of standards without accompanying it with 
supports, and yet that has become our norm.”  
 ED2’s focus on increased (and more equitable) spending on public education matched 
Rhodes’ (2012) description of educational liberals’ policy preferences. This emphasis on 
targeted resources and supports for high-need schools also tallied with the arguments made 
by Congressional Democrats during the 1990s about creating opportunity-to-learn standards 
(Cross, 2014).  
The Orientation of Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational 
Leaders’ Narratives  
 The setting of members of organizations representing educators or educational 
leaders’ narratives. The members of this group of political entrepreneurs each described the 
opposition to the CCSS as being rooted in broader concerns that were products of the time 
and place that the standards were introduced. To ED1 and ED3, the setting of events was a 
deeply divided political environment. ED2, on the other hand, spoke about the impact of 
shifts occurring within the education reform community.  
 A nation of distrust. ED1 and ED3 both argued that the politicization of the CCSS 
had nothing to do with the actual product. In the words of ED1, “The irony in all of this is 
that the resistance was not to the standards themselves. It was the political environment or the 
conditions that were being set around those standards that caused the resistance.” He viewed 





conservatives and teachers who opposed being held accountable based on new standards that 
they had not had time to adjust to. In addition, he spoke about the politics surrounding the 
standards as being part of a much broader trend. Like BE3, he described Obama-era 
education reforms as continuing a decades-long movement toward greater federal influence. 
From his perspective, the backlash to the CCSS was, in part, the result of the tension felt by 
constituents who believed that decisions about teaching should be made at the state and local 
levels. Things really came to a head, he explained, during the policy debates around ESSA.  
 According to ED1, when the ESSA was being written, the Obama administration had 
continued to push for a strong federal role in education. This had caused a major rift between 
the Democrats and Republicans, with Senator Lamar Alexander airing his belief that the 
Democrats “can’t help themselves…. They’re going to exceed their authority no matter what 
kind of language the Congress puts into law” (ED1). ED1 described two of the law’s main 
architects, Senator Alexander (R) and Senator Patty Murray (D), as engaging in a “tug back 
and forth” over increasing or decreasing the federal role. In the end, however, the new law 
did devolve much decision-making back to the states. Thus, the passage of the ESSA proved 
to be “a shift in that long-term trend” (ED1).  
 Also contributing to the swing away from strong federal influence was the 2016 
presidential election. “With the election of Donald Trump, and DeVos being named as 
Secretary,” ED1 reflected, “that even further shifted the control from Washington.” All of 
these developments mean that it is now the role of the states to “carry education policy” 
(ED1). According to ED1, the answer to the question of whether the ESSA and the Trump 
administration’s vision for education mark the beginning of a new trend, rather than a 





believed could be predicted was that “the struggle between states and the federal government, 
which has been going on for years, will continue.”    
  Speaking about the impact of the political environment, ED3 suggested that there has 
been a mounting sense of cynicism regarding anything public in recent years. In his words, 
“It is a sense of distrust in anything public: in state boards, in boards of education. I think you 
have significant public distrust of anything governmental.” The 2016 election, he said, 
brought these sentiments to the foreground: “I mean the whole public discourse on the 
government is bad. ‘We need to dismantle everything in Washington,’ [or] ‘drain the 
swamp.’ I mean, it’s the public discourse of distrust and fear.”  
ED3 spoke about recently attending a conference that his organization had 
coordinated in which members were expressing opinions that a few years ago would not have 
been considered appropriate. “They have become emboldened by this public discourse,” he 
observed. “What I am thinking is that publicly, as a nation, we have emboldened those who 
are distrustful to go out and propagate that fear.” He argued that such discourse has served to 
undermine peoples’ confidence in government and public officials, which has consequently 
“built this whole nation of distrust of anything.” Though he conceded that the United States 
has a long history of Anti-Federalism and states’ rights, ED3 asserted that these ideas are 
now more freely expressed. Pointing to the impact of social media, he stated, “Now, people 
feel free to share it, and there is a platform for it.” Moreover, he understood this heightened 
sense of distrust in government as denoting a trend toward individualism and away from a 
concern for the public good.  
I think that that is a huge obstacle to try to get back to a conversation 
about, “Let’s do something common: common standards for the common 
good.” Because I don’t think that there is any appetite nationally for a 
common understanding of the good of the nation, period; whether it be in 
education or anything else…. There is no public appetite nationally for the 






 The political isolation of teachers. The contextual shift ED2 described as impacting 
her organization’s work on the CCSS pertained to the growing influence of certain voices 
within the education reform community. She explained how her organization had long been 
supporters of the standards movement, but that the coalition that formed around the CCSS, in 
its drive to push for greater standardization and accountability, had intentionally 
marginalized educators’ opinions.  
[My organization] was a member well before Gates and others were 
ever involved in education. But what happened was, it wasn’t in vogue with 
the powerful and the elite to embrace teachers in this particular iteration. They 
specifically—people like Michelle Rhee, Joel Klein, and the Gates 
Foundation—wanted to keep us out of the coalition, because they wanted to 
try to blame us if it didn’t work. They liked that we thought it was important, 
but we were not part of their planning. We just happened to think standards 
were important, and we always have. (ED2) 
 
The upshot of feeling marginalized was that the unions stepped away from advocacy efforts. 
In addition, this rift, or internal shock (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), fractured the coalition and 
undermined attempts to defend the initiative against the criticisms of external opponents.  
 Characters in the narratives of members of organizations representing 
educators or educational leaders. Within this group, the portrayal of heroes and antagonists 
differed depending on whether the participant interviewed came from an organization 
representing educational leaders or one that represented educators. ED1’s and ED3’s 
depictions of character types more closely aligned with those described in the narratives told 
by political entrepreneurs from other groups. ED2, on the other hand, offered a counter-
narrative in which various organizations within the coalition were portrayed as antagonists.  
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on heroes 
and heroines. The groups ED1 and ED3 named as important advocates for the CCSS 





and the civil rights community. ED3 also mentioned the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as 
playing an important role by funding many of the organizations within the coalition.  
 ED2’s portrayal of heroes or heroines diverged from ED1’s and ED3’s because her 
interpretation of events was very different from theirs. For example, because she viewed the 
initiative as having produced negative effects for members of her organization, her 
discussion of other organizations within the education reform space was less favorable. One 
group that she did regard positively was the civil rights community. Although they did not 
always agree on every issue, ED2 described the civil rights community as coming together 
“more often than not” with her organization. She also mentioned that civil rights 
organizations and the teachers’ unions had “worked very closely together on ESSA.” 
Regarding the issues that represented a difference of opinion between the unions and the civil 
rights community, ED2 made it clear that she understood the reasons why civil rights 
entrepreneurs were such strong advocates for standards-based reform. Moreover, she did not 
fault them for taking a hard position.  
I don’t blame the civil rights community for wanting to push for equity 
and higher standards. I don’t think it was the civil rights community that tried 
to reduce everything to a test score—I think that was the Gates Foundation 
and Tom Kane and people like Joel Klein and Michelle Rhee. I think that the 
civil rights community was trying to find ways to have higher standards in 
communities that have been shortchanged.  (ED2) 
 
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on 
antagonists and troublemakers. As noted above, the main antagonists mentioned by ED1 
and ED3 were states’ rights conservatives, the newly elected Republican officials who felt no 
ownership of the standards, conservative media sources, Diane Ravitch and her supporters, 
and the teachers’ unions (later on). From the perspective of ED2, however, the main 
antagonists that she encountered were organizations within the coalition, including the Gates 





community (e.g., Michelle Rhee and Joel Klein). She described these actors as being “more 
interested in the test results and in the algorithms than they were in what was happening to 
children.” Another group she named as antagonistic to the teachers’ unions was the business 
community. From ED2’s viewpoint, the business community had been allies but then turned 
on the unions: “The business people used to work with us, but they decided that we were 
their enemies. With the exception of some businesses, they look at teachers as their 
enemies—which is ridiculous!” In addition, she mentioned the Trump administration as 
being antagonistic toward teachers’ work. Specifically, ED2 was critical of the U.S. 
Department of Education’s limited action when it came to overseeing the implementation of 
the ESSA. She described how she had felt hopeful that the new law would create the space 
for educators to innovate. However, this opportunity had been undermined at the federal 
level, ED2 believed, because the Secretary of Education was not an advocate for public 
schools.  
I think Betsy DeVos is actively sabotaging it. What she is doing is 
focused on her pet projects, which are the destabilization and defunding of 
public schools, as opposed to creating best practices and really helping states 
and communities find their way to best practices and being incubators all over 
the place. That’s what ESSA was supposed to be. (ED2) 
 
 Regarding troublemakers from within the assemblage of supporters, ED1 and ED3 
both cited the Obama administration as having created problems for the CCSS. ED1, for 
example, criticized the decision by President Obama to mention the Common Core by name 
in some of the speeches that he made. Furthermore, he said, former Secretary of Education 
Arne Duncan added to the perception that the initiative was a federal one.  
Secretary Duncan was vocally supportive of the work. In fact, in the 
early draft of the regulations under the stimulus, the department included a 
requirement that states adopt the Common Core or similar standards. The 
language was removed in the final regulations because the requirement was 
poisonous, but critics had already attached the administration to the higher 






ED1 and ED3 were united in the conviction that federal involvement had politicized the 
initiative and undermined the coalition’s work.   
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on 
victims. All three members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders 
had strong concerns about educational equity and the treatment of students. In the way they 
framed their organizations’ equity objectives, they communicated a belief that certain groups 
of students were not afforded the same opportunities to be successful.  
 ED2’s description of educational equity placed particular emphasis on the inequitable 
distribution of resources: “I thought [he CCSS] would help create equity in a very inequitable 
situation for students who faced austerity, a lack of funding, and a lack of resources and other 
supports that they needed.” Like the opportunity-to-learn standards that congressional 
Democrats called for during the Clinton administration (Cross, 2014), ED2 advocated for the 
reduction of financial inequities between districts and schools.    
 ED2 was also critical of the impact of high-stakes testing and accountability on 
students and schools: “It became about blaming and shaming and pointing fingers, and it was 
used as a way of punishing students, punishing schools. It created huge anxiety—particularly 
for kids with special needs” (ED2). This critique of the testing culture echoed sentiments 
expressed by members of the opt-out movement (Matheson, 2015).    
 The other group that ED2 spoke about being harmed by the CCSS was teachers. She 
described educators as feeling set up by initiative leaders: “The good underlying it was just 
completely eclipsed by the fact that they were being set up. They weren’t given the 
resources, they weren’t given the support, and they weren’t given the opportunity or latitude 
to adjust” (ED2). This sense of mistreatment, she argued, led to resistance among the rank-





Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders on the 
Present and Future 
 Regarding the current status of the initiative, ED1 and ED3 both described state 
standards as having been raised by the CCSS. Their predictions for the future of the standards 
movement were similarly optimistic, believing that standards-based systems were here to 
stay.    
 A belief shared by all three members of organizations representing educators or 
educational leaders was that future efforts to modify state standards would be more locally 
driven.  
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on the 
present and future of the CCSS. ED1 said that the changes being made to state standards in 
the wake of the backlash were not affecting their substance: “Even though states have 
renamed those standards or gone through revision processes, most of them have maintained 
the integrity of the Common Core.” One of the reasons for this, he argued, was that it would 
be difficult for states to now say “We want to lower our standards.” ED3 shared this belief. 
 Similar to EC2’s portrayal of the standards being the first phase of a broader, ongoing 
project, ED1 stated, “What we’re beginning to see is this sort of tiering of reform based on 
the fact that we have these standards. That’s really positive for me.” What is more, ED1 
declared that the initiative had been successful in transforming existing educational 
institutions across the states: “We are now more standards-based than previous to the 
Common Core.” 
 The one area that ED1 felt some unease about was the continued existence of 
common assessments: “The idea that we would measure against our shared expectations in a 





Nevertheless, he cited the emergence of “watchdog” organizations, which release reports on 
changes being made to state standards, as giving him hope that the higher expectations of the 
CCSS will remain in place.  
 The three participants from this group suggested that future policy work around 
educational standards would be driven by the states. ED3, for example, opined that state 
leaders now recognize the benefits of elevated standards and will find ways to engage in less 
formal state-to-state work. 
States will now say, “This was a good idea. Let’s kind of continue 
this.” I think it will become much more organic. I think it will become much 
more state driven. I think it will be more colleague-to-colleague in terms of 
state-to-state. (ED3) 
 
Likewise, ED2 spoke about future standards work shifting back to the state and local levels. 
She also made the case that future initiatives should more carefully consider the perspectives 
of educators to avoid implementation challenges. In her own words, “Standards are 
important, but there has to be educator and community involvement in the development of 
them and some sense and trust that they’re being implemented with fidelity.”   
 Also regarding the future of state standards, ED1 indicated that, based on what he had 
observed, he did not believe the devolution of federal authority represented a rejection of the 
standards-based reform paradigm. Speaking about the ESSA state plans submitted to the 
Department of Education, he observed,  
The first pieces of evidence here are the first state plans that were 
submitted, which are not a radical shift away from the direction that’s been 
taken. They are still setting high standards; they’re still looking for ways to 
intervene in low-performing schools.  
 
He went on to suggest that he is not concerned about the future of standards-based reform.  





sense—that would scare me or excite me about some new directions,” he said. “It’s going to 
be incremental."   
 Members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders on the 
present and future of the coalition. From the perspectives of ED1 and ED3, support for 
college- and career-readiness standards remains strong. For that reason, the coalition of 
advocates still exists. However, according to these informants, supporters also now recognize 
that future work must happen at the state level and avoid federal involvement. 
I am not sure that anyone has walked away from the concept of 
standards-based reform. I think what they have walked away from are the 
processes used to get it done and the fact that it was a national endeavor. 
(ED3)  
 
As already mentioned, ED2 discussed how her organization had engaged in collaborative 
work with the civil rights community around ESSA. Regarding the broader coalition of 
reform-minded organizations and the business community, however, ED2 indicated that 
organizations representing educators had been mistreated and snubbed by these groups. 
Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational Leaders on the 
Moral/Evaluation 
 Reflecting on the lessons learned from their experiences working on the CCSS, the 
three members of organizations representing educators or educational leaders all spoke about 
the importance of building the capacity and understanding of the people who will be charged 
with implementation. Another major takeaway that ED1 and ED3 both discussed was the 
shortcomings of the initiative’s messaging campaign.  
 Lead with capacity. This group of political entrepreneurs shared the belief that key 
actors had not been adequately prepared for the implementation of the CCSS. ED1 recalled 
how he had assumed that leaders at the state and local levels were deeply engaged in 





a great deal of confusion about the rationale for the standards. Reflecting on what he would 
do differently if he could go back, ED1 stated,  
I would engage much more deeply in an extensive outreach during the 
development phases…. It’s interesting to me that in the places where there 
was the greatest outreach to the local community in the states, we had the least 
resistance. So I can see that correlation. 
 
ED3 provided a very similar take. He described how implementation had occurred too 
quickly, before the educators were fully ready to accept or deliver on the necessary shifts:  
You have to build the capacity first before trying to make that kind of 
a drastic change. Rather than saying that we are going to move with these 
standards in three years, it may have been ten years. My biggest advice is to 
lead with capacity and not with regulation.  
 
 The type of capacity that ED3 was referring to was greater than just fiscal resources. 
He argued that the CCSS coalition had failed to build parents’ and educators’ understandings 
of the rationale behind the initiative: “Capacity means the ability of people to understand the 
content of the standards themselves [and] the ability of people to understand the change of 
their own behaviors and the reasoning behind it.” ED2, meanwhile, argued that 
implementation had moved ahead too quickly and without the requisite provision of 
resources and supports to make sure that educators were ready to teach to the new standards.  
When they went full speed ahead on the assessments, and not on 
implementation, that was a problem. There was not the funding to help 
teachers actually learn this new curriculum and to teach it and to adjust it to 
their students’ needs as well as their needs. (ED2) 
 
 Message, message, message. The other major lesson ED1 and ED3 discussed was 
related to the importance of messaging campaigns. ED1 said the coalition had been caught 
unaware by the political shift that was happening in the United States. Thinking back, he 
suggested that they should have worked harder to hold onto prominent conservative 
supporters and found a way to make them spokespeople. In his own words, “We should have 





responding, and doing what we could to keep the momentum going.” ED1 also said the 
coalition had not been prepared to counter the negative messages coming from conservative 
media sources, assuming, instead, that the rationale was self-evident. 
No doubt they were more adept at delivering messages than we 
were…. We had our noses down doing our work and thinking that, on our 
merit, this will be a good idea and people will accept it. There’s just lots of 
good ways to undercut that. (ED1) 
 
 ED3 drew very similar conclusions regarding the failings of the coalition’s advocacy 
work. He offered the following advice to future political entrepreneurs: “I think the big thing 
is message, message, message.” He also suggested that the coalition should have more 
carefully considered how to incorporate a broader representation of political views during the 
policy discussions: “I think that the process got a little politicized by the folks who were 
absent from the table, not necessarily just the folks who were at the table.” This verdict 
squared with comments made by CR3 and EC3, both of whom suggested that the 
communities they represent had not been adequately engaged. 
The Narratives of Members of Organizations Representing Educators or Educational 
Leaders 
 The narratives told by this group of political entrepreneurs all depicted opposition to 
the CCSS as coming from both sides of the political spectrum. There was a shared belief that 
the standards had been implemented too quickly and without the requisite capacity building 















Elements of the Narratives Told by Members of Organizations Representing Educators or 
Educational Leaders 





A successful initiative 1/3 Polarized partisan environment 2/3 
A moderately successful initiative 1/3 Political isolation of teachers 1/3 
An unsuccessful initiative 1/3 Orientation: Heroes   
Complicating Action   State officials/leaders 2/3 
Opposition from left and right 3/3 Business community 2/3 
States’ rights conservatism 3/3 Teachers' unions 3/3 
The rising tension of federal influence 1/3 Civil rights community  3/3 
Regime change 1/3 National non-profits 1/3 
Influence of conservative media 2/3 The Gates Foundation 1/3 
Union opposition 3/3 Moderate Rs and Ds 2/3 
Future of the CCSS   Orientation: Antagonists   




Future of CCSS Coalition   Conservative media 2/3 
Still support, now less formal 2/3 Diane Ravitch  1/3 
Unions have been excluded 1/3 Teachers' unions (later on) 2/3 
Moral/Evaluation   Gates Foundation 1/3 
Lead with capacity 3/3 The Obama administration 1/3 







Troublemakers   
The Obama 
administration 2/3 









The Narratives Told by Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials 
Resolution: Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials on the 
Result of the CCSS  
 The final group of political entrepreneurs identified by Rhodes (2012) is 
organizations representing state elected officials. As depicted in Rhodes’ rendering of the 
evolution of education reforms, as well as by several of the political entrepreneurs 
interviewed, elected officials (especially governors) have been supporters of the standards 
movement since the excellence agenda of the 1980s. According to Rhodes, these prominent 
actors share many of the same policy objectives as the business community. For example, 
they view raising academic standards and holding schools accountable as important strategies 
for strengthening economic competitiveness. While identifying the participants for inclusion 
in this group, the decision was made to expand the definitional criteria of organizations 
representing state elected officials. Specifically, in addition to actors from elected officials’ 
membership organizations, interview participants were recruited from policy organizations 
that view elected officials as being their main target audience.  
 All three of the members of organizations representing state elected officials voiced 
the same belief that the CCSS had been a successful initiative. From SO1’s perspective, it 
had raised awareness about how standards should be developed as well as the importance of 
aligning standards with assessments. In her words, “Making people smarter about an issue 
that is important is a good thing” (SO1). She also viewed the fact that many states are still 





she suggested that the federally funded consortia had successfully “raised the bar around the 
country for assessments” (SO1).   
 SO2 was more hesitant in her response: “That’s actually kind of a tough question to 
answer…. I do [believe it was successful].” Although she viewed the implementation of the 
initiative as having been challenging, she described standards as now being higher and 
clearer than prior to the CCSS. “At the end of the day,” she stated, “the standards that are 
being used are better” (SO2).  
SO3 also believed that the CCSS had achieved its objective of raising standards: 
The end result was that 44 states adopted [the CCSS] in 2010, and 
even though seven years later a number of states now have backed off or 
rejected them by name, the fact is that all 50 states today have much higher 
standards. And even those states that said they were backing away from the 
Common Core, when you look closely at them, most of them stayed pretty 
close to it. 
 
The other major initiative accomplishment SO3 mentioned was that the CCSS had provided 
evidence that a coalition of governors, chief state school officers, and other state-level actors 
could work together on education policy. Reaffirming his appraisal of the initiative, SO3 
said, “I am not an apologist for the Common Core or its process. I happen to think that it was 
successful, that it accomplished a great deal, and that the impact of it will continue for many 
more years.” 
Complicating Action in the Narratives of Members of Organizations Representing State 
Elected Officials. 
 The conditions were right.  SO1 and SO3 both recalled how, during the early stages 
of the initiative, support had been strong and bipartisan. They each mentioned that there had 
been no indication of the impending backlash. In fact, both described the CCSS as taking off 





 According to SO3, the CCSS first started gaining traction during the Bush II 
administration. This same informant described how his expectation had been that it would 
take at least a decade for it to be fully implemented. He also discussed how the initiative 
commenced as very much a state-led effort. Back then, SO3 explained, “we didn’t have the 
federal government, quote, ‘trying to help us.’ So people couldn’t focus on that and say, 
‘Well, see? It’s really a federal initiative.’” He recalled a conversation that he had with 
Margaret Spellings, who was the secretary of education for President Bush II. She had told 
him that common standards were not on her agenda and that she would, therefore, not be 
taking a position on the new initiative. The agnosticism of Secretary Spellings was described 
by SO3 as having helped the CCSS get off the ground. In his own words, “The conditions 
were right…. I think it was the right timing—the fact that there was truly no federal 
assistance that anybody could point to as a warning sign” (SO3).  
 Contrasting the CCSS with the politics that had surrounded Goals 2000, SO3 
explained that members of Congress during the Clinton administration had been able to “grab 
that bone in [their] teeth and just wrestle it around and yell about it and stuff. You couldn’t 
do that under this process, because the feds weren’t being asked for anything.” According to 
SO3, the decision to try to build the CCSS from the states up was due to the architects’ 
recognition that federal involvement had the potential to derail the new standards. 
I thought Governor Hunt was a genius in that what he saw was you’re 
never going to get anything federally. That’s just not our tradition and lances 
have been broken in two or three previous administrations trying to do this. 
(SO3)  
 
 SO3 explained that, prior to the CCSS becoming politicized, initiative leaders had 
pulled together a coalition of respected actors from both major parties: “I mean, Jeb Bush 
was involved with this, Mitch Daniels was involved in this, Sonny Perdue got involved—





account of the bipartisan origins of the CCSS was backed up by SO1, who stated, “In the 
beginning, as you know, there was a combination of Republican- and Democrat-controlled 
states who adopted the standards, before they realized—before all this backlash started to 
happen!” 
 SO1 and SO3 both described being taken aback by how many states made the 
decision to get on board: “In the beginning, what surprised us more was how many states 
wanted to be part of it” (SO1). According to SO1, she had only expected eight to 10 states to 
sign up. As the invitation was extended, however, it became clear that many more states were 
interested. 
I think over 40, maybe closer to 45 or 46, states said yes. Now some of 
those states chose later not to adopt, but at least they said it was worth 
working together going forward. So clearly that is a bipartisan initiative there! 
(SO3) 
 
 Thinking back to the early stages, SO1 spoke about observing some disgruntled 
content area experts criticizing the standards but not feeling too concerned by their negative 
analyses. In her words, “I think we thought that ultimately the quality of the standards 
themselves would trump everything, in terms of the criticisms of the standards themselves.” 
She also described not anticipating the extent to which the political environment was about to 
grow so polarized.  
 An unholy coalition. Like BE1 and BE3, SO1 suggested that some of the earliest 
critics had been a faction of rival content area experts who had worked on antecedent efforts 
to establish new standards in Massachusetts and felt that their work was being cast aside by 
the CCSS. She described how some of these experts started traveling around the country to 
speak against the initiative, which had the effect of sullying public perceptions early on.  
 SO1 mentioned another hostile group with vested interests in opposing the new 





maintain the status quo because they were still living through the No Child Left Behind Act, 
with all its state tests, and they were fearful about how their students [would look].” These 
state- and local-level actors, SO1 argued, “were concerned about the truth being told about 
how well or poorly their kids were doing.” In other words, this group was worried that raised 
standards would be used to make public schools look bad.  
 A topic discussed by all three members of organizations representing state elected 
officials was the fact that opposition to the standards was bipartisan. The resistance, they 
said, came from conservatives on the right (including newly elected political leaders and 
members of the Tea Party movement), parents on both sides of the political divide, and the 
teachers’ unions and other members of the education establishment, which tended to the left. 
Speaking about the opposition by the teachers’ unions and conservatives, SO3 stated, “That 
then enabled others to create this unholy coalition of the left and the right. When you get 
Diane Ravitch and Glenn Beck side-by-side?! That compounded the problem.”  
 Members of state elected officials on conservative opposition. Members of this 
group all spoke about the resistance from Republican officials and grassroots conservatives. 
 A new generation of leaders. According to SO3, the CCSS had begun as a “truly 
bipartisan initiative.” He recalled that Republican and Democratic governors and chief state 
school officers had lined up to work together. Yet when it came time to implement the new 
standards, “Most of them were gone” (SO3); the generation of governors and state chiefs that 
been responsible for the CCSS had retired or been replaced. 
So whereas you had Governor Daniels in Indiana, who had been a 
strong advocate for the Common Core initiative, he went out of office and 
Governor Pence came in who was not. Governor Bentley replaced Governor 






The new generation of political leaders felt no ownership of the CCSS and, as the initiative 
started to be associated with the Obama administration, they came to recognize that opposing 
the standards would help them gain a political advantage.  
You never gain political currency by being for something, most of the 
time. You try to strike a difference with the predecessor by being against 
something. So, “By golly, what are these standards that have suddenly been 
imposed upon us?” (SO3) 
 
 SO2 described the older generation of incumbent Republicans as being caught off 
guard by the sudden swing to the right within the party that occurred following the 2008 
election: 
What we saw was a lot of the more traditional veteran Republican 
legislators, who were more than likely chairs of education committees, 
weren’t the ones who were actually opposed [to the CCSS]. They had a hard 
time understanding where some of these groups were coming from. So it was 
a lot of those very conservative groups that were coming to power at that time. 
They were a little bit different from anything we had seen before.  
 
 Paralleling the accounts provided by political entrepreneurs from the other groups 
interviewed, the members of organizations representing state elected officials said that the 
emergence of the Tea Party had marked a deleterious shift in the political environment. The 
associated partisan polarization of American politics was perceived as having contributed to 
the declining influence of the largely centrist CCSS coalition. As SO1 explained, such was 
the climate that even supportive policymakers felt compelled to temper their backing: 
Even though progressive Democrats and progressive Republicans had 
supported these standards, it just became too costly—figuratively—too costly 
for them to continue to support them because elections were in the balance 
and the opposition was so well funded and so well mobilized. 
 
 It looked like a creature of the federal government. According to SO1, the “biggest 
problem” encountered by the CCSS coalition was that “Obama was president.” All three 
informants from this group described the Obama administration’s involvement with the 





of Education began to get involved and began to express their support for it, it became very 
mired in politics.” RTTT, SO1 explained, created “a perfect excuse to fight the standards and 
the federal government at the same time—Obama, basically—at the same time.” She 
described how Secretary Duncan had failed to anticipate the backlash from groups like the 
Tea Party, believing that standards-based reforms were still supported on both sides of the 
political divide. Because President Obama had just won a “stellar victory,” SO1 suggested, 
“There was an assumption that the majority of the country was behind them, which of course 
was not really the case.” 
 SO1 recalled that prior to becoming secretary of education, Arne Duncan had been 
the C.E.O. of the Chicago Public Schools. It was in this role that he first learned about the 
CCSS. Upon joining the Obama administration, Secretary Duncan attended a national 
meeting in Chicago that had been coordinated by CCSS leaders for the state chiefs. This was 
the point at which, SO1 suggested, the Secretary of Education decided to endorse the new 
standards by way of RTTT: “He said, ‘Oh, yeah. I know this is happening. This is a good 
thing, and we’ll put it in there.’” However, according to SO1, Secretary Duncan’s lack of 
experience at the federal level meant that he did not yet have a firm understanding of how to 
effectively deal with Congress and the states. Basically, in his haste to move ahead with an 
education agenda, Secretary Duncan included the language on standards and assessments 
alongside teacher accountability, interventions in low-performing schools, and the 
development of new data systems in RTTT. Because these different assurance areas were 
grouped together within the one competitive grant program, they came to be perceived as an 
effort to federalize education, triggering the backlash.  
I think it just happened too fast. I think a few years into his job he 
might have understood it better, but he was getting a lot of pressure from a lot 
of places to get the Race to the Top thing out there and to make sure all of 





effort was a creature of the federal government, of the Obama administration, 
and it was an attempt to usurp states’ rights. (SO1) 
 
The decision to incentivize the standards within RTTT was viewed by the three members of 
organizations representing state elected officials as a major mistake. As SO3 explained, 
“[RTTT] gave everyone who thinks the federal government is anathema to education the 
rallying cry that they needed that it was an Obama initiative.” This issue was further 
exacerbated, SO3 argued, when “Obama actually took credit for it early on, even though he’d 
had nothing to do with it. He backed off, but the damage was done.” 
 Fake news. According to SO1, the animus that existed toward President Obama was 
a causal factor in the rise of the Tea Party. Moreover, the association between the CCSS and 
the Obama administration created a prime target for these conservatives to pounce on.  
It presented a perfect golden opportunity for folks like the Tea Party to 
attack both Obama and federal involvement because, as you can see now with 
the [Trump administration], they are trying to de-federalize everything. And, 
as you know from our history, the feds have usually stepped in around issues 
of equity. So that whole crowd was not going to be happy about this. (SO1) 
 
 The angst of groups like the Tea Party, SO1 argued, was partially rooted in racism: 
“Racism played a huge part in this. It was racism towards Obama—just no doubt about it…. 
Look at our history, if you combine the states’ rights idea with a Black president…. It’s 
serious.” According to SO1, President Obama’s opponents used these prejudices to mobilize 
constituents on the political right against the CCSS. Central to this effort was the propagation 
of disinformation.  
 SO1 described the launch of the CCSS as coinciding with “the beginning of false 
news.” She recounted learning about some of the misinformation that was being circulated, 
including a story about students who had taken CCSS-aligned assessments on computers 
having had pictures taken of their retinas. “Part of the problem,” she explained, “was that 





that just made the thing more complicated.” SO2 recollected how CCSS supporters had 
struggled to figure out how to respond to the fake news campaigns. She described the 
advocacy coalition as having been naïve about the politics at play and the power of 
conservative groups to influence constituents.  
I think they had no idea what was about to hit them. And they had no 
idea, frankly, that they would stoop to the levels they did to make it happen: 
that they would use pretty outrageous accusations that left legislators, school 
administrators, and teachers wondering who was telling the truth. (SO2) 
 
 SO1 and SO2 both said that the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) had 
played a role in the changing attitudes of Republicans and conservative voters. Regarding the 
influence of groups like ALEC, SO1 stated, “As more and more conservative dollars came 
into play, the vitriol just increased by leaps and bounds.” She recalled feeling that the CCSS 
coalition simply could not compete with the negative messaging campaigns being waged 
against them: “They were well funded, and they were well manned, whereas all of us who 
were involved had other jobs to do. You know? We were not doing this full-time.”  
 SO1 described how CCSS advocates had failed to effectively counter the 
disinformation campaigns. Initiative opponents, she said, “just kept churning out, churning 
out, churning out, tons and tons of information. And you couldn’t possibly keep up with 
them.” Part of the reason for this failure, SO1 explained, was that funding for CCSS 
advocacy work was coming from a range of different foundations that required recipients to 
submit lengthy proposals. In her words, “It was very much more cumbersome than when the 
Koch Brothers gave money to Heritage or Pioneer, or to whomever the heck they give it! So 
we just had many more obstacles” (SO1). What is more, the coalition found that it was 
difficult to counter the sensationalized hyperbole with dry facts about educational standards: 
“We were determined to tell the truth. It’s hard when you’re fighting…. When you’re 





 SO2 spoke about the work that she had conducted in order to provide state elected 
officials with accurate information about the CCSS. These efforts to educate legislators 
became her organization’s role during the initiative’s implementation. 
We were in probably 20 states that first year that it really heated up—
testifying before legislatures, answering questions about what it was, and 
trying to dispel the myths about what it wasn’t. Answering all sorts of 
questions about misinformation that was just stunning. (SO2) 
 
Among the fake news stories that she encountered during her travels was one that suggested 
data would be collected from CCSS assessments and given to Bill Gates. Another was that 
information would be gathered on the students’ parents’ political party affiliations. In 
addition, a tale that she heard in several places was that the CCSS incorporated “gay math.” 
Describing her response to this fabrication, SO2 remembered feeling bemused: “With a 
straight face, we had to answer that question. ‘What is gay math? I don’t really understand 
that question.’ It was just a level of misinformation that we had not seen before.” Like ED3 
and SO1, SO2 suggested that the fake news campaigns were well orchestrated. In her words, 
“It was an organized effort. It seemed like the same propaganda was reaching many 
legislators through a variety of ways. A lot of it was just being faxed straight to their offices.”  
 Resistance from legislators. SO2 and SO3 both identified the failure by the CCSS 
coalition to successfully engage state legislators as a significant factor that contributed to the 
politicization of the standards. SO3 described the legislators’ main membership 
organizations, the NCSL and ALEC, as having been adamantly opposed to the CCSS from 
the beginning. The fact that ALEC was not supportive was anticipated, according to SO3. 
Not having the backing of NCSL, however, was a disappointment for the CCSS coalition 
leaders. SO3 suggested that the reason NCSL did not initially get on board was that one of 
the organization’s leaders was very conservative. As a result, CCSS leaders “never could get 





the coalition had not been able to communicate with state legislators through this 
organization, many elected officials felt like they had been ignored. In the words of SO3, 
“that became a rallying cry: ‘Well you talked to the governors, you talked to the chief state 
school officers, but you didn’t talk to us.’”  
 SO2 offered a counter-perspective as to why the state legislators came to resent the 
CCSS. Based on her conversations with state elected officials, she found that legislators felt 
the initiative had been crammed down their throats without the necessary time for them to 
work on building political buy-in among their constituents.  
It wasn’t conceivable that states wouldn’t need time to really talk 
through whether or not this was a good idea for them to adopt. The timeline 
paid no attention to that, it paid no attention to politics, and there was a lot of 
naivety about the politics that would be involved. (SO2) 
 
Legislators felt that the CCSS coalition assumed they would acquiesce, SO2 revealed. As a 
result of what was perceived to be a heavy-handed effort by governors and chief state school 
officers to ramrod the initiative through without much discussion, the state legislators never 
fully got behind the CCSS.  
 Members of organizations representing state elected officials on liberal 
opposition. Informants from this group discussed the opposition of individual educators, the 
teachers’ unions, and disgruntled parents.  
 Ten pounds of rocks in a five-pound bag (teacher evaluations).  An explanation 
provided by the three members of organizations representing state elected officials as to why 
the CCSS became so politicized was that the initiative lost the support of educators and the 
teachers’ unions. All three connected this opposition to the changes that were made to 
teacher evaluation systems. 
The other reason there was a backlash was we tried to put ten pounds 





State Standards, but many states, and the federal government at that time, 
were also pushing for very rigorous teacher evaluations. (SO3) 
 
These informants each expressed the belief that the teachers’ unions’ opposition had been a 
logical response. SO1, for example, described the unions as doing “what they were supposed 
to do, which is protect their folks…. They rightly said, ‘It’s too soon to hold our folks 
accountable for having kids meet these standards.’”  Likewise, speaking about the adoption 
of the CCSS at the same time as the new assessments and evaluations, SO2 stated, “The 
unions, very wisely, saw that that was all going to be connected.” SO3 also suggested that the 
unions had a “valid concern.”  
 The political entrepreneurs from this group all believed that it had been a mistake to 
attempt to raise standards at the same time as changing how teachers were being evaluated. 
According to SO3, the CCSS coalition had very little to do with the Obama administration’s 
decision to pursue new systems that evaluated teachers based on student test scores. 
However, the coalition was closely affiliated with an organization that had wanted to make 
those changes concurrently: “The group that was pushing for it at the same time was the 
Gates Foundation, and the Gates Foundation was integral to the Common Core” (SO3).  
 Parental opposition. SO3 drew a line from discontented teachers to the opposition of 
parents. In his words, “Because teachers were active and motivated on, ‘Whoa! You’re going 
to evaluate me on this?’ That translated into disgruntlement being expressed to parents.” He 
also pointed out that many parents had grown concerned about the ways more rigorous 
standards might impact their children’s education and grades. A further concern felt by 
parents, according to SO3, pertained to the issue of student privacy. Because RTTT had also 
pushed for the development of new data systems, the CCSS became conflated with this other 
assurance area, which then added fuel to the belief that the federal government was driving a 





A lot of folks began to link the Common Core to [the idea that] this 
provides common data pools…. If you have common standards and common 
ways of measuring kids, it is easier to take the data…and then you can sell it 
to Rupert Murdoch or somebody who will make great use of it. I am being 
facetious, but it was not a facetious issue. (SO3) 
 
Such concerns about data were, SO3 explained, an issue for parents on either side of the 
political divide, thus adding to the bipartisan coalition of antagonists: 
All of a sudden you had the far right who didn’t like anything above a 
school district, you had the far left who were expressing concerns about data, 
and of course that also involved the far right, and then you had the teachers’ 
unions suddenly jumping on because of teacher evaluations. All of a sudden 
you had a pretty tough and formidable coalition of opposition.  
 
SO1 concurred that parents didn’t fully understand what the initiative was and viewed the 
standards as an example of federal overreach. 
The Orientation of Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials’ 
Narratives 
 The setting of members of organizations representing state elected officials’ 
narratives. The narratives told by this group of political entrepreneurs portrayed a political 
environment that was increasingly partisan and polarized. All three suggested that the 
Republican Party had shifted further to the right in recent years, leaving moderate 
Republicans out of favor.   
 Everything is hyper-political. Speaking about the current climate, SO2 stated, 
“Everything is just hyper-political.” As previously noted, she mentioned how veteran 
Republicans that she knew had a hard time understanding where some of the very 
conservative factions that emerged around 2010 had come from. As conservative groups like 
the Tea Party gained power, it became increasingly difficult for more moderate voices to be 
heard within the party. SO1, similarly, described the shift in the political environment 





perspective, this turn of events could, in part, be connected to the growing influence of very 
conservative organizations, such as ALEC, over state legislatures. SO3, meanwhile, viewed 
the shifting nature of the GOP as being part and parcel of how politics works. In essence, 
recognizing the animus that existed toward President Obama, Republicans made the 
calculated decision to oppose everything that he stood for. 
I feel I would be giving too much credit to most of the candidates if I 
were to say they had looked at it closely and decided that they had 
philosophical and intellectual opposition to the Common Core. I think they 
saw political advantage. (SO3) 
 
 SO1 expressed strong concerns about the direction in which national politics was 
heading. She viewed the emergence of the Tea Party and the later election of President 
Trump as part of the same ominous trend toward de-federalization and devolution.  
I think we are entering an era where states are going to be given more 
and more authority, and there is going to be less and less federal authority on a 
whole variety of issues—education is just one of them. Civil rights, 
healthcare, all that stuff, is devolving more and more back to the states, with 
less and less federal oversight and therefore fewer and fewer consequences. 
And given the composition of state legislatures and governors’ seats in the 
majority of states, they are going to take full advantage of this freedom. And 
given, also, the economies in some of these states, the less they have to spend 
on education, and particularly on kids whose parents don’t vote…. I think 
we’re in for some dark days. I think we’re in for some very dark days. (SO1) 
 
 Characters in the narratives of members of organizations representing state 
elected officials. The actors and organizations this group named as supporters of the CCSS 
were consistent with those named by the political entrepreneurs from other groups: the 
business community, the civil rights community, state leaders and chiefs, the Gates 
Foundation, and moderates on either side of the political divide. The antagonists identified by 
the members of organizations representing state elected officials also resembled the broader 
coalition’s accounts. The Tea Party, conservative media sources, the teachers’ unions, 





troublemakers, meanwhile, included the Obama administration and the governors and state 
chiefs.   
 Members of organizations representing state elected officials on heroes and 
heroines. One of the groups mentioned as being supportive in the narratives told by SO1 and 
SO3 was the business community. According to SO3, business leaders had played a key role 
in pushing for the new standards. 
I think the marketplace helped drive a lot of the Common Core. You 
had a significant number of major business leaders. I don’t want to tell the 
Trump administration, but their secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, was one of 
the leaders of the Common Core with Exxon Mobil, and Ed Rust with State 
Farm, and Wes Bush with Northrop Grumman, then Craig Barrett with Intel. 
So a number of key business leaders were also driving this thing. (SO3) 
 
 The same two informants also mentioned the contribution made by the civil rights 
community. Interestingly, both described how the civil rights groups were not fully on board 
at the very beginning. SO1’s understanding of why this had been the case was that civil 
rights leaders were concerned that students of color and low-SES students were already not 
receiving sound educations and that once standards were raised, unless appropriate supports 
were put in place, these students would fall further behind. She explained that the civil rights 
groups later changed their minds, however, and got behind the initiative. SO3’s version of 
events also suggested that civil rights groups were wary of the initiative at the beginning: 
“We brought civil rights organizations in at the end, but we did not adequately explain to 
them this wasn’t something that was just going to put children of color and traditionally 
underserved students further behind.” The narratives told by civil rights entrepreneurs, who 
felt that the broader coalition had failed to engage with them at the beginning, buttressed this 
description of the civil rights groups only being brought in at the end.  
 All three members of organizations representing state elected officials mentioned the 





CCSS. Other groups mentioned by all three as having been supportive of the coalition’s work 
included the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and national organizations that Gates had 
funded (e.g., the Collaborative for Student Success). According to SO3, it was the Gates 
Foundation that helped the coalition to expedite the development process at a time when 
things had been moving very slowly. 
I don’t think you can say enough about the impact of the Gates 
Foundation, and I say that in a positive way, I think it was largely positive. 
Because if they had not come in and said, “Enough! You guys are spending all 
this time worrying about process, and it’s time to get moving on working on 
the Core with support. We will support the process, and we will support those 
that are necessary to actually write the standards.” (SO3) 
 
 Each member of this group of political entrepreneurs also made mention of the fact 
that moderate Republicans and Democrats had supported the coalition at the beginning.  
 Members of organizations representing state elected officials on antagonists and 
troublemakers. Among the antagonists identified by the members of organizations 
representing state elected officials were very conservative members of the Republican Party. 
There was a belief shared among these informants that the party had moved further right 
following the election of President Obama and that Republicans strongly opposed the CCSS 
due to the presidential connection.  
 SO3 explained that the subject of the CCSS had been used by Republicans to gain a 
political advantage over their opponents. In essence, the CCSS provided a “condensation 
symbol” (Edelman, 1985, p. 6), which evoked an emotional response from constituents based 
on the perceived threat of federal overreach. During the 2010 and 2012 elections, the rising 
generation of conservative Republicans deployed such themes in order to bolster their 
election campaigns. Incumbent Republican backers of the CCSS, meanwhile, were forced to 





 All three members of organizations representing state elected officials described the 
resurgence of the Republican Party as coinciding with the influx of conservative dollars and 
the influence of such organizations as ALEC. Speaking about the changing attitudes of 
Republicans toward the CCSS, SO1 stated, 
You might look at election cycles for governors, for example, and see 
how that matches up with this growing reluctance. And also the influence of 
ALEC on legislatures. And the election cycles there, which of course are 
every two years anyway, but you might sort of see why changes in 
attitudes…. I bet you’ll find some connections. 
 
Also connected to this perceived rightward trend was the dissemination of disinformation. 
SO1 and SO2 both spoke about an organized effort to spread fake news regarding the 
initiative, which made it more difficult for the coalition to effectively communicate with 
stakeholders. Among the mentioned sources of such propaganda were Glenn Beck and the 
conservative advocacy organizations receiving funding from the Koch brothers.   
 The teachers’ unions were also described as opposing the work of the coalition. From 
the perspectives of this group of informants, union opposition was in response to changes 
made to teacher evaluation systems. All three political entrepreneurs suggested that the 
unions’ resistance was well founded: teachers should not have been evaluated on the new 
standards until they had time to adapt. Related to the loss of educator support, SO3 pointed 
out that teachers were the main group that actively communicated with parents and the public 
about what the CCSS was. Because the teachers did not fully support the new standards, their 
skewed perspectives tainted the understandings of the broader public. Parental opposition 
was also discussed by SO1.  
 Another group of opponents SO3 mentioned was the state legislators’ membership 





between the coalition and legislators. As a result, he suggested, it had proven difficult to get 
an audience with state elected officials.   
 Further groups of antagonists mentioned by SO1 were a faction of rival content area 
experts and the Trump administration. The content area experts that she spoke about were 
individuals who had been involved in an earlier effort to develop new standards in New 
England and resented the idea that their work would be replaced. Her issues with the Trump 
administration concerned the movement toward de-federalizing education.  
 Regarding troublemakers within the ranks, all three members of organizations 
representing state elected officials suggested that the Obama administration’s involvement 
had created problems for the coalition. SO2 also spoke about the failure of the coalition to 
effectively engage with legislators. She argued that the governors and state education chiefs 
driving the initiative had not given the state elected officials the time they needed to build 
political support, which subsequently caused resistance in state legislatures across the 
country.   
 Members of organizations representing state elected officials on victims. The main 
victim-type characters mentioned by this group of political entrepreneurs were students, who 
were portrayed as being harmed by uneven and low standards across and within the states 
prior to the CCSS. SO1 also expressed concerns about the future impact of diminished 
federal influence over education on students of color and low-SES students.   
Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials on the Present and 
Future 
 The informants from this group described themselves as feeling fairly confident about 





become increasingly uncommon over time. An area that they felt less optimistic about was 
the future of strong accountability and common assessments.  
 Regarding the future of the CCSS coalition, the members of organizations 
representing state elected officials painted a bleak picture. The coalition that formed around 
the CCSS was roundly described as no longer being cohesive or active.  
 Members of organizations representing state elected officials on the present and 
future of the CCSS. Speaking about the impact of the initiative, SO2 stated, “I think the 
higher standards are here to stay. I really don’t see states rolling back. It would be really hard 
to argue that we shouldn’t have college- and career-ready standards.” A similar statement 
was made by SO3, who said, “I think the Common Core is largely intact as it was written. 
So, the good news is that what the Common Core has done is it has embedded the concept in 
every state of college- and career-ready standards.” The suggestion that the concept of 
college and career readiness is now embedded in every state communicated a belief that the 
coalition’s entrepreneurship had successfully transformed existing institutions.  
 SO1 described the CCSS as having the potential to continue to make a positive 
impact, but she warned that standards by themselves would not be enough. States must also, 
she argued, be implementing the other major elements of standards-based systems, including 
aligned assessments. A concern that SO1 had moving forward was that the Trump 
administration did not appear to be interested in advocating for standards-based reform. 
The problem is we have the new secretary of education who is not 
about to be going around saying, “Look how kids are doing on NAEP vs. their 
state test scores.” I mean, it is unlikely that she is going to be helping to 
resurface some of the issues that drove us to develop these standards in the 
first place: the great disparities between state test scores and NAEP. (SO1) 
 
Likewise, SO3 stated that he was very concerned about the future of the aligned assessments, 





  The main area of concern that SO2 had regarding the future of the standards 
movement related to accountability. She recounted conversations that she had had with 
newly elected legislators in which it became clear that they were not particularly concerned 
about ensuring that every student was taking the state assessments.  
[If low-performing students are discouraged from taking the tests], 
suddenly we lose our ability to have a true picture of what is going on in the 
schools. But those legislators who are making those decisions weren’t around 
to see that that was a problem, and when you tell them that that’s why we do 
what we do, they’re not very sympathetic to it. (SO2) 
 
 Another topic that SO2 suggested legislators do not appear to have much interest in 
was the idea of truly common standards and assessments. Although she described these 
elected officials as agreeing with the notion of raised standards and assessments, she also 
suggested, “They don’t care that their state standards match other states’ standards, and they 
don’t care that their assessments match other states’ assessments” (SO2). Given the apathy 
felt by legislators vis-à-vis the idea of commonness, SO2 said, “I think we have probably 
come about as close as we were ever going to get [to national standards] …. I think that, 
politically, it is just too challenging to accomplish that.” 
 Looking ahead to the future of the CCSS, SO1 held onto the hope that the initiative 
would ultimately be judged a success. Her argument was that standards had been raised as a 
result of the initiative and that it had, therefore, been successful in improving the educations 
of many students. 
What I’d like to think is that in the states that are holding onto the 
standards that they’re implementing them well and the kids are actually 
benefitting. That would be great. And if that isn’t happening in 50 states? 
Well, that wasn’t happening before in 50 states! So if some of these states just 
do a better job of helping their kids, then it is a success. (SO1) 
 
 Members of organizations representing state elected officials on the present and 





coalition that formed around the CCSS was no longer active. In the words of SO1, “I think 
people right now are just lying low to avoid any attacks.” She also described the coalition as 
“not working as a cohesive group any longer.”   
 A similar picture was painted by SO3, who described how the politicization of the 
CCSS during the presidential campaigns had decelerated the coalition’s work: “Ted Cruz and 
several others made the Common Core a whipping boy, and the energy went out.”  
Politically, SO3 argued, the CCSS brand name became a third rail that nobody wanted to 
touch. Moreover, because the advocacy coalition believed that their standards had 
successfully been infused, it did not make sense for supporters to keep talking about the 
initiative. As stated by SO3, “We’re not having meetings regularly; I’ll put it that way.” 
 SO2 also indicated that the work of the coalition had been impaired by the 
politicization of the CCSS. She explained that state legislators had grown to resent the two 
organizations that had led the initiative and, as a result, now felt less inclined to collaborate 
with the CCSSO or NGA on education policy issues. 
To this day, every time we say that we have partnered with NGA or 
we are working with CCSSO on something, legislators look at us like they’re 
the devil, which is really unfortunate. There is a lot of suspicion there. (SO2) 
 
 Organizations Representing State Elected Officials on the Moral/Evaluation 
 The main lesson learned by this group as a result of their involvement with the CCSS 
was the importance of targeted engagement with key stakeholders. Other topics discussed as 
takeaways were the importance of messaging and the benefits of scaling up.  
 Engage targeted audiences. The most prominent complaint legislators expressed to 
SO2 was that the coalition had not spent enough time building political will to make the 
CCSS a success.  
From a legislator’s perspective, and from the feedback they would 





by the governor without any discussion, without any political buy-in or effort 
to build support. It was just, “We’re doing this. You will accept it. You don’t 
have any say in it.” And legislators were not going to take that. They just 
weren’t. (SO2) 
 
 SO2 described the timeline as being “completely improbable.” There had not been, 
legislators felt, enough time built in for state leaders to grasp the rationale behind the new 
standards or for them to discuss the major reform with constituents.  
 SO2 said that her organization had pushed the coalition leaders to make more of an 
effort to engage with state legislators, but these recommendations had gone unheeded: 
When [my organization] would talk with some of the advocates or the 
folks that were directly involved with the creation of Common Core, they 
would look at us like we were crazy when we would say that you need to be 
talking to legislators, or you need to be making presentations about why this is 
important to the legislature, or you need to be encouraging the chiefs to talk to 
legislators, or the governor to talk to legislators. That didn’t even cross their 
mind. They, quite frankly, couldn’t conceive of why that was important, until 
it became an all-out war on the states. Then they very quickly had to 
backtrack.  
 
 Another group that was mentioned as not having been successfully engaged with was 
educators. In the words of SO3, “The single most important constituency to have supporting 
something is teachers.” He described educator support as critical from both a pedagogical 
standpoint but also a political one. Specifically, teachers were the stakeholders charged with 
implementing the new standards.34 Moreover, teachers also played a critical role in 
explaining the CCSS to parents and the public. Yet, as he explained, “With the teacher 
evaluation issue, which I think was a valid concern, that began to poison the well.” SO2 
shared the belief that the coalition had failed to adequately engage with teachers, suggesting 
that this important group of stakeholders never fully understood what the CCSS really was. 
																																																								
34	Paralleling Weatherley and Lipsky’s (1977) account of street-level bureaucrats, SO3 






It’s one thing to try to convince the policymakers, but you also need to 
remember the stakeholders, and that effort was really botched. It still is 
botched. I talk to teachers all the time that still don’t quite get what it is. 
That’s pretty inconceivable that a teacher wouldn’t know what Common Core 
is and isn’t. (SO2) 
 
 The main advice that SO3 had for future policy workers advocating for new standards 
was to educate people about why their initiative is important. Speaking about what should 
have been done differently by the CCSS advocates, he said the coalition should have engaged 
in a public education campaign.  
Public education campaigns writ large are kind of like spitting into the 
sea, but I would have picked specific audiences to say, “Here’s the value of 
the Common Core.” Teachers would clearly be one. Civil rights 
organizations—we brought civil rights organizations in at the end, but we did 
not adequately explain to them this wasn’t something that was just going to 
put children of color and traditionally underserved students further behind, 
that indeed it was designed for all students and the supports needed to be 
there. Everyone understood that the support needed to be there so these 
students could reach these standards as well. So a public education campaign 
targeted at certain groups about why it was important. (SO3) 
 
 The importance of communication strategies. Interrelated with the topic of 
stakeholder engagement were SO1’s and SO2’s suggestions regarding the importance of 
messaging strategies. SO1 described the CCSS coalition as not having the necessary 
expertise to counter the negative messages coming from opponents.  Speaking about what 
should have been done differently, she said, “I think we would have had a strong 
communication professional, for want of a better term, or organization that could anticipate 
what was going on out there and figure out better ways to respond to some of the accusations 
that were just completely unfounded” (SO1). SO2 also spoke about the missteps of the 
coalition when it came to messaging. From this informant’s perspective, the marketing of the 
initiative came too late. In her words, “I think the biggest challenge was around 
communication. I don’t think they that did very well, and I don’t think there was a lot of 





 Another issue SO2 mentioned was that the initiative was never perceived as being a 
bipartisan effort by conservative policymakers: “They had a lot of left-leaning people who 
were very much involved with it and who were initially making the sales pitch, which also 
immediately would give some pause.” SO2 submitted that the coalition should have spent 
more time thinking about who the “faces of the initiative” were.  
 The benefits of scaling up. The other main recommendation SO3 made for future 
work around state standards was to start small and then build up. He described how the scale 
of the initiative had made it difficult for the coalition leaders to be able to focus on keeping 
supporters on board when the backlash started: “We could have probably done better had we 
not had 44 states sign up, but if we instead had had 38 and then gained some, as opposed to 
having 44 and then fight against losing any” (SO3).   
The Narratives of Members of Organizations Representing State Elected Officials 
 The narratives told by members of organizations representing state elected officials 
highlighted the impact of the polarized political environment on state legislatures. Their 
narratives also provided some insight into the extent to which disinformation campaigns had 
influenced perceptions about the initiative. The main topics discussed by this group are 
outlined in Table 15. 
Table 15. 
Elements of the Narratives Told by Members of Organizations Representing State Elected 
Officials 





















Resistance from left and right  3/3 Business 
community 
2/3 
Union opposition 3/3 Moderate Rs 
and Ds 
3/3 
Regime change 1/3 Teachers' unions 
(early on) 
3/3 
States’ rights conservatism 3/3 Civil rights 
community 
2/3 
Antipathy toward Obama 1/3 State 
officials/leaders 
3/3 
Influence of disinformation 2/3 National non-
profits 
3/3 
Legislator opposition 2/3 Gates 
Foundation 
3/3 
Parental opposition 2/3 Orientation: 
Antagonists 
  
Future of the CCSS   Republicans/Tea 
Party 
3/3 
State standards will remain higher 





Future of CCSS Coalition   Conservative 
media 
2/3 
No longer active 3/3 Teachers' unions 
(later on) 
3/3 
Moral/Evaluation   Parents 2/3 
The importance of engaging with 
stakeholders 
3/3 Legislators' orgs 1/3 
The importance of messaging 2/3 Trump 
administration 
1/3 
Benefits of scaling up 1/3 Rival content 
area experts 
1/3 


















Common Themes and Conceptual Manifestations at the Coalitional Level 
 Having identified the main topics discussed by each group of political entrepreneurs, 
these findings were further condensed based on commonalities to arrive at common themes 
and conceptual manifestations among all of the stories gathered as data.  
The Result of the CCSS 
 As shown in Table 16, the majority of participants in this study (10/15) viewed the 
CCSS as having had a positive effect. The most common explanation offered for this 
appraisal was that, despite the backlash and later efforts to rename and revise the CCSS, state 
standards had been raised across the country. Only two of the political entrepreneurs 
interviewed said that they did not view the initiative as a success. From the perspective of 
CR3, this was because it had not built broad support for the idea of high and consistent 
standards. Meanwhile, ED2 pointed to what she perceived as a shift away from a focus on 
improving teaching and learning and toward punitive standardization.   
Table 16. 
Perspectives on the Result: Was the CCSS a Successful Initiative? 
Description of Initiative's Success Presence of Topic 
A success 10/15 
A moderate success 2/15 
Not a success 2/15 
Too early to judge 1/15 
The Future of the CCSS and Coalition 
 Fourteen of the political entrepreneurs expressed a positive viewpoint regarding the 
future of the CCSS, with most of these informants suggesting that state standards would 
remain higher and more common as a result of the initiative. The fact that the standards 
might become less common over time was not a major cause for concern across the groups. 
Moreover, several participants suggested that states making revisions could prove to be a 





have cursive, and I want you to have handwriting. Like, that’s great! As long as we’re 
layering on top of [and] not lowering the bar!” 
 While the future of state standards did not cause the coalition members concern, some 
did voice unease about the future of common assessments and accountability systems. In the 
words of CR1, “I think we are likely to remain in kind of a common standards land, but I am 
not sure that makes a whit of difference if the assessments of those standards are not 
common.”  At the time when these political entrepreneurs were being interviewed, it was 
becoming apparent that more and more states were withdrawing from the CCSS testing 
consortia (Gewertz, 2017).  This development was raised by four of the informants as being 
problematic. SO3, for example, stated, “Where I am really concerned is [the future of] the 
Common Core-envisioned common assessments.”  
 Also causing some anxiety for four of the participants was the future of accountability 
systems. These informants suggested that the devolution of responsibility over statewide 
accountability systems, as legislated by the ESSA, meant that state leaders might no longer 
force schools to pay close attention to the performance of historically underserved students. 
CR2 most clearly articulated this belief: “I’m not worried about [the future] for standards. I 
am worried about it for accountability: the systems by which [each] state is making sure that 
schools are serving all.”  
 The participants’ predictions for the future of the coalition that formed to advocate for 
the CCSS were less similar than they had been regarding the future of career- and college-
readiness standards. Four informants spoke about the advocacy coalition having gained 
strength from the experience of working on the CCSS. These individuals were all either civil 
rights or business entrepreneurs. The narratives of these four informants revealed that a 





enactment of the ESSA and is continuing to push for standards-based accountability at the 
state and national levels. Even members of this sub-coalition, however, suggested that the 
influence of standards-based reform advocates has waned in recent years. Participants 
correlated this decline in sway to the diminishing influence of center-right Main Street 
Republicans with connections to the business community.  
 Five of the political entrepreneurs interviewed suggested that although there is still 
much support among the groups that came together around the CCSS, the backlash has made 
it too challenging for their organizations to continue to publicly advocate for common state 
standards. Furthermore, contradicting the claim that the coalition still exists on any level, five 
of the participants indicated that the configuration of groups that formed to advocate for the 
CCSS has abandoned the idea of future collaboration on any efforts concerning state 
standards. ED2, meanwhile, suggested that her organization’s efforts to engage with other 
groups around educational standards had been impaired as a direct result of the CCSS.  
Table 17. 
Perspectives on the Future of the CCSS and Coalition 
Future of the CCSS Presence of Topic 
Standards will remain higher and more 
common 14/15 
Future of the Coalition Presence of Topic 
Evolved and stronger now  4/15 
Supportive but less active 5/15 
No longer active 5/15 
Unions have been excluded 1/15 
Complicating Action: How and Why Did the Common Core Become Politicized? 
 Every political entrepreneur was asked to provide their own explanation of how and 
why it was that the CCSS became so politicized and unpopular. The narratives told by 
members of the different groups revealed a range of understandings encompassing a mixture 





concerned with commonalities of interpretations. In order to arrive at some major themes at 
the coalition level, the topics that emerged across the database (see Tables 11-15) were 
combined and winnowed down. These specific concepts and themes were then further 
categorized under two major headings denoting the most general themes (see Table 18). 
Table 18. 
Perspectives on How and Why the CCSS Became Politicized 
Complicating Action: How/Why Did the CCSS Become Politicized? 
A Product of Environment A Product of Processes Used 
Resistance from the poles Perception of federal ownership/overreach 
A new era of Anti-Federalism The fault of Obama administration and RTTT 
States' rights conservatism Federal funding of testing consortia 
Antipathy toward Obama State of the Union address 
Influence of conservative media Perception of "top-down" initiative 
Rising tension of federal influence on 
education Led by national organizations 
Resistance to testing and 
accountability Began on a large scale  
Resistance from education 
establishment 
Failure to effectively communicate/engage 
with key stakeholders 
Resistance from parents Failure to engage with educators 
The disappearing center Failure to engage with civil rights 
advocates 
Regime change 
Failure to engage with communities at the 
grassroots 
The declining influence of moderate 
voices Failure to engage with conservatives 
  
Failure to engage with legislators 
Improbable timeline 
Not enough time for educators to adapt 
Not enough time for building political 
support 
Failure to build capacity (provide necessary 
supports) 
Failure to adapt to changing conditions 
Failure to counter disinformation 
Failure to decouple standards from high 
stakes 
 Major themes: The narratives told by coalition members. Across the database, the 





politicization of the initiative evidenced a range of shared understandings that could be 
categorized under two major theme headings: 
1. The politicization of the CCSS was a product of environment; and 
2. The politicization of the CCSS was a product of the processes used by initiative 
leaders. 
A third major theme that emerged—both manifestly and latently—was that the actual 
standards were not considered to be a contributing factor to the politicization: 
3. The politicization of the CCSS was not a product of the standards themselves 
The politicization of the CCSS was a product of the environment  
 Resistance from the poles. Every group of political entrepreneurs provided an 
account of the CCSS being impacted by a highly partisan and polarized political 
environment. Following the election of President Obama in 2008, coalition members 
explained, intense feelings of ideological conflict and alienation served to energize 
individuals and groups who opposed the agenda of the newly installed administration. The 
political entrepreneurs’ portrayals of the hyper-partisan political environment paralleled 
Abramowitz’s (2010) account of polarization in the age of Obama. According to 
Abramowitz, politics in the United States has become increasingly polarized along 
ideological lines in recent years, making bipartisanship and cooperation much more difficult. 
Moreover, he argues that this growing divide has contributed to an increase in political 
engagement among members of the public. 
As the Democratic and Republican parties have become more 
polarized and party identification in the electorate has become more consistent 
with ideological and issue positions, supporters of the two parties have come 
to perceive a greater stake in the outcome of elections. For Democrats and 
Republicans alike, the difference between winning and losing an election is 
much greater than in the past because the differences between the parties’ 






Based on the narratives told by the political entrepreneurs interviewed, this combination of 
political division and grassroots political engagement, on both sides of the political spectrum, 
factored into the resistance that formed against the CCSS.  
 A new era of Anti-Federalism. The fact that the CCSS was adopted by the states 
within such a polarized environment was understood by participants as having been a 
significant factor in the politicization of the initiative. For example, according to the 
informants, the decision by the Obama administration to endorse the standards was used to 
mobilize conservative constituents in opposition to the CCSS. Yet, as explained by the 
political entrepreneurs interviewed, the resistance was by no means limited to the political 
right. Other strong opponents were actors and groups who resented the long-term trends 
associated with high-stakes accountability and federal influence over education, including 
parents and the teachers’ unions. Opposition to federal involvement in education was, 
therefore, a bipartisan issue.  
 According to the political entrepreneurs, grassroots conservative groups that 
mobilized in opposition to the CCSS included the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party 
and members of the Christian right. From the perspective of the informants, both of these 
groups were animated by their deep antipathy for President Obama and his administration.  
 Participants pointed out that members of the grassroots conservative resistance were 
further incited by the political discourse being propagated by conservative media, which 
included a well-organized disinformation campaign on social media. One participant 
described these negative campaigns as marking “the beginning of false news” (SO1). 
Another provided a rundown of the talking points that had been used to rally conservative 
opposition, including the idea that the CCSS represented a federally driven attempt to impose 





 Several of the coalition members interviewed described how incumbent and aspiring 
members of the Republican Party had sought to gain a political advantage by capitalizing on 
the feelings of animosity toward the President. Essentially, the CCSS became a prime target 
for denunciation among conservatives because it provided a “condensation symbol” 
(Edelman, 1985, p. 6) that encapsulated the belief that President Obama was overreaching 
and seeking to push a liberal agenda. Those political actors seeking to weaponize the 
initiative ignored the fact that the CCSS predated the 2008 election and had not been 
developed by the Obama administration.  
 The political turnover in Congress and state legislatures that occurred during the 
elections of 2010 and 2012 provides an example of what the ACF terms an external shock 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). During this period of regime change, many Democrats and more 
moderate Republicans were replaced with very conservative Republicans, which diminished 
the political support that had previously existed for the CCSS.  
 The rising tension of federal influence on education. Criticisms of the federal 
government’s involvement in education were not limited to those being expressed on the 
political right; another major source of resistance to the CCSS was what CR1 dubbed the 
“traditional public schools establishment.” 
 As described by Abramowitz (2010), the polarization of American politics has roots 
that can be traced back to the Southern strategy of Richard Nixon. Over the past five decades, 
he argues, the widening partisan divide has manifested in the events surrounding President 
Reagan’s overtures to conservative Democrats, the Republican revolution led by Newt 
Gingrich, the impeachment of President Clinton, and the intense enmity felt toward President 
Bush II and the Iraq War. By the time President Obama was elected in 2008, partisan and 





 Abramowitz’s (2010) account of the growing partisan polarization leading to 
heightened tensions evokes the same dramatic structure deployed by a number of the political 
entrepreneurs when discussing the decades-long policy trajectory leading to the CCSS. Like 
Rhodes (2012), these informants traced the movement toward common state standards as 
originating during the Reagan administration. Moreover, they described how the rise of 
standards-based reform had been accompanied by growing federal influence over the 
instructional core and state accountability systems. The high-stakes accountability of the 
NCLB law, they argued, created an intensifying sense of tension among educators and 
educational leaders, which was further exacerbated by the elevated standards and changes 
made to teacher evaluation systems under RTTT. A common rendering of events provided by 
the different groups of entrepreneurs was that the unions eventually balked as a result of the 
pressures associated with the CCSS being coupled with new teacher evaluation systems that 
factored in student performance against the more rigorous standards.    
 Combining Abramowitz’s (2010) account of growing political polarization with the 
narratives told by political entrepreneurs for this research project regarding the rising tension 
of federal influence over education and associated accountability pressures, the politicization 




















Where Two Plotlines Converge: Backlash at the Intersection of Polarization and High-Stakes 
Accountability.   
 
 Interconnected to the topic of educator resistance to high-stakes accountability were 
the participants’ accounts of how the disgruntlement of teachers had contributed to the 
opposition of parents. CR1, for example, described the opt-out movement as being “very 
much a function of teachers talking to parents.” Like the teachers, parents had grown to 
resent the rising pressures associated with testing and accountability, and they started to 
express their opposition to the standards-based reform paradigm and the CCSS. 
 The Disappearing Center. Abramowitz’s (2010) book on the polarization of 
American politics is titled The Disappearing Center. This imagery captures a central thesis of 
the author: There are now far fewer moderates among Republican and Democratic officials 
and politically engaged constituents than there were fifty years ago. As a result of this trend, 
there is no longer a strong coalition at the center that can counter the extremes at either end 
of the political spectrum.  The narratives told by political entrepreneurs buttressed the idea 





movement further to the right by Republicans and further left by Democrats, the old centrist 
coalition that formed to support standards-based reform has become far less influential and 
less vocal. In the words of SO1, 
Even though progressive Democrats and progressive Republicans had 
supported these standards, it just became too costly for them to continue to 
support [the CCSS], because elections were in the balance and the opposition 
was so well funded and so well mobilized.  
 
Correspondingly, CR1 described how, “While the Common Core had strongly bipartisan 
roots, and it had bipartisan support, the Republicans who were involved with [the CCSS] are 
the Main Street Republicans—the business-oriented Republicans who are out of favor now.” 
The notion of a disappearing center was further captured when SO3 stated, “We stood our 
ground until there was no ground to stand.”  
The politicization of the CCSS was a product of the processes used by initiative leaders 
 The second major theme that emerged from the words of the political entrepreneurs 
was the belief that opposition to the CCSS was the result of some missteps when it came to 
the processes that were used during the development and implementation phases of the 
initiative. 
 Perception of federal overreach. Given the context of a deeply divided political 
environment, there was much agreement among the informants that federal endorsement of 
the standards through RTTT and the federal funding of the testing consortia had fueled the 
backlash to the CCSS. During the early formulation discussions, the CCSS coalition had 
predicted that federal involvement would create problems for the initiative. Speaking at a 
2008 workshop that had been organized by initiative leaders regarding the political feasibility 
of common state standards, Lorraine McDonnell made the following statement: “Federalism 





option or common standards movement is really going to alter this defining characteristic of 
U.S. education policy” (as cited in National Research Council, 2008, p.  55).  
 However, as described by several informants interviewed for this study, when it 
became clear that the Obama administration was considering including the standards 
assurance area in RTTT, the coalition failed to successfully intervene. According to BE1, 
some initiative leaders had attempted to prevent this pitfall, but their pleas had gone 
unheeded: 
One of the criteria for Race to the Top was that you were participating 
in the development of these standards—the Common Core standards—and we 
urged Secretary Duncan not to do that over, and over, and over. And he did 
it…. By the time he retracted that requirement, it was too late; the damage was 
done. 
 
Reflecting on the problems that had been created due to the Obama administration’s 
involvement, EC2 opined that the broader coalition should have spoken out more forcefully: 
I think [we should] have done everything we could to make sure the 
Obama administration did not create any federal incentives or connections to 
it. I mean, I think when they did that, or if they were thinking about doing it, 
those of us involved should have cried bloody murder and persuaded them not 
to do it. 
 
 Another common critique of the Obama administration was the way in which the 
President had drawn attention to the issue of common standards in speeches that he had 
made. In the words of EC2, “They made it worse when they had the President take credit for 
the adoption of these standards in a State of the Union address and then on the campaign trail 
in 2012.” A further example of this belief was when BE3 stated, “It was basically Obama’s 
State of the Union address, which basically set this up as though it was a federal initiative, 
which it was not.”  
 Perception of a top-down initiative. An additional topic discussed by various 





“top-down.” Beyond the issue of federal involvement, other factors contributing to the 
perception of the CCSS being a mandate driven by distant authorities included the fact that 
the coalition leaders were national organizations, the fact that the initiative began on a broad 
scale, and the sense by various constituents that they had not been included in policy 
formulation discussions.  
 Led by national organizations. Multiple informants suggested that the coalition’s 
work had been perceived as disconnected from the communities that were being charged 
with implementing the new standards. BE1, for example, argued that the decision to make 
two national organizations leaders of the CCSS contributed to the appearance of it being a 
top-down initiative: “The organizations led this—the National Governors Association and the 
Council of Chief State School Officers—and that probably didn’t help us because everyone 
equates national with federal.” Similarly, SO2 stated that even state legislators felt the CCSS 
was being “ramrodded through by the chief or by the governor without any discussion.”  
 Began on too large of a scale. Another factor that added to the perception that the 
initiative was detached from local communities was the fact that so many states adopted the 
standards straight away. Because the initiative began on such a large scale, it quickly took on 
the appearance of a national program, thus sparking resistance among those interest groups 
and constituents that value state and local control of education. Numerous informants shared 
their belief that a better way of doing things would have been building proof points in a 
smaller subset of states and then start scaling up. For example, BE3 asserted, “If I were 
advising governors five or 10 years from now—whenever they wanted to do this—part of my 
advice would be to find some way to get this going at the bottom; make it more of a bottom-





 Failure to engage key constituents. Related to the coalition’s failure to quell 
concerns about the CCSS being a top-down initiative was the notion that there had been 
insufficient stakeholder engagement. Multiple participants shared the belief that the coalition 
had not consulted effectively with vital stakeholders. Among the groups that felt sidelined by 
the initiative’s processes was the civil rights community. This perspective was captured by 
CR1 when she stated, “I know the civil rights organizations were brought on later than they 
should have been, and there was some sort of resentment among them about that.”  
 There was also a shared belief among the civil rights entrepreneurs interviewed that 
the coalition had failed to directly engage with important stakeholders at the grassroots, 
including with communities of color. As CR3 observed, “The logic, I think, on Common 
Core was that if you had enough powerful elite people who were on the same page, it 
wouldn’t matter what regular people thought. And I think that has been proven to fail.” 
 A similar critique was provided by EC3, who argued that the coalition had failed to 
engage in targeted outreach to conservatives, including faith communities. Likewise, ED3 
suggested that the coalition should have incorporated a broader representation of political 
worldviews during the development of the standards. SO2 also criticized the coalition for 
failing to address the concern felt by Republican legislators that the initiative was a product 
of the political left.  
 An improbable timeline. Another issued related to the processes used by the 
initiative’s leaders was the pace at which the standards were adopted. From the perspective 
of educators, ED2 explained, the decision to forge ahead without giving teachers time to 
adapt to the new standards meant that they felt like they were being set up. 
When they went full speed ahead on the assessments, and not on 
implementation, that was a problem. There was not the funding to help 
teachers actually learn this new curriculum and to teach it and to adjust it to 






State legislators also viewed the timeline as improbable. According to SO2, these elected 
officials felt like they were being asked to support an initiative without being given the 
requisite time to fully understand the rationale or to build political will. 
It wasn’t conceivable that states wouldn’t need time to really talk 
through whether or not this was a good idea for them to adopt. The timeline 
paid no attention to that, it paid no attention to politics, and there was a lot of 
naivety about the politics that would be involved. (SO2) 
 
 Failure to build capacity (provide necessary supports). Multiple informants argued 
that the new standards had not been accompanied with the requisite level of supports for 
educators. The most critical political entrepreneur regarding this topic was ED2, who stated, 
“[Teachers] weren’t given the resources; they weren’t given the support.” 
 Failure to adapt to conditions. According to the participants interviewed, the 
challenges faced by the coalition could have been reduced had they been more strategic in 
responding to changing conditions. Cited examples of the coalition’s failure to adapt 
included the slowness of advocates to counter the disinformation campaigns and the lateness 
of decoupling the standards from high-stakes accountability.  
 Failure to counter disinformation. A common criticism expressed by the informants 
was that the coalition had failed to communicate the rationale behind the standards to the 
public. In addition, when opponents started to muddy the waters with their negative 
disinformation campaigns, the coalition was slow to respond. EC3 advised, 
My primary advice is the way you describe this narrative to the 
American public is more critical than what you describe to them. I think the 
communication around Common Core was so poor that it was one of the 
primary reasons it failed. 
 
 Failure to decouple standards from high stakes. Every group of entrepreneurs spoke 
about educators’ opposition to being evaluated based on higher standards. According to ED2, 





accountability until a time when teachers felt better prepared to teach to the new standards. 
Yet, she went on to say, Secretary Duncan had ignored this call for a course correction. That 
decision to move ahead in spite of the educators’ concerns, ED2 explained, was central to the 
unions’ decision to temper their support.   
 SO3 claimed that the CCSS advocates did eventually attempt to decouple the 
standards from the new teacher evaluation systems. By the time this decision was made, 
however, it was already too late: 
Bill Gates made this speech. I think it was here in DC, maybe it was 
New York, but anyway he made this speech in which he called for a 
moratorium: not implementing aggressive teacher evaluations for several 
years. By that time, the word was already out, and you couldn’t get that horse 
back in the barn.  
 
The politicization of the CCSS was not a product of the standards themselves   
 The third major theme that emerged from the narrative data was that the politicization 
of the CCSS had nothing to do with the standards themselves. This theme was based on both 
the words spoken by coalition members and the words that were left unspoken. Manifest 
examples of the belief that the standards were not a major cause of the backlash included the 
following statements: “You know the unions officially blessed the standards early on…. So, 
it’s not like there is anything about the standards themselves that they thought was 
problematic” (CR1); “The irony in all of this is that the resistance was not to the standards 
themselves” (ED1); “These [negative] opinions are not based on standards. These are based 
on the politicization and propaganda surrounding the standards” (ED3); “I don’t really think 
that the standards themselves are the thing that got the bad name and bad rap” (EC1); “The 
standards themselves were fine, but the appendices are where I think those who constructed 





 In addition to these manifest examples, the belief that the standards were not the 
source of the backlash was also latently communicated: Not one participant suggested that 
there was anything wrong with the content of the CCSS.  
Orientation: Setting and Characters 
 As already discussed, the political entrepreneurs described the broader context 
surrounding the initiative as having contributed to the specific events and factors leading to 
the politicization of the CCSS. Expressly, the new standards were adopted by the states 
during a time in which American politics was deeply divided along partisan-ideological lines 
and stakeholders were growing frustrated with high-stakes testing and accountability. In 
addition to these factors, the three civil rights entrepreneurs and SO1 all spoke about the 
impact of racism on the policy subsystem. From an ACF perspective, systemic racism may 
be viewed as a relatively stable parameter that creates constraints for subsystem actors 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007). CR3 was the participant who provided the most detailed account 
of the relationship between racism and the politics of education. 
Education has been such an important part of preserving White 
supremacy and racism in this country that you cannot talk about education 
without implying something about race. Whether that was the criminalization 
of enslaved people learning how to read, whether it was the preservation of 
legal segregation, whether it was remedies to past discrimination, education 
and race are inextricably linked in this country. (CR3) 
 
 One political entrepreneur who provided a perspective slightly different from the rest 
of the coalition on the impact of contextual factors was ED2, who described shifts within the 
education reform community, including the growing influence of philanthropic foundations 
and the marginalization of the teachers’ unions. ED2’s account of this shift in power within 
the policy subsystem (away from the unions and toward private foundations) was consistent 








Orientation: Narrative Settings  
Orientation: Setting Presence of Topic 
Polarized partisan 
environment 12/15 
Systemic racism 4/15 
Political isolation of 
unions 1/15 
 The participants’ depictions of characters in their storied accounts were relatively 
similar across the database. As shown in Table 20, the main supporters identified by the 
coalition members included the teachers’ unions (early on), the civil rights community, and 
the business community. The main antagonists, meanwhile, were conservative Republicans 
(including the Tea Party) and the teachers’ unions (later on). Regarding troublemakers from 
within the group of supporters, the Obama administration was named by 12 of the people 
interviewed.   
Table 20. 
Orientation: The List of Characters 






Teachers' unions  
(early on) 14/15 Republicans/Tea party 14/15 
Civil rights community  13/15 
Educators/unions  
(later on) 13/15 
Business community 12/15 Conservative media 7/15 
National non-profits 11/15 
Parents/Opt-out 
movement 7/15 
Moderate Republicans 10/15 
Conservative advocacy 
orgs 5/15 
State officials/leaders 10/15 Trump administration 5/15 
Gates Foundation 9/15 Diane Ravitch 3/15 
Democrats 8/15 
Rival content area 
experts 3/15 
Southern Baptists 1/15 Business community  1/15 
Orientation: Victims 
Presence of 















membership orgs 1/15 
Obama administration 12/15 Obama administration 1/15 
The NGA 2/15 
  CCSSO 1/15 
Moral/Evaluation: Lessons Learned 
 The political entrepreneurs’ descriptions of the lessons that they had learned as a 
result of their involvement in the CCSS were closely related to their accounts of coalitional 
missteps outlined on the processes side of Table 18. The most commonly discussed 
takeaways were the importance of engaging with a broad range of stakeholders and the 
importance of messaging. Many of the participants shared the belief that a major factor that 
had contributed to the backlash against the initiative was that the public did not have an 
accurate understanding of what the CCSS was, how it was developed, and why it was 
important. Interestingly, the argument that the coalition should have spent more time building 
capacity was only broached by five of the informants.  
Table 21. 
Lessons Learned by the Coalition 
Moral/Evaluation Presence of Topic 
Importance of engaging with 
stakeholders 11/15 
Importance of messaging 10/15 
Benefits of scaling up 7/15 
Importance of building capacity first 5/15 
Summary of Findings 
 The narratives told by the different groups of political entrepreneurs revealed mostly 
positive perspectives on the impact of the CCSS. Despite all of the challenges associated 
with the politicization of the initiative, the majority of informants believed that state 
standards had been raised as a result of their efforts. Moreover, the general consensus was 





having successfully elevated expectations, it would now be difficult for state leaders to say, 
“We want to lower our standards.” 
 When asked to describe how and why the CCSS became so politicized and unpopular 
over time, the participants’ responses mostly fit within two main categories of beliefs: 1) the 
politicization was a product of the environment (e.g., political polarization), and 2) the 
politicization was a product of the processes used by the CCSS coalition during the 
development and implementation phases (e.g., the concurrent changes being made to teacher 
evaluation systems). It was also notable that not one single participant suggested that the 
politicization had anything to do with the standards themselves.  
 The main variances among the narratives corresponded to the priorities of the 
different overarching groups that the participants’ organizations belonged to. For example, 
the civil rights entrepreneurs were most vocal in describing the failure of the coalition to 
build grassroots support among communities of color. Similarly, participants from 
organizations representing state elected officials and educational conservatives both 
described how the coalition had not been successful in engaging with constituents on the 
political right. Another example of a group-specific concern was provided by BE2 when she 
described how the dominant framing of the CCSS as a means for bolstering global economic 
competitiveness had failed to resonate with the small business owners that she interacted 
with in Middle America.  
 Of all the participants in this study, the political entrepreneur from an organization 
representing educators was the most critical of the coalition’s work. From her perspective, 
the CCSS became part of an agenda that was seeking to standardize education and was 





outspoken when it came to the failure of coalition leaders to provide adequate supports 
during the implementation phases. 
 As had been hypothesized while first devising this research, a topic raised by every 
group pertaining to the politicization of the standards was the impact of federalism. The fact 
that education is, legally, primarily the responsibility of state and local governments, together 
with popular opposition to federal involvement in education, factored into the resistance that 
arose on both sides of the political spectrum. This finding tallied with Rhodes’ (2012) 
argument that the institutions of the federal system, along with the interests that have grown 
up around these institutions, have long created the foremost constraints for political 
entrepreneurs seeking to enact or implement education policies on a common state or 
national basis.  
Section III: The Obstacles to National Education Standards  
 The study outlined here was first conceived during informal conversations between 
the researcher and members of the coalition of organizations that formed to advocate for the 
CCSS. During these exchanges, several policy workers expressed a seemingly fatalistic point 
of view regarding the opposition that exists vis-à-vis the idea of national education standards. 
Fundamentally, these actors communicated an anecdotal perspective that many Americans 
harbor a deep aversion to centralized decision making and that such sentiments were 
particularly strong regarding education. To paraphrase one of these individuals, “It’s just not 
the way we do things in the United States.” These accounts called to mind Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1967) description of social institutions being experienced as “possessing a 
reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” 
(p. 58). National education standards were, essentially, considered unthinkable in the context 





 One of the books read while first seeking to make sense of the politics of national 
education reforms in the United States, and why it was that national standards were 
considered to be contentious, was Rhodes’ (2012) An Education in Politics. In this text, 
Rhodes describes the institutions of federalism as having a strong influence on the 
governance of schooling, especially given the extent to which education has remained a 
decentralized and local affair. Moreover, he argues that powerful interests on the left and the 
right have long questioned the legitimacy of federal involvement in education, thus 
discouraging reformers from pursuing a more aggressive course of action. Examples cited 
when outlining his concept of institutionally bounded entrepreneurship included the Bush I 
administration’s America 2000 and the Clinton administration’s Goals 2000. In both of these 
cases, efforts to establish national education goals were scuppered by the critiques of hostile 
interests from both sides of the political divide.  
 Also influential when first formulating this investigation of the reasons for the 
politicization of the CCSS were Jenkins-Smith, Sabatier, and their collaborators’ writings on 
the ACF (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Weible & Sabatier, 
2007). According to the ACF, policy subsystems exist within, are affected by, and sometimes 
affect, the broader context (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). As shown in Figure 1, one of the 
categories of variables that impact subsystem affairs are the social, cultural, economic, and 
institutional structures that embed a policy subsystem (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Like 
Rhodes’ (2012) account of institutional constraints restricting the entrepreneurship of 
education reformers, the ACF conceives of policy work being conditioned by a range of 






 In the following section, major findings are presented based on the research 
participants’ descriptions of the relatively stable social, cultural, and institutional factors that 
impacted their work on the CCSS. The narrative data, as well as data from the participants’ 
responses to the specific question of why national education standards have proven to be 
contentious, were analyzed using a mixture of theory-generated codes and open coding.  
 The findings in this section are presented at the coalitional level. Major topics 
discussed by participants were categorized under two main headings: exogenous constraints 
and endogenous constraints (see Table 22). The difference between these two categories is 
that exogenous constraints concern broader sociocultural and institutional factors while 
endogenous constraints are specific to the nation’s education systems.    
Political Entrepreneurs’ Descriptions of Constraints 
 Various groups met the CCSS initiative, much like America 2000 and Goals 2000, 
with strong opposition. This research project was initially conceived to explore the 
perspectives of political insiders on why efforts to establish common state or national 
standards had proven so contentious and unpopular among certain groups of stakeholders. 
Moreover, building on Rhodes’ (2012) account of the impact of federalism on educational 
policy, the research was designed to capture descriptions and explanations of the institutional 
constraints faced by political entrepreneurs seeking to implement standards-based reforms on 
a multi-state or national basis.  
 The interviews with political entrepreneurs from different types of organizations 
revealed many insights into the impact of social, cultural, and institutional factors on their 
policy work. The main topics discussed were coded and categorized under two major 
headings: exogenous constraints and endogenous constraints. Exogenous constraints were 





constraints included the constitutional structure and a tradition of local control, reflecting 
what Corcoran and Goertz (2005) describe as a “strong distrust of centralized authority” (p. 
25); the prevalence of individualistic belief systems in American society; and the effects of 
systemic racism. Endogenous constraints were ones specifically associated with education 
systems. Among the endogenous constraints mentioned were fragmented education 
governance structures; the limited capacity of state and local education agencies; the 
challenges associated with local funding; and institutionalized norms and sociocultural values 
and beliefs pertaining to local control of curricula. (These topics are listed in Table 22.)  
Table 22.  
Exogenous and Endogenous Constraints 
Exogenous Constraints 
Presence 
of Topic Endogenous Constraints 
Presence of 
Topic 
Constitutionality & a 
tradition of state and local 
control 15/15 
Governance structures: A big 
complicated system 
9/15 
Parental control: Fear of 
indoctrination 4/15 
Limited capacity of SEAs and 
LEAs 5/15 
Individualistic beliefs 7/15 Limited capacity of teachers 3/15 
The word “common” 6/15 
Teacher resistance to 
change 2/15 
Systemic racism  4/15 Local funding 3/15 
  
Curricula: The last bastion of 
local control 5/15 
Exogenous Constraints 
 Constitutionality and a tradition of state and local control. Each of the 15 
informants, in various ways, made reference to the opposition to the CCSS being rooted in 
concerns about federal overreach. As discussed in Chapter II, the federal government has 
limited constitutional authority to exercise legislative power over the states’ public education 
systems. In addition to this legal constraint, there exists a long-standing preference for 
localism in the United States, which may be traced back to the concerns about centralized 





Goertz, 2005). Many of the participants made direct reference to this history while describing 
the constraints that exist when it comes to national education reform efforts.  
 Speaking about why efforts to establish education standards on a national basis have 
proven controversial in the United States, CR1 made the following statement: 
I mean, it’s really mostly a function of our history. Then you add to 
that our current moment where there is a celebration of all things locally 
determined—even when we know that gets us in horrible trouble as a country! 
I think it is more tied up in that than it is anything particular to education. 
 
In the words of Berger and Luckmann (1967), “Institutions always have a history, of which 
they are the products” (p. 54). CR1’s argument that the popular opposition to national 
standards was associated with the history of the nation, rather than specific concerns about 
education, communicated a perception of institutional factors impacting subsystem affairs.  
 Similarly, EC2, who described himself as being a supporter of federalism (i.e., a 
limited federal role in education), suggested that the controversy that surrounded the CCSS 
was inevitable and had, therefore, been expected by coalition leaders.  
We always expected that it would become controversial if it was 
linked to the federal government. And even if it wasn’t linked to the federal 
government, there was some expectation it would be controversial because it 
has always been controversial. There is a reason why we never had national 
standards and tests in this country, just like we have never had national 
healthcare. There have been strong currents against it. (EC2) 
 
His suggestion that there are “strong currents” against national standards, as well as his 
remark about national standards “always” having been controversial, indicated a perception 
of objectivated institutions. Specifically, the institutions of federalism were experienced as 
possessing an external and coercive reality of their own that even constrained national efforts 
that were not linked to the federal government.  
 BE3 also conveyed a sense of inevitability when it came to the contentious politics of 





who had observed the conflict surrounding Goals 2000, he described how the potential for 
backlash had always been anticipated by coalition leaders: “The history of the federal 
government and standards was already problematic—we knew that from the nineties.” Part 
of this opposition, he explained, was that “There still is a long tradition in defense of local 
control, particularly around curriculum issues, and people can’t distinguish between 
standards and curriculum” (BE3). This topic of local control of curricula will be revisited 
under the findings on endogenous constraints.  
 Explaining why there is broad opposition to a strong federal hand in education, EC2 
spoke about the institutions associated with federalism and local control being “a given” to 
many people in the United States: 
I mean there is this constitutional history here. It is not in the federal 
constitution, it is prominent in state constitutions, and I think that matters to a 
lot of people. Just the nature of doing this in an enormous continental country 
like ours, there is this argument that the federal government is just too far 
removed from the action to try to do this directly. So I think this is just sort of 
a given in the United States: It is going to be state-by-state.  
 
Likewise, both ED2 and ED3 suggested that federalism was widely accepted as natural and 
the way that government should function. For example, when explaining why there would, 
from his perspective, likely never be national standards in the United States, ED3 said, “That 
is not how our country was founded. It is not how our country operates.” 
 According to ED3, part of the popular aversion to federal involvement in the 
establishment of educational standards was based on a suspicion of concentrated power and 
centralized authority. Moreover, he argued that trust in governmental institutions had, based 
on his observations, declined in recent times as a result of the growing partisan divide.   
There are those folks who simply don’t believe that that is the role of 
any type of thing on the federal level…. It is a sense of distrust in anything 
public: in state boards, in boards of education…. I think you have significant 






 An alternative spin on this issue of distrust of centralized authority was provided by 
EC3, who connected beliefs about federalism to the faith traditions of low church 
evangelicalism: 
 I think it’s clear that “small government" is such a plank of the conservative 
agenda and, of course, it finds its way into the evangelical agenda as well. The whole 
idea [regarding] the checks and balances system, at some level, has a clear tie to 
evangelicals’ beliefs. Because we’re fallen—because man is subject to the 
vicissitudes of all kinds of corruption—you have checks and balances built in. And 
the federal government having too much power in any regard is problematic.  
 
 From ED1’s perspective, the strong opposition to national or common education 
reforms was a distinguishing, and frustrating, characteristic of American political culture:  
I guess some folks feel the Articles of Confederation were better than 
the Constitution. We just have this unbelievable parochialism in our country 
that doesn’t exist in other places. It’s sort of built into this psyche of the 
American politico. It is frustrating at times to experience some of this.  
 
He held up Australia as a counter-example when suggesting that federal systems need not be 
characterized by opposition to national standards: “Even in a place like Australia where you 
still have states, they seem to have a willingness and a tradition of working together, which is 
kind of nice” (ED1). 
 EC1 also made the argument that such institutional constraints were confounding. 
From her perspective, the emphasis on the autonomy of states made little sense in the 21st 
century, particularly given recent trends toward more transient workforces:  
We just have to get rid of the idea in the Constitution that states are 
their own governing jurisdictions and entities. I mean, with such a mobile 
society it doesn’t work as well as it did back in the 18th century. It just 
doesn’t.  
 
 Fear of indoctrination. Closely related to the topic of distrust of distant or centralized 
authority was the idea that the backlash to the CCSS, as well as previous efforts to establish 
national standards, was a product of parental fears about the socialization function of schools 





was provided by EC3, who spoke specifically about the anxieties felt by evangelical parents 
regarding the transmission of secular values by educational institutions.  
I think in education this whole idea of how you educate young minds 
dictates what knowledge and values you transmit to the next generation. The 
knowledge piece isn’t so controversial, but the values piece is. Right or 
wrong, I think it’s clear that we have developed a narrative in America that 
says that our education system has become far more secularized. (EC3)  
 
BE2 also discussed the topic of parental unease with the idea of common standards. From her 
viewpoint, the partisan animus felt toward Congress and the President had fed parental 
antipathy regarding educational standards that they understood as having been developed in 
Washington, DC.  
The fact that somebody on Capitol Hill, which you know is arguably 
the worst place in the world, is trying to tell you how to raise your child and 
tell you what’s acceptable for your child to read, or do, or see….  If you are 
going to affect my child in a way that I am not comfortable with, the buck 
stops there. I think that, in and of itself, was one of the biggest problems. 
(BE2) 
 
 This topic of parental control is interconnected with a popular preference for local 
control of curricula, which is further discussed as one of the endogenous constraints. 
 Individualistic beliefs. According to Corcoran and Goertz (2005), a predisposition 
for individualism characterizes a national ideology, which has “deep roots in American 
culture” (p. 25). Akin to Labaree’s (1997) account of social mobility goals, individualists 
view education as a means for self-advancement. The interview data revealed a prevalent 
conception that the widespread preference for individualism ran counter to the ideas 
embedded in the CCSS, particularly regarding the generation of public goods. Much like the 
narratives told by informants about states’ rights traditions, individualism was perceived as 
being deeply entrenched in the belief systems of the American public.  
I think any time you’re talking about doing it on a national basis, it just 





guess, in this country. [Laughs] We just don’t like the idea of doing what 
others are doing. (SO2) 
 
 Another insightful account of individualistic beliefs was provided by CR3, who 
explained that some parents opposed the idea of all children being taught to the same set of 
standards because that could hamper the abilities of their own children to get ahead: “It kind 
of was like this White suburban, ‘Forget the Common Core. This is lowering the rigor of 
coursework for our children.’”  
 The word “common.” Six of the political entrepreneurs interviewed suggested that 
the pervasiveness of individualistic beliefs meant that many members of the public were 
inclined to oppose the word “common.” BE2, for instance, asserted, “The word ‘common’ in 
any way, shape, or form, I think we’ve all learned, is just not helpful to the conversation.” 
When probed to explain what it was about the word that people objected to, these informants 
provided some fascinating elucidations. For example, according to BE1, calling the initiative 
the “Common Core” had fueled the hostility of parents who did not want their children to be 
thought of as being the same as other children. 
I don’t think we ever anticipated that the word “common” would have 
such a negative connotation. And as we experienced resistance, many of the 
individuals that were arguing against the standards kept saying, “Our children 
are not common. Our children are unique. One size does not fit all.” (BE1) 
 
ED3, meanwhile, argued that the word common triggered a negative response because it 
evoked the idea of collectivism: “I think that the word ‘common’ really…. Folks that are of a 
right-wing mind think, ‘Oh, you’re talking socialist education—socialism,’ and whatnot.” 
 Reflecting on the way in which the brand name had come to be perceived, BE1 
proclaimed, “I wouldn’t have called it Common Core.” Correspondingly, SO3 described how 





nascent initiative. According to this informant, the word “common” was flagged, even then, 
as possibly being misinterpreted by the American public.  
Governor Hunt always had some reservations about calling it Common 
Core. I thought it ought to be called the American Standards. The only 
problem there was that—and I think he recognized this as well—then you are 
implying that there is one standard. It has almost a federal or a national ring to 
it. (SO3) 
  
A contradiction? Three of the participants raised the topic of polling data that 
appeared to indicate that the idea of common standards was actually quite popular with the 
majority of the public. EC2, for example, stated, “What you also see in the data, in the 
opinion poll data, is that support for the notion of it has been much more robust. You know? I 
mean for common standards.” Such data seem to contradict the assertion that the backlash to 
the CCSS was a product of public opposition to the idea of states having the same standards 
(Peterson, Henderson, West, & Barrows, 2017). As EC1 explained, public concerns about the 
CCSS were less connected to the commonness and more related to the issue of federal 
involvement:  
If you ask them if they like the idea of having standards so you can 
compare what  a student knows in one state to another state, they do. If you 
ask them if they think the federal government should dictate curriculum, they 
say no. 
 
BE3, however, indicated that he remained skeptical of such findings. From his perspective, 
responses to survey questions about hypothetical national standards did not provide an 
accurate depiction of public sentiments:  
All the public opinion polling at that time said, if you ask the public, 
“Do you think we should have national standards, or should we just have 50 
state standards?” everyone said national. It polled off the charts! But it’s easy 
for anyone: parents, the taxpayers, even teachers, to give––quote, unquote––
the “socially acceptable,” right answer to that in a poll––until the shit hits the 
fan! Right? Then the arguments get more complicated, and people aren’t 
really all that committed to the answer that they gave. So, either way you see 
support, you should understand that it’s a bit squishy. And in any event, in the 





relatively small number of legislators [who] can overwhelm everything else. 
So anyway, it is complicated.  
 
 Racism. The other major example of an exogenous constraint discussed by the 
political entrepreneurs was the long history of racism and White supremacy in the United 
States and the ways in which racial inequities have been perpetuated by social institutions. 
Four of the informants spoke about subsystem affairs being conditioned by structural racism.  
 An example of the responses provided regarding the impact of racism on subsystem 
affairs was when CR3 suggested that some of the opposition to the CCSS was based on 
White America’s resistance to the challenges being made to existing power structures:  
Education has been such an important part of preserving White 
supremacy and racism in this country that you cannot talk about education 
without implying something about race. Whether that was the criminalization 
of enslaved people learning how to read, whether it was the preservation of 
legal segregation, whether it was remedies to past discrimination––education 
and race are inextricably linked in this country. It is therefore controversial on 
that basis as well. 
 
Endogenous Constraints 
 In addition to constraints associated with the broader context, the political 
entrepreneurs also spoke about constraints that are embedded in the nation’s systems of 
education. The main examples of endogenous constraints identified by informants included 
education governance structures, the uneven distribution of resources and capacity, and a 
customary proclivity for local control of curricula.  
 A big, complicated system. Nine of the participants said that seeking to implement 
national reforms was inherently difficult given the geographical breadth of the country and 
the established fragmented and decentralized structures of education governance. BE3 
summed it up in the following way: 
It is a big, complicated system…. If everyone was well intentioned and 





system, and there is lots of variation in design, in execution, in capacity, and 
all that, around the country. So, it is just inherently difficult to do. 
 
 A lack of capacity at the state and local levels. Closely related to the topic of the 
constraints associated with governance structures was the perceived lack of capacity at the 
state and local levels. In the words of BE1, “I think one of the key constraints was the 
capacity at the local level and the state level to deliver on the promise of the standards.” He 
went on to explain that, from his perspective, state education agencies (SEAs) are only really 
designed to monitor the compliance of districts based on federal rules and regulations. 
Moreover, though SEAs help identify low-performing schools, they are often not equipped 
with the resources to help turn such schools around. He also explained that, at the local level, 
many district offices do not have enough people with the requisite expertise to help school 
leaders understand how to effectively change the behaviors of building-level practitioners.  
 A very similar argument was made by ED3, who argued that the implementation of 
the CCSS had been constrained by the lack of local capacity: “You have to build the capacity 
first before trying to make that kind of a drastic change…. My biggest advice is to lead with 
capacity and not with regulation.” In other words, it is important to ensure that practitioners 
understand the rationale behind changes being made and to provide them with specific 
training and resources to facilitate implementation.   
 One of the main grievances voiced by ED2 was that the CCSS had been an 
inadequately funded mandate, which thus limited the practitioners’ ability to successfully 
implement the new standards. She also argued that this failure to provide the necessary 
resources was characteristic of a troubling trend within the standards-based reform 
movement.  
The standards movements that have failed are the ones that have been 
rhetorically pushed without accompanying resources or the ability to adjust. If 





Poverty, the first 25 years of ESEA brought huge improvements in education 
standards to America, particularly for poor kids. So when this was coupled 
with needs and resources, there was not that kind of opposition that happened 
when a couple of people stood up and announced a set of standards without 
the accompanying supports. No other industry, no other profession, would 
announce a set of standards without accompanying it with supports, and yet 
that has become our norm. (ED2) 
 
Her description of the federal government’s and reform community’s change in focus (away 
from inputs and toward outputs) resembled McDonnell’s (2005) account of the shift from the 
equity agenda to the excellence agenda.   
 Limited capacity of teachers. Three of the political entrepreneurs spoke about what 
they perceived as a lack of capacity in the teacher workforce. CR1, for example, suggested 
that implementing higher standards was made more difficult when the teachers themselves 
lacked the competencies that they were supposed to be teaching to students.  
The most significant one is the lack of capacity in our current teacher 
force to actually teach kids to those standards. Honestly, many of those 
teaching in today’s classrooms wouldn’t themselves meet the standards for 
exiting high school that are articulated in Common Core, much less be able to 
know how to get their kids there. (CR1) 
 
Similarly, SO1 described the constraints associated with seeking to raise standards in schools 
where the teachers never successfully mastered their content areas: “Studies have been done 
on the expectations that teachers have when they were at poor schools, when they were 
teaching children of color, and in some states, where they themselves haven’t been educated 
to the highest levels.” From her perspective, part of the reason why pre-CCSS standards had 
been subpar was that teachers who lacked essential proficiencies were the ones writing them. 
 Teacher resistance to change. Also related to teachers’ work, two informants spoke 
about an inevitable inertia in schools associated with practitioners’ resistance to change. This 





certainly characterized by this, and it was inevitably going to happen that teachers would feel 
stressed and over-challenged and decide that [the standards] were impossible.” 
 Local funding. A further endogenous constraint mentioned by three of the political 
entrepreneurs was the extent to which the funding of schools is reliant upon state and local 
taxes. For example, according to BE1, the federal government’s junior partner status when it 
comes to funding education, combined with the lack of constitutional authority, makes it 
much more difficult for the federal government to be able to drive national reform efforts.  
In this country, as you have probably learned, we have 50 states. For 
the most part, with the exception of a couple of states, most of the funding for 
education comes from the states. It does not come from the federal 
government. In a majority of the states, they provide roughly 74 or 77 percent 
of K-12 spending. (BE1) 
 
From the standpoints of CR3 and ED2, the ways in which schools are funded create 
constraints because it leads to inequities between schools, districts, and states. Referencing a 
landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, in which it was found that reliance on property taxes to 
fund public schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
CR3 stated, “One of the things we are looking to is the San Antonio vs. Rodriguez Supreme 
Court case, which found that there is no federal right to an education. We have a long-term 
goal of overturning that.”   
 The last bastion of local control. Closely interrelated with the aforementioned 
constraints of the strong federal system and tradition of states’ rights, the tradition of local 
control over curricular decisions was discussed by five of the political entrepreneurs as 
having created much resistance to the idea of common state standards. BE1 described 
curricula as being the one element of standards-based reform that the coalition sought to 
avoid taking on: “That’s the last bastion of local control…. That would have been the 





have actually killed the work on standards.” Similarly, BE3 spoke about the strong defense of 
local control over curricula as miring the conversation about common state standards. He 
described how members of the public often conflate standards and curricula and that this 
confusion was a cause of some of the resistance to the CCSS.   
There still is a long tradition in defense of local control, particularly 
around curriculum issues, and people can’t distinguish between standards and 
curriculum…. On the one hand, we said, “No, no, no! It’s just what kids are 
going to learn not how we are going to teach.” Except when you say you want 
the curriculum aligned, it already gets confusing. That distinction breaks down 
in public debate. (BE3) 
 
 As already discussed, opposition to the idea of federally driven curricula was 
described by some political entrepreneurs as a product of an enduring distrust of centralized 
decision making and parental fears regarding the values being transmitted by schools. A 
further factor identified by informants as contributing to the preference for localism was the 
arguments for teacher autonomy or professional discretion. Basically, according to several of 
the political entrepreneurs interviewed, practitioners at the local level feel best positioned to 
make decisions regarding content and instructional practices. ED2 described the teachers’ 
perspective as follows: “Education is a state and local responsibility. And there is a fierce 
commitment in the United States of America to maintain local control over education.” Any 
effort to standardize curricula was, for that reason, viewed with deep suspicion.  
 According to CR3, the arguments for teacher autonomy represent the major dividing 
line between the teachers’ unions and the civil rights community. From her perspective, 
standards are important precisely because they help overcome the constraints associated with 
local control and the inequitable distribution of effective educators. 
I believe that teachers on their own will reinforce inequitable 
opportunities to education. And I think that that universe of people on the left 
would disagree with me, and they would argue that teachers are in the best 






 As has been described, the arguments for state and local control were not limited to 
those being made by states’ rights conservatives. The interview data revealed a perception 
among the informants that distrust of distant or centralized control, specifically with regard to 
decisions affecting the instructional core, was a bipartisan issue that allowed hostile interests 
from both sides of the political spectrum to converge in opposition to the CCSS.  
Major Theme: Constraints 
 The topics delineated in Table 22 were further condensed and re-categorized to arrive 
at an overarching theme for this section: Constrained by the “common” AND by the “core.” 
This general theme contained two more specific themes.  
1. Constrained by the “common” AND by the “core:” 
a) The Common: Constrained by institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs 
associated with states’ rights and individualism; and 
b) The Core: Constrained by federalism and the challenges associated with 
engendering change at the instructional core. 
 The Common: Across the database, the political entrepreneurs interviewed spoke 
about the impact of factors external to subsystem affairs on their policy work. There was a 
shared understanding that the same basic social, cultural, and institutional structures that 
embed the subsystem, in conjunction with hostile interests that have grown up around 
existing institutions, had constrained the implementation of the CCSS as well as antecedent 
national standards initiatives.  
 Though the formal rules associated with federalism were a common topic when 
discussing constraining factors, the participants also described a range of informal 
constraints, including norms, values, and beliefs (e.g., popular preferences for state and local 





the coalition. Many of the informants used words such as “inevitable,” “built in,” “a given,” 
and “always” when describing these forces, providing evidence that these constraints were 
experienced as an external and coercive reality.   
 A concept running across the data was that opposition to the idea of the CCSS was, in 
part, a product of deeply entrenched beliefs regarding the role of government and the threat 
of federal overreach. According to the participants, the very notion of common or national 
standards ran counter to a large section of the American public’s belief systems or 
worldviews. As ED3 stated, “There is no public appetite, nationally, for the common good 
right now.” 
 The Core: Other major factors that were described as creating obstacles for the 
coalition were the institutions and interests associated with federalism and the nation’s 
education systems. In short, the complexity of governance structures, combined with the 
uneven distribution of resources and a preference for local control of curricula among 
members of the “lowerarchy” (Marshall & Gertsl-Pepin, 2005, p. 55), make top-down efforts 
to affect instructional practices extremely challenging for national organizations and federal 
authorities.  
 The idea for the major theme heading used in this section came from the following 
exchange during the interview with ED1: 
ED1: “I don’t think people are opposed to higher standards. I think it’s 
more of an issue of the commonness and the core.” 
 
Interviewer: “You think that word common was misinterpreted?” 
 
ED1: “Yeah, really. And core also. We could have chosen a different 






CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS  
Introduction to Chapter V 
 This research was designed to examine the perspectives of different members of an 
advocacy coalition regarding the events and factors that contributed to the politicization and 
declining popularity of the CCSS. Moreover, the investigation sought to explore the policy 
core beliefs that bound the members of various organizations together in support of common 
state standards and the perceptions of these political entrepreneurs concerning the existence 
of institutional constraints. An approach based on Polkinghorne’s (1995) paradigmatic 
analysis of narratives was used to “locate common themes or conceptual manifestations 
among the stories collected as data” (p. 13). The main topics identified were condensed into 
categories and specific themes, which then formed the basis for six major themes.  
 In this fifth and final chapter, the significance of these major themes is discussed 
along with implications for future policy work and recommendations for future research.  
Significance of Findings 
 The following questions guided the research outlined in this dissertation: 
1) What do the interview data reveal about the policy core beliefs of political 
entrepreneurs working for organizations within the CCSS advocacy coalition? 
2) How are the narratives of these political entrepreneurs similar, and how are 






3) What do these narrative accounts reveal about the political challenges or 
institutional constraints associated with seeking to establish and implement 
national or common education standards in the United States?  
What Did the Interview Data Reveal About the Policy Core Beliefs of Coalition 
Members? 
 The ACF conceives of subsystem actors as being “boundedly rational” (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2014, p. 191): They are motivated by goals but are unclear about how to achieve 
them. Due to their limited cognitive abilities, these individuals simplify the world through a 
three-tiered belief system. On the highest tier of the belief system are “fundamentally 
normative values and ontological axioms” (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014, p. 191), known as 
deep core beliefs.  Deep core beliefs are generalizable and not subsystem specific. The 
middle tier of the belief system model is labeled policy core beliefs. Policy core beliefs are 
specific to the topic and territorial scope of the subsystem. “Empirically, policy core beliefs 
include overall assessments of the seriousness of the problem, its basic causes, and preferred 
solutions for addressing it (called policy core preferences)” (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014, p. 
191). The lowest tier of the system is known as secondary beliefs. Secondary beliefs are 
concerned with a subset of the policy subsystem or the instrumental means for achieving the 
outcomes associated with policy core beliefs.  
 The interviews conducted for this research focused specifically on the policy core 
beliefs of a sample of political entrepreneurs who came together to engage in work on behalf 
of the CCSS. In order to operationalize the policy core beliefs of participants, the following 
series of questions was asked: 
§ From your perspective, why were the Common Core standards important?  





§ What are the causes of these problems? 
§ In addition to standards, what are your preferences for solving these 
problems? 
Two major themes emerged from the responses of informants: 
 
1) Education as a public and private good: Meeting the needs of the market, polity, 
and individual; and 
2) Casting anchor: The centrality of standards within systemic school reform efforts. 
 Across the database, members of the five overarching groups of political 
entrepreneurs described their support for the college- and career-readiness standards as being 
motivated by goals that conceived of public education as both a public and a private good 
(i.e., society/economy-centric and student-centric). The main differences between the various 
groups of subsystem actors related to where they placed greater emphasis. For example, the 
business entrepreneurs most strongly emphasized social efficiency goals, while civil rights 
entrepreneurs were most concerned about social mobility for historically underserved 
students. It was notable that members from four out of the five groups mentioned economic 
benefits alongside the benefits for students.35, 36 This economy/student framing helped 
broaden the appeal of the initiative and create the necessary conditions for building a 
bipartisan advocacy coalition. 
																																																								
35 The only group that did not discuss the economic benefits of elevated education standards 
(i.e., better meeting employer/workforce needs) was the civil rights entrepreneurs. This group 
did, however, mention the public goods of democratic equality as being part of the reason for 
their involvement with the initiative.  
 
36 The fact that the civil rights entrepreneurs did not mention social efficiency-type goals 
during their interviews should not be interpreted as meaning that this group is disinterested in 
that topic. The gathering of additional data on civil rights entrepreneurs’ deep core beliefs 





 The other major theme that emerged from the data on policy core beliefs was a shared 
belief in the centrality of standards to systemic education reform efforts. It was apparent that 
the participants were well versed in the underlying logic behind the standards-based reform 
paradigm, and many of them used very similar language when discussing the basis for the 
standards initiative. For example, the common standards were described by 14 of the 
participants as providing the foundation for the other elements of reform, including aligned 
assessments, curricula, and accountability policies.  
 Though both of the major themes from this section were predictable, given that these 
ideas have been at the heart of the standards-based reform movement for decades, the 
interview data also provided evidence of how the beliefs articulated by the members of 
different groups within the coalition contained some nuance. For example, ED2, who worked 
for an organization representing educators, viewed common standards as being critical for 
equalizing resources between schools. CR2, meanwhile, suggested that common standards 
offer a vital tool for civil rights advocates to ensure that teachers are treating immigrant 
students equitably. And BE1 argued that the establishment of common standards was very 
important for raising the status of CTE. It was apparent that, although the various participants 
spoke in similar ways to other members of the broader coalition about the importance of 
standards-based reform, they also shared more specific outlooks and values with other 
members of the overarching group with which their particular organization was affiliated. 






Implications of the Findings on Policy Core Beliefs 
  Sheingate (2003) describes the ability of political entrepreneurs to present single 
innovations in ways that resonate with multiple points of view as being critical for building 
coalitions in support of institutional change. In the case of the CCSS, initiative leaders 
portrayed college- and career-readiness standards as an innovation that addressed both 
economic and equity goals (Hunt, 2011). Based on the interviews with political 
entrepreneurs, these two overarching areas of focus were, for the most part, consistent with 
the priorities of the different organizations that came together to advocate for the standards. 
However, various informants suggested that the coalition had missed the mark when it came 
to building broad support for the standards. Specifically, some respondents argued that the 
leaders of the initiative had failed to make crucial connections with important constituencies 
at the grassroots, waiting until after the point at which the CCSS had already become 
politicized to engage in outreach efforts. What is more, although the lines of reasoning 
concerning economic competitiveness may have strongly appealed to state elected officials, 
members of the business community, and many members of the education reform 
community, the interview data revealed that such arguments did not reverberate with other 
groups of stakeholders. An example of this was provided by one of the business 
entrepreneurs when she spoke about traveling the country to present on the economic 
benefits of the CCSS:  
These sort of mom-and-pop shops were looking at global 
competitiveness as if it was a bad thing…. The last thing they wanted was a 
kid that was, like, growing up in Seoul, where they were having 12 or 14 
hours of school every single day. That’s not what they want for their kids! 
(BE2)  
 
 The other groups that emphasized problems with how the initiative had been framed 





organizations representing state elected officials. Informants from each of these groups said 
the constituents that they work most closely with either did not understand or did not concur 
with the rationale that the CCSS coalition had led with. CR3 described how the coalition’s 
focus on building support at the grass-tops of national organizations—and particularly 
organizations representing political and business elites—meant that potentially supportive 
communities at the grassroots level were neglected.  
I think that there is fertile ground, especially among communities of 
color, of support for something like national standards. And if the strategy had 
been to begin with those communities rather than the business community or 
White moderates, I think it would have been more successful. (CR3) 
 
 These findings carry some important implications for future policy work, particularly 
regarding the need to build support beyond the subsystem and at the grassroots. The ACF’s 
focus on the policy core beliefs of subsystem actors (e.g., elected officials, representatives 
from the private sector, members of nonprofit organizations, academic researchers, and 
members of the news media) offers a useful framework for understanding the behaviors of 
policy participants and the formation of advocacy coalitions. However, as was the case with 
the CCSS, focusing primarily on the beliefs of people operating in or near the policymaking 
arena can render the viewpoints and priorities of individuals and groups on the outside of 
such “clusters of influence” (Marshall & Gertsl-Pepin, 2005, p. 160) overlooked. As CR3 
stated, “The logic, I think, on Common Core was that if you had enough powerful elite 
people who were on the same page, it wouldn’t matter what regular people thought. And I 
think that has been proven to fail.”  
 The data also brought to light some valuable insights concerning the entrepreneurs’ 
conceptual definitions of the term “equity” and potential limitations with the ACF’s focus on 
policy beliefs. Regarding the former, it was notable that every political entrepreneur 





noteworthy given that a common rendering provided by historians of education (McDonnell, 
2005) and critical scholars (Noblit & Green, 2015) is that the excellence agenda of the 1980s 
supplanted the equity agenda associated with the Great Society reforms of the mid-1960s.  
 According to McDonnell (2005), as a result of the transition between education 
agendas three decades ago, “the terms of the national discourse shifted from educational 
opportunity and equity to educational excellence” (p. 25). Yet, as illustrated through the 
words of the political entrepreneurs interviewed for this research, the issue of equity still 
remains a commonly expressed concern among the members of the reform community. 
These subsystem participants viewed the CCSS as an initiative that would help improve 
educational opportunities for historically underserved students. However, what was also 
apparent, based on the data gathered, was that the word “equity” carries different meanings 
for different actors. Expressly, most of the political entrepreneurs used the term equity when 
describing their policy priority of ensuring that all educators maintain equally high 
expectations for all students. This form of ideational equity stood in contrast to the material 
equity objectives identified most explicitly by ED2. From her perspective, ensuring 
educational equity meant equalizing the distribution of funding and resources between 
schools and providing targeted interventions for underserved students.37  
 The fact that the majority of informants described equity in terms of elevating and 
equalizing standards, or expectations, and did not explicitly mention increasing or equalizing 
resources as being a priority, also provides some insight into the competing conclusions that 
the entrepreneurs drew when seeking to make sense of the factors that contributed to the 
politicization of the CCSS. Many of the participants suggested that one of biggest mistakes 
																																																								
37 The policy preference of providing targeted resources to schools serving historically 
underserved students was also mentioned by four other participants. The three civil rights 
entrepreneurs and ED1 described their equity concerns as pertaining to both the expectations 





the coalition made was in how the initiative had been framed: The backlash was understood 
as being largely the result of a botched messaging campaign. Yet this strong focus on 
messaging, rather than resources, represented a major point of contention. As forcefully 
argued by the leader of an organization representing educators, there was a belief among 
many practitioners that the standards initiative had been “rhetorically pushed without 
accompanying resources or the ability to adjust” (ED2). The divergence of opinion among 
the reformers regarding the meaning of the term “equity” provides an example of the tension 
that exists vis-à-vis the question of whether education reform should focus more on inputs 
(i.e., seeking to improve low-performing schools by providing additional, targeted funding 
and resources) or outputs (i.e., seeking to improve outcomes for students by raising 
expectations and holding low-performing schools accountable). The differences in how the 
political entrepreneurs framed their equity concerns were consistent with the ideological split 
underlying the shift in agendas during the 1980s.  
 The interviews with political entrepreneurs also brought into question a core 
assumption of the ACF: that the policy beliefs of subsystem participants serve as a “causal 
driver for political behavior” (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 122). Nine of the 15 
political entrepreneurs made mention of the significant role that philanthropic foundations 
played in supporting the work of the coalition. For example, CR2 made the following 
statement regarding the impact of philanthropic giving: “Gates was a big one that supported 
our work, but also everyone’s work.” The fact that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
provided funding for so many of the organizations that came together to advocate on behalf 
of the CCSS offers an alternative explanation to what the ACF suggests drives the political 





effort due to funding incentives, rather than purely because of policy core beliefs. Testing 
this hypothesis was beyond the scope of the research outlined here.  
How Did the Narratives of Political Entrepreneurs Compare Regarding the 
Politicization and Declining Popularity of the CCSS? 
 Public opinion data show that the CCSS initiative grew increasingly unpopular 
between 2012 and 2016 (see Appendix A). The research for this dissertation was designed to 
compare the perspectives of insiders concerning the questions of how and why it was that 
support eroded for the CCSS.  
 The participants in this study were all members of organizations that had advocated, 
in various ways, for the standards initiative. The sample for this research was selected and 
stratified based on Rhodes’ (2012) schema of five overarching groups: business 
entrepreneurs, civil rights entrepreneurs, educational liberals, educational conservatives, and 
organizations representing state elected officials. The majority of participants were very 
senior leaders within their organizations (see Table 4). Each political entrepreneur was 
shown the chart depicting polling data (see Appendix A) and asked to explain how and why 
it was the CCSS grew politicized and unpopular over time. This section of the interview was 
the least structured, and the participants were encouraged to provide extended responses.  
 The participants’ accounts were analyzed using a form of narrative inquiry. Rather 
than adhering to Labov’s (1972) model of only extracting linear past tense clauses, the 
narratives mined from the data encompassed all sustained accounts told about events, 
subjective experiences, and states of affairs across time, including predictions about the 
future. The narrative data were then coded and analyzed through an iterative process of 
reading, memoing, describing, classifying, and interpreting. The coding framework that was 





(1972) and the NPF’s (McBeth et al., 2014) descriptions of narrative elements, and codes that 
emerged from the data. During the second cycle of coding and analysis, the topics 
participants discussed were further condensed into a list of common themes and conceptual 
manifestations. These specific themes and concepts were then categorized under three major 
theme headings:  
1) The politicization of the CCSS was a product of environment; 
2) The politicization of the CCSS was a product of the processes used by initiative 
leaders; and 
3) The politicization of the CCSS was not a product of the standards themselves 
The interviews revealed that this sample of coalition members viewed the political backlash 
against the initiative as being a result of the confluence of environmental factors and missteps 
when it came to the processes used by initiative leaders. Not one informant described the 
politicization and declining popularity of the CCSS as being associated with the college- and 
career-readiness standards themselves.  
 There was broad consensus across the sample of coalition members that resistance to 
the initiative was interrelated with opposition to mounting federal influence over education. 
Although the CCSS did not originate with the Obama administration, the initiative’s 
sponsorship by the U.S. Department of Education, through RTTT, served to create a 
perception that the standards were federally owned. Moreover, opponents on the political left 
and right propagated this understanding among members of the public in order to push their 
own agendas. Republicans, for example, were described as having weaponized the issue of 
CCSS as part of a campaign that was designed to rally conservative voters against the Obama 
administration. In addition, the unions, according to the informants, turned against the 





The opposition that existed regarding a growing federal role was described by multiple 
participants as representing the climax of a tension that had been mounting for decades. 
 Many of the entrepreneurs discussed the political environment as growing 
increasingly polarized during the Obama administration. As officials and constituents moved 
toward opposite poles, moderate individuals and groups in the political center grew 
increasingly isolated. This shift was especially significant for the CCSS coalition, which was 
comprised of center-left and center-right organizations with connections to both major 
political parties and the business community.  
 Six years ago, Rhodes (2012) observed, 
Democrats and Republicans have converged on a policy agenda that 
borrowed themes from both partisan camps without simply splitting the 
difference between liberalism and conservatism. Furthermore, and against the 
claims that partisan polarization obstructs federal involvement in social 
policy, increasing polarization has not forestalled expanding federal influence 
and investment in schooling. Indeed, federal intervention has grown alongside 
partisan polarization. (p. 7)  
 
Developments since the publication of Rhodes’ (2012) text indicate that bipartisan consensus 
regarding a policy agenda, and regarding federal involvement in education, may have finally 
come undone as a result of partisan polarization. Eleven of the political entrepreneurs 
interviewed described the organizations that they worked for as having tempered or 
concluded their work on common state standards. In other words, by 2017 what had 
previously been an agenda with broad appeal was viewed as one to avoid. The four 
entrepreneurs who suggested that their work around standards was still ongoing were all 
members of the business-civil rights coalition. As described by Rhodes, these two groups 
have been “the most consistently influential political entrepreneurs in the realm of education 
policy” (p. 14) in recent decades. Even these groups, however, described shifts within the 





[The coalition’s] influence with Republicans is pretty much gone. And 
those were critical relationships early on. So yeah, the coalition is still strong, 
still together. If anything, stronger and better, trusting relationships, but it is 
much harder getting traction with Republicans. And since Republicans are in 
charge, you see what we’ve got. (CR1)   
 
 Regarding the negative impact of processes adopted by coalition leaders, the political 
entrepreneurs discussed a range of decisions that had added to the politicization of the 
initiative. The main mistake cited was the decision to allow the Obama administration to 
endorse the CCSS. This federal connection had, from the perspective of the participants, 
fueled much of the opposition to the standards. Closely related to this error was what the 
coalition members understood as a failure to engage with stakeholders and effectively 
communicate what the standards were, where they had originated from, and why they were 
important. According to the informants, because many constituents did not understand the 
CCSS, it made it easier for opponents to spread inaccurate information, which further 
inflamed the resistance.  
Implications of the Findings on Why and How the Initiative Became Politicized  
 Various theories on policy processes, including the ACF (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014), 
the NPF (McBeth et al, 2014), and the Multiple Streams Approach (Zahariadis, 2014), 
recognize that policy decisions are affected by the broader political and societal context. As 
highlighted by the case of the CCSS, the need to attend to contextual conditions is not just 
important for ensuring the successful steering of policy through the subsystem; the 
environment that embeds a subsystem remains an important consideration when it comes to 
implementation.  
 During the current era of hyper-partisan polarization, it is especially important for 





policy: messaging, or framing, is critical. Describing the challenges that the coalition faced 
regarding communication, SO2 stated, 
I don’t think they did very well, and I don’t think there was a lot of 
thought into explaining what they were and why [the standards] were 
important. I think there were a lot of assumptions about the fact that it would 
be pretty self-evident. And I think they were caught off guard when it wasn’t. 
 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, several of the political entrepreneurs asserted that 
messaging alone does not help address the fundamental challenges associated with the 
inequitable distribution of capacity and resources. One way in which the coalition could have 
helped allay the concerns of practitioners was to ensure that districts were provided with the 
requisite resources and training to help facilitate the successful implementation of the new 
standards.  
 Another significant implication drawn from the data was the importance of allowing 
for course corrections. The vast majority of participants in this study recognized that the 
decision to make changes to teacher evaluation systems concurrently with implementing 
higher standards created significant problems for the initiative. Although the teachers’ unions 
called for a moratorium, this request was disregarded. According to ED2, the failure to 
acknowledge the concerns of educators led the unions to retract their support.  
 As described by SO3, when it comes to education policy, maintaining educator 
support is an important factor for two reasons: 
What I learned out of this was the single most important constituency 
to have supporting something is teachers, for the reason that there are three 
million of them, but also for the reason that they not only will implement the 
standards, which is critical, they will be the ones explaining them to the 
parents and the public. So from both a pedagogical standpoint but also a 
political one, you needed to have the teachers. 
 
 Future policy work around the idea of national or common state standards must pay 





CCSS. According to the coalition members interviewed for this study, federal involvement, 
when it comes to the setting of educational standards, remains deeply unpopular among large 
segments of the public. The leaders of the CCSS flagged this problem early on, but they later 
failed to intervene when Secretary Duncan expressed an interest in including common 
standards as an assurance area in RTTT. Concerns about centralized decision making and the 
usurpation of local control could have been avoided had more of an effort been made to build 
support and capacity at the grassroots level. Moreover, rather than having so many states 
adopt the standards from the beginning, building proof points in a subset of states then 
scaling up could have helped alleviate the worries of stakeholders.   
What Are the Political Challenges or Institutional Constraints Associated with Seeking 
to Establish and Implement National or Common Education Standards  
in the United States? 
 The original goal of this research was to explore the understandings of political 
insiders regarding the questions of how and why it was that efforts to establish national or 
common standards have proven to be challenging and unpopular. The researcher was drawn 
to this topic following informal conversations with members of the CCSS coalition in which 
they communicated the belief that the American public harbors a deep aversion to the idea of 
national standards. As had been hypothesized, the interview responses of the political 
entrepreneurs revealed a general perception that exogenous sociocultural and institutional 
factors have created constraints for subsystem actors seeking to establish national state 
standards. Moreover, participants described how efforts to bring about changes in behavior at 
the instructional core on a national basis were restricted by byzantine education governance 
structures, hostile interests that have grown up around existing institutions, and the 





topics discussed by the participants were further combined and categorized under one major 
theme heading: 
1) Constrained by the “common” AND constrained by the “core.” 
 The constraints associated with the “common” included institutionalized norms, 
values, and collective beliefs concerning federalism and public vs. private interests. 
Informants described the distrust that exists concerning federal overreach and the impact of 
religious and partisan anxieties. Relatedly, the participants spoke about the entrenched 
ideology of individualism in American culture, which manifested in constituents’ distaste for 
the word “common.”  
 The “core” constraints were ones pertaining to the challenges associated with seeking 
to change behaviors at the instructional core. Examples of these types of constraints included 
the decentralized and fragmented structures associated with how education is governed in the 
United States. In addition, variations in the capacity of state and local education agencies to 
lead change and disparities in the distribution of resources and effective educators made 
broad-scale efforts aimed at improving instructional practices more complicated. 
Furthermore, according to the participants, popular beliefs regarding local control of 
curricula meant that educational standards that were perceived as being driven from afar 
were generally met with opposition.  
Implications of the Findings on Constraints 
 As described by BE3, education in the United States is a “big, complicated system.” 
For that reason alone, all efforts aimed at establishing and implementing education policies 
on a common state or national basis are inherently difficult. The federal structure, the 
inequitable distribution of capacity and resources between and within geographical regions, 





stakeholders are factors that can impact all major public policies (Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1984). But in addition to these institutional or structural challenges, it is also important to 
recognize the impact of such factors as sociocultural beliefs, norms, and values. The power 
of culture to influence policy outcomes should not be underestimated. In the case of the 
CCSS, like Goals 2000 before it, popular beliefs regarding the “appropriate” role of the 
federal government, which may be traced back to the founding of the nation, served to 
politicize the standards initiative. Even though the leaders of the CCSS coalition had 
predicted such pitfalls and sought to emphasize the fact that the standards had originated 
independently of the federal government, the initiative still came to be viewed with suspicion 
by hostile interests and members of the public, who opposed what they perceived as being a 
top-down, centralized, national program.   
 Institutions are characteristically difficult to change (Sheingate, 2003). When shifts in 
institutions do occur, however, it is often the result of the agency of political entrepreneurs. 
One of the more surprising findings from this investigation was that 10 out of 15 of the 
people interviewed expressed the belief that, despite all of the challenges associated with the 
backlash, the CCSS had been a success. The most commonly cited explanations for this 
appraisal offered by the political entrepreneurs were that state standards had been raised, the 
concept of college and career readiness was now embedded in many of the states’ education 
systems, and the subsequent changes being made to the standards (post adoption) appear to 
be only superficial. These entrepreneurs held out the hope that their work on the CCSS will 
continue to make a positive difference for students, society, and the economy.  
Implications for Future Research 
 The research conducted for this dissertation only touches the surface of the issues 





of national or common education standards. The fact that institutional and sociocultural 
barriers to such reforms exist is far from new knowledge. Federalism is the system by which 
the United States’ government was founded and continues to operate. Under that system, 
education remains the legal responsibility of the states. Moreover, there is little appetite 
among practitioners and members of the public when it comes to federal decision making 
regarding the instructional core of education.38 The arguments between adherents of the 
nationalist tradition and supporters of the states’ rights tradition have been raging for 
centuries. From a constructionist perspective, there cannot be one “correct” answer when it 
comes to the question of whether there should be a national approach to education standards 
in the United States. For political entrepreneurs who wish to pursue such an initiative, 
however, it is important that they recognize the power of institutions and associated norms, 
beliefs, and hostile interests to stymie or derail their efforts.  
 There are some gaps in the research discussed here that could be examined in future 
investigations. Examples of potential topics for further research are discussed below. 
The Other Side 
 This study examined the beliefs and perspectives of political entrepreneurs who 
advocated for the CCSS. Within the data gathered, the informants made many assertions 
about the beliefs and motivations of initiative opponents. With the exception of the interview 
with ED2, missing from the data were the emic perspectives of the groups that came to 
oppose the CCSS (e.g., members of the Tea Party movement). Future research could gather 
data directly from these hostile actors to examine how they described their own opposition. 
An interesting angle for future studies of the resistance could be to use the ACF’s belief 
																																																								
38	According to polling data gathered by Education Next in 2017, only 36% of the general 
public and teachers believed that the federal government should play the biggest role in the 





system model as a means for investigating the allegiances formed by groups on either side of 
the political spectrum.  
The Federal Perspective 
 Also missing from this study was the perspectives of officials from within the Obama 
administration. This decision was made because Rhodes (2012) does not include the federal 
government within his framework of overarching groups. The reason offered by Rhodes 
when explaining the exclusion of federal officials from his list is that he views members of 
the executive branch as allies, rather than political entrepreneurs: “This perspective 
recognizes the important contributions of political allies while giving most credit to political 
entrepreneurs” (p. 23). However, given the central role the Obama administration played in 
the narratives told by the coalition members, there would be some value in documenting 
federal officials’ accounts of the events and factors that contributed to the politicization and 
declining popularity of the CCSS.  
Public Sentiments 
 Another group that was discussed by the political entrepreneurs but not interviewed 
as part of this research was members of the public. The interview data gathered indicated a 
general perception that public opinion is opposed to federal involvement in the setting of 
standards. Interestingly, though this claim regarding a popular preference for state and local 
control of standards is supported by polling data gathered by West, Henderson, Peterson, and 
Barrows (2017), the same Education Next survey found that 61% of the public is supportive 
of the general concept of common standards.39 Further research could examine whether the 
																																																								
39	The question asked in this survey found that support was higher for common state 
standards when the name Common Core was not used. It is noteworthy that the word 
“common” was not used in the question, which instead asked about standards that are “the 





claims made by participants regarding the extent of and cited ideological reasons for public 
opposition to the CCSS stand up to scrutiny.  
The End of the Story?  
 The timeframe during which the interviews were conducted for this study was the 
early stages of the Trump administration. There was, therefore, an expressed sense of 
uncertainty regarding the future of the federal role in overseeing states’ compliance with the 
standards and accountability mandates associated with the ESSA. It was, as many described, 
too early to know whether the new emphasis on devolved decision making was the beginning 
of a new trend or an unusual blip within the movement toward increased standardization. 
Future research should continue to track the evolving federal role and the actions of 
organizations that subscribe to the tenets of the standards-based reform paradigm.  
Final Remarks 
 Education is the means by which children are equipped to enter college and the 
workplace and assume adult roles. In recent times, trends related to globalization and 
technological change have combined to create new challenges and opportunities for students 
and the educators that serve them. In the context of the United States, a range of political 
entrepreneurs came together to address these issues and advocate for common college- and 
career-readiness standards. This study offers some insights into their experiences working on 
this major initiative.  
 Diversity of culture, the uneven distribution of resources, and other regional 
differences across and within the states have long been recognized as obstacles to achieving 
equitable opportunities and outcomes for children. As argued by the political entrepreneurs 
interviewed for this investigation, all students should be afforded equal access to a high-





converged to advocate for the CCSS coalesced around core policy beliefs pertaining to this 
common goal.  
 In this study, consideration has been given to the issues facing subsystem actors who 
are interested in the establishment and implementation of common standards across the 
United States. Recognition of the factors impacting these reform efforts has illuminated the 
ways in which groups and individuals are able to affect the direction and progress of 
educational policy. Emphasis has been given to the importance of strength and clarity of 
vision, of stakeholder engagement, of effective communication, and of building capacity. 
Having a “good idea” is not enough on its own to deliver change. A detailed appreciation of 
the cultural landscape and a readiness to understand and address the fears and concerns of 
those who feel threatened by change is crucial to achieving positive outcomes. 
 Transformative leadership presents the fundamental challenges of integrating diverse 
and conflicting priorities, overcoming obstacles, and navigating a pathway forward. In 
addition, all efforts to alter long-standing institutions must take into account the human 
aspect, where cultural heritage, beliefs, and emotions—and how they are handled—play a 
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1) Do you consider the Common Core a successful initiative? 
 
Additional Prompts: 
• From your perspective, why were the CCSS important?  
- What problem/s do the standards help resolve? 
- How serious is this problem? 
- What are the causes of the problem? 
- In addition to standards, what are your preferences for solving the 
problem? 
 
Transition to Question 2:  
 
Look at this chart showing public opinion on the Common Core State Standards Initiative 
(CCSS). As you can see, polling data suggest that public support for the standards eroded 
over time. I am trying to better understand what led to this decline in popularity.  
 
I also want to gain insights from experts regarding the events and factors that resulted in the 
politicization of CCSS. When I say “politicization” I am referring to the strong opposition 
from various groups and the standards becoming political or partisan in character 
 
2) Using this timeline chart to help facilitate recall, please will you share your 
perspectives on how and why the initiative became politicized and unpopular? 
 
Additional Prompts: 
- When did you first realize that the initiative was becoming politicized? 
- If initiative leaders could go back in time, what might they have done 
differently to avoid the challenges that arose? 
- In your opinion, what is the future of the CCSS initiative and the broader 
common state standards movement? 
 
3) Looking at the list of statements of support on the CCSS website, the coalition that 
formed to advocate for the initiative was clearly broad and bipartisan. Who do you view 
as being the main players in the coalition? 
 
Additional Prompts: 
- Did [your organization] have an official position on the Common Core? 
(If so, did it change over time?) 
- Which actors or organizations opposed the initiative? Tell me when and 
how their opposition impacted the initiative. 
- Does the coalition that supported the CCSS still exist?  







4) What were some of the most significant challenges faced by organizations looking to 
build support for and implement common state standards? 
 
Additional Prompts: 
- How would you explain why national or common education initiatives are 
so contentious in the US? 
- Is there anything inherent in the subject of education standards that makes 
it particularly contentious? 
- What advice would you offer to policymakers who are interested in 
establishing/implementing national or common education standards? 
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